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Abstract
The historiography of Native reserves which has emerged from the Waitangi Tribunal's
historical inquiry into Maori grievances against the Crown since 1985 has necessarily been
preoccupied with the creation and alienation of reserves in the context of the Crown-iwi
partnership and national Native reserve policies. This thesis investigates the local dimensions
of Crown policy and restores a focus on Crown-hapu relations by offering an analysis of the
creation, utilisation and administration of the Native reserves of the FitzRoy, Omata, Grey,
Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks in North Taranaki between 1840 and 1875. It argues that Native
reserve were intended to contain, control and assimilate Maori and as such the Native reserve
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policies of the New Zealand Company and the Crown were indicative of visions of the Maori
future within an evolving Anglo-settler society. Although this agenda of assimilation remained
prominent, the views of Crown officials regarding how Native reserves would perform these
functions changed markedly between the 1840s and 1850s. In particular there was a shift
away from scattering reserves amongst settler sections in the hope that Maori would emulate
settlers and learn to be 'civilised' to an attempt to have Maori re-purchasing land from the
Crown instead of Native reserves, which they would hold in individualised Crown title. Thus it
was hoped that the communal nature of Maori society would be broken down and Maori would
come to adhere to British social, legal and economic norms. At the same time this thesis
recovers and assesses the world-views and expectations of Te Atiawa hapu about their future
with Pakeha. It demonstrates the impact of these visions on hapu understandings of the
purpose and nature of Native reserves, and on the ways in they formed economic and social
relationships with settlers in utilised the reserves. The combination of primary historical
sources and a statistical analysis demonstrates that these relationships played a significant
role in shaping the work of the Native reserves commissioners appointed under New Zealand
Native Reserves Act 1856 in Taranaki. In particular they lead to the commissioners modifying
their initial pro-active approach to bringing the reserves under their administration if favour of
acting as intermediaries between Te Atiawa and settlers with pre-arranged leases. A
comparison of the nature and utilisation of reserves in hapu and Crown control demonstrates
that although Te Atiawa retained control of approximately half of the Native reserves in these
blocks all of their most commercially viable reserves were brought under the Act, and in the
iii
process the Native title was extinguished. Co-operative relationships, which underpinned the
leasing of reserves in the private sphere, were in marked contrast to public settler expressions
of unease about Te Atiawa and their reserves in New Plymouth, and to mistrust between the
two communities that reached its zenith during the Taranaki Wars. Such mistrust ultimately
lead to the absence of Te Atiawa Native reserves and communities from the city of New
Plymouth.
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2Introduction
Te Atiawa Iwi and Hapu
This thesis examines the Native reserves created by the Crown at the time it acquired the
FitzRoy, Omata, Grey, Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks from certain hapu of Te Atiawa iwi in
Taranaki between 1844 and 1854. A brief explanation of this iwi and its various hapu and their
rohe is required to place the detailed discussion of Native reserves that follows in context. It is
possible to indicate the approximate location of the various iwi of Taranaki. However, it must
be remembered that drawing sharp boundaries on a map does not accord with iwi and hapu
understandings ofcomplex overlapping interests and allegiances orwith the dynamic nature of
such allegiances. South of about the Kai Iwi Stream near Waitotara, Nga Iwi 0 Taranaki are
bordered by the Whanganui people, Ati-hau-a-paparangi; in the North, beyond the area around
the Mokau River, lies the rohe of Ngati Maniapoto. Moving from south to north the iwi of
Taranaki are Nga Rauru, Pakakohe, Tanqahoe", Ngati Ruanui, Ngati Ruahine-Rangi, Taranaki,
Te Atiawa, Ngati Maru, Ngati Mutunga and Ngati Tama (see Figure 1).
Te Atiawa are said to take their name from Te Awa-nui-a-rangi, a son of Toi,' and whakapapa
to the Tokomaru waka.' The rohe of Te Atiawa today is generally regarded as running from
about Onukutaipari just south of Paritutu (the towering rock which is a landmark near the
power station on the southern fringes of New Plymouth city) inland to a point on Mt Taranaki's
eastern slope known as Tahunatutawa. It then runs down again to the town ofMidhirst, curving
in a line near Tarata and coming back to the coast again to Te Rau-o-te-Huia near the mouth
of the Onaero River. Within this rohe lie the city of New Plymouth and the towns of Inglewood,
Bell Block and Waitara. The hapu ofTe Atiawa today are (from south to north) Ngati Te Whiti,
2 The Waitangi Tribunal noted in 1996 that Pakakohi and Tangahoe had demonstrated that "they exist today as
distinctive and viable entities deserving separate consideration" (Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report:
Kaupapa Tuatahi, GP Publications, Wellington, 1996, pxi). The status ofthese two iwi in relation toNgati Ruanui
and its negotiations with the Crown tosettle its claim was further examined inWaitangi Tribunal, The Pakakohi
and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report, Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2000.
3 SPercy Smith, History and Traditions ofthe Maoris ofthe West Coast North Island ofNew Zealand Prior to
1840, originally published by the Polynesian Society and printed by Thomas Avery, New Plymouth, 1910, Capper
Press, Christchurch, reprint 1984, p 119.
4 Benjamin Wells, The History ofTaranaki: A Standard Work on the History of the Province, Edmondson &Avery,
"Taranaki News" Office, New Plymouth, 1878, reprinted byCapper Press, Christchurch, 1976, p4 citing John
White.
Ngati Tuparikino, Harnua', Ngati Tawhirikura, Puketapu, Manukorihi, Pukerangiora, Otaraua,
and Ngati Rahiri. The FitzRoy, Omata, Grey, Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks whose Native
reserves are the subject of this thesis, fell within the rohe of Ngati Te Whiti, Ngati Tuparikino,
Hamua and Ngati Tawhirikura."
Iwi and Hapu Names in this Thesis
Throughout the thesis I have used 'Te Atiawa' as the spelling for the name of this iwi. This is
most commonly used by tribal organisations today although Ati-Awa and Ngati-Awa are often
heard in conversation in Taranaki. Hapu affiliations of the individuals dealing with Native
reserves in the study area in the 1840 -1875 period are difficult to establish. Therefore to save
lengthy repetition of four hapu names when discussing the actions of Te Atiawa within the city
and Waiwakaiho area I have used the term Ngamotu hapu as an inclusive term to cover
people of several closely related hapu. This is appropriate from a historical perspective
because the term Ngamotu hapu was frequently used by Crown officials to describe Te Atiawa
people in this area. One account of the origin of this name can be found in The New Zealand
Dictionary of Biography entry for Wharepouri, a rangatira of these hapu. In 1832, after the
siege of Otaka Pa near Ngamotu beach at New Plymouth by Waikato, Wharepouri and about
400 men with their women and children began a migration to the Wellington and Cook's Strait
regions. "On this march his people were known as Ngamotu, after their last place of residence;
they included Ngati Tawhirikura and Ngati Te Whiti."7 It is likely that many of these people also
affiliated to other TeAtiawa hapu living in the townlWaiwakaiho area. Angela Ballara estimated
5 Ngati Tawhirikura hapu in Taranaki began re-establishing themselves and their marae atKatere (on part of
former the Katere Native Reserve) in July 1980; in 1997 the author was commissioned towrite ahistory ofhapu.
The presence ofNgati Tuparikino and Hamua was reasserted in a Maori Land Court case in July 1997 regarding
the guardianship of the New Plymouth railway station site; the author provided research material forthis case on
behalf ofNgati Tawhirikura.
6 In 1922 a petition from Neha Kipa and others toSir Maui Pomare (the member ofWestern Maori) was sent "on
behalf of the hapus ofNgatitewhiti, Hamua, Ngatitawhirikura and NgatiTuparikino in relation to Pukeariki Pa (New
Plymouth)." (LS 20/19/15, Pukeariki Pa file, Vol. 1, L1NZ, New Plymouth). A further petition emphasjsing the rights
of these hapu inPukeariki and elsewhere in the New Plymouth city area was made on 29 September 1937 toHT
Ratana and was headed "The petition ofthe associated Subtribes Ngatitewhiti and Ngatituparikino." (Petition No.
56/1937, 29 September 1937, LS 20/19/15, Pukeariki Pa file, Vol. 1, L1NZ, New Plymouth).
7 The People ofMany Peaks: The Maori Biographies from the Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, Vol. 1(1769
- 1869), Bridget Williams Books/Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1991, P301.
4that the migration perhaps contained up to 2000 people, and that the contingent of Ngamotu
people "included Ngati Te Whiti, Ngati Tawhirikura, Te Matehou and other hapu ofTe Atiawa."8
Choice of Thesis Topic
This thesis grew out of six years (1992 - 1997) I spent living in New Plymouth working as a
researcher and archivist, first with Te Atiawa Tribal Council, and then with Ngati Tawhirikura
hapu at Katere marae overlooking the Rewarewa pa at the mouth of the Waiwakaiho River.
During that time I learnt about the history of the people and the land from the perspective of my
hosts, and was fortunate to gather and store knowledge of that history and to participate in the
development of the iwi and hapu. One of the projects I undertook during my time with Te
Atiawa Tribal Council was researching the title histories of all the Native reserves within the
rohe. During the course of the Taranaki claim before the Waitangi Tribunal (the hearings for
which had been completed before I started work with the iwi) two volumes of title history for
Native reserves had been prepared by Waitangi Tribunal statt.' However, these highlighted
many gaps in information about the title of reserves and I set out to plug these and to produce
a more comprehensive title history. Through this research I became very interested in the
reserves, but left Taranaki in 1998 before the work could be completed.
However, I felt that I had found a vocation as a historian and later decided to return to
university to study history at post-graduate level. At honours level I wrote a paper about the
legal status of the Native reserves and began to shift my thinking away from title history into
larger questions about what the Crown and what Te Atiawa understood about the ownership
and purpose of Native reserves. My honours research revealed that historians had paid little
attention to Native reserves. Aside from the work of Ford and Harris, there were only two other
published works on the Crown's Native reserve policy, both from the Waitangi Tribunal's
8 Angela Ballara, 'Te Whanganui-a-Tara: Phases ofMaori Occupation ofWellington Harbour c. 1800 -1840' in
The Making of Wellington, 1800 -1914,0 Hamer and RNicholls (eds), Victoria University Press, Wellington,
1990, p 22.
9 Janine Ford, 'Title Histories of the Native Reserves made in the FitzRoy, Grey and Omata Purchases in
Taranaki, 1844 - 1848, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, 1991 and Aroha Harris, 'Title Histories of
the Native Reserves made in the Cooke's Farm, Bell Block, Hua, Waiwakaiho and Tarurutangi Purchases in
Taranaki (1847 -1858)', report commissioned bythe Waitangi Tribunal, 1991.
5Rangahaua Whanui series." With the knowledge I already had of the creation and alienation of
these particular reserves I felt I could build an analysis of the Crown's policy, its
implementation in Taranaki and its impact on how particular hapu were able to use their Native
reserves. I hoped that this would fill a gap in the historiography as well as return important
knowledge to the iwi and hapu of Te Atiawa. So with the co-operation of those I had worked
with in Te Atiawa, and with the agreement of the Runanga 0 Te Atiawa I chose to develop
these ideas in aMasters thesis.
The Scope of this Thesis
The decision to focus this thesis on the Native reserves within the FitzRoy, Omata, Grey,
Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks was made because the area defined by these purchases is the
rohe of several distinctive but closely related hapu, principally Ngati Te Whiti, Ngati
Tawhirikura, Hamua and Ngati Tuparikino. The Waiwakaiho and Hua purchases were included
in this study because the people who signed those deeds and were allocated reserves within
those blocks also had interests in the reserves in the three blocks which lie on the New
Plymouth side of the Waiwakaiho, and to exclude their interests beyond the Waiwakaiho would
have cut unnaturally across these interests. By including the Waiwakaiho and Hua reserves in
the study area I was able to encompass two sets of purchases in which quite different methods
of reserve creation were used. Because the same hapu had interests in both sets of purchase
reserves it was possible to compare Maori responses and the impact of these different Crown
policies and processes on the same people. Reserves in the blocks to the north of the
Waiwakaiho and Hua purchases were excluded from the study because they lie within the rohe
of the Puketapu hapu ofTeAtiawa.
The thesis is concerned with the ways in which the evolution of Crown policy and practices
with regard to the creation and administration of Native reserves was shaped by the
understandings, needs and agendas of Ngamotu hapu and settlers in Taranaki. It was
obviously necessary to discuss the origins of Native reserves, and the creation of the reserves
10 J EMurray, Crown Policy on Maori Reserved Lands, 1840 to 1865 and Land Restricted from Alienation, 1865
to 1900, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, 1991 and Ralph Johnson, The Trust Administration of
Maori Reserves, 1840-1913, Waitangi Tribunal, Rangahaua Whanui Series, 1997.
6in the context of the Crown purchase of the blocks in which they were created. It was decided
to use the Crown's administration of the reserves by Commissioners under the first Native
reserves legislation, the New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, as a focus for inquiry into the
intersections and interchange between Crown policy and practice, the actions of the Te Atiawa
hapu in utilising and managing the reserves, and their interaction with the settlers (individually
and collectively). This means that the thesis spans the period from the New Zealand
Company's transactions of 1840 to 1875. Itwas decided quite early in the thesis to exclude the
period after 1882 when the Native Reserves Act 1882 introduced a new form of administration
by vesting the reserves in the Public Trustee, The New Zealand Wars presented themselves
as a major junction in the relationship between Te Atiawa, the Crown and settlers inTaranaki. I
was particularly curious about what impact this crisis had on the economic and social
relationships between Te Atiawa and settlers over Native reserves. Therefore I extended this
study beyond 1865 to enable the focus of this thesis to remain on the commissioners
administering the reserves under the 1856 Act and its 1862 amendment. The Native Reserves
Act 1873 has not been discussed in detail, although it did signal significant changes with
regard to the role of Maori in administering the reserves this shift in policy ultimately had little
impact as the Act was never lmplernented." It was decided to end the period under
examination at 1875 because an important part of this thesis relies on a statistical analysis of
the ownership and utilisation of the Native reserves using Native reserve schedules as raw
data. These sources were unable to provide comprehensive data to sustain this investigation
beyond 1875.
As this thesis evolved it became apparent, as the title suggests, that the principal ideology
underpinning the Native reserves policies of both the New Zealand Company and the Crown
was the assimilation of Maori into a dominant Anglo-settler society. However, the terms used in
historical and sociological texts in New Zealand to describe attempts by the colonizers to
position Maori in relation to British settler society vary considerably. In 1973 Alan Ward used
the term 'amalgamation' to examine "the practical legal and administrative provisions relating
11 Ralph Johnson, The Trust Administration ofMaori Reserves, 1840 - 1913, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua
Whanui Series, 1991, pp 77 - 84.
7to Maori" within the mechanisms of an evolving Anglo-settler State in New Zealand, 12 In 1981
Keith Sorrenson implied that the colonizing endeavour was considered by the British to involve
a progression of 'civilising' Maori ("turning them into brown-skinned Europeans"),
amalgamating Maori and Pakeha through inter-marriage and finally "absorbing" Maori "into a
predominantly European population.?' The term 'assimilation' has been used by Donald
Loveridge in relation to British Government policy in New Zealand in 1839 - 40, and by the
New Zealand sociologist Paul Spoonley in describing the aims of late nineteenth century
lnstllutlons." On the other hand, James Belich preferred the term 'conversion' to assimilation
or amalgamation using conversion "to mean not only religious conversion but the whole
package of agencies by which non-Europeans were to be transformed into something
European-like and peacefully sub-ordinated to Europeans.'?' He points out that
"Europeanisation" and "subordination" were not the same thing but that it is difficult to draw a
distinction between them when "in practice there was astrong tendency toblur them."16
Given these various definitions of the colonizing process the use of the term 'assimilation' in
this thesis requires some explanation, While acknowledging the often subtle distinctions other
historians and sociologists have made between the terms traversed above I have chosen to
use the term assimilation in the case ofNative reserves because I would argue that the Crown,
Company and settlers were most interested in replacing "Maori values with Victorian values
and Maori institutions with British institutions", in order to "make the Maori British."? The
evidence strongly suggests that it was believed necessary to encourage the break-down of the
structures, values and practices which made Maori society distinctive in order for Maori to be
absorbed into settler society. This was the ultimate aim of Native reserve policies, but does not
exclude the possibility that such policies were designed to lead Maori (with various degrees of
12 Alan Ward, A Show ofJustice: Racial/Amalgamation' inNineteenth Century New Zealand, Auckland University
Press/Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1973, pvii.
13 Keith Sorrenson, 'Maori and Pakeha', in The Oxford History ofNew Zealand, WHOliver and BRWilliams
(eds), Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1981, p 169
14 Donald Loveridge, 'The Origins of the Native Lands Acts and Native Land Court inNew Zealand', report for the
Crown Law Office, Wellington, 2000, p 31 and Paul Spoonley, Racism and Ethnicity, 2nd Ed., Oxford University
Press, Auckland, 1993, p 65,
15 James Belich, Making Peoples: A History ofthe New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End ofthe
Nineteenth Century, Penguin Books, Auckland, 1996, pp 124 - 125,
16 Belich, Making Peoples, 1996, p 125,
8compulsion) through the stages of being 'civilised' by, and amalgamated with the settlers or
that other Native policies aimed to amalgamate rather than assimilate Maori.
17 Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830 - 1847, Auckland University Press,
Auckland, 1977, p 147.
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Chapter 1: Native Reserves in New Zealand: A Review of the
Historiography
Introduction
A comprehensive understanding of the Native reserves created by the Crown at the time of its
purchase of various blocks of land from the hapu of Te Atiawa iwi in North Taranaki between
1844 and 1854 has been hampered by the limitations of the existing historiography. The
creation, purpose, status, utilisation and alienation of these reserves cannot be adequately
understood without placing them within the wider context of the colonial enterprise. More
particularly they need to be examined within the Crown's primary agenda of the assimilation of
Maori into British legal, social and economic structures. Before the Waitangi Tribunal was
given jurisdiction to hear Maori historical grievances in 1985, narratives of the colonial
enterprise were essentially narratives of the growth of the State in New Zealand. These failed
to deal satisfactorily with Native reserves because they assumed that the Crown's policy of
assimilation was both inevitable and beneficial to Maori. Therefore, Native reserves were
characterised as temporary measures by which the Crown protected Maori while they adjusted
to British settler society. According to this view Native reserves were proof of the humanitarian
and protective foundation of Maori-Crown relations. This led, with the exception of the New
Zealand Company 'tenths' reserve scheme, to a general neglect of Native reserves in our
historiography. The Company's reserves received considerable attention in narratives of the
State because they were part of the Wakefield ian founding myth.
Paul McHugh has recently analysed the evolution of narratives of state authority, exploring the
extent to which historians have located the origins of the Crown's sovereignty in the Treaty of
Waitangi. 18 In particular he discussed the consequences this had for historians'
conceptualisation of the relationship between the Crown and Maori. The broad patterns and
demarcations McHugh detected in narratives of the State offer a useful framework for an
examination of the place of Maori and their Native reserves within those histories. McHugh
argued that until the mid-1980s Whiggish narratives of national progress dominated New
18 Paul McHugh, 'Law, History and the Treaty ofWaitangi', NZJH, Vol. 31, No.1, April 1997, pp 38 - 57.
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Zealand historiography of the State." As a consequence, Maori were pushed to the margins
of the historian's vision and narratives focused upon "the verticalized aspect ofCrown - (Maori)
subject relations."20 McHugh detected signs of a new historiography emerging in the first five
years of the Waitangi Tribunal's inquiries into Maori historical grievances against the Crown,
between 1985 and 1990. These narratives saw the Treaty of Waitangi as a contract between
the parties, and attempted to construct histories which centred transactions between the
Crown and Maori. Despite this, McHugh argued that these narratives continued to exhibit many
of the characteristics of the older Whig tradition. In particular they remained presentist (in that
they depicted the past inevitably leading to present day marginalisation of Maori), and state-
centred in so far as they viewed the Treaty "as a Lockean contract of governance setting up
the ongoing measure ofthe legitimacy ofstate relations with Maori.'?'
According to McHugh's analysis the 1990s saw Maori claims against the Crown move "into a
new political sphere - what might be called 'the politics of settlement' - and that movement
has had necessary consequences for the discourse of the Anglo-settler state, including its
historiographic rnechanlsrns.f" He suggested that the Court of Appeal played a critical role
here as it invested the Treaty with ageless 'principles', and placed the Crown's relationship
with Maori in an eternal present. What emerged, according to McHugh, was a doctrine, "which
puts Crown-tribe relations into an horizontalized context designed to facilitate settlement.,,23
McHugh characterized these new histories as a "historiography of contest, co-existence and
contingency" better able to capture a sense of "a Maori epic of political life on the New Zealand
Islands.,,24 In these new narratives Whiggish certainties of progress and harmony in which the
Crown protected Maori from the adverse effects of the colonial enterprise have been, in
McHugh's words, "fatally weakened if not severed.,,25
19 Ibid, P40.
20 Ibid, P39.
21 Ibid, P54.
22 Ibid, P39.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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Whig Narrative of the New Zealand State
One of the characteristics of most histories of New Zealand before about 1960 was that they
were essentially narratives of the Anglo-settler State that attempted to explain and justify the
presence ofthe State in New Zealand through trne." This type ofnarrative can be regarded as
'Whig' in that it was primarily
State-centred and celebrates the growth of parliamentary institutions, seeing
Westminster democracy as the Darwinian evolutionary endpoint of constitutional
growth. It is essentially a tale vindicating parliamentary democracy and the rule of (the
common) law."
In the New Zealand context works such as W P Morrell's British Colonial Policy in the Age of
Peel and Russell (1930), George Radcliffe Mellor's British Imperial Trusteeship, 1783 - 1850
(1951) and A H McLintock's Crown Colony Government in New Zealand (1958) all adhered to
this definition ofWhig histories in that their primary purpose was to narrate the progress of the
New Zealand State towards self-government and independence." McHugh has pointed out
that in these Whig narratives "the Crown's sovereignty 'is' and it does not arise from some
foundation particular to the New Zealand-Aotearoa settinq.'?' Therefore, "the Treaty of
Waitangi cannot be seen as the moment ofconstitutional origin" and Maori representation and
participation in the colonial polity are marginalised, becoming "no more than soil-clearing in
character ... no more than hiccups in the path of eventual mature constitutional forrn.?" As a
consequence the relationship between the Crown and Maori was also marginalised: at worst
relegated to a backdrop against which the drama of colonial progress was played out. Instead
historians tended to privilege the relationships between the British Colonial Office, New
Zealand Government, the New Zealand Company, and missionary groups and position them at
the centre of their narratives."
26 Ibid, 38 - 39.
27 Ibid, P40.
28 Morrell outlines the main principles tobe surveyed in his book as "colonial preference, systematic colonization,
self-government stopping short of responsible government, humanitarianism." (W PMorrell, British Colonial Policy
inthe Age ofPeel and Russell, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1930, P27).
29 McHugh, 1997, P42.
30 Ibid, P43.
31 See George Radcliffe Mellor, British Imperial Trusteeship, 1783 - 1850, Faber and Faber, London, 1951, P337
and Morrell, 1930, pp 110, 115 and 128.
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Where these historians do discuss the problem of race relations they invariably conclude that
the Crown's policies towards Maori were protective and designed to promote Maori welfare."
Morrell does not question that "certain principles of trusteeship" should have been the
foundation of Native policy in New Zealand." In general these historians accept the colonial
assumptions that the losses suffered by Maori in the process of the acquisition of their land for
British settlers were adequately compensated for by the gift of 'civilization', good government
and Christianity. In other words, the Crown's agenda of the assimilation of Maori into the
institutions of the Anglo-settler State was assumed by historians to be inevitable and desirable.
Morrell cited these advantages of colonization from the 1835 - 37 British Parliament Select
Committee on Aborigines in British Colonies, and admired them as good principles. He did
however admit that there were sometimes problems in implementing them."
The predominance of the Whiggish narrative of the State in New Zealand histories before
1960, with its themes of progress and the protection and assimilation of Maori, had particular
consequences for historical discussion of Native reserves. Native reserves were viewed as a
temporary feature of the first 20 years of the colony and so received little attention, except
where they were connected to the national founding myth of Wakefieldian settlement. As a
result the purchases of the New Zealand Company, particularly at Port Nicholson, received
much attention from historians thus establishing the pre-eminence of Company's tenths
reserves in the discourse on Native reserves." In keeping with the Whiggish trend of these
narratives, they emphasized the importance of the New Zealand Company as the founders of
the colony, and the Company's perceived role in the beginnings of the New Zealand State.
Reserves became symbolic of the Company's protective humanitarianism. Discussion of the
Company's reserves remained firmly embedded in narratives of contest between the Colonial
Office, the Crown in New Zealand and the New Zealand Company for authority and control of
the colonization process.
32 See for example Mellor's discussion of Governor Grey's administration (Mellor, 1951, pp 350 - 359).
33 Morrell, 1930, p 27.
34 Ibid, P26.
35 These reserves, known as tenths reserves (the Company had promised that a 1Olh (or in some cases an 11 th) of
all purchased land would be held in trust for Maori).
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Narratives of the State also emphasized the assimilating function of the Company's tenths
reserves. There was a strong tendency to position the Company's concept of trusteeship,
(which would later be incorporated into the Crown's Native reserve policy), within the
framework of the general protective policies of the Company and of the Crown. Mellor
. exemplified this uncritical approach in simply quoting the findings of the British parliamentary
committee of 1844, which approved of the Company's reserve policy." In fact few historians
questioned this view of the tenths reserves, a view which was essentially that promoted by the
New Zealand Company itself. Keith Sinclair was an exception in this period, however; in 1946
Sinclair began a closer examination of the roots of the early Victorian notions of
humanitarianism out of which grew the Company and Crown's policy of assirnllatlon."
Importantly he concluded that these high ideals were generally overridden by pressure from
influential colonial and trading groups amongst the settler community and by the constraints of
the colony's finances. 38
One remarkable early study of Maori-Crown relations was GWRusden's 1883 History ofNew
Zealand. Rusden's findings were controversial at the time of their publication: welcomed by
"the humanitarian party in the colony" but greeted with public indignation by others. A
successful libel suite brought against Rusden by John Bryce the Minister of Native Affairs over
comments in the book further undermined Rusden's credibility." William Renwick argued that
this probably contributed to the dismissal by New Zealand historians of Rusden's work until
relatively recently. However, Renwick pointed out that "Rusden was our first revisionist" and
many "opinions, for which he was reviled for in the 1880s have become orthodoxies in the
1990s."40 Rusden was generally critical of the Company's 1839-40 purchases from Maori in
which these reserves were created." He also provided the first case study of the Crown's
36 Mellor, 1951, pp 364 - 7.
37 Keith Sinclair, 'The Aborigines Protection Society and New Zealand: AStudy in Nineteenth Century Opinion',
MA thesis, University ofNew Zealand; 1946, p 11.
38 Ibid, P18.
39 Rusden had written about Bryce's role in the military raid on Handley's Woolshed atNukumara inSouth
Taranaki in1868 that it "was abrutal assault on women and children who were 'cut down gleefully and with ease'
by Bryce and other cavalry men" (William Renwick, 'Who was GWRusden and does it matter?', Stout Centre
Review, Vol. 3, No.4, 1993, P23).
40 Ibid, pp 18 - 23.
41 Rusden, History ofNew Zealand, Chapman and Hall and GRobertson, London and Melbourne, 1883, Vol. 1,
pp 198-199.
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failure to provide adequate reserves for Maori. Contemporary public controversy resulted in a
considerable body ofhistorical evidence in the case of a Ngai Tahu reserve in Princes Street,
Dunedin, and Rusden discussed the failings of the Crown at length in this case." He
concluded that, "the General Government and the Otago Provincial Government conspired to
defraud the Maoris of their reserve at Princes Street in Dunedin."43 He regarded this as a
"crime ... too significant to be passed over.?"
Rusden was also the first to examine the Crown's legislative framework for the administration
of Native reserves. He cited the words of Henry Sewell, the architect of the New Zealand
Native Reserves Act 1856, that the Act was designed to "extricate the Maoris from tribal
barbarism." In response Rusden, remarkably for his time, argued that this Act was a clear
breach of the Treaty of Waitangi: "It was, in fact, an impeachment of their guaranteed rights,
and well known to be so by those who framed it."45 Rusden argued this on the grounds that by
requiring the assent ofministry the Act made the Governor "a co-agent [along with the ministry]
of defrauding the Maons.:" Rusden is almost alone in this era in citing examples of Maori
engagement with and opposition to the Crown's administration of the tenths reserves. He
quotes at length both Wiremu Tako Ngatata's desire for Maori to manage their own lands and
Tawhai's comparison ofthe Native Reserves Bill 1873 to fish with bones."
The first published work about Native reserves in New Zealand was the 1929 history of the
New Zealand Company's tenths reserves written by Roland Jellicoe of the Native Trust Office.
42 Ibid, Vol. 2, pp 324 - 339.
43 Ibid, p 324.
44 Ibid, P324. In 1991 the Waitangi Tribunal reported on the Ngai Tahu claims including claims relating to the
Princes Street Reserve. The Waitangi Tribunal found that the reserve was not suitable for the purpose and had
been used only intermittently by Ngai Tahu and "were unable to sustain the claimant's grievance ...that they were
prejudiced by the failure ofthe Crown to formally reserve the Princes Street reserve in1853." However they did
conclude that the Crown ought to have met itsobligation to provided tenth reserves inthe Otakou purchase
(Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngai Tahu Report, Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, Vol. 1, pp 44- 51).
45 Rusden, 1883, Vol. 1,P568.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid, Vol. 3, pp 66 - 7 and p 463 respectively. Wiremu Tako Ngatata a chief with connections to Ngati Te Whiti
and Ngati Tawhirikura was a member of the Legislative Council from 1873 until his death in 1887 (Dictionary of
New Zealand Biography, Vol. 1 (1789-1869), Bridget WiliiamslDepartment of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1990, pp
313 - 315). After petitions from Maori the Native Reserves Bill 1873 was amended tocontain significant provision
for a board of Maori assistant commissioners in each district headed by a Pakeha commissioner and reserves
were to be legally vested in the district commissioner. Despite these extensive modifications the Bill was passed
but never implemented (Johnson, 1997, pp 77 - 83).
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It was an attempt to reconcile the tenth reserves originally allocated by the Company to Maori
in Wellington and Nelson with those listed in schedule Dof the Native Reserves Act 1873.48 It
was laid on the table in the House by leave and printed as G-1 in the Appendices to the
Journals of the House of Representatives in 1929, but nothing further is know about its
genesis. Jellicoe provided the first narrative ofthe Company and Crown's administration of the
tenths reserves in Wellington and Nelson. However, in places this is little more than a sketch;
for example, the whole period of the Public Trustee's administration between 1882 and 1921 is
dismissed in one sentence." He made little comment about the failure of the legislation to give
Maori any control of their reserves. Only once does Jellicoe note any Maori reaction to the
legislation and this is simply quoted rather than discussed. 50 Jellicoe shared with other
historians of the period a preoccupation with the Wakefields and the Company as founders of
the nation State and a view of the Company's reserve policy as essentially protective of Maori
interests." However, because the history's purpose was to investigate the fate of the reserves
and reconcile the area allocated with that which remained in 1873 there was considerably
more evaluation of how well the Company's intention translated into reality.52 As a
consequence Jellicoe provided the first assessments of factors which prevented the Company
from successfully fulfilling its high ideals. Overall they concluded that:
The founders of the Company were men of high ideals, who were sincere in their
desire that the interests ofthe Native race should be safeguarded. The chief fault was
the lack ofproper inquiry into the validity of the titles supposed to be conveyed by the
Native vendors, and in this the Company cannot be held wholly to blame."
Jellicoe did not question whether the New Zealand Company was right in making the Native
reserves and holding them in trust for Maori. Despite some recognition of the irregularities in
the Company's early purchases, the purchases and the reserves are essentially viewed as the
means that justified the end - the successful and stable colony.
48 Roland LJellicoe, The New Zealand Company's Native Reserves, published under the authority of the Hon. Sir
Apriana Ngata, M.A., LL. S., Minister in Charge, Native Trust Office, Government Printer, Wellington, 1930, p vii.
49 Ibid, P87.
50 Ibid, P79.
51 Ibid, preface and p 9.They take the view, as had Mellor, Morrell etc, that Governor Grey's administration was
particularly concerned with Maori welfare and civilisation (pp 49- 73).
52 Ibid, preface.
53 Ibid, P89.
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In Taranaki, the Company's tenths reserves were rapidly abolished, and therefore received
almost no attention in New Zealand histories before 1960. The marginalisation of Native
reserves in Taranaki in these narratives was compounded by provincial histories dominated by
two themes: the acquisition of land for British settlement, and the armed conflict between Maori
and Pakeha. The trajectory of these narratives emphasized how these obstacles to 'progress'
and to the development of a settled, peaceful province were overcome." This pattern left little
room for consideration of the relationships between Crown, Maori and settlers in managing the
Native reserves for mutual benefit.
New Perspectives: Re-evaluating the Impact of Colonization
In the works of some historians of the late 1960s to early 1980s a marked shift to a more
critical approach to the colonizing enterprise can be detected. In particular, there were
attempts to re-examine the Crown's policy of the assimilation of Maori and the place of
'protective' policies such as the provision of Native reserves. There was also a new focus on
the impact of that colonization upon Maori. As part of that inquiry historians began to evaluate
the extent to which Maori engagement with the developing settler society in New Zealand
changed Maori society. As a consequence of these shifts Maori began to move closer to the
centre of the historian's gaze, and historians made some attempts to recognize and account
for Maori motivations and initiatives: to accord Maori actors a degree of agency. We also see
the beginning of an exploration of the Maori world-views and perspectives that formed the
context for those actions. However, these trends remained somewhat uneven and historians
were not able to entirely escape the Whiggish influences of the past with narratives still
substantially shaped by examination of the development of the nation State and its
mechanisms ofgovernance.
It is not terribly surprising that historians began to question the impact of colonization on
indigenous peoples at this time. The civil rights and protest movements of the 1960s and 70s
brought a new awareness of minority and indigenous rights, and the struggle of many former
colonies for independence in this period formed the social and political context in which
54 See for example Wells, 1878; J STullet, The Industrious Heart: A History ofNew Plymouth, New Plymouth City
Council, New Plymouth, 1981 and Brian Scanlan, Taranaki People and Places, published bythe author and
printed by Thomas Avery and Sons, New Plymouth, 1985.
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historians wrote. McHugh argued that "the pressure of decolonization" experienced by the
Commonwealth was largely responsible for "the Whiggish theme of the colonial replication of
Westminster democracy under devolving Crown sovereignty [losing] power as an
historiographical imperative of Commonwealth hlstory.'?' In New Zealand, Maori grievances
became increasingly visible from the mid-1970s with the 1975 Land March, the rise of Nga
Tamatoa, the establishment of Waitangi Day and its use as a forum for protest, and Maori
occupation of Bastion Point and of the Raglan Golf Course in 1978 -79. 56 The fiction of
harmony and progress that the Whig narratives of New Zealand race relations had helped to
create could no longer be sustained in the face of the reality of Maori experiences of
colonization, and in particular the past actions of the Crown."
Keith Sinclair's 1957 Origins of the Maori Wars was a landmark foreshadowing this re-
evaluation of colonial conflict between Maori and Pakeha. A decade later the Australian
historian, B J Dalton in his Warand Politics in New Zealand, 1855 - 1870 (1967), examined
New Zealand Native policy and its relationship to the colonial enterprise." However, he was
often unable to avoid framing his analysis of Native policy in terms of the relationship between
the British and New Zealand Governments, and the introduction of responsible government.
What was new about Dalton's narrative was that instead of accepting that Government policy
was essentially protective of Maori he evaluated the impact of colonization. This is particularly
evident in his reassessment of Governor Grey's administration of Native policy. Dalton
concluded that Grey's 1841 policy "advocated the immediate replacement of Native custom by
British law and the deliberate destruction of chiefly authority - a policy, in short, "of rapid and
forcible assimilation.?" He does however concede that the circumstances Grey encountered in
New Zealand led him to adopt a "wholly pragmatic" approach very close to the "paternalistic
55 McHugh, 1997, P43.
56 Alan Ward, AnUnsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington,
1999, pp 25 - 29.
57 McHugh, 1997, p 50. These social changes coincided with the rise ofanew generation ofNew Zealand
historians who began to research, write and teach New Zealand history, university courses inNew Zealand
history, the emergence oflocal publishers supporting serious writing and the establishment ofthe New Zealand
Journal ofHistory in 1967 and the New Zealand Historical Association in1969. (Bronwyn Dalley and Jock Phillips
(eds), Going Public: The Changing Face ofNew Zealand History, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2001,
introduction, p 10).
58 BJ Dalton, War and Politics inNew Zealand, 1855 - 1870, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1967, pp 1- 2.
59 Ibid, P47.
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approach he had condemned in theory.?" Dalton examined and questioned the
appropriateness of the Government's assimilation policy for Maori and its impact on their
society. He uncovered the assumptions that underpinned the policy, observing that the
colonists "never dreamed that any aspect of Maori culture might be worth preserving" and
believed "it self-evident that the settlers represented a superior civilization which must wholly
supersede or absorb the inferior."61
Dalton asked a new question, which has since become central to the discourse of the colonial
experience ofMaori: to what extent was Maori society changed ordamaged orable to adapt to
colonization?" Dalton weighed the negative impacts of disease and alcohol on the social,
cultural and economic structure of Maori society against the advantages of 'civilisation.'63 He
concluded that traditional Maori society was irreparably damaged by the onslaught of another
culture, arguing that "European influence had destroyed the customs that set apart the
aristocracy, rangatira, from whom leadership had come. It had also made obsolete the skills in
war and peace which were the sources ofpersonal authority, rnana.r" While his analysis was
a valuable counter-balance to previous assumptions of the power of Government policy to
protect Maori from such negative impacts, the danger, which he was not wholly able to avoid,
was that such an assessment risked characterizing Maori as victims and discounting Maori
agency.
Alan Ward's meticulous and finely balanced 1973 study, A Show of Justice: Racial
Amalgamation in Nineteenth Century New Zealand was still to some extent framed by the
Whiggish preoccupation with the development of the State. He acknowledged that the main
theme of his work was "the building in New Zealand of a bureaucratic machinery ofstate, and
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid, P6.
62 Arecent essay by the Ngai Tahu historian, Te Maire Tau 'Matauranga Maori as an Epistemology' inHistories,
Power and Loss. Uses of the Past - ANew Zealand Commentary, Andrew Sharp and Paul McHugh (eds), Bridget
Williams Books, Wellington, 2001,61 ·74 fits within this concern with this larger question inthat he discusses the
impact ofcolonisation ofMaori knowledge systems (matauranga Maori). For two different perspectives on Tau's
essay see the review ofthis collection by Kerry Howe, NZJH, Vol. 36, No.2, 2002, pp 203 - 204 and the review
by Michael King in New Zealand Books, June 2002, p 9.
63 Dalton, 1967, pp 3- 4.
64 Ibid, P4.
20
English concepts of law and judicial lnsfitufions.?" However, Ward's work was innovative in
that it placed Maori experience of the State at the centre of the narrative. In particular, he set
out to survey the ways in which this "civil administration affect[ed] the Maori throughout the
nineteenth century, especially as it relates to problems of social control and the practical
application of British law" and to gauge "the attitudes of the Maori, a 'stateless' people, to the
intruding machinery of the state.?"
Ward was also fundamentally concerned with the impact of the colonizing enterprise upon
Maori society. He clearly articulated this question in a way which Dalton was unable to do,
noting that:
Debate about the receptivity of Maori society to European ideas, artifacts and
institutions is closely related to the question of whether Maori society became
disrupted by early contact, or whether borrowings from the West were incorporated
into asubstantially intact traditional framework."
Ward concluded that the "traditional Maori social structure and value system were open and
adaptive, not rigid or inflexible; and certainly the rivalry to demonstrate mana itself stimulated
adventurousness and hence change."68 However, he balanced this stance with recognition that
from the time of early contact there were forces and inevitable changes that were beyond the
control ofMaori people and created "new stresses and anxieties."69
Ward's assessment of Maori society as essentially adaptive and open to change presented
new possibilities for constructing narratives in which Maori agency was given greater weight.
More specifically it suggested to historians that colonization was an interactive process in
which Maori were actors rather than passive victims. In this sense his work foreshadowed and
laid the foundation for narratives which, as McHugh has expressed it, better reflect a history of
"encounter, co-existence and cornpetflon.?" Ward probed and weighed the complex motives
Maori had for accepting, rejecting and modifying European technology, religion, and lifestyles.
65 Ward, 1973, p 3.
66 Ibid, Pviii.
67 Ibid, P16.
68 Ibid, P18.
69 Ibid, P18.
70 McHugh, 1997, P39.
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This led him to argue that on many occasions Crown officials and settlers mistakenly assumed
that Maori were submitting to British direction and control when in fact they were simply
demonstrating a "lively curiosity about British institutions." 71 By pointing out that Maori and
settlers viewed one another's behaviour through the lenses of their own cultural assumptions
Ward offered a new avenue for exploring the colonial enterprise. Ward concluded that policies
of "amalgamation", as they were then called, were flawed by their "disastrously limited
appreciation of local values, of local peoples' possible preference for their own insfitutlons.?'
However, his overall conclusion that amalgamation policies were "emasculated by European
attitudes of racial orcultural superiority", and pandered" to settler prejudices, which denied the
Maori real participation in the European order except at a menial level" closed down some of
the possibilities his approach suggested. 73
Ward placed the allocation and management of Native reserves within the context of the
Crown's policy of amalgamation. In particular he focused his attention on their use for
'beneficial purposes' that would integrate Maori into the settler world. 74 This certainly
suggested a fruitful new perspective. It also signalled a departure from the historians'
discussions of reserves within the context of policies that were considered essentially
protective towards Maori. However to a large extent Ward, like previous historians, continued
to focus upon the Native reserves of the New Zealand Company. Nevertheless as a
consequence ofhis greater consideration of the administration of reserves he was able to draw
attention to the lack of control Maori suffered in regard to their reserves, raising issues about
trusteeship, ownership and Maori ability to lease and otherwise manage the reserves. He
concluded that "High-flown humanitarian theories of how the Maori would benefit from the
increased value of their reserved lands could not outweigh the fact that the lands in the
'reserved' category were no longer in Maori control.?' Ward also sketched out many of the
factors which were important to Native reserve usage and management before 1875,
suggesting numerous avenues for further research. In particular, he recognized Maori struggle
for survival on their inadequate reserves, their marginalisation in the growing urban settler
71 Ibid, P15.
72 Ibid, P36.
73 Ibid, pp 39.
74 Ibid pp 88 - 9.
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economy, and the inability to effectively use reserves "owing to the confusion of the non-
traditional form of multiple ownership introduced by the Land Court.?" The effectiveness of
administration ofthe reserves by Commissioners under the New Zealand Native Reserves Act
1856 and Maori responses to that administration were canvassed as were possible reasons
why Maori sold reserves."
By the mid-1970s the first Maori historians were emerging and offering an insider analysis of
the way in which Maori control of their future had been severely constrained by colonial policy.
In his 1977 book, Maori Land Tenure: Studies in a Changing Institution Hugh Kawharu
concluded, that:
As events were to prove, policy and pace of colonization were regulated simply by
circumstances. Thus while sometimes it was said that the interests of the Maori were
to be paramount - that colonization should not serve them ill or proceed without their
free consent - at other times regard for the interests of the Maori was subordinated to
regard for the interests of the Europeans. The plain fact of the matter was that the
long-term interests ofMaori and European colonists were opposed."
Kawharu's work also revealed publicly a coherent body of basic Maori values, perspectives
and practices underpinning land use and ownership that most Pakeha New Zealanders had
never realised existed. This made a significant contribution to historians' understanding ofthe
fundamental concepts and tikanga shaping Maori experiences of and actions in the colonial
encounter. At the same time, Kawharu's conclusions about Native policy were symptomatic of
the emergence of long-held Maori grievances against the Crown from the relative obscurity of
the Maori world into the public arena, and the way in which they were undermining Whiggish
certainties about the protective nature ofCrown policies and practices.
By the beginning of the 1980s the field of New Zealand history was considerably broader than
it had been adecade before. The editors ofthe 1981 Oxford History ofNew Zealand noted that
the historiography had enlarged to encompass the intersection of political, economic, social
and cultural narratives and that historians had begun to turn their attention "towards basic
75Ibid,p151.
76 Ibid, P221.
77 Ibid, pp 93, 151 and 252 - 3.
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social questions - to the evolution of both Maori and Pakeha society, their unity and their
separateness.'?" Keith Sorrenson's essay, 'Maori and Pakeha', as the title suggests, moved
right away from Whiggish preoccupations about the evolution of the State and instead
constructed a new narrative of the impact of colonization around British settler agendas of
progressively civilising, amalgamating and absorbing (or assimilating) Maori into an Anglo-
settler society." In evaluating the effectiveness of this agenda Sorrenson is particularly
interested in the mechanisms used in this process (especially education and intermarriage)
and their impact on inter-cultural relationships. Yet he does not simply take it for granted that
assimilation was the correct course of action; Maori actors are given agency through a
consideration of their responses and interaction with Pakeha. In particular he asks not just how
well did these mechanisms work but how well did policies of amalgamation, and eventual
assimilation equip Maori to combat civllsation?"
One of the most significant aspects of Sorrenson's essay is the way in which he unfurled 'the
progress of the colony' in an entirely new way. The events that mark the development of New
Zealand in his narrative centre firmly on the acquisition of land from Maori and the subsequent
conflicts and resolution of those conflicts which these initial acquisitions caused. Thus his
narrative begins with the pre-1840 purchases of land from Maori, their examination by the
Spain's commission, the purchases of the 1840s and 50s under Governors FitzRoy and Grey
and the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s (and their final conclusion at the arrest of Rua
Kenana in the Urewera in 1916).82 No only are the events that mark out this narrative
different from those which had been used by historians before but so too is Sorrenson's
consideration of Maori resistance. For Sorrenson the colonial period was more than "a naked
contest for land, important though this was. It was also a contest for authority, for mana, for
authority over the land and the men and women it sustained." This new narrative, its markers
78 Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure: Studies ina Changing Institution, Clarendon Press, Oxford (UK) and New York,
1977, pp 6-7.
79 WHOliver and BWilliam (eds), The Oxford History ofNew Zealand, Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1981,
introduction, viii and ix.
80 Sorrenson, 1981, p 169.
81 Ibid, P171.
82 Ibid, P172 - 188.
83 Ibid, P175.
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and themes would come, in the next two decades in the Waitangi Tribunal's work, to be the
dominant construction ofthe colonial past.
Ann Parsonson's 1981 essay 'Pursuit of Mana' was amongst the first attempts by a New
Zealand historian at getting behind the facade of Maori-Crown transactions and making sense
of Maori actors using Maori values and concepts." Parsonson considered the traditional
expressions of mana, and argued that Maori society tended to reinterpret traditional practices
to incorporate and adapt the new. Thus, during colonisation, "as a variety of new ways of
pursuing traditional social and economic rivalries came to hand, they were taken up with
unabated viqour.?" Cast in this light Parsonson argued that the public ceremony ofpayment of
land was seen by Maori as "a recognition of their claim to the land involved", a recognition of
the mana of the sellers." Traditional practices and values by which strangers are incorporated
into Maori communities suggested to Parsonson that for Maori the 'sale' of land was intended
as away of incorporating settlers into their world and forming relationships with them based on
expectations of ongoing benefits for both parties: "chiefs everywhere sought access to the
skills and goods the Pakehas brought with them, to markets they offered, the employment they
provided?" This raised the possibility that for Maori selling land was not so much an alienation
of the land from their control but that "by installing Pakeha, they had simply put it to a different
use.?" These arguments alert historians to the importance of relationship in Maori world-views,
and to a counter-interpretation of the sale of land. These ideas can easily be extended to
transactions between Maori, settlers and the Crown over Native reserves, and as such offer an
important lens through which to view, explore and explain the tensions between Maori and
Pakeha motivations, understandings and expectations in avariety oftransactions. 89
84 Ann Parsonson, 'The Pursuit of Mana' in The Oxford History of New Zealand, W H Oliver and B R Williams
(eds), Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1981, pp 140 -167. For a reply toParsonson's arguments see Angela
Ballara, 'The Pursuit of Mana: A Re-evaluation of the Process of Land Alienation by Maoris, 1840 -1890', JPS,
Vol. 91, No.4, December 1982, pp 519 - 541.
85 Parsonson, 1981, p 142.
86 Ibid, P147.
87 Ibid, P149.
88 Ibid, P148.
89 Parsonson's 1992 essay 'The Challenge to Mana Maori', informed by her participation in the Ngai Tahu inquiry,
strengthened the perspectives ofher 1981 essay but also delineated more clearly the constraints and pressures
experienced by Maori in their transactions with the Crown, (Ann Parsonson, 'The Challenge to Mana Maori' in The
Oxford History ofNew Zealand, 2nd Edition, Geoffrey Rice (ed), Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1992, pp 167
- 200).
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The Waitangi Tribunal's Reports
The Development of a Bi-cultural Lens
The historical investigation of the Waitangi Tribunal into Maori claims against the Crown since
1985, when the Tribunal was granted jurisdiction to examine events dating from the signing of
the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, is the most radical review and revision of the nature of the
colonising enterprise and its outcome for Maori in New Zealand's history. As a consequence
the reports of the Waitangi Tribunal have profound implications for the foundations on which
historians base their interpretations of our past. Four significant components of the Tribunal's
approach have particular implications for histories of Native reserves. The first component is
the foundation of all the others: the Tribunal's interpretation ofthe Treaty and the obligations of
the Crown towards Maori. From this flow reassessments of Crown-Maori relations and of the
loss of land and other taonga. Most of all this framework has resulted in an entirely new bi-
cultural lens which has restored Maori values, laws and world-views to an equal place in
historical narratives alongside those of the British colonisers. It is this bi-cultural approach that
has come, above all to characterise the Tribunal's work.
It is in the Tribunal's reports that the development of this bi-cultural approach can be traced. Its
basis has been a fundamental re-interpretation of the Treaty and its meaning. By considering
the differences in meaning between the Maori and English texts of the Treaty and giving
particular weight to the Maori text as the version which most Maori signed the Tribunal has
redefined the rights and obligations of Maori and the Crown towards one another. In weighing
the meaning of 'sovereignty' and 'kawanatanga', 'possession' and 'rangatiratanga' the Tribunal
concludes that Maori who signed the Treaty had ceded to the Crown "the authority to make
laws for the good order and security of the country but subject to Maori interests." In return
Maori retained not only their possession of their lands and other taonga but also "the mana to
control them in accordance with their own customs and having regard to their own cultural
preferences." The Tribunal argues that as a result the Crown has an obligation to ensure that
Maori were left with sufficient land for their maintenance and support."
90 Waitangi Tribunal, Report ofthe Waitangi Tribunal on the Manukau Claims, Government Print, Wellington,
1985, pp 90 - 91 and Waitangi Tribunal, The Orake! Report, Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1987, pp 208-
209.
91 The Orakei Report, 1987, p210.
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This reassessment provides a new conceptual framework within which Crown-Maori relations,
Crown policies and their impact can be measured. These fundamental rights and duties are
further supported and delineated by an emphasis on the principles of the Treaty. In the 1990s,
after the 1987 New Zealand Maori Council case in the Court of Appeal, which defined the
principles of the Treaty, the Tribunal began to apply these principles to historical claims and
this has led to a more thorough definition of the duties of the Crown towards Maori. McHugh
argues that this approach has also re-interpreted the Crown-Maori relationship as "horizontal"
in that it is seen as a partnership between two politically autonomous parties rather than the
previous "verticalized" Crown-subject conception. As a result a new historiography "of co-
existence, dialogue and negotiated, ritualised contest" has emerged. 92 These new
developments are first apparent in the Tribunal's 1991 Ngai Tahu Report and continued in the
1996 Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi and the 1999 Whanganui River Report. 93
In viewing Maori and the Crown as Treaty partners who ought to have equal mana the Tribunal
has developed a bi-culturallens through which it has explored the cultural context in which the
colonial encounter occurred. This has had enormous benefits for historians by providing a
means of understanding how Maori world-views and the values and laws that underpin them
have shaped Maori experiences of colonisation. The importance of this perspective can be
seen in the Tribunal's Muriwhenua Land Report, 1997 and in the Whanganui River Report,
1999 where some of the earliest chapters in these reports offer a detailed investigation of
Maori laws of relationships, values and contracts as well as an examination of the nature of
Maori authority. These are then explicitly compared and contrasted to British values and laws
in the same period." In doing so the Tribunal is then able to offer explanation of Maori
expectations, motivations and reactions in their transactions with the Crown. In particular these
reports conclude that Maori desired a future based on mutually beneficial relationships
between equal and autonomous partes." Therefore, the political question for Maori often
became not "whose authority should prevail, that ofMaori or that of the Queen" but rather "how
the respective authorities of Maori and Pakeha were to be recognised and respected and the
92 McHugh, 1997, P49.
93 Ngai Tahu Report, 1991, Vol. 2, pp 218 - 245.
94 Waitangi Tribunal, The Muriwhenua Land Report, GP Publications, Wellington, 1997, pp 21 - 29 and Waitangi
Tribunal, The Whanganui River Report, GP Publications, Wellington, 1999, pp 28 - 54.
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partnership maintained."96 This bi-cultural approach has indicated that Maori, and not just the
Crown, had policies about British settlement and the future of Maori and Pakeha. This
approach has been largely responsible for restoring the agency of Maori actors in historical
narratives. At the same time this lens has prompted a more complete examination of British
settler views of themselves and of Maori, thus offering the real possibility for a more nuanced
reading ofNew Zealand's past.
The Bi-cultural Lens and Native Reserves in theTribunal's Reports
The Tribunal's evolving Treaty jurisprudence as outlined above has radical implications for the
Tribunal's view of the history of Native reserves. The obligation of the Crown to ensure that
Maori interests are protected and that iwi have enough land to enable them to participate as
equal Treaty partners in the development of New Zealand have led to a heavy emphasis on
questions about the creation and alienation of Native reserves. In particular the Tribunal has
asked whether Maori received sufficient reserve land to provide an economic base to
participate in the evolving nation as equal Treaty partners. They have also tried to assess the
extent to which Native reserves were alienated and to investigate the Crown's failure to
prevent their loss. Although there are distinctive Treaty issues relating to Native reserves the
Tribunal's approach also places them in the wider context of the loss of land, resources and
other taonga, making clear for the first time the enormity of Maori loss, the pervasiveness of
that experience and the means by which it occurred.
This focus is evident in the reports of the Tribunal that have dealt with Native reserves,
beginning with The Ngai Tahu Report, 1991; Te Roroa Report, 1992; The Taranaki Report,
1996; The Muriwhenua Land Report, 1997 and most recently the Wellington report: Te
Whanganui a Tara me ona Takiwa Report, 2003. In the case of Ngai Tahu the Tribunal found
that: "Ngai Tahu, as owners of the land, were entitled to be left with 'ample', that is to say more
than adequate land. Ten or fifteen acres per head was no more than sufficient for a bare
subsistence." The Native reserves allocated should have been enough "to enable them to live
95 The Whanganui River Report 1999, 1999, pp 106 -107, 109.
96 The Taranaki Report, 1996, PP 5- 6.
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comfortably and prosper.'?' In the Muriwhenua Land Report, the Tribunal concluded that,
"while both sides assumed that Maori should benefit from European settlement, there was no
drive to reserve the land that Maori needed for that purpose. The result was the virtual
exclusion of Maori from the central Muriwhenua bowl, on the rims - politically, socially, and
economically.?" However, while these are obviously profoundly important matters, they
constitute only the beginning and end of the history of Native reserves allocated to particular
iwi and hapu. To truly make sense of the significance of Native reserves we have to examine
how Maori and settlers were utilising the reserves, and the economic and social relationships
that this involved.
By using a bi-cultural lens the Tribunal has made the connection between the provision of
Native reserves and the Crown's agenda of assimilation. In their Te Roma Report, 1992 the
Tribunal concluded that "In practice there was ageneral reluctance on the Crown's part to set
aside Native reserves. Rather, Maori were to participate in the market economy, be brought
directly under British law and institutions and become part and parcel of colonial society."
The Tribunal has also been able to provide useful new assessments of the effectiveness and
impact of the protective and assimilationist strands of Crown policies and to illuminate the
relationship between these two aims. In general, the Tribunal has concluded that the
imposition of assimilation policies by the Crown in New Zealand was a denial of
rangatiratanga, the right ofMaori to autonomy and self-determination in the colonial enterprise,
guaranteed by article 2 of the Treaty. The Crown's Treaty obligation to actively protect Maori
was seen to extend to protecting both their rangatiratanga and taonga. This reassessment has
the effect of permanently severing old Whig identifications of assimilation policies with the
protection of Maori interests. In the Tribunal's post 1990 narratives assimilation and protection
are regarded as opposing impulses in Crown policy. In its Te Roma Report in 1992 the
Tribunal commented that "Right from the beginning of British intervention in New Zealand
official attitudes and policies on reserves reflected the conflicting objectives of protection and
97 Ngai Tahu Report, 1991, P339, The Tribunal in the Muriwhenua Land case made similar arguments about the
quantity and quality of the reserves provided in that district." (The Muriwhenua Land Report, 1997, p 332).
98 The Taranaki Report, 1996, pp 41 &53 and The Muriwhenua Land Report, 1997, p 205 respectively.
99 Waitangi Tribunal, Te Roroa Report, Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992, p 91.
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asslmllatlon."'" In the 1999 Whanganui River Report it argued that "The early governors were
instructed to protect Maori customs not inconsistent with the principles of humanity from the
operation of English law. However, the ultimate objective of British policy was to assimilate
Maori into English law and political institufions."?'
Tribunal Historical Research on Native Reserves
In addition to the published reports of the Waitangi Tribunal, the Tribunal's process has
generated a substantial body of commissioned historical research. Donald Loveridge's
examination of the origins of the Native Lands Acts and the Native Land Court does much to
uncover the ideas at the heart of the British colonial enterprise, and illuminate the world-view of
the colonisers. Loveridge pointed out that beliefs about the superiority of "Christian civilisation
based on sedentary agricultural" and in particular British "culture, religion and empire" sat
alongside genuine beliefs in the ability of 'savage' nations to be raised up to the level of the
'civilised' .102 In particular he has been able to locate the development of the New Zealand
Company's Native reserve policy in the "cross-fertilisation" of two "dominant schools of [British]
colonial reform" in the 1820s and 1830s: the humanitarian concern with minimising the
damage inflicted on indigenous people during colonisation and the ideas of those advocating
systematic colonisation as the most economically viable means of creating British
settlements. 103
Surprisingly, considering the vast number of reports on the Tribunal's record, only four are
directly relevant to Native reserves made in purchased blocks. In 1991 a two-volume title
history of the Native reserves created in the purchased blocks of North Taranaki was
completed for the Taranaki inquiry.!" This was followed in 1997 by two general works
examining the Crown's Native reserves policy produced as part of the Tribunal's Rangahaua
Whanui series: Ralph Johnson's The Trust Administration ofMaori Reserves, 1840 - 1913 and
100 The Te Roroa Report, 1992, p 91.
101 The Whanganui River Report, Waitangi Tribunal, 1999, pp 105 -106.
102 Loveridge, 'The Origins of the Native Lands Acts and Native Land Court inNew Zealand', 2000, p 20.
103 ibid, pp 16 - 20.
104 Ford, 1991 and Harris, 1991.
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J E Murray's, Crown Policy on Maori ReseNed Lands, 1840 to 1865 and Land Restricted from
Alienation, 1865 to 1900. 105
Johnson and Murray provided the first detailed and systematic examinations of Native reserve
policy, legislation and administration; this alone makes their reports significant reference
works. They cover somewhat similar territory and so are treated together here. Of the two,
Johnson provides the fuller examination of the phases of New Zealand Company and
Government administration of Native reserves from 1840 onwards and the origins and purpose
ofthe New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856. 106 However, because these reports are by way
of national overviews, they necessarily focus on central government. As a consequence the
role of Maori in administering their reserves is not explored to any real extent. The focus on
central government also precluded a full examination of the implementation of central
government policies, legislation and administration in each province. However, both Johnson
and Murray acknowledged that what actually happened to reserves in a particular place
depended on local circumstance and relationsnlos.!" In addition Johnson did attempt to
examine the situation in each province, but was hampered by the time constraints of the
project and by the fragmentary nature of the primary evdence.!" Therefore, lack of data and
the abolition of tenths reserves there limited his consideration ofTaranaki Native reserves."?
The overviews of Johnson and Murray also highlighted several consistent themes running
through Native reserve policy, legislation and administration. Both connected the Crown's
management ofNative reserves to wider Native policy objectives: trusteeship, assimilation and
tenure 'reform'. Johnson's report traced the origins and evolution of the concept of trusteeship
and its use by the New Zealand Company and by the Crown in legislation and
adrrmisfration."? While Murray sketched the evidence for asserting that Native reserve policy
was heavily underpinned by the desire to individualize title to Native land, Johnson paid
particular attention to the attitudes and understanding of Henry Sewell, the architect of the
105 Johnson, 1997 and J EMurray, Crown Policy on Maori Reserved Land, 1997.
106 Johnson, 1997, PP 23 - 28.
107 Murray, 1997, PP 5- 6.
108 Johnson, 1997, P23.
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1856 Act, and noted that the Act was the first statute that provided for the individualization of
title to Native Land. I I I Johnson and Murray also flagged two other important issues affecting
the nature of the reserves: confusion and debate over their purpose and legal status, and the
influence of settler opinion and demands on reserve location. Johnson explored several
contemporary debates. Firstly, he considered whether the Native title had been extinguished
over reserves at the time of the purchase of the block of land surrounding them, and whether,
therefore, they were Crown land orremained in Native title. 1l2 Secondly, he discussed debates
over the utilization of tenths: whether they were to be occupied by Maori, or leased by trustees
on their behalf with the revenue providing funds for schools, hospitals and other arnenites.!"
All these themes and issues point to fruitful avenues for further research.
Ford's and Harris' title histories ofNative reserves in various purchase blocks in Taranaki were
intended as companion volumes and both follow the same format. Their introductions indicate
that they were commissioned to provide very basic data about the reserves after it became
clear at a Tribunal hearing in June 1991 that "there was a need to identify all the Native
reserves made to Maori within the land purchases 1844 - 1860 and to find out about their
ensuing history.'?" As a consequence of this brief, and the very short period of time allocated
for researching and producing the reports, the focus was on locating each reserve,
establishing lts size, and how it was alienated. A summary of the total area of reserves
created, the percentage of the purchase block reserved, and general conclusions about the
methods of alienation are provlded.:" The title accounts provided an initial database for
investigating the history of these reserves but when examined closely proved to be incomplete
in many places. The reports were unable to give any attention to where reserves fitted into the
III Murray, 1997, pp 9- 21 and Johnson, 1997, p 27. He also notes Native Secretary, T HSmith's 1859
instructions to Native Reserves Commissioners to subdivide and individualize title toreserves (Johnson, 1997,
p36).
112 Johnson, 1997, pp 5- 7. Murray also covered this debate, Murray, 1997, p 6.
113 Johnson, 1997, pp 9-10.
114 Ford, 1991, p 1.
115 Ford, 1991, P4 and Harris, 1991, p i - iv.
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Crown's Native policy and gave only limited attention to Native reserves legislation and the
administration ofthe reserves!"
In providing an overview of the Rangahaua Whanui research Alan Ward dealt with the history
of Native reserves and restrictions on alienation together, and this led to conclusions which
were less focused on Native reserves. However Ward did conclude that the
whole question of reserves and restrictions on title reflects the ambivalence between
the view of Maori as individuals having full control over their property (including the
right to sell it) and that of Maori as inheritors of a tribal patrimony much of which (at
least) should be preserved under article 2of the Treaty for future qenerations.!"
In other words, there were significant tensions within Native reserve policy between the
"trusteeship of the Crown" which suggested that significant portions of land ought to have been
protected from alienation and the demands for "formal equality with settlers" which implied "that
Maori should be free to deal with their own land as they saw fit, including sell it."1l8 These
tensions were closely connected with visions of the future ofMaori in New Zealand society and
the role that Native reserves should play in assimilating Maori into an Anglo-settler society.
The Colonial Enterprise in Recent Maori and Pakeha Historiography
Since 1990 there has been a flood of publications about the Treaty of Waitangi, sovereignty,
race relations, the New Zealand Wars, Maori society and the colonial encounter in New
Zealand generally. Amongst these have been contributors from legal, anthropological,
economic and historical disciplines employing a variety of approaches. These have been able
to provide perspectives on the cultural, intellectual, spatial, economic and legal dimensions of
the colonial enterprise. It can be argued that these new narratives form, in McHugh's words,
"more truly a historiography of encounter and one more attuned to the circumstances of
contemporary New Zealand political life than one that assimilates Maori into submissive,
supplicant status.?" In respect of the topic of this study such studies offer new ways of
understanding how Native reserves fitted into the respective visions of Crown and Maori for
116 Ford noted that there was a need for an analysis of the legislation and Native reserve policy, especially for the
period before the Native Reserves Act 1856 (Ford, 1991, p 6). Johnson and Murray's 1997 reports later filled this
gap, tosome extent.
117 Alan Ward, National OvelView, Vol. II, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, Wellington, 1997, p277.
118 Ibid, P276.
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inter-cultural relations in New Zealand after 1840. In addition, recent work by Maori historians
suggests that Tribunal-inspired narratives of loss and conflict constructed through the lens of
the principles of the Treaty may be limited in their ability to encompass the totality of Maori
experience in the period before 1860.
Post-colonial approaches to Maori-Pakeha relations, notably the work of Giselle Byrnes on
colonial landscape and surveying, have turned away from the previous focus on the political
and legal means by which New Zealand was colonised. Instead Byrnes argued that the task
for the historian is to effect "a post-colonial unravelling of the many shifts and subtleties of the
colonial project." 120 In particular her work suggests that a key dimension of the colonising
enterprise was spatial and ideological. For Byrnes, "strategies employed in map-making - the
re-inscription, enclosure and ordering of space" are "an analogue for the acquisition,
management and reinforcement of colonial power."!" This approach reconfigures the
colonising enterprise as, amongst other things, a series of conflicts and negotiations between
two peoples with two utterly different cultural landscapes.:" That is, with very different visions
of land, landscape, land use, and the place of people in that landscape.!" Yet this contest is
one in which each side exercised agency, won and lost rather than one in which Maori were
inevitably overpowered. Byrnes suggested that
119 McHugh, 1997, P57.
120 Giselle Byrnes, Boundary Markers: Land Surveying and the Colonisation ofNew Zealand, Bridget Williams
Books, Wellington, 2001, p 5.
121 Brynes, 'Affixing Names toPlaces: Colonial Surveying and the Construction ofCultural Space in New
Zealand', New Zealand Studies, Vol. 8, No.1, March 1998, p 24.
122 "Acultural landscape, however, is anatural landscape that has been fashioned byaculture ina particular
way. Cultural landscapes prioritize the human presence and itseffects." (Byrnes, 2001, p 11).
123 Brynes argues that inevitably the Maori cultural landscape was over-written bythat of the colonizers, the denial
(implicit orexplicit) of an already existing representation of landscape." (Byrnes, 'No Holidays are kept in the
Bush: Surveying inTaranaki and the Discourse ofColonization', Archifacts, April 1993 No.1,P15). This Maori
landscape she describes as an oral map (Byrnes, 1993, p 20). This is reminiscent ofdiscussion byBarbara
Bender on indigenous maps. Drawing on the work of Foucault, Bender argues that the written maps ofcolonizers
and the oral maps of indigenous peoples can be considered as two discourses about landscape and meaning.
The colonizer's map and discourse comes tobe accepted as the dominant discourse; abird's eye/God's eye view
of the land with itshomogenizing the grid that reinforces the exclusive ownership toa defined parcel of land, and
the division ofpublic and private space. The indigenous map becomes an alternative, often subjugated discourse
emphasizing a ground level view of the land where an oral map records the social, economic, political and
spiritual connection between individuals and groups (kinship) and with the land itself as part ofaweb ofkinship
(Barbara Bender, 'Subverting the Western Gaze: Mapping Alternative Worlds', in Peter J Ucko & Robert Layton
(eds) The Archaeology and Anthropology ofLandscape: Shaping Your Landscape, Routledge, London, 1999, pp .
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to see colonisation simply as a one-way exercise of power ignores the often confused
nature ofcolonial relationships. Instead, colonial contacts have been described as 'the
middle ground' and the 'contact zone' - a place of negotiation, exchange and agency
as much as expressions ofpower. 124
One of the strengths of Byrnes' approach is that it illuminates the early Victorian cultural
notions that informed settler intellectual and physical constructions of landscape'", and in this
is part of a trend in recent historiography to reassess settler world-views. This offers the
possibility ofbalancing the Maori perspectives which Tribunal narratives have delineated.
Understandings ofplace and landscape are central, in aquite different way, to the recent work
of several Maori historians fruitfully combining the methods of academic history with
perspectives which are firmly rooted in their experience of tribal narratives and flkanqa.'" Of
particular interest are recent essays by Ngai Tahu historian Te Maire Tau and Te Atiawa
historian Danny Keenan. Tau's and Keenan's approaches and the intellectual traditions they
work in are somewhat different from each other, as are their distinctive iwi and hapu
perspectives; however both hold that the organising principles of any historical narrative must
be whakapapa. In his 2000 essay Tau gives a detailed and enlightening discussion of the way
in which Ngai Tahu have viewed land as part of a whakapapa which includes atua, earth, sky,
trees, elements, sea and people so that every entity in this cosmology is linked in a web of
kinship. 127
In his 2002 essay Keenan argued that Maori "mediate" histories "through certain traditions,
always with a strong sense of identity, legitimacy, and mana to the fore" and that "these
mediated histories were always firmly located in specific historic landscapes, though these
landscapes may have undergone marked and permanent change, and may even have slipped
124 Byrnes, 2001, P8.
125 Byrnes, 2001, pp 18, 54 - 55.
126 Te Maire Tau, 'From Better be Dead and Out of the Way' to 'To be Seen to Belong' in John Cookson and
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from the ownership ofthe people."!" For Keenan "the primary structuring device for this kind of
approach was undoubtedly whakapapa, as asserted from the paepae" and this anchored
people to a known landscape.!" Keenan argues for writing histories using such guiding
principles and suggests that these narratives would give "a better sense of how Maori people
responded to change. It [this new approach] even suggests how Maori sought to control the
meanings of that change - or perhaps even to assert that no real change had occurred, but
that continuities with pre-contact tradition had been preserved."!" Tau and Keenan both argue
that the perspectives offered by whakapapa have the potential to provide viable alternative
frameworks for the historical narratives of Maori-Crown relationships and the colonising
enterprise. These alternative narratives move away from narratives of conflict and loss to
emphasise the persistence of connections to place and the stability of tribal visions and
aqency.!"
Lyndsay Head's 2002 essay, 'The Pursuit of Modernity in Maori Society: The Conceptual
Bases ofCitizenship in the Early Colonial Period', provides a Maori-centred perspective from a
Pakeha historian on the evolution of Maori political philosophy during the nineteenth century. It
has its origins in Head's extensive reading and translation of nineteenth century letters and
documents written in te reo Maori by Maori individuals and leaders.!" To some extent Head
deliberately placed her work against what she sees as the prevalence of autonomy as the
organising principle of the recent historiography ofnineteenth century Maori experience.:" She
argued that this dominance has had serious consequences for the way in which Maori actors
and their descendants have been categorised as 'rebel' and 'loyal'. In response she postulates
a more nuanced reading of Maori citizenship in the nineteenth century because, "the language
128 Keenan, 2002, p 248.
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in which many Maori in the early colonial period expressed a sense ofbeing does not illustrate
easy dichotomies."?'
Head's focus is on why Maori were neutral or actively supported British government. In many
ways this is a question about the extent to which Maori society was changed, and changed
itself in the colonial encounter, but it is also one that has not been addressed in our current
historiography. Head argued that the tendency of historians to hold that Maori society simply
adapted its existing practices to accommodate changes brought by colonisation ignores the
thorough, fundamental and radical changes in the basis of Maori society. These, she argued,
had their roots in the adoption ofChristianity and "were all in one direction, and irreversible." 135
Head examined the way in which many Maori, particularly those considered by the Crown as
'friendly or loyal', used Christianity as the basis for a vision of a shared future, one based on
Maori concepts of relationships and whakapapa extending to embrace settlers. She suggests
the possibility that, at least in some times and places, the consensual and co-operative in
Maori, Crown and settler relations were as significant as conflict, misunderstanding and loss.
Head thus provides a model that suggests a number of very plausible motivations and
expectations shaping the economic and social engagement of 'friendly' hapu with settlers and
Crown officials in utilizing and administering their Native reserves in and around New Plymouth
in the period before the wars ofthe 1860s.
Post-colonial spatial history and the Maori-centred approaches ofMaori and Pakeha historians
are concerned with the cultural and intellectual dimensions ofcolonisation. But there were also
important economic and legal dimensions to the use and management ofNative reserves, and
to Crown agendas for the assimilation of Maori. Recent work in history, law and anthropology
suggests new questions about the economic and legal aspects of Native reserve history.
Steven Webster reviewed the ethnographic and anthropological literature on Maori economic
Paul McHugh (eds), Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2001, p 97. For comment on Head's essay see Kerry
Howe's review of the collection in which it appeared, NZJH, 36 (2), 2002, pp 203 - 204.
134 Head, 2001, p 98.
135 Ibid, P100.
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responses and initiatives in colonial New Zealand.:" He concluded that in investigating the
economic dimensions of Maori colonial experience we must seek to avoid an "oppositional
model" which interprets Maori society as either civilized or primitive; capitalist or tribal; and
suggested the choice between "Maori traditionalism and assimilation (to capitalism)" is a false
one."' Webster argued that for most Maori communities economic change lay somewhere
between the poles of capitalism and tribalism. Yet, in his conclusions he leant towards the
capitalist end of the continuum, arguing that Maori social structures could notbe kept separate
from "the acknowledged manifold change in production, distribution and consumption" which
their engagement with the settler economy brought with it. 138 His analysis is helpful in any
attempt to assess the ways in which Maori engaged with capitalism in the period before 1875,
and in attempting to locate the use and ownership ofNative reserves within their economy.
Spatial histories have emphasised the ways in which dividing the landscape into bounded
parcels by surveying, mapping and naming, reinforced and legitimised western notions of
private property and enabled these pieces of land to be traded in the capitalist economy. Legal
historians, for their part, have increasingly focused on examination of the property rights
associated with Crown-derived title and Aboriginal or Native title. Paul McHugh's seminal work
on Native title clarified important connections between the Treaty and sovereignty, and Native
title and customary law and tenure, placing his analysis of these issues in the context of British
and Maori legal and cultural consfructs.!" John Weaver provided a clear analysis of the
components of British concepts of property rights, a system in which "all the potential sticks in
the bundle ofproperty rights are gathered in a single owner." 140 He identified the key strands in
this ideology of property as; "the idea of individualised land title", the "concept of productive
usage" and the desire for "compact settlement" characterised by "concentration and
contiguity."141 Weaver's analysis of the colonial frontier offers perspectives that could be
136 Steven Webster, 'Maori Hapu asaWhole Way ofStruggle: 1840s -1850sbefore the Land Wars', in Oceania
69,1998, pp 5- 7.
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employed to examine the impact settler ideologies of property rights had upon Maori ability to
retain and exercise their property rights to Native reserves.
The place ofMaori in narratives of colonisation in New Zealand has shifted dramatically since
the 1970s. Before this period Maori were depicted as essentially an obstruction to the progress
of the Anglo-settler State and as a result Maori remained on the margins of the historians'
gaze. Since the 1970s, and especially since the historical investigation of the Waitangi
Tribunal, the impact of colonisation upon Maori society has become a significant historical
question. The colonising enterprise has been re-configured as the colonial encounter: one of
conflict, contest and co-operation that gives agreater sense ofMaori agency. Atthe same time
Maori values and world-views have been restored to their rightful place in these narratives and
have helped to explain this encounter from a Maori perspective. The old certainties of Whig
narratives about racial harmony and progress have been shattered, leaving space for a more
balanced and insightful reading ofthe Maori-Pakeha past.
The Structure of this Thesis
Chapter one of this thesis places Native reserve histories in the wider context of the
historiography ofcolonial New Zealand and explores the evolution a number ofsignificant and
useful approaches to that past. Chapter two draws upon the bi-cultural approach of the
Waitangi Tribunal to delineate early Victorian British perceptions of indigenous people and
their role as colonisers and Te Atiawa Maori perceptions of land and relationships in terms of
their expectations and perceptions of a relationship with the settlers. It examines the evolution
ofCompany and Crown policies of assimilation and the function of Native reserves within that
policy in this context and investigates the implementation and administration ofthe Company's
tenths reserve scheme atNew Plymouth between 1840 and 1844. This chapter closes with the
abandonment of the Company reserves at New Plymouth and their replacement by the Native
reserves of the FitzRoy block. An examination of the nature of these reserves provides an
indication of the Crown's policy of Native reserves and suggests how these were shaped by
settler and Te Atiawa agendas for the settlement at New Plymouth.
Chapter 3 examines the creation of Native reserves by the Crown in the Omata and Grey
purchases around New Plymouth in 1847. It investigates Governor Grey's new policy for
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Native reserves and the impact Ngamotu hapu wishes and settler pressure had on its
implementation in these blocks. The aggregation of Native reserves is examined in terms of
the tensions this created between settler attempts to keep Maori communities at a distance
and ideals of assimilation. Ngamotu hapu understandings of the reserves and their utilisation
of them as part of their highly successful engagement with the capitalist economy in the
province between 1844 and 1858 are examined to provide an insight into the relationships
hapu were forming with settlers through leasing reserves and the way thatthe Crown (and
settlers) attempted constrain this expression of economic independence. Chapter 4 examines
the creation and allocation of Native reserves and the relationship between reserve land and
land re-purchased by Te Atiawa from the Crown in these blocks. The work of Lyndsay Head is
drawn on to examine the implications of this shift in Crown policy towards the individualisation
of title in terms of the Crown's assimilationist agenda and of the fundamentally different
assumptions Te Atiawa and the Crown had about the pre-requisites for Maori modernity.
Chapter 5 investigates the origins and provisions of the New Zealand Native Reserves Act
1856 and the implications its definition of the legal status of Native reserves had for the
immediate tasks of the commissioners appointed under the Act in Taranaki. The chapter
discusses the way various local factors, Te Atiawa attitudes towards the Act, and their existing
relationships' with the individual commissioners assisted or constrained their pro-active
approach tobringing reserves under their administration. In particular the impact of Te Atiawa-
settler leasing on the commissioners' work and on Te Atiawa decisions to bring reserves under
the Act are discussed. The secondary task of the commissioners - toapprove Crown grants to
Te Atiawa owners of reserves - is examined with regard to the affect of local pressures.
Chapter 6 offers an analysis of the patterns of utilisation: occupying, leasing to settlers and
selling, comparing reserves administered by the commissioners and those remaining in Te
Atiawa control. Discussion then focuses on the ways in which Te Atiawa engaged with this
market demand, the costs and benefits ofdoing so and the extent to which hapu were able to
maximise the benefits ofcash income and minimise the pitfalls of loss ofcontrol and ownership
ofreserves close to New Plymouth.
40
Chapter 7 offers an investigation into the social dimension of relationships between Te Atiawa
landlords and settler lessees arguing that lease arrangements were more than simply
economic compacts but provide insight into the inter-cultural relationships in the private sphere
at New Plymouth from 1858 to 1863. These provided a counter-point to public tensions
between settlers and Te Atiawa over communities living on Native reserves in and around the
town of New Plymouth. The impact of war on public and private relationships between Maori
and Pakeha suggests that this permanently reduced the boundaries ofsocial trust between the
two communities but was unable to completely sour private relationships between landlords
and lessees. However the consequence for Te Atiawa was a permanent exclusion from living
places within the township.
41
Chapter 2: New Zealand Company Tenths in Taranaki and the
Beginnings of the Crown's Native Reserve Policy
Introduction
Native reserves for Maori were a feature of the British colonists' plans for Maori from the first
purported acquisitions of land by the New Zealand Company and its ancillary companies from
1839. The Company's policy regarding the reserves it intended to create for Maori in the
district they purchased and the nature and purpose of those reserves are a significant
indication ofthe place they envisaged for Maori within adominant Anglo-settler society. Behind
the Company's vision for the Maori future were anumber ofcultural and legal assumptions that
had their origins in the wider context of British debate during the 1820s and 1830s about
colonisation and its impact on indigenous people. These ideas illuminate early Victorian
attitudes towards the indigenous 'other' as well as British perceptions of themselves as
coloniser and civiliser.
The cultural values and practices of Maori with regard to the incorporation of strangers into
their communities and the rights and obligations of such arrangements provides a useful
means ofexamining questions regarding the meanings hapu ascribed to their transactions with
the Company and the wider question of how they visualised their future after the arrival of
British settlers. Hapu values regarding land and visions of their future with Pakeha illuminate
something of their understanding of the Company's Native reserves and their reluctance to
utilise them. In the process ofdefining the role and status of Pakeha, these visions also shed
light on the role hapu envisaged for themselves in an evolving Maori-Pakeha community.
A delineation of Company and hapu policies of settlement and the role that Native reserves
were intended to play in the future of Maori form a fruitful context in which to examine the
implementation of the Company's Native reserve policy at New Plymouth between 1841 and
1844. The number, size and location ofthe Company's reserves; the extent to which Te Atiawa
were liVing on or otherwise utilising the reserves; and the extent to which the Company was
able to fully implement its policy in the creation and allocation of the reserves in the face of
pressure from settlers and hapu all provide an indication of the initial, and formative,
experience of reserves by Te Atiawa hapu. This period also illuminates tensions between the
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theory of reserves as a means of assimilating Maori; Maori resistance to the Company and
Crown attempts to control where their communities lived; and settler desires to keep Maori ata
distance from the British settlement. Attempts by Company and Crown officials to administer
the reserves also demonstrate some of the confused and conflicting ideas about the nature
and purpose of the reserves. Finally the abolition of the Company's reserves and the creation
of the Native reserves in the FitzRoy block by the Crown in 1844 signalled the beginnings of a
distinctive Crown policy of Native reserves which owned much to the Company's policy and
experiment atNew Plymouth.
The Origins of the New Zealand Company's Tenths Reserves
The New Zealand Company
The first reserves provided for Maori in New Zealand were created by the New Zealand Land
Company, better known as the New Zealand Company!" The Company was formally
constituted in London on 2 May 1839, but was the heir and successor to a number of similarly
named ventures. In particular it owed its existence to the New Zealand Association formed two
years before, and to an even earlier New Zealand Company which had sent an exploratory
expedition to New Zealand in 1825.143 These ventures were "a component of a much wider
process, the expansion of European power into the global arena from the fifteenth century
onwards.'!" However, they were also a response to conditions in England in the 1820s and
early 1830s, 'a period in which highly mechanised industry caused widespread unemployment
amongst skilled craftspeople. A rapidly increasing population, urban and rural poverty, disease
and overcrowding were identified as social problems.!" Many families saw emigration to one of
the colonies of the British Empire as an answer to these condltions.!" New Zealand came to
be perceived as rich in resources, with abundant and readily available land and this made it
attractive to prompters of emigration schemes, despite its remote location. Influential
individuals began organising associations and companies to undertake commercial ventures
involving trade with New Zealand and later these organisations began to advocate emigration
and permanent British settlements in New Zealand.
142 A detailed account of the history of these companies can be found in Patricia Burns, Fatal Success: A History
of the New Zealand Company, Heinemann Reed, Auckland, 1989.
143 Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ona Takiwa, 2003, p45.
144 Peter Gibbons, 'Cultural Colonization and National Identity' NZJH, Vol. 36, No.1, 2002, P7.
145 Burns, 1989, p 26.
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The New Zealand Company was essentially a speculative venture: shares in the Company
were sold and profits were to be paid out to shareholders. These profits were to come from
selling New Zealand land in Britain to emigrants and prospective emigrants to the colony.'? Its
plans for New Zealand were modelled on the theory of systematic colonisation developed by
colonial theorist Edward Gibbon Wakefield. Wakefield's attempt to define a successful and
profitable means of colonising British territories contributed to widespread debate in Britain in
the mid-1820s, in parliament and the media, over the emigration of the poor as a solution to
unemployment and psuperism.!" Adefining aspect ofWakefield's theory, and one essential to
the economic success of the Company's plan, was Wakefield's notion of 'sufficient price'.149
Wakefield considered that the development of settlements depended upon both capital and
labour and without a sufficient supply of labour capitalists would not immigrate to a colony.
Therefore, the ratio of labourers to 'capitalists' needed to be regulated by setting the price of
waste land sufficiently high to guard against the labouring classes immediately acquiring land
and reducing the supply of labour. On the other hand, the price of land could not be so high
that it discouraged labourers who hoped to eventually own land from emigrating altogether.150
One of the consequences of this theory was that the Company considered it necessary to
acquire large areas of New Zealand land very cheaply so that when the land was sold to
settlers enough profit was generated to fund the further immigration and public amenities
settlements requlred.!" It was in the hope of making such purchases that the Tory was
dispatched to New Zealand on 12 May 1839, ten days after the Company was constituted.!"
The Company and the Crown, 1839 -1840
The haste with which the Company dispatched the Tory and with which it concluded
transactions with Maori for land in New Zealand were a consequence of the Company's
attempt to secure land for settlement ahead of the imminent acquisition of sovereignty by the
146 Ibid, P65.
147 The Company's prospectus was issued on 2 May 1839 and by July all available sections ina principal
Company settlement of99, 999 acres had been pre-sold at£1 per acre. On 30July afurther 50,000 acres was
advertised for sale atthe same price (Ibid, pp 16-17).
148 In particular Wakefield seems to have been responding toan 1823 select committee plan for colonisation and
its 1826-27 evaluation ofthe scheme that had resulted in State-assisted Irish emigration to Canada (Ibid, pp 25 -
27).
149 Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ona Takiwa, 2003, p 46.
150 J SMarais, The Colonisation ofNew Zealand, Dawsons ofPall Mall, London, 1968, pp 4 - 5.
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British Government. At the time the Company was constituted in May 1839 it was known that
the British Government was about to send Captain William Hobson to New Zealand to
intervene in and acquire sovereignty over some or all of the country. It seemed almost certain
that Hobson would enact the British colonial policy ofnot allowing British subjects to obtain title
to land except by a grant from the Crown. The key figures behind the venture (by then formed
as the New Zealand Colonisation Association) also knew, several months before the Company
was constituted, that with the imposition of Crown pre-emption, all previous private
transactions with Maori for land would be subject to a Government lnquiry.!" In response
Edward Gibbon Wakefield urged the Association to act immediately to secure large areas of
land in New Zealand and it was arranged that an expedition would set out on 25 April 1839.
However this was delayed until 12 May 1839 and in the meantime the Company was
constituted. 154
The Company had completed its transactions for land for British settlements with Maori in the
central region of the country during September, October and November of 1839. Meanwhile
Hobson had been dispatched to New Zealand reaching Sydney on 24 December 1839, where
he was sworn in as Lieutenant Governor of any territory that Britain might acquire in New
Zealand. He finally arrived in the Bay of Islands on 29 January 1840 with instructions from the
Secretary of State Lord Normanby to "treat with Maori for their recognition of the Queen's
sovereignty overthe whole or any parts of New Zealand they were willing to cede.?" Hobson
immediately announced by proclamation to all British subjects that the Queen would only
acknowledge as valid those titles to land that had been derived from orconfirmed by a Crown
qrant.!" Hobson was informed by Normanby that the Governor of New South Wales would
appoint a commission to investigate all previous transactions between British subjects and
Maori for land and confirm any which were found to be valid with a Crown qrant.'" The issue
of sovereignty and the Crown's pre-emptive right were addressed in the following months by
the signing of the Treaty ofWaitangi at Waitangi and in various places around the North Island
152 Burns, 1989, p 94.
153 Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ona Takiwa, 2003, p48.
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and South Islands. Before this was completed Hobson officially proclaimed the whole of New
Zealand to be British on 21 May 1840. One proclamation covered the North Island, another
covered the South Island and Stewart Island, and both were published in the London Gazette
on 2October 1840.158
The New Zealand Company's Colonising Enterprise
The nature, purpose, extent and location of the Company's reserves for Maori gave a strong
indication of where the Company envisaged Maori would be positioned in relation to a
dominant British settler society. It is necessary to understand something of the nature of the
Company's settlements in New Zealand before examining the way in which reserves for Maori
would be located within and in relation to those settlements. At the centre of the Company's
colonising enterprise was the establishment of townships where British population and culture
could be concentrated. Therefore, its activities focused on establishing townships at Port
Nicholson, Wanganui and Nelson, with offshoots of the Company establishing settlements at
New Plymouth, Otago and Canterbury.!" The British population rose rapidly; Belich noted
that within two years of their establishment each of these towns had between 1000 and 4000
settlers. 160 By 1861, the Pakeha population of the colony had reached 100,000 heavily
outnumbering the estimated 60,000 Maori.!" In containing the British population townships
effectively bounded the limitless (and threatening) 'space' ofwilderness and converted it into a
'place.'!" Maps both recorded and expressed a desire for boundaries between the ordered,
'civilized' world of the settler township and the 'wild lands' that surrounded it, while the naming
offeatures depicted on maps divided and claimed cultural space and began the transformation
of the unknown into the familiar. 163 By surveying, mapping and naming, the Company and its
British settlers attempted to create, at least conceptually if not in reality, "an improved version
158 Ibid, P82, citing proclamations in BPP, Vol. 3, pp 140-141.
159 Ibid, P46.
160 Belich, 1996, p 188.
161 However Belich noted that three-quarters ofPakeha and one-sixth ofMaori were in Auckland, Wellington and
the South Island. Outside these centres "50, 000 Maori interacted with 25, 000 Pakeha" and here "Maori had the
power toimpose their definition ofconsent, oratleast to force Pakeha to negotiate with it"(Belich, 1996, p228).
162 Byrnes, 'No Holidays are kept in the Bush', 1993, p 15.
163 Place names performed several other functions. They "were deliberate and provocative statements ofpower"
but they also "enabled settlers todomesticate the landscape by giving features intheir new 'home' the names of
familiar and loved places they left behind." (Byrnes, Boundary Markers, 2001, p80). Names, particularly inthe
Company's settlements, commemorated founding figures and encoded the story ofBritish settlement permanently
(Ibid, p 83).
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of whatever part of the contemporary metropolitan society they had recently quit." Here a
transplanted British population would live and the township would become the location of all
that was 'civilized!" Towns also concentrated the British population, and it was hoped that
daily interaction with one another would prevent settlers from integrating to the indigenous
community and slipping down the scale ofcivilisation. 165
The mechanisms by which the Company created townships as places within the landscape
were also a means by which it attempted to "legitimise the ownership of that place."!" The
Company divided the land into sections and proposed that settlers purchase land in
'allotments' containing one town acre and one hundred acres in the surrounding country.!"
The establishment of settler homes and farms on these sections was the logical conclusion of
the Company's claims to ownership of land in New Zealand. This grid of sections laid over the
landscape was the most visible manifestation of the way in which the Company's settlements
were to be ordered according to British cultural and legal notions. In particular, it was surveyed
into regular sized sections with legally recognised boundaries. This enabled sections to be
depicted on a cadastral map and later on grants and titles, thus recording the extent and
ownership of parcels of land.!" This grid effectively enshrined Western notions of
individualism, private property and the division between public and private spaces.
The Principles of the Company's Tenths Reserve Policy
The details of the New Zealand Company's reserve policy reflected its plan for the reserves to
be the principal means by which Maori would be relocated into the 'civilised' sphere of British
townships. The Company's directors instructed William Wakefield, the brother of Edward
Gibbon Wakefield and the Company's principal agent in New Zealand, to
164 Gibbons, 2002, PP 7- 8.
165 Patrick Maloney, 'Savagery and Civilization: Early Victorian Notions' NZJH, Vol. 35, No.2,
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take care to mention in every booka-booka, or contract for land, that a proportion of
the territory ceded, equal to one-tenths ofthe whole, will be reserved by the Company,
and held in trust by them for the future benefit ofthe chief families of the tribe.!"
Essentially this required the Company to reserve urban and rural sections in the proportion of
one in ten for Maori. That is, for every ten sections selected in each of these districts by
settlers the Company would select one section for Maori. As a consequence of this policy the
Company's reserves for Maori came to be known as 'tenths reserves.' The public selection of
sections in Company settlements was determined by lottery in London, each purchaser
drawing a number that established in what order individuals had the right to select sections
when they arrived in the colony. During this London lottery Company officials drew on behalf of
Maori for their 'tenths' reserves. Jerningham Wakefield explained that by this method "the
Native reserves were sure to be well scattered among the lands occupied and owned by white
men, and of fair average value.'?" The Company's policy was vague regarding the tenure of
the tenths reserved for Maori but, as its instructions to Wakefield suggest, it initially assumed it
would hold the land in trust for Maori chiefs. l71
The Company assumed that it could allocate Maori a place to live and decide who would
receive reserves. As the Company's instructions to Wakefield suggest, it initially planned only
to allocate reserves to chiefs and their families. This appears to have been an attempt to retain
what the Company perceived as the 'classes' ofMaori society. Wakefield was reminded by the
Company that by
reserving for the rangatiras [sic] intermixed portions of lands on which settlements
shall be formed ... they will thus possess the means, and an essential means, of
preserving, in the midst of a civilized community, the same degree of relative
consideration and superiority as they now enjoy in their own tribe.!"
No provision was made for Maori not ofchiefly rank but it was assumed that they would earn a
living from being employed by their chiefs or by the settlers, and would eventually be able to
169 Instructions to Colonel Wakefield, Principal Agent ofthe Company [from the Directors ofthe Company], May
1839, BPP, Vol. 2, pp 578.
170 Wakefield, 1908, p30.
171 Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ona Takiwa, 2003, p47.
172 Instructions to Colonel Wakefield, Principal Agent of the Company [from the Directors ofthe Company], May
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buy land.!" In this regard the Company's policy for Maori conformed to its general policies
regarding social class and land ownership. The initial development of the colony was seen to
rest on keeping the price of land above the level that a labourer could immediately afford. It
was hoped that this would limit the amount of land the majority of settlers could buy and
ensure a large pool ofaffordable labour would be available to a land-owning gentry to enable
them to develop their land during the first decades ofthe colony's development.
Tenths Reserves and Cultivations
The Company's tenths reserve policy became combined with and confused by clauses in the
Company's deeds which promised that existing pa, cultivations and burial places would be set
apart for those who signed the deeds. Ideologically these promises threatened to undercut the
Company's attempts to relocate Maori onto the reserves (which was a necessary step if Maori
were to live intermixed with the settlers and learn 'civilised' habits). At least one Company
official voiced opinions about the negative effect that retaining pa would have on the attempt to
'civilise' and assimilate Maori. He declared that
nothing short of breaking up their pahs and locating their inhabitants in decent huts, in small
villages on their own reserves, and by degrees associating them with the white population, will
render them generally fit companions for any, even the lowest ofthe settlers.'?"
The question soon arose as to whether pa, cultivations and burial places were to be reserved
over and above the tenths reserves or whether these places should simply be included in the
reserves as a fulfilment of those promises. In reality where pa, cultivations and burial places
were not included by chance in the tenths reserves the Company was often forced to
designate them as part of the reserves because Maori refused to abandon their pa and
associated properly!" At Wellington Maori firmly resisted attempts to move them out of their
favourite pa: many ofwhich were located on flat lands on ornear the coast ornear freshwater
food resources - also desirable places for planned European settlement. This practice resulted
in a merging of the Company's tenths reserves, pa, cultivations and burial places, and it
became difficult for officials to separate the two categories ofland.
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The Ideologies Informing the Company's Reserve Policy
The Company's proposal to use reserves for Maori in its settlements as a means ofcontaining,
controlling, 'civilising' and eventually assimilating Maori into the British population was based
on a set of cultural assumptions. Beliefs about the necessity and desirability of 'civilising'
indigenous people in the lands that Britain colonised were widely held in a number of circles
within British society by the 1830s. These beliefs were underpinned by a widespread
assumption ofBritish cultural superiority. As Burns pointed out the British Empire's power-base
"combined a victorious army and navy with the most developed technology in Europe,
therefore it was not unnatural that some should think in terms of Britain guiding and educating
vast areas of the earth.'?" The conversion of indigenous peoples to Christianity was seen as a
necessary prerequisite for their 'civilisation' and the certainty with which Evangelical
missionaries set out to convert indigenous peoples in British colonies both reinforced and
expressed the economic and political power of the Enpire.!"
The assumption ofcultural superiority which was acomponent of Imperialism was underpinned
by early Victorian notions ofthe 'civilised' and the 'savage' which derived from astadial view of
human social development. This theory proposed that "Humanity was ... a single family,
composed of numerous peoples or nations at different stages of development?" However
amongst all these various peoples "human nature was supposed ... to be everywhere the
same - broadly amenable to reason and capable of progress through the assimilation of higher
ideas and institutions together with the reform or abandonment of corrupt and inhuman
practices."179 As a consequence, human societies could be visualised positioned on a scale or
ladder from 'barbaric' at the bottom of the scale to 'civilised' at the top. Societies were
considered capable ofmoving up (and down) this ladder as they developed (or regressed).
This view ofsocial development also informed British actions as colonisers. They implied that it
was the responsibility of more advanced nations "to help raise higher up the ladder of civility
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those savage nations displaying progressive tendencies."180 Maori fitted this category having
been identified as showing encouraging signs of being able to be 'improved' and 'civilised'.":
In particular, they had recently adopted Christianity and had demonstrated a remarkable
affinity for commerce .182
Also underpinning the Company's proposed reserve policy was a desire that Maori should
benefit from colonisation, or at least they should receive some advantages to off-set the
negative effects colonisation had been shown to have on indigenous peoples in other colonies.
In this the Company's policy was heavily influenced by the humanitarian ideals of the 1820s
and 1830s. These concerns were part of a wider context of reform movements that aimed to
improve social and economic conditions in Britain. The success of the Abolition of the Slave
Trade Society (founded earlier in 1787) in lobbying for the withdrawal ofBritish slave trading in
1807 had also turned people's attention to the suffering ofslaves in the colonies of the Empire.
This soon led to a general concern for the effects of colonisation on indigenous peoples and
the formation ofmissionary societies and the Society for the Protection ofAborigines. 183
The ideas of the Aborigines Protection Society established in 1837 had a significant influence
on the Company's reserve policy.184 In particular the Company's policy of scattering reserves
through the settler townships it created owed much to the ideas of Reverend Montague
Hawtrey, a prominent member of the Aborigines Protection Society. Hawtrey deplored the way
in which the large blocks of land reserved for indigenous peoples in the Australian and North
American colonies, atadistance from European settlement, development and 'civilisation', had
simply preserved these people in their 'unimproved' state. Instead, Hawtrey proposed that
reserves be made for Maori in smaller blocks scattered amongst the settlers' holdings, "where
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they would rapidly increase in value and provide an income by which Maori might enter 'the
same scale ofcivilisation and social order as their European visitants." 185
The Company held that "the wilderness land purchased by the Company from the natives was
valueless to them, and acquired value entirely from the capital extended in emigration and
settlement."186 Therefore, they claimed the reserves would become increasingly valuable "by
the improvement and cultivation ofother lands with which they should be intermingled."18? The
Company's assumption that uncultivated land was valueless was a pervasive concept in early
Victorian legal thought. The idea can be traced back to Emerich de Vattel's Droit des Gens
published in London as The Law ofNations in 1760 (and revised and reprinted in 1834) which
argued that the cultivation of the earth was an obligation imposed on mankind by nature, and
that therefore those who did not cultivate were 'savages'. Vattel reasoned that people had no
rights over land that they did not cultivate, and uncultivated land could legitimately be taken by
Europeans (who would cultivate it). His writing also gave validity to colonial reserves and
reservations policies by arguing that those who confined nomads within narrower limits were
obeying the 'views of nature'. These ideas were taken up and elaborated by John Locke and
later by Thomas Arnold. These theories were given added weight by early Victorian Christian
interpretations ofthe book ofGenesis, which considered those who failed to cultivate the earth
disobeyed the will ofGod.188
Company Tenths Reserve Policy as an Indicator of Visions of the Maori Future
The Company's Perspective
The Company's reserves were effectively a means by which Maori could be removed from
'wilderness' and enclosed in a space where 'civilisation' was concentrated. Heavily influenced
by Hawtrey and the Society for the Protection ofAborigines the company rejected reservations
at a distance from British towns where "the defective habits and inclinations of the savage"
were preserved and "his existence as an isolated and inferior being" was perpetuated and
encouraqed.!" Instead the Company saw itself as pioneering a system of reserves scattered
185 Sinclair, 1946, pp 40- 41,
186 Instructions from the Directors of the Company toHalswell, 10October 1840, BPP, Vol. 2, P669,
18? Wakefield, 1908, p 29,
188 Maloney, 2001, pp 154 - 156,
189 Wakefield, 1908, p 30.
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amongst the homes and lands of British settlers, This was to be the first "deliberate plan" and
"systematic attempt" to civilise and "to improve a savage people through the medium of
colonisation."190 Because such a method had not been tried elsewhere the Company
confessed its reserves scheme to be "experimental.'!"
The relocation of Maori communities onto tenths reserves was intended to perform several
important political functions. It would bring Maori into townships where British law was in
operation and being enforced. Maori behaviour in general could then be controlled and any
threat to the British population could be quickly neutralised. The way in which the reserves
positioned Maori in relation to the townships laid out for British settlers gave a clear indication
of the sort of future that was being envisaged for Maori. It was hoped that by dispersing Maori
amongst the settlers they would have settlers as "constant examples before their eyes, and
consequent emulation to attain the same results.'?" It was considered particularly important
that Maori adopt methods of agriculture which would "enable them to produce more than they
consumed, without taking all their time; so that they might set aside some hours for the
cultivation of their intellect and their religious education.?" The Company considered that this
process "would naturally lead the inferior race, by an easy assent, to a capacity for acquiring
the knowledge, habits, desires, and comforts, of their civilised neighbours."194
Te Atiawa Perspectives
Extrapolating the Company's vision for the future of Maori in its settlements from the
statements of various Company officials is a relatively straightforward matter. However,
delineating the vision of the Ngamotu hapu for their own future in Taranaki alongside British
settlers ismore challenging. Yet this is a necessary context which both offers a counterpoint to
the Company, and later Crown, view of the function of reserves and enables us to get at the
meanings which hapu ascribed to Native reserves. As outlined in the first chapter of this thesis,
there is now a substantial body of research illuminating the way in which Maori world-views
shaped their responses to the colonial encounter. I have drawn upon this literature to argue
190 Instructions from the Directors of the Company toHalswell, 10October 1840, BPP, Vol. 2, P668.
191 Ibid.
192 Wakefield, 1908, p 31.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
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that when Ngamotu hapu entered transactions with the Company in 1839 and 1840 they also
made assumptions that they would absorb such Pakeha as might arrive. As large numbers of
British settlers arrived in the early 1840s these assumptions rapidly proved to be false,
necessitating a change of approach from incorporating Pakeha into Maori settlements to
accommodating them alongside Maori communities.
The relationships of people, affiliating to whanau, hapu and iwi, to one another and to their
particular land were, and remain, intertwined in Maori thought. As a consequence, Maori saw
themselves as users rather than owners of the land. The right to use particular areas of land,
sea and waterway and their resources always depended upon an individual's membership of
and duty to an associated community living on that land.!" This was in complete contrast to
"English law, where individuals held defined parcels of land without concomitant duties to an
associated community, and where land might be given over to strangers without the
community's permission ."196
Land and resource use rights, and the relationships in which they were embedded were
'written' on the land itself in an 'oral map.?" Natural and man-made features and their names
were markers and mnemonics that acted as prompts enabling the knowledgeable viewer to
access information about whanau, hapu and iwi boundaries; land and resource use; and tapu
places associated with birth, death, and tupuna.!" Thus "their historical stories are anchored
spatially" and could be 'read' to emphasise hapu identity, whakapapa, mana and
rangatiratanga. 199 Relationships and land use became inseparable, the landscape becoming a
'kin-scape' ordered by and expressing social, economic, cultural and spiritual relationships. 200
195 The Muriwhenua Land Report, 1997, p 23.
196 The Whanganui River Report, 1999, p 110.
197 As Byrnes has pointed out surveying, mapping and naming were a "a denial-adescription - of the existing
indigenous landscape which was already navigated and named" (Byrnes, 'Affixing Names to Places', 1998, p 22).
198 Te Maire Tau has discussed Ngai Tahu landscapes and argued that whakapapa demonstrates that Maori
widely regarded geographical features as not simply places where events involving tupuna took place but as
tupuna themselves. (Tau, 'Ngai Tahu and the Canterbury Landscape', 2000, pp 41 - 59).
199 Bender, 1999, p 41. I have also drawn on Byrnes, Boundary Markers, 2001, P92.
200 This isa term employed by Barbara Bender to describe the kinds ofalternative (often indigenous) maps which
are subsumed by authoritative maps (Bender, 1999, p 36).
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As a consequence of these underlying values "Maori as users of land thought in terms of
relationships and control, not in terms ofownership.?" Connection to communities (and hence
to land) came through descent or through mcorporaton."" The incorporation of outsiders into
communities was a common practice throughout the Pacific and provided a crucial precedent
that shaped Ngamotu hapu behaviour when they encountered whalers, traders and the
Company and its settlers in the 1830s and 1840s. As apractice it allowed the outsiders to gain
access to land and other resources in exchange for contributing to the community and abiding
by its norms. In return new members with useful skills strengthened the hapu."? Alternatively
an outside group might be permitted to live on land within acommunity's rohe. While the group
would maintain its independence, it would be obliged to acknowledge the source of its land by
offering appropriate tributes to its host.'"
The expectation that Pakeha newcomers would be incorporated into Maori communities was
particularly strong in places where iwi and hapu already had considerable contact with Pakeha
whalers, traders and missionaries. In the case of Te Atiawa hapu at Ngamotu near New
Plymouth and at Queen Charlotte Sound Pakeha had already been incorporated into their
communities and they had benefited from their presence. Dicky Barrett and his whaling crew
had already become part of the Maori community at Ngamotu. In exchange for their skills as
traders and whalers, they had been given use rights to portions of tribal land and resources
and provided with wives. They were also expected to follow iwi customs and to defend the
community. As a result these hapu had already experienced the economic and technological
advantages the newcomers would bring and were acquiring and trading in western goods.
These goods had become an expression of mana in their community. They had also seen the
defensive advantage of the newcomers." These experiences and expectations would have
played asignificant role in how Ngamotu hapu in Taranaki viewed the arrival of the Company's
representatives and their 'deed of purchase'. In 1839, William Wakefield of the New Zealand
Company employed Barrett as an interpreter and pilot. When Barrett arrived on board the Tory
201 The Whanganui River Report, 1999, p107.
202 The Muriwhenua Land Report, 1997, p 24.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid, P25.
205 Angela Caughey, The Interpreter: The Biography ofRichard 'Dicky' Barrett, David Bateman, Auckland, 1998,
pp41 - 52.
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with his Ngamotu wife at Ngamotu in November 1839 bringing with him agroup ofPakeha and
explaining the intention of these men to 'purchase' the land it is almost certain that Ngamotu
simply understood that they were agreeing to Barrett bringing more of his people to live
amongst them.206
Nothing in their previous experience with traders, whalers and missionaries prepared Ngamotu
hapu for the numbers of Pakeha that began to flood into their rohe from 1841 onwards. They
foresaw neither the sheer numbers who would arrive nor the fact that they would not be the
small groups of single men they had previously been able to marry into their communities.
Their expectation that they would control where the newcomers would live and how they would
act were also quickly disappointed. All of this is quite evident from the comments of Te
Wharepouri, a Ngamotu hapu chief who saw the settlers arriving at Port Nicholson and
expressed his surprise and dismay to William Wakefield saying:
I thought you would have nine or 10 [Pakeha]...1 thought that I could get one placed at
each pa, as awhite man to barter with the people and keep us well supplied with arms
and clothing; and that I should be able to keep these white men under my hand and
regulate their trade myself. But I see that each ship holds 200, and I believe, now, that
you have more coming. They are all well armed; and they are strong of heart, for they
have begun to build their houses without talking. They will be too strong for us; my
heart is dark. Remain here with your people; I will go with mine to Taranaki?"
However, the fundamental desire for a mutually beneficial relationship with the newcomers
expressed in the words of Te Wharepouri, and the values on which this desire was based,
remained the rationale for Ngamotu hapu in dealing with settlers at New Plymouth through
agreements and purchases in the 1840 and 1850s. The values, practices and desires outlined
above strongly suggest that Ngamotu hapu regarded subsequent transactions with the
Company, Crown and settlers as agreements to an ongoing relationship in which the land was
not alienated from Ngamotu control but allocated to newcomers. In this way the community
asserted its mana over the land, and strengthened their title to i1,208 Maori notions of
206 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p 35.
207 Wakefield, 1908, pp 202 - 203.
208 Patricia E Berwick, 'Land and Land Ownership in the Wellington Tenths and Taranaki: The Gap between
Tangata Whenua and Crown Concepts in the 1840s', prepared for the Wellington Tenths Trust for presentation to
the Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1996, p 26.
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host/guest relationship ordered the relationship between Ngamotu hapu and settlers at New
Plymouth: the hosts having a responsibility to provide land and resources to the guests in
exchange for the guests conforming to the tikanga of the hosts, and bringing the benefits of
technology, trade, defence and literacy. This notion of relationship suggests that the hapu
expected the transaction to be the beginning not the end of an association akin to a
partnership."209 It also followed from these basic assumptions that Ngamotu hapu regarded
themselves as tangata whenua and the newcomers as manuhiri. Therefore it would have
seemed only fitting that they, as tangata whenua would have control over manuhiri, even to the
extent of presuming "to say where the newcomers could site their townships and build their
houses.'?" And ofcourse as tangata whenua they expected to be able to choose where they
themselves would live. With such different expectations about how Maori and Pakeha would
share the land and its resources and on what basis, it is unsurprising there were
misunderstandings and conflict between Te Atiawa, surveyors and settlers in Taranaki.
209 The Whanganui River Report, 1999, p 109.
210 Ibid, P108.
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transactions in Taranaki, 1839 -1840 (source: The Taranaki Report, 1996, fig. 5).
58
Implementation of the Company's Tenths Reserves at New Plymouth
The Provision for Tenths Reserves in the Company's Deeds, 1839·1840
The Company's ability to create tenths reserves in Taranaki was predicated upon its purported
acquisition, exclusive ownership and control of land in the district. Central to the Company's
claim were written deeds signed by some members of Te Atiawa and other iwi living at
Ngamotu near New Plymouth and in the Cook Strait region in 1839 and 1840.211 In October
1839, William Wakefield claimed he had acquired some 20 million acres from certain Taranaki
and other Maori in Wellington. The area extended from Aotea Harbour near Waikato in the
North and the Hurunui River in the South lsland."" As this included the whole of Taranaki,
Wakefield attempted to complete the acquisition for the Company with two further deeds
signed at New Plymouth by certain Maori living there. These were given effect on 15 February
1840.213 The land ofconcern in this thesis was contained in one ofthese deeds, the 'Nga Motu
deed' that purported to convey to the Company all the coastal land from Hauranga south of
Paritutu to the Mohakatino River, just south of Mokau in the norta.'" The approximate
boundaries of the Ngamotu deed are shown in Figure 2.
A clause in the Ngamotu deed promised to reserve for the Maori vendors one-tenth of all the
land purchased: "A portion equal to one tenth ofthe land ceded by them will be reserved by ...
the New Zealand Company ... and held in trust by them for the future benefit of the said chiefs
their families, tribes and successors forever.?" It is unlikely that Barrett was able to clearly
convey the contents of this clause in the deed to Ngamotu hapu in Maori. Barrett was a
relatively uneducated man with functional, but by no means expert Maori language skills,
therefore he probably struggled both to understand the Company's scheme fully and to
211 Deeds - No. 419, Taranaki Block, orThird Purchase ofNew Zealand Land Company, 8 November 1839 and
Deeds - No. 420, Ngamotu Block: Purchase ofNew Zealand Land Company, 15 February 1840 both inHH
Turton, Maori Deeds ofOld Private Land Purchases inNew Zealand, 1815 - 1840, microfiche, n/d, ATL,
Wellington.
212 The Taranaki Report, 1996, pp 22 - 23.
213 Ibid, P23.
214 Ibid, Fig. 5, P24. The second deed covered a wedge shaped portion ofcentral Taranaki land between
Hauranga and the Hangatahua River (Stony River). In 1844 the Company abandoned all claims to land covered
bythe Central Taranaki deed (p 27).
215 Deeds - No. 420, Ngamotu block, 15 February 1840, Turton's Maori Deeds ofOld Private Land Purchases.
There was also an oral agreement between Colonel Wakefield and Te Atiawa atQueen Charlotte Sound,
Wakefield recorded inhis journal for 2November 1839 that Te Atiawa agreed tothe transaction with the
Company for their land on the condition that Barrett and Love and their families also had land reserved for them,
as they had "long been considered as belonging tothe tribe" (Wells, 1878, p 20).
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translate it into an oral explanation in Maori.!" The inadequacy of his explanation of the
reserves the Company would make for Maori was exposed at Commissioner Spain's inquiry
into the Company's Port Nicholson transactions in 1843. Barrett stated that he translated the
clause in the Wellington deed that covered the reserves as: "When people arrive from
England it will show you your part, the whole of yoU."2 17 He was afterwards asked by Spain
whether he told "the Natives who signed the deed that one-tenth of the land described should
be reserved for the use of themselves and their families, or simply that the Europeans should
have one portion of the land, and the Natives the other portion?" He answered "No; I did not
tell them that they would get one-tenth; I said they were to get a certain portion of land, without
describing what that portion was.'?" Even Commissioner Spain admitted that Barrett's
translation was a likely cause for Te Atiawa confusion over the nature and extent of the
reserves.!" This gap between Company and Te Atiawa understanding about the nature of the
tenths reserves became increasingly evident during the establishment of the New Plymouth
settlement.
The Laying outof New Zealand Company's Settlement at New Plymouth
By 26 August 1840, the Plymouth Company of Devon, which intended to send immigrants to
New Zealand, had purchased 60,000 acres of North Taranaki land from the New Zealand
Cornpany.>" The Plymouth Company's surveyor, Frederick Alonzo Carrington, arrived at New
Plymouth with two assistants, two labourers and Barrett and his Te Atiawa wife and family in
January 1841.221 After admiring the fertile land around the mouth of the Waitara River,
Carrington regretfully decided against it as the site for the settlement because of the
dangerous bar at the mouth of the river. Instead, he decided the best site would be between
216 Jerningham Wakefield recorded that although Barrett "was an excellent whaler" he was "no political
economist" and "did not see the whole bearing ofour theory of the system of Native reserves; but he agreed that it
was anoble and just provision against the chance ofwant coming upon them when they should have expended
the original payment" (Wakefield, 1908, p 31).
217 'Report byCommissioner ofLand Claims on Titles to Land in New Zealand, NO.1 - Port Nicholson', 31 March
1845, BPP Vol. 5, p 16.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 The short-lived Plymouth Company was formed inPlymouth, England by Thomas Woollcombe, friend and
solicitor ofthe New Zealand Company director Sir William Molesworth on 25 January 1840. Its first immigrants
arrived atNew Plymouth on the William Bryan on 30 March 1841. After financial difficulties the Company merged
with the New Zealand Company in May 1841 (Wells, 1878, pp 48 and 59 and Raewyn Dalziel, 'Popular Protest in
Early New Plymouth: Why did it Occur?', NZJH, Vol. 20, No.1, 1986, P5).
221 Evidence ofCarrington, 6June 1844, BPP, Vol. 2, II. 1158 - 1172, pp 60 - 61.
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the Huatoki and Te Henui rivers. He returned to Taranaki the following month and began to
survey the 550 acre site of New Plymouth into town sections. Suburban and rural sections
stretching along the coast to beyond Waitara were also proposed. In all the plans covered
about 68,500 acres of cleared coastal land intended for the settlers who had purchased
Taranaki land in England.222 Individual settlers were permitted to purchase no more than eight
'allotments', each allotment consistinp of one town section (of a quarter of an acre) and one
rural section (of 50 acres)?" Carrington's plan of the township was a near perfect expression
of the ideal English town, with a green belt separating town sections from the surrounding
suburban and rural allotments. But the mismatch between these conceptions and the reality of
the New Plymouth township remained very great, so much so that the New Plymouth that had
been envisaged became a 'virtual' town.224 As late as the 1880s New Plymouth remained "little
more than the straggling village capital of a coastal strip of small farms that it had been since
its founding."225
Carrington faced persistent opposition from Te Atiawa as he surveyed the land the Plymouth
Company claimed to have purchased. This increased as Te Atiawa steadily returned to their
land in Taranaki from the Wellington Coast and Cook Strait region. By September 1841,
Carrington estimated that the number of Maori in the district had increased from about 80
when he arrived in January to around 300.226 It became clear that those who had signed the
New Zealand Company's deeds did not understand them to have conveyed their land in
Taranaki to the Company. Many others returning from the Wellington and Cook Strait region
had not been party to any transactions at all and objected to their lands being trespassed upon
222 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p 26.
223 'The Prospectus of the New Plymouth Company' reprinted inWells, 1878, pp 51 - 52. The prospectus does
not give the size of rural sections but in 1844 Carrington stated that 9350 acres of rural land in 187 rural sections
had been sold, from this a figure of50acres for rural sections was calculated (Evidence ofCarrington, 11 June
1844, BPP Vol. 2, I.1505, P78).
224 "In 1849, the town consisted ofa few small stores on either side of the Huatoki Bridge, a few cottages at
Devenport, as Sl. Aubyn Street was then called, and afew around the 1St Mary's] church." (Wells, 1878, p 147).
225 Rollo Arnold, New Zealand's Burning: The Settlers' World in the Mid-1 BBOs, Victoria University Press,
Wellington, 1994, p 183.
226 Frederick Carrington toSecretary ofNew Zealand Company (Plymouth and London), 22September 1841 in
Carrington, Frederic Alonzo, Copy of the Journal also Official and other Letters ofFred. A. Carrington, Principal
Surveyor, New Plymouth. Typescript, Macmillan Brown Library, University ofCanterbury, Christchurch, 1841, P
11.
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and claimed by the Plymouth Company.f" The Waitangi Tribunal concluded that the New
Zealand Company's transaction at Ngamoutu "was lacking in reality" and that "it was
impossible for a small group then living at one extremity of the block to have had sufficient
right, title, and interest to convey the vast territory concerned," In any case Maori did not
understand the transaction as asale,228
Carrington tried to appease the anger ofagroup ofTe Atiawa men from the Huatoki (who were
"joined by some Natives from the interior") that he had employed in March 1841 to assist him in
the survey of the banks of the Huatoki Stream. With the aid of an interpreter Carrington
attempted to explain the provision of reserves and how valuable they would become to Te
Atiawa. 229 In 1844, he described the incident in more detail, saying that he "marked it upon a
small piece of ground about the size of this table", taking a stick and making "a number of
lines, and put so many for the Europeans and so many for the Natives, and then I got the
interpreter [Joseph Davis] to explain to them the great value which the Native land would be".
However, he admitted that he did not explain "what size the Native reserves were.?" Unease
about the Company's claim to land was set to intensify as British settlers began arriving atNew
Plymouth in 30 March 1841, reaching apopulation ofover 1000 by 1843.231
227 Carrington, Copy of the Journal also Official and other Letters, 1841, for example see entries for13April 1841 ,
27 JUly 1843, 18& 22 August 1843. Also Wicksteed to Colonel Wakefield, 25July 1842 and 31 July 1843 in
Wells, 1878, pp 86 and 97 respectively.
228 The Taranaki Report, 1996, pp 34 - 35.
229 Carrington, Copy ofthe Journal also Official and other Letters, 1841, pp 51-3 and Evidence ofCarrington, 6
June 1844, BPP, Vol. 2, I. 1350, P69. He admitted hewas "not able atthat time tospeak aword of the language."
230 Ibid, I.1353 and I. 1359, p70.
231 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p 26.
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c. 1844 (source: BPP NZ 15, 1846 -1847, untitled undated
map between p140 and 141).
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Selection of Sections as Tenths Reserves for Maori
By July 1842, the settlers at New Plymouth had gathered publicly to select town and suburban
sections from Carrington's survey plan. On the same occasion town and suburban sections
were also selected as tenths reserves for Maori by the New Zealand Company's officials: the
Surveyor, Carrington; the Company's resident agent, Captain Liardet, and the Company's
store-keeper George Cutfield.232 It is unclear whether Maori knew about this selection orwere
present as it was being made. However, in the course of the survey of rural sections in the
Company's block some Te Atiawa leaders had approached Carrington, and made it clear that
they wanted to remain on particular pieces of land. On 8 June 1841, several weeks before the
date set for the public selection of rural allotments, Henry King, the Crown's Protector of
Aborigines, and an unnamed missionary approached Carrington for advice about how to
ensure that rural tenths were selected for Maori.'" In the course of their visit Carrington
produced a map on which he had marked two sections "which the Natives wished to have."234
He seems to have deliberately sought Te Atiawa opinion through one of his assistants who
was fluent in Maorj,235 It is clear that these pieces of land were within the Puketapu hapu rohe
and that the chief Katatore was the leader of the people claiming them.236 From Carrington's
evidence it is apparent that they put a strong claim to him: they were living on the lands and
"would not go off thern.?" Both the missionary and the Protector ofAborigines approved of the
sections Carrington had reserved at the wish of Te Atiawa. However, settlers selected the
sections promised to Puketapu hapu: one was selected by a surgeon named Evans and the
other by Captain John George Cooke.238 Puketapu hapu certainly must have been confGsed by
232 Evidence ofCarrington, 11 June 1844, inBPP, Vol. 2, I. 1486, P77 and Extract ofa letter from Wicksteed to
Colonel Wakefield, 8July 1842, BPP, Vol. 2 (556), P379. Presumably when the Plymouth Company merged with
the New Zealand Company inMay 1841 Carrington became employed by the New Zealand Company as he
continued surveying in New Plymouth until he left the country in August 1843 (EVidence ofCarrington, 6June
1844, BPP, Vol. 2, I. 1212, P62).
233 No notice ofappointment for position as district protector ofaborigines has been found but it was common for
resident magistrates to be appointed to the position. King was appointed resident magistrate atNew Plymouth in
1848 and retired in1852 (G HScholefield (ed), A Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, Vol. I, Department of
Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1940, p 268 and 467).
234 Evidence ofCarrington, 11 June 1844, BPP, Vol. 2, I. 1486, P77.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid, 1.1491, P77.
237 Ibid, 1. 1494, P77.
238 Ibid, I. 1490, P77. It islikely that this was one ofthe root causes ofcontinuing Te Atiawa protest and
occupation ofCooke's Farm until the Crown purchased it forCooke in 1848.
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the fact that a promise had been made by Carrington but disregarded by other Company
officials.
The intervention of Henry King, the District Protector of Aborigines, in the selection of the
Company's rural tenths for Maori in Taranaki was the Crown's first, rather informal,
involvement with reserves for Maori in the province. The Company had notified King that the
rural lands were to be selected on 20 June 1841 and King became concerned that "such notice
is silent as to the reservations of the one-tenth of the land made by the Company in favour of
the aborigines."239 He made inquiries with Carrington about what arrangements the Company
intended to make regarding the selection ofrural tenths in order
to prevent, if possible, any disappointment and annoyance that may arise, should it
happen that lands, the possession of which the Natives may be desirous to retain,
should be selected to the exclusion by parties who are about to select land under your
notice,z40
These comments imply that King understood that the location of the tenths should, at least to
some extent, reflect Maori wishes for land that they wished to retain. As we have seen this was
entirely at odds with the Company's official policy. Carrington informed King that the town and
suburban tenths had been selected for Maori by Company officials and advised King to attend
the selection' of rural land on the 20th "when you can choose, or see chosen, every tenths
section, and ensure tothe Natives that towhich they are entitled."241
It appears that there was a break-down in communication which caused misunderstandings
between King and the Company's new agent John Tyson Wicksteed about who would draw
lots for Maori in preparation for the public selection of rural allotments. This resulted in no one
drawing lots on behalf of Te Atiawa,z42 A dispute then arose between King and Wicksteed
about this omission and who had the authority to choose sections for tenths reserves. When
King protested at the selection of rural sections on 20 June 1842 that no provision had been
made for rural tenths for Maori, Wicksteed informed him that "that he ought to have drawn to
239 Carrington quoting from King to Carrington, 4 June 1841, BPP, Vol. 2, I. 1484 -1485, P76.
240 Ibid, I.1485, P76.
241 Ibid, I. 1486, P76.
242 Extract ofa letter from Wicksteed to Wakefield, 8 July 1842, BPP, Vol. 2, P379.
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see what number the Natives were entitled to, and that in consequence of his not putting in a
lot for the Natives, they were excluded in his oplnion.?" Wicksteed prevailed and no rural
reserves were made despite King's claim to have the authority to choose lands for Te Atiawa
by virtue of his position as District Protector of the Aborigines.244In turn, Wicksteed refused to
acknowledge King's authority because he claimed that the directors of the Company had
instructed him as resident agent to choose the Native reserves in concurrence with the
Company's chief surveyor." This dispute was symptomatic of a general struggle for power
between the Company and the Crown, as the Crown began to assert its authority in the colony
after the arrival of Lieutenant Governor Hobson in the country in January 1840 and the
subsequent establishment ofCrown Colony government in New Zealand.
Wicksteed's unwillingness to select rural tenths for Maori after the public selection on June 20
was at least partly a response to complaints from settlers who were unhappy about scattered
sections being set apart as rural tenths. Two settlers, Charles Brown and Alexander Aubrey,
had come to Wicksteed arguing that the forthcoming selection of rural tenths would violate the
Company's terms of sale that "expressly stipulated, that purchasers might take their land in
contiguous sections orblocks.'?" Incidents ofthis kind caused the Company to rapidly modify
its policy. Instead of scattered sections selected by the Company on behalf of Maori, William
Wakefield approved a new policy of aggregating tenths into larger blocks, with Maori having
input into the location of reserves. Wicksteed suggested that the best solution to the tension
between the provision of rural tenths and settler demands was to "to take a block of land for
the Natives, equal to what their tenths would give them, in some districts agreeable to
themselves."247 Wicksteed was ofthe opinion that "this arrangement would be preferred to that
which mixes them up with the Europeans, especially as their town and suburban lands enable
them to live among the settlers, should they like the proxirnlty.?" Wakefield agreed to
Wicksteed's change ofpolicy, hoping that Maori returning to the district would be happy to "be
243 Evidence ofCarrington, 11 June 1844, BPP, Vol. 2, I. 1487, P77.
244 Extract ofa letter from Wicksteed to Wakefield, 8JUly 1842, BPP, Vol. 2, P379.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
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located together for the purposes of cultlvatlon.?" However, nothing seems to have been
done about providing rural tenths for Maori in Taranaki. Two years later William Spain, the
Commissioner appointed to inquire into the Company's transactions, recommended that the
Crown should appoint someone to make aselection of rural tenths for Maori.25o
There is conflicting evidence about both the total amount of land finally reserved by the
Company for Te Atiawa and what type of sections it comprised. Sources clearly indicate that
Company officials on behalf of Te Atiawa selected town and suburban sections as tenths, but
that no rural tenths were selected for tnem."! On one hand a May 1843 report by the Company
stated that it had reserved 6,000 acres of town and suburban land for Maori at New
Plymouth.252 This equated to one-tenth of the 60,000 acres it claimed in Taranaki. It is unclear
what proportion of this 6000 acres was in quarter-acre town sections and what proportion in
the larger 50 acre suburban sections. A map of the suburban sections and tenths is shown in
Figure 3, the 12 sections that are shown as reserved for Maori (excluding those with Barrett's
name on them) certainly do not represent one-tenth of the sections surveyed. However they do
equate to slightly more than 1 in 10 ofthe sections selected by settlers.i" On the other hand,
an 1868 inventory of "lands set apart for the benefit of the Natives by the New Zealand
Company" in Taranaki states that 200 town sections ofa quarter of an acre each (a total of50
acres) and 19 suburban sections of 50 acres each (a total of 950 acres) were the only tenths
created. This totalled just 1000 acres, far less than 10 percent of the Company's 60,OOO-acre
c1aim.254
The Company's Reserve Scheme: Initial Difficulties
The Company's tenths scheme was less successful than had been hoped. The primary reason
for this was that Te Atiawa firmly refused to abandon their existing pa and kainga and relocate
249 Ibid.
250 Spain toFitzRoy, 12June 1844, AJHR, 1860, E-2, No.7.
251 Evidence of Carrington, 11 June 1844, BPP, Vol. 2, I. 1522, P79.
252 The Seventh Report of the Directors of the New Zealand Company presented tothe Annual Court of
Proprietors, London, 30th May 1843, printed by Johnston and Barrett, London, 1843, p 11.
253 If the suburban sections were 50 acres as the Plymouth Company's prospectus indicated (see note earlier in
this chapter) then these 12sections totalled only 600 acres, leaving 5400 acres in town sections. Given that this
equates to21, 600 quarter-acre sections this seems amassive amount oftown land tobe allocated toMaori.
254 'Papers Relative toLands set apart for the Benefit of the Natives bythe New Zealand Company - Taranaki
Inventory', AJLC, 1868, encl. in No.4, n/d.
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their communities onto the tenths reserves provided by the Company." Although, as
previously noted, incomplete and simplistic explanations did little to assist Te Atiawa
understanding of the reserve scheme, the real problem was that the reserves were
incompatible with the historical identification of Te Atiawa hapu with their own areas. The
Company failed to understand that Te Atiawa's reality was a landscape of recent and ancient
settlements, cultivations, places for gathering the resources of forest, waterways, coast, and
ocean; and burial and other tapu places that marked out relationships and mutually agreed use
rights. Therefore, the areas of land which had been selected as tenths reserves by the
Company for Maori were already subject to, and in the eyes ofTe Atiawa remained subject to,
ancestral rights and associations.
Te Atiawa refused to use reserves that were on land that they had no tribally sanctioned rights
to. A typical incident occurred in 1844 near Cooke's farm at the Hua. Puketapu hapu began
cultivating an area selected by Captain Cooke. George Clarke junior, the Assistant Protector of
Aborigines, "remonstrated with them ... and pointed out two Native reserves at a short
distance, which were much more adapted to their purpose." However Puketapu hapu
"positively refused to make use of them; on the plea that they belonged to another family, and
that, therefore they had no right to occupy them.256 They felt strongly about their perceptions
stating, "that it was with reluctance they interfered with Mr. Cooke, and that they were ready to
remove if I would point them out another spot upon which they could cultivate with equal
advantage, within the limits of their own clalm.?" However, all that Clarke could do at this
impasse was to rather limply advise them not to interfere with Europeans?"
255 As acontemporary critic ofthe Company's scheme argued, reserves in town were unable toprovide Maori
with the natural resources they were accustomed to and itwas unrealistic to expect that Maori would immediately
desire to leave places that meet their needs, and on which they had settled over many generations, and where
their ancestors were buried, to occupy town sections and amongst settlers (Ernest Dieffenbach, Travels in New
Zealand: With Contributions to the Geography, Geology, Botany, and Natural History ofthat Country, John
Murray, London, 1843, pp 146-8).
256 'Extract from Sub-Protector Clarke's Report to the Chief Protector', 29 June 1844, AJHR, 1860, E-2, No, 10.
257 Ibid.
258 In Wellington Commissioner Spain noted with surprise that the Company were experiencing similar difficulties
"in getting Natives belonging to one family togo on areserve made within the boundary ofthe land belonging to
another family." ('Report by Commissioner of Land Claims on Titles to Land inNew Zealand, No.1 Port
Nicholson', 31 March 1845, BPP Vol. 5, P15).
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These situations were not uncommon in Taranaki, and Te Atiawa were generally resistant to
occupying the tenths reserves because they were not located in areas where particular
communities had traditional rights. The following month after the incident at Cooke's farm,
John Whiteley, a Wesleyan missionary who had been active amongst Te Atiawa in Taranaki
since before the Treaty was signed, informed George Clarke senior, the Chief Protector of
Aborigines, that the allocation of reserves "with distinct reference to the prejudices, preference
and predilections of the Natives themselves as to locality" had not been attended to and that
he had heard this "complained of again and aqain.?" The Wesleyans seemed to be
advocating that reserves for Maori should conform to the places they already inhabited. Again
the idea that reserves should be aggregated into larger blocks was raised. Late in 1844
Samuel Ironside, another Wesleyan missionary, suggested to Commissioner Spain that "ample
provision of land should be made for the resident Natives, not in sections chosen by lottery, but
blocks of5,000 acres in the different directions now occupied by them."26o
The New Zealand Company's Administration of the Tenths Reserves
The New Zealand Company had a well-articulated general theory of reserves for Maori but its
plans for administering the reserves were extremely vague. The Company's instructions to
William Wakefield, and the clauses relating to the provision of reserves in the deeds which he
executed show that the Company intended to hold the reserves in trust for the benefit ofchiefs
and their families. 261 Although the Company never formalised this trust it did appoint Edmund
Halswell, a lawyer who had been involved in the establishment of the Company, as its
commissioner "for the management of the lands reserved for the Natives in the New Zealand
Company's settlements."262 However, the Company's plans for the administration of the
259 Whiteley toGeorge Clarke senior, 1July 1844 enclosure 1inWhiteley toSecretaries, Kawia [sic]. New
Zealand, 15August 1844, Wesleyan Missionary Society Papers, qMS-2178, ATL, Wellington.
260 Ironside to Spain, 30 October 1844, BPP, Vol. 5, P80.
261 Trusteeship also had a Christian basis. The decision toset aside one tenth of the land echoes the Biblical
practice ofgiving one tenth ofall you have toGod. Inthis case the members ofthe Aborigines Protection Society
who conceived this policy saw themselves as trustees of this tenths, which they must improve if God was tobless
the colonising endeavour. There isan echo here of the parable of the talents as well: the Society declared that
"Colonisation ". will not prosper, - will not be well pleasing to the Most High, if, intaking nine tenths, we turn not to
the best advantage ofour wards, like honest guardians, the remaining tithe" (Sinclair, 1946, pp 27 - 28 citing
England &Her Colonies, Aborigines Protection Society, 1841, P8).
262 Ward toHalswell, 10 October 1840, The Twelfth Report of the Directors ofthe New Zealand Company,
London, 1844, p481 (Wai 145# A29) and Ward toWakefield, 13October 1840, Exert relevant to the tenths from
CO 208, P347 (Wai 145 record ofdocuments, doc C1 (c)).
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reserves were so lacking that Company directors confessed that they could offer Halswell no
instructions. Instead they asked him to report onthe Maori population, its habits and the quality
of the reserves and to make suggestions for the "cultivation, improvement, or disposal of the
reserves. "263
The Company was uncertain as to whether Maori should manage the reserves themselves,
either by cultivating them or letting them to settlers. Neither were they sure what was to be
done with the rental income generated if they were to be leased to settlers. They wondered
whether it should be "permanently appropriated as afund for promoting the moral and religious
instruction of the chief families, or the Native race generally."264 Neither was the Company or
the Crown certain about who actually owned the reserves. In 1840 Halswell considered that
"the reserves can only be dealt with at present as the property of the Company."265 Yet in 1845,
Halswell stated that Native reserves "might be considered their [Maori] exclusive private
property.'?" But as Halswell reported, Governor Hobson, "always appeared to treat the
reserves as the absolute property ofthe Natives."267
The Crown's Intervention in theAdministration of theCompany's Tenths
Reserves
Edmund Halswell's Administration as Commissioner of Native Reserves
In July 1841,. the Crown appointed Edmund Halswell as its first official specifically charged with
the administration of the tenths reserves at Port Nicholson, Nelson, Wanganui and New
Plymouth. As we have seen, the Company had already appointed Halswell as its
commissioner of reserves in April 1841. However he had only been in the country three
months when he was informed by Governor Hobson that his "commissionership of Native
reserves under the Company was a nullity, because the Company had no land to reserve." As
Hobson saw it, the Company as yet held no Crown derived legal title to land in New Zealand,
and therefore could not make reserves from land it did not own. Instead Hobson proposed that
263 Ward toHalswell, 10October 1840, The Twelfth Report of the Directors ofthe New Zealand Company,
London, 1844, p 481 - 483 (Wai 145 record ofdocuments, doc A29).
264 Ibid.
265 Instructions from the Directors of the Company toHalswell, 10October 1840, BPP, Vol. 2, P669.
266 Extract from a report byEdmund Halswell tothe Superintendent of the Southern District, 15April 1845, BPP,
Vol. 5, P427.
267 Halswell to Secretary, New Zealand Company, 11 November 1841, The Twelfth Report of the Directors ofthe
New Zealand Company, London, 1844, p487 (Wai 145 record ofdocuments, doc A29).
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Halswell should take up paid positions in the Court of Quarter Session and in the Court of
Requests at Wellington and be appointed Protector of Aborigines for the southern district and
commissioner of Native reserves, without a salary for either of the latter offices.?" This
illustrates again how the administration ofthe tenths was very quickly caught up in the struggle
for power between the Crown and the Company. As far as the Crown was concerned Halswell
was not an employee of the Company, but was fully and officially employed by the Governor.
However, Halswell and the Company both continued to consider that he was employed by
them to manage Company reserves. As a consequence he received instructions on the
management of the reserves from the Company's principal agent, William Wakefield, as well
as from the Governor and other Crown officials such as George Clarke senior (Chief Protector
ofAborigines) and from Willoughby Shortland (the Colonial Secretary).269
Halswell's administration was hampered by the conflicting approaches ofthe Company and the
Crown regarding the purpose of the reserves. The Company attempted to persuade Maori at
Port Nicholson to vacate their pa and cultivations on sections allocated to settlers and tomove
onto the tenths reserves provided for them,z70 In contrast the Crown "preferred a policy of
leasing the Native reserves to settlers, with the rental income going to the benefit ofMaori,
rather than encouraging Maori to live on the reserves.'?" The Crown pursued its policy by
appointing acommittee to oversee tenders for leases of tenths reserves at Port Nicholson in
September 1841: one ofwhose members was Halswel1.272 The formation of acommittee may
have been connected to the Crown's granting of a Royal Charter of Incorporation to the
Company on 12 February 1841, in which the Crown expressed its intention tomanage reserve
lands on behalf of Maori and. for Maori benefit.'?' The revenue from these leases was to be
paid directly to the Colonial Treasurer, to be credited to a "Native trust fund.?" The Waitangi
Tribunal concluded that "this indicated that the Crown had abandoned the Company's plan to
268 Edmund Halswell toLord Lyttleton, 29 April 1846, BPP, Vol. 5,pp 422-423. Official announcement of
Halswell's appointment toall three ofthese positions was published in the New Zealand Gazette, 1841, No.2,
P29.
269 Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ona Takiwa, 2003, p 282.
270 Ibid.
27! Ibid.
272 The other committee members were Michael Murphy (Police Magistrate) and Richard Hanson (Crown
Prosecutor) (Ibid).
273 Johnson, 1997, p 3.
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make chiefs and their families alone the beneficiaries of the tenths and had adopted a trust
policy in relation to the reserves."275
However, it soon became apparent that the Crown's committee would have difficulty controlling
the leasing of tenths reserves and collecting the rents from them for Native purposes. Maori
were quick to see the opportunity to arrange leases of reserves directly with settlers. This
strongly suggests that they regarded the reserves as land which remained in their ownership
and over which they had the right to exercise all the property rights of owners. In 1841,
Halswell commented to the Secretary of the New Zealand Company that "though, taking the
Natives as a body, they are not capable of undertaking the management of their lands, there
are individual instances where the letting and renting of land are well understood.'?" It
appears that when Maori attempted to lease reserves Halswell intervened either to stop the
lease being executed or failing this, to collect the rents for the trust fund.277 The Crown also
attempted to stop Maori and settlers arranging leases between themselves by threatening to
prosecute settlers who were occupying or leasing Native reserves. 278 This response by the
Crown is consistent with its ongoing assertion of the sole right to grant title (this included land
claimed by the Company as at this point the Company had not been issued a Crown grant for
land inany of its settlements).
When it realised that stopping privately arranged leases was impossible the Crown intervened
to control these leases and the revenue from them. In September 1841, Halswell was informed
by George Clarke senior that the committee of trustees was to let, by public tender, reserves
not occupied by Maori. Leases were to be for a term of no more than seven years, and they
were instructed to collect the rents and use them to pay for the particular Maori religious,
274 Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ana Takiwa, 2003, p 285.
275 Ibid, P282.
276 Halswell tothe Secretary of the Company, 11 November 1841, BPP, Vol. 2, P671.
277 The Tribunal cited as evidence the case ofthe Pipitea chief Wairarapa who Halswell prevented from letting a
Thorndon tenth in1841 and the case ofWi Tako Ngatata who was letting a tenths reserve atKumutoto only to
find that the rent was being collected byCommissioner Halswell
(Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ana Takiwa, 2003, p 282).
278 Proclamation byColonial Secretary, Willoughby Shortland, 10September 1841, HHTurton, An Epitome of
Official Documents relative to Land Purchases in the North Island ofNew Zealand, 1883, ATL, Wellington,
microfiche edition, nld, D-2.
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educational and health facilities outlined in the letter.?" Halswell complained that the policy had
"prevented my letting any of the lands, no one having been found willing to erect buildings on
town acres, or clear country land, for so short a term. In consequence, not a foot ofground has
been taken, and no funds have been realised."280 It appears that Halswell sanctioned no leases
for tenths atNew Plymouth. Bishop Selwyn reported that he had been unable to sanction any
expenditure for the benefit of Maori at New Plymouth because he "could not learn that any
Native land had been let in the settlement of New Plymouth.'?" When no further instructions
were forthcoming from the Company or the Governor, Halswell felt unable to do much more to
let the reserves or to generate income for the benefit of Maori.282 In April 1842, Halswell was
instructed to refrain from entering into further leases, partly as result of problems associated
with Barrett's lease, but also as a result of a more general level of confusion surrounding the
nature ofadministration."283
Administration by theCrown Trustees
In 1842 the Governor appointed three trustees: Bishop Selwyn, of the Church Missionary
Society in New Zealand; William Martin, the Chief Justice; and George Clarke senior, the Chief
Protector of Aboriqines.t" to replace Halswell and the other committee members as
administrators of the tenths reserves." It was envisaged that the tenths would be legally
vested in the Crown who would then vest them in the trustees along with the rents from the
reserves." However, after the death of Hobson, the Acting Governor Shortland refused to
279 Clarke toHalswell, 28 September 1841, Turton's Epitome, D-3.
280 Halswell to the Colonial Secretary, 29 November 1841 & Halswell toSecretary, New Zealand Company,
10February 1842, The Twelfth Report of the Directors of the New Zealand Company, London, 1844, p 488 and
490 (Wai 145 record ofdocuments, doc A29).
28! G.A.[Bishop Selwyn] toHis Excellency, 19December 1842, BPP, Vol. 2, p 186.
282 Halswell to the Secretary of the Company, 10February 1842, BPP, Vol. 2, P676.
283 Johnson, 1997, p 8. Barrett had erected ahotel on town acre 514 partly on the strength ofa claim to the land
byhis wife's people (Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ona Takiwa, 2003, p 283).
284 Governor Hobson appointed the first protector of aborigines in New Zealand, the missionary George Clarke
Senior, in 1840 under instruction for the Colonial Office. He and his district protectors were tohave summary
jurisdiction incourt cases between Maori and Pakeha and were toplayarole inprotecting Maori interests during
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285 Colonial Secretary toHalswell, 18June 1842, The Twelfth Report of the Directors of the New Zealand
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1843. (Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ona Takiwa, 2003, pp 283 - 284).
286 Shortland to the Chief Justice, 26July 1842 and Bishop ofNew Zealand toArthur Wakefield, 23May 1843,
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pass legislation to formalise the trusf.'" In 1845, Halswell was in doubt that any "declaration of
trusts has ever been executed" and was uncertain as to whom the reserves were actually
legally vested in,288
The fundamental principle of the trust remained the same as that of the 1841 Port Nicholson
committee: that isthat the 'improvement' ofMaori was to be paid for by the revenue generated
by leasing the reserves." All funds generated, after the Protectorate Department's costs had
been covered, were to be applied by the trustees to "the establishment of schools for the
education of youth among the aborigines, and in furtherance of such other measures as may
be most conducive to the spiritual care of the Native race, and to their advancement in the
scale of social and political existence.?" Bishop Selwyn considered that hostelries and
schools on the English model, and very much for the purpose of changing Maori habits and
bringing them into astate of 'civilisation' should be a priority. 291
The terms ofthis trust had several advantages from the perspective of the Company and ofthe
Crown. The tenths in fact became a 'reserve' of land that could be made available to settlers
as leasehold. The rents would pay for the 'improvement' of Maori so that they would not be a
drain upon the Company or Crown's limited funds. Meanwhile the facilities built would rapidly
assimilate Maori. However, in reality this was extremely problematic. Sufficient revenue to fund
this programme depended upon leasing the very reserves on which Maori were living. Allowing
Maori to remain in their pa and kainga that were also supposed to be reserved for them could
287 Governor FitzRoy initiated another attempt atatrust forNative Reserves in 1844 through the Native Trust
Ordinance 1844; its preamble isaclear statement that these lands and the funds that would derive from them
were tobe applied for the purposes ofthe rapid assimilation ofMaori into the habits and usages of the European
population. However FitzRoy's successor, Governor Grey refused to gazette the ordinance and soit never came
into force (Johnson, 1997, p 12.)
288 Extract from areport byEdmund Halswell tothe Superintendent of the Southern District, 15April 1845, BPP,
Vol. 5, P427.
289 Colonial Secretary tothe Chief Justice, 26 July 1842, BPP, Vol. 2, P683.
290 The idea that reserves should be leased to provide funds for institutions to 'civilize' Maori appears tohave had
the support ofthe Aborigines Protection Society: A leading member of the society, Reverend Hawtrey, writing to
Lord Russell ofthe Colonial Office in 1840, "explained that his intention was that these reserves should be made,
not so that the Maoris could continue tolive in their customary way, but so that a fund might be provided tomeet
"the expenses which must be incurred before the Natives can be placed in the same scale ofcivilization and
social order as their European visitants." (cited inSinclair, 1946, pp 40 - 41).
291 Extract from the letters and visitation [51] ofthe Bishop ofNew Zealand - Journal, written atNelson, August 21
toAugust 29, 1842, The Fifteenth Report orthe New Zealand Company, London, 1842, Appendix No.1, P17.
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solve this problem. However, many of these places had not been reserved as promised, and in
any case allowing Maori to remain in their settlements threatened to undermine the Company's
programme of assimilation. That policy depended upon breaking up the communal lifestyle of
pa and kainga and persuading Maori to live on reserves and embrace western notions of
individual ownership.
The plans to use funds from the rents from tenths reserves to pay for the costs of protecting
and 'ciVilising' Maori were severely constrained by the small amount of revenue that was
generated. Few reserves were ever leased and so the revenue generated was too low to
sustain the programme that Selwyn had in mind.292 Chief Justice William Martin had resigned
as trustee in 1843 and Bishop Selwyn resigned in February 1844 after Governor FitzRoy
refused to recognise the existing trustees?"
Administration of theCompany's Tenths in Taranaki by the Crown's Trustees, 1841 •
1844
In 1841 the Crown's trustees appointed Henry St. Hill, a Wellington land agent, as their agent
for the tenths in Taranaki. In January 1844, Wicksteed, the Company's agent in the settlement,
claimed that because St. Hill had difficulty visiting New Plymouth as often as the trustees
required Bishop Selwyn had asked him to act for St. Hill "in letting and superintending the
Native property in Taranakl.?" New Plymouth was certainly the most isolated of the
Company's settlements, so it probably seemed logical that Wicksteed would be appointed as a
deputy to the trustees. However, the administration soon broke down because ofdifferences of
opinion between Wicksteed and Henry King, the Crown's Protector ofAborigines in the district.
Wicksteed followed the Crown trustees' lead in arranging or sanctioning leases over some of
the tenths reserves, while King complained that Wicksteed was letting reserves against the
wishes ofTe Atiawa. This exposed a misunderstanding about whether ornot Wicksteed in fact
had been appointed to act for St. Hill.
292 No surplus was generated in Wellington. In Nelson, the situation was more positive: the reserves were
generating over £300 per annum and a small hospital and a hostel had been built there. (G.A.[Bishop Selwyn] to
His Excellency, 19December 1842, in BPP, Vol. 2, P186). Also see FitzRoy's assessment offacilities for Maori
(Governor Robert FitzRoy, Remarks on New Zealand inFebruary 1846, Wand HWhite, London, 1846, p60).
293 Te Whanganui-a-Tara me ana Takiwa, 2003, pp 283,285.
294 Wlcksteed to Wakefield, 22January 1844, Turton's Epitome, 0-11.
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Wicksteed reported that he had let several of the tenths reserves "on advantageous terms to
respectable tenants.'?" But King had written to Bishop Selwyn informing him that Wicksteed
had let reserve lands that Maori wished to occupy.'" Presumably, King had come to this
opinion from complaints brought to him by Te Atiawa. Before the matter was resolved, Bishop
Selwyn visited New Plymouth, where he insisted "upon the Native reserves being let for the
benefit of the aborigines, and not occupied by them.'?" In response to King's complaint Bishop
Selwyn instructed Wicksteed to abstain "from acting on behalf of the Native reserves in any
ostensible manner: the Company having resigned the charge of the Native reserves into the
hands of the Government."298 Clearly Selwyn believed that Wicksteed was acting as the
Company's agent in administering the reserves. Therefore he asked him toco-operate with the
Crown's officials: Mr. St. Hill, the agent for the trustees, and the Acting-Protector ofAborigines
in the district, Captain King, in ensuring that "the wishes of the Natives may in all cases be
consulted, and that no land upon which they are now settled be let, save with the express
consent ofthe Board ofTrustees.'?"
Wicksteed objected, complaining that the Bishop's stand on the matter was contradictory. On
one hand the Bishop had said that Native reserves were to be let rather than occupied by
Maori and on the other he insisted that Maori wishes as to which land they occupied and which
they leased were to be respected." Wicksteed also recognised that if reserves intended by
the Company for Maori use and occupation were not to be occupied and cultivated by them
this left the problem ofwhere Maori were going to live in adistrict where all the remaining land
in the area had been 'purchased' by the Company and was now, as he saw it, the Company's
exclusive property. It was clear to Wicksteed that the reality would be that reserves not
295 Ibid.
296 G.A. New Zealand, Auckland, to the Colonial Secretary, 8 May 1843, IA1,43/204, ANZ, Wellington. He may
also have been influenced by the opinion ofthe Chief Protector ofAborigines, George Clarke, who "publicly
declared that these reserves were payment to Maori for the remainder of the land. Maori therefore looked upon
them as their own and they effectively ceased to be available to be leton their behalf by Crown trustees." (Ward,
1997, p 91).
297 Wicksteed to Colonel William Wakefield, 30 November 1842, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki,
A-1, NO.2.
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required for occupation by Maori could safely be let, but that should more Maori return to the
district this surplus would quickly disappear and be unavailable for generating funds."?
Bishop Selwyn's decision not to recognise Wicksteed's administration plunged the tenths
reserves into a state of administrative limbo. Wicksteed took Bishop Selwyn at his word and
refrained from interfering in the management of the reserves from April 1843. It also appears
that the Crown's trustees took no active role in managing the tenths at New Plymouth. The
following year Wicksteed stated that: "since that period [April 1843] I am not aware that any
care has been taken of the Native property in Taranaki by any person, be he trustee,
commissioner or agent." He pointed out to Wakefield that as a result the tenths were being
neglected and were unproductive interms of raising funds for Native purposes."?
The Abolition of the Company's Tenths and theCreation of Native Reserves
bytheCrown at New Plymouth, 1844
Introduction
The tenths reserves the Company created for Maori in the New Plymouth settlement were
abolished after the Governor FitzRoy found it necessary to intervene in the settlement in 1844.
His intervention was a direct result of petitions from Te Atiawa angered by Commissioner
Spain's decision to recommend that the Company's claim to 60,000 acres in the province be
upheld."? FitzRoy's intervention resulted in negotiations with Te Atiawa over a block of land
surrounding the township of New Plymouth (the FitzRoy block). Within this block the Crown
created its first Native reserves for Te Atiawa.
Commission Spain's Recommendation Regarding the Company Tenths
As mentioned previously, the Crown had signalled its intention to investigate all private
transactions for land in New Zealand. During the debate around the signing of the Treaty at
Waitangi Hobson had promised Maori that all private purchase before the Treaty would be
examined and "lands unjustly held would be returned."304 On the instructions of the Colonial
301 Wicksteed to Wakefield, 30 November 1842, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-1, No.2.
302 Wicksteed to Wakefield, 22 January 1844, Turton's Epitome, 0-11.
303 Forsaith toClarke, 10 July 1844, IA1, 44/1596 filed at44/1696, ANZ, Wellington and Whiteley to Clarke, 1
July 1844 enc. No.1 inWhiteley to Secretaries, 15 August 1844, Wesleyan Missionary Society Papers, qMS-
2178, ATl, Wellington.
304 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p25 citing Colenso.
77
Office the New South Wales legislature then enacted the New Zealand Land Claims Ordinance
in August 1840 (this was later re-enacted in New Zealand as the Land Claims Ordinance
1841). This ordinance gave the Governor the power to appoint a commissioner to inquire into
transactions. The commissioner was to recommend to the Governor that a grant be issued to
the party involved in cases where Maori affirmed the transaction .305
In November 1840 a special arrangement was made for the New Zealand Company's
transactions. The Company would renounce its claims to massive areas of the country in
exchange for four acres for every pound it had spent on colonisation, to be chosen from the
lands described in any ofits deeds.306 Although the terms ofthe agreement stated that it would
apply only to land the Company had acquired before Hobson's arrival, and the Ngamotu deed
was signed after his arrival, the Company filed a claim to Taranaki.t" In January 1841 William
Spain, an English lawyer, was appointed Land Claims Commissioner to investigate the land
purchases of the Company. However, the Wellington investigation meant that Spain was
unable to begin his hearings atNew Plymouth until May 1844.
In June 1844, Spain recommended that the Company be awarded 60, 500 acres in Taranaki.
. .
As a part of his decision to recommend that the Company's existing arrangements be
confirmed Spain also upheld the existing tenths reserves and suggested that the tenths
scheme be completed by the allocation ofrural tenths to Te Atiawa. Although many ofthe rural
sections had already been selected by settlers Spain was of the opinion that "strict justice"
demanded that an authorised officer be appointed to select the reserves on behalf of Te
Atiawa and that "the officer oragent who may hereafter be authorised for this purpose, should
be at liberty to make choice of any sections already so selected by purchasers from the
Company.'?" He also recognised that in making such choices the agent should consider "the
obvious interests, the fair requirements or the natural predilections of the Natives."309 He
305 Ibid, P25.
306 R. Veron Smith toSomes, 18 November 1840 and Somes toRussell, 19November 1840, BPP, Vol. 3, P207
and pp 209 - 210 respectively.
307 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p 25.
308 Spain toWicksteed, 13 June 1844, BPP, Vol. 5, P80.
309 Ibid.
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suggested to Govemor FitzRoy that the trustees ofNative reserves appoint "an agent here, to
make these selections as soon as possible.'?"
Spain also attempted to ensure the Company's promises to reserve pa, cultivations and burial
places were honoured in addition to the 6050 acres towhich Te Atiawa were entitled as tenths
reserves.": However, he was careful to define the limits of pa as being "the grounds fenced in
around their Native houses, including the cultivation or occupation around the adjoining
houses, without the Ience.?" Cultivations to be reserved were to be limited to "cultivations on
those tracts ofcountry which are now used by the aboriginal Natives of New Zealand since the
establishment of the colony.'?" Spain made it clear that the award he was recommending be
made to the Company was "saving and excepting ... all the pas, burying places, and grounds
actually in cultivation by the Natives, situate within any part of the before described block of
land hereby awarded to the New Zealand Company.'?"
310 Spain toFitzRoy, 12June 1844, AJHR, 1860, E-2, No.7.
3ll Ibid. Wicksteed, the Company's agent atNew Plymouth, reported inJune 1844 that Maori were cultivating 10
acres atMoturoa; 25 acres atHuatoki; 2acres atHenui; 16 acres atWaiwakaiho; 2 acres atHua (this excluded
10 acres 'lately cut down'); 6acres atHuhira and 60 acres which were being cultivated byMaori atother places
(Numgareta [sic], Waiongana, Waitera, Pukerangiora, Kirva [sic] and Tamwa [sic]) (Wicksteed to Spain, 13 June
1844, BPP, Vol. 5, p79).
312 Wells, 1878, p 106.
313 Ibid.
314 Ibid.
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Figure 4: An 1850 Map showing the 1844 FitzRoy block (and other blocks purchased in
1847) and the Native Reserves within thatblock, (source: HHTurton, Plans of Land
Purchases in the North Island ofNew Zealand, Vol. II, Provinces of Taranaki, Wellington
andHawkes Bay, 1878, microfilm edition published byAlexander Turnbull Library,
Wellington, n/d.).
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The FitzRoy Agreement, 1844
Spain's recommendation was utterly unacceptable to Te Atiawa. They appealed to the
Governor not to accept Spain's findings arguing that, because many Te Atiawa had not been
involved in the transaction with the Company, they had not sold their land?" After Spain's
decision, and while Te Atiawa waited for a reply to their appeal to the Governor, tensions
between Te Atiawa and settlers rose steadily. There were encounters between settlers and Te
Atiawa near Mangaoraka and Waitara, and the settlers sent their own appeal to the Governor
for military aid.:" In response to these petitions, FitzRoy finally arrived at New Plymouth on 2
August 1844. He was assisted by the Wesleyan missionary Reverend John Whiteley from
Kawhia, and protectors ofaborigines Donald McLean and Thomas Forsalth.:"
It was clear to FitzRoy that some kind of solution must be found rapidly. He was firmly of the
view that despite Spain's decision the Company had not effected a valid purchase. Most of all
he was aware - he could hardly fail to be so alter their protests and letters - that Te Atiawa also
believed this. He decided to intervene "because the injustice of awarding land to the New
Zealand Company, which was well known not to have been purchased by them, was apparent
to every Native.?" For FitzRoy what was most at risk was the long-term peace, stability and
viability of the settlement: "It appeared so clear to the Governor that the view taken by the
Land Commissioner could not be adopted by the Government without causing bloodshed, and
the probable ruin of the settlement."319 A compromise which Te Atiawa, the Company and its
settlers could agree to was needed. FitzRoy recognised the settlers were already established
at New Plymouth and "required sufficient land.?" He also realised that although Te Atiawa in
the area of the town "were desirous that they [settlers] should not quit the place" they were
315 Wiremu Kingi Whiti [Te Rangitake] and other Ngatiawa chiefs from Waikanae &Warekauri to Governor
FitzRoy, 8 June 1844, Wells, 1878, p 111. Also John Whiteley toGeorge Clarke, 1July 1844 enclosure 1 in John
Whiteley to Secretaries, Kawia [sic], New Zealand, 15August 1844, Wesleyan Missionary Society Papers, qMS-
2178, ATL, Wellington from people with land atTaniwa, Waitara, Waiongana, Puketapu, Te Hua, Mangaoraka,
Waiwakaiho, Te Henui, Huatoki, and Ngamotu.
316 Ibid.
317 FitzRoy, 1846, P29. It isclear that FitzRoy's approach was heaVily informed by suggestion made by the
Protector ofAborigines, T SForsaith, see Forsaith to the Chief Protector, 23 November 1844, BPP, Vol. 12, pp
215·216,
318 FitzRoy, 1846, P29.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
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also "determined not to sell them certain favourite localities."32\ Therefore he aimed to "secure
the rightful possession of a small block of land about the town, sufficient for the present
occupation ofthe setners.?"
Te Atiawa appear to have been negotiating a policy with the colonisers to control the extent of
British settlement at New Plymouth.323 Te Atiawa hapu took the initiative, defining the block of
land on which they were willing to allow the Europeans to live. This accords perfectly with the
sense of autonomy Maori presumed as tangata whenua but was outrageous to Company
officials who believed utterly in their right to control the form of the settlement at New
Plymouth. Wicksteed, the Company's agent, described Te Atiawa as "insolent and
troublesome" because they were "marking out very narrow boundaries of the land they
intended to give up to the Europeans; who first were confined to the seaside ofthe Devon line,
then to be allowed to progress towards the Belt, or, in the event of large utu not being
forthcoming, to the south side ofthe Huatoki.,,324
By 1844 Ngamotu hapu probably realised that the old method of marrying strangers into the
community and providing them with resources in exchange for trading for and defending the
community was simply not viable as large numbers of settler men arrived with wives and
children oras part of an extended kin network. Instead they sought a means ofcontrolling and
permanently 'containing the settler community as a whole within fixed boundaries. Yet the
decision to pursue this new strategy was not made easily. McLean complained that, "every
one, young or old, has a voice in their deliberations, and which often causes dissatisfaction
and annoyance."325 But the fact that the arrangements were finally agreed to by Ngamotu hapu
demonstrated that they continued to seek new ways of creating the direct and mutually
beneficial relationships with settlers that they had expected.
In this context the FitzRoy agreement can be characterised as a "political settlement based on
the reality that there were already settlers on the land who had to be either accepted ordriven
32\ Ibid.
322 FitzRoy to Wicksteed, 22 November 1844, BPP, Vol. 5, P144. Waiver see proclamation, 6March 1844, encl.
P in FitzRoy toLord Stanley, 15 April 1844, BPP, Vol. 4, pp 199 - 200.
323 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p40.
324 Wells, 1878, pp 120 - 121, citing Wicksteed toWakefield, 23 November 1844.
325 McLean tothe Chief Protector, 17 December 1844, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, NO.4.
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OUt."326 The majority of settlers were already living within the town area that later became the
FitzRoy block, and Ngamotu people had been willing from the beginning to have Europeans
settle amongst them. Therefore the key conditions that Te Atiawa insisted on were "that
settlers still outside the FitzRoy block would be brought back into it (and the deed was not
executed until certain settlers had shifted) and ... that the settlers would expand no further."327
The Governor understood that Ngamotu people were willing to create a community on this
basis whereas Puketapu hapu under Katatore at the Hua, and Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake in
the Waitara district were more firmly opposed to any British settlement on their land. The
Protector of Aborigines involved in negotiating the agreement described the block as
"principally claimed by those Natives who are best disposed towards the Europeans.'?"
Governor FitzRoy did not view the agreement as a permanent solution to New Plymouth's
difficulties. Instead he saw the agreement simply as a way to calm tensions and ensuring
settlers had the land they required while the remainder of the Company's original claim was
gradually acquired by the Crown through deeds of cession. This was explicit in FitzRoy's
explanation of the agreement to Wicksteed. FitzRoy explained that he would secure enough
land for "the present occupation of the settlers by completing the small part only of the
purchase said to have been made by the New Zealand Company.'?" This reinforced settler
beliefs that the Company had the right to the whole area, and all that was required was to pay
further 'compensation' to some Maori." To enable the Company to eventually recover the full
area it had claimed, FitzRoy waived the Crown's pre-emptive right in favour of the Company so
that it could 're-purchase' the remainder oftheir claim directly from Maori."! FitzRoy somewhat
idealistically envisioned that Te Atiawa would offer, in their own time, small blocks of land to
the Company, to which the Company would then gain clear title.
326 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p 40.
327 Ibid.
328 Extract from Report ofForsaith to the Chief Protector, 23 November 1844, BPP, Vol. 12, pp 215-216.
329 FitzRoy to Wicksteed, 22 November 1844, BPP, Vol. 5, P144.
330 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p41.
331 FitzRoy to Wicksteed, 22 November 1844, BPP Vol. 5, P145.
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Native Reserves in the FitzRoy Block
The FitzRoy agreement was signed on 28 November 1844. Itstated that "the pas, cultivations,
burial places, and reserves are all that we retain.'?" This strongly suggests that at the very
least there was some initial agreement about these issues even if the sites and lands in
questions had not been strictly defined before the deed was signed. In the month following the
signing of the agreement the town and suburban tenths that the Company had laid out for
Maori within its original claim were abolished, and a new set of reserves were made within the
boundary ofthe FitzRoy block" The boundaries ofthe block and the Native reserves within it
are shown in Figures 4 and 5. The reserves were defined on plans of the block; they included
several that were obviously small clearings being used for cultivation, and several areas to be
used by Maori for up to a year as temporary culfivailons.?' It is also possible that some small
traces of the Company's tenths reserves remained in the Native reserves of the FitzRoy block.
The Governor wrote to Wicksteed that it was his intention that any of these tenths actually in
the occupation of Maori would be retained as reserves in the new block, but any which were
"not required for their present use oroccupation will likewise be placed at your disposal for the
above mentioned purpose alone [the resettlement of settlers onto the block]." 335 By 21
December, Wicksteed was able to write to Wakefield enclosing "a tracing of the block [FitzRoy
or "home block"] which shows the parts reserved for the Nalives.?" He reported that "nearly
all" of the reserves "were either Native reserves made by the Company, or land which they had
actually obtained possession ofand were cultivating."337
The Company's tenths policy had set the benchmark for the amount of land considered
sufficient as a reserve for Maori. However, the reserves (totalling 312.93 acres) in the FitzRoy
block represented slightly less than one tenth (9.20 percent) of the block's total area of 3500
332 Deeds - NO.2 FitzRoy Block, New Plymouth District, 28 November 1844, HHTurton, Maori Deeds ofLand
Purchases inthe North Island ofNew Zealand, 1877, Vol. II, Taranaki Province, ATL, Wellington, microfiche
edition, n/d.
333 Itwas calculated that settlers would need 2,800 acres ofthe 7,150 acre block which would still leave 4,350
acres "out ofwhich the reserves could be selected" (Extract from Report ofForsaith to the Chief Protector, 23
November 1844, BPP, Vol. 12, P216).
334 T7, TR 3and TR 7, all 1844, L1NZ, New Plymouth.
335 Wells, 1878, pp 118-9 citing FitzRoy to Wicksteed, 22 November 1844.
336 Wicksteed to Wakefield, 21 December 1844, NZC 3/24, No. 58/44, P474, ANZ, Wellington.
337 Ibid.
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acres." A few days before the deed was signed, Forsaith did a quick reckoning as to how
much land in the block would be available for allocation as Native reserves if FitzRoy's plan
went ahead. He indicated that up until this point the tenths policy had not really been
questioned, but he wondered if the demands of settlers for their sections would mean that the
Crown might need to be more flexible about this proportion. He suggested that if reserving a
tenth of the block "should be found inconvenient, the rule of reserving a tenth might be
abandoned, and separate blocks marked out for the use of those Natives who were parties to
the sale, and who reside orare in the habit ofcultivating within the prescribed Iimits."339
The creation of the Native reserves in the FitzRoy block marked a decided shift in Native
reserve policy. It shows that the Crown had firmly rejected the Company's practice of making
selections for reserve sections by lottery. They had also abandoned the idea of selecting
individual sections as reserves so that Maori were scattered amongst the sections held by
settlers. Instead the Crown took up the suggestions that had been made as early as 1842 by
the missionaries and Company officials in Taranaki that Native reserves should be aggregated
into blocks with Maori having some input into the location and size ofthe reserves>"
The Company had proposed aggregating the rural tenths into blocks in order to meet settler's
demands that they be free to choose adjacent sections to form sizeable farms. The pattern of
Native reserves in the FitzRoy block indicates that pressure from settlers to be able to hold
larger blocks of rural and suburban land continued to shape the Crown's policy regarding the
size and location of Native reserves beyond the immediate boundaries of New Plymouth
township. It is also possible that Te Atiawa were keen to have their reserve land in the rural
and suburban zone in blocks large enough for a community to live on and farm profitably. We
find that the largest reserves in the FitzRoy block (Numbers 7, 17, 18, 23 and to some extent
20, see Figure 4) are furthest from the town ofNew Plymouth, which at that time was confined
338 Deeds - No. 11, Crown Grant for the FitzRoy, Omata, Grey and Tataraimaka Blocks to the New Zealand
Company, 8 April 1850, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki Province.
339 Extract from Report ofForsaith tothe Chief Protector, 23 November 1844, BPP, Vol. 12, P216.
340 These suggestions were reiterated bya Wesleyan missionary Samuel Ironside around the time that the
FitzRoy agreement was being negotiated. He suggested that "ample provision of land should be made for the
resident Natives, not in sections chosen bylottery, but blocks of5000 acres in the different directions now
occupied bythem." (Ironside to Spain, 30 October 1844, BPP, Vol. 5, P80).
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between the Huatoki and Te Henui Rivers. Aside from Native reserves 10 and 11, all the cases
where two reserves are adjacent to each other (Native reserves 18 and 23, and Native
reserves 15 and 16) are either on the fringe of the town or beyond it. As Murray suggests, this
may have been part of a deliberate policy of making reserves in locations that would not
interfere with the expansion ofthe setternent."!
Conversely, the number of very small areas of land designated as Native reserves in the
FitzRoy block indicates that the Crown was following the policy of the Company in reserving
Maori pa and cultivations. A number of the FitzRoy reserves were clearly reserved because
they were small patches of land under cultivation at the time ofthe agreement. Understandably
Maori were unwilling to abandon their food growing clearings. But in the long term their small
size and isolation in a sea ofsettler-owned sections made them vulnerable to being subsumed
into settlers' sections, sold or exchanged. However, the Crown's commitment to reserving pa
and cultivations remained inconsistent, and some pa and kainga of historical importance toTe
Atiawa and in use at the time ofthe agreement were neither designated as Native reserves nor
reserved in addition to the Native reserves. This meant that very few reserves made were
within the central New Plymouth area and those that were made were all very small pieces of
land. This was to have the effect of permanently shutting Te Atiawa out of central New
Plymouth as. it developed as a provincial business centre. For example, Pukeariki (the hill of
chiefs), a prominent, ancient pa and burial site on the south side of the Huatoki Stream, near
the mouth, was not set aside or included within the boundaries of a Native reserve, despite a
number of approaches being made by hapu leaders to officials. It had clearly been a concern
since the beginning of the settlement, when Te Atiawa pointed out that the graves of the
children ofTe Wharepouri were in the pa, and as a result, Captain Liardet, the Company's first
Resident Agent at New Plymouth, had the immediate area around the graves fenced off.342 On
3 September 1844, two months before the FitzRoy deed was signed, McLean was approached
by Te Rangikapuoho
for a place to settle on at PukiAriki [sic] or the Flagstaff it being the Pa or residence of
all the principal chiefs ofNgamotu and several of their forefathers are now lying buried
341 Murray, 1997, p 7.
342 Evidence ofCarrington, 11 June 1844, BPP, Vol. 2, I. 1605, P83.
86
here and the [sic] Rangi Kupua is desirous of having a place at this Pah for a
residence for himself and his tribe. I promised him that I should speak to the Governor
about that when he arrived here on the first ofOctober. Moturoa also made application
for ahouse on this Pah for himself and some ofhis people to live in.343
Conclusion
From the beginning of systematic British colonisation in New Zealand by the New Zealand
Company Native reserves featured prominently in visions ofthe future place of Maori within the
Anglo-settler State. The Company created tenths reserves: one in every ten sections in their
settlements selected by lottery on behalf of Maori and scattered amongst the sections held by
settlers. These reserves were to be one of the principal mechanisms by which Maori would be
contained and controlled. In British settler towns Maori were to be 'civilised' by emulating the
example of their settler neighbours until they were eventually assimilated into the dominant
British settler society. The New Zealand Company claimed to have acquired all of the land
within the Te Atiawa rohe in Taranaki in 1840. It subsequently surveyed the land into individual
sections and a flood ofsettlers arrived at New Plymouth to take possession between 1841 and
1844. It was in this context that the Company created the tenths reserves, attempting to
reposition TeAtiawa within the 'civilizing' sphere ofNew Plymouth township.
However, the Company's tenths policy fitted very poorly with Maori concepts of ancestral
associations' and use rights. In particular the concept of exclusive individual ownership of
bounded parcels of land and the presumption that the newcomers had acquired an exclusive
right to the land that wiped away all previous tribal rights was completely alien to Maori
concepts and tikanga. As a result Maori resisted attempts to relocate their communities onto
tenths reserves. Added to these difficulties was the impact the struggle for power between the
Company and the Crown in the early 1840s had upon the allocation and administration of the
reserves. The commissioner appointed by the Company was soon also responsible to the
Governor as well and this created confusion. Nor was there certainty about the purpose of the
reserves. The Crown appointed trustees and attempted to lease the reserves as an
endowment for Maori and use the funds to build institutions to facilitate the assimilation of
Maori. In contrast the Company continued its attempts to confine Maori to the reserves. These
343 McLean diary entries 3to6 September 1844, McLean Papers, qMS-1194 and draft letter ofMcLean, 4
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assumptions, policies and the subsequent confusion over authority and purpose are all evident
in the case of the tenths reserves at New Plymouth. The result was that no rural tenths were
allocated to Te Atiawa in Taranaki and the administration ofthe town and suburban tenths that
had been selected on their behalf was neglected.
The Company's cultural and legal assumptions had shaped its vision of assimilation. The
Company's tenths and the right to the whole area claimed by the Company remained a potent
assumption for Company, settlers and the Crown at New Plymouth (even when Governor
FitzRoy overturned recommendations for a grant to the Company, and cancelled the tenths
reserves within the Company's original surveyed claim). Similarly their own law and culture
shaped Ngamotu hapu visions of their future with Pakeha. Initial expectations that they would
be able to incorporate into their communities all the Pakeha who would arrive were rapidly
modified in the face of the large numbers of settlers. The Company and its settlers had very
different expectations about who would control the allocation of land and about how the two
communities would live together, and these conflicting visions resulted in mounting tensions in
the province.
In the FitzRoy agreement of 1844 Te Atiawa sought to divide the land at New Plymouth
between themselves and the settlers, and to permanently limit British settlement. Thus
Ngamotu continued to seek ways of accommodating Pakeha on the basis of the kind of
mutually beneficial relationships they had originally envisaged, and to continue to regulate that
relationship on the basis of tangata whenua/manuhiri rights and obligations. In this way they
hoped to obtain the benefits of trade and technology in exchange for allocating settlers a right
touse land and resources.
It was in the FitzRoy block that the Crown created its first reserves for Te Atiawa. To a large
extent it followed the pattern already set by the Company of intermingling settlers and Te
Atiawa in an attempt to assimilate Maori. However the Crown abandoned the lottery system for
the selection of sections and reserves in the FitzRoy block. Instead Te Atiawa had some input
into the location of reserves. At the same time pressure from settlers was largely responsible
October 1844, McLean Papers, qMS-1192, both ATL, Wellington.
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for a move towards aggregating the rural allocation into larger blocks. These changes marked
the beginning of the evolution of a distinctive Crown Native reserve policy in the 1840s and
1850s.
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Chapter 3: Crown Native Reserves in the Ornata and Grey Blocks,
1847
Introduction
The Crown created Native reserves for Taranaki Maori at the time of its purchase ofthe Omata
and Grey blocks in 1847. These purchases from Ngamotu hapu ofTe Atiawa and Taranaki iwi
signalled a new level ofengagement by the Crown in land settlement in Taranaki. The policies
of the newly appointed Governor, George Grey, indicated that Te Atiawa would have some
influence on the extent and location ofthe Native reserves created for them. In this context the
extent of hapu influence and pressure from the Company and its settlers on Crown officials
involved in the negotiation of these purchases and Native reserves are significant factors in
assessing how successful Ngamotu hapu were in getting the reserves they wanted.
A comparison of the nature of the Native reserves created in these two blocks with the
Company's tenths and with the Native reserves in the FitzRoy block provides a useful means
of illuminating changes in the Crown's Native reserve policy and practice. These developments
in policy highlight significant tensions between the intention to continue to use Native reserves
as a means of assimilating Maori into settler society and local circumstances and attitudes
which led to reserves that tended to marginalize Maori.
Although many Ngamotu people were involved in the negotiations surrounding the selection
and survey of Native reserves in these blocks there were a variety ofunderstandings amongst
hapu about the distinction between the Native reserves and the rest of the land within the
blocks. These understandings need to be viewed in terms ofMaori and British concepts ofland
use and ownership and the ways in which settlers reinforced (or failed to reinforce) their claims
to sections within the block. The inter-cultural encounters that took place over the sharing of
this space highlight how these often conflicting views were resolved. Overall this examination
is able to indicate to what extent Ngamotu hapu were using the Native reserves created for
them. By placing this utilisation of Native reserves within the context of Ngamotu (and Te
Atiawa) engagement with the capitalist economy at New Plymouth from 1847 to 1858 (when
the commissioners of Native reserves were appointed) conclusions can be drawn about
Ngamotu strategies for economic development. These in turn shed light on Ngamotu
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aspirations for their future amongst the settlers. Similarly Crown and settler responses to this
economic self-determination indicate the place that they envisaged for Maori within settler
society in the district.
The Native Reserves and thePurchase of the Ornata and Grey Blocks, 1847
Crown Purchasing after the FitzRoy Agreement
Although the acquisition of the FitzRoy block in 1844 was not strictly a purchase it signalled a
clear intention on the part of the Crown to acquire the land within the Company's original
60,000 acre claim from Te Atiawa. The Crown and many British settlers at New Plymouth
assumed that the New Zealand Company had effected a valid purchase when Te Atiawa
signed the Company's 1840 deed, Therefore, they reasoned, the whole of the Company's
block was available for immediate settlement by British lmmiqrants.:" The Crown regarded the
Native title over the Company's block as having already been extinguished. Therefore, it
considered all that was required to take possession of the block was the payment of
'compensation' to Maori who had not received payment from the Company.
Grey made his plans to acquire the remainder of the Company's block known to Maori at a
meeting with Ngamotu hapu at New Plymouth on 1 March 1847 and at another meeting with
Puketapu hapu the following day. At first Te Atiawa from Ngamotu, Huatoki and Waiwakaiho;
Puketapu hapu resident in Taranaki; and those who had arrived by steamer from Wellington
for the meeting with the Governor, steadfastly proclaimed their position regarding the
expansion of settlement: that settlers remain confined to the FitzRoy block.:" However, it
appears that Puketapu hapu took a harder line on this settlement policy, and backed their
support for the FitzRoy agreement by actions that appeared hostile towards settlers.346
Despite Grey's angry threats that unless Puketapu accepted 'compensation' for their interests
he would acknowledge the rights ofWaikato to the land, Puketapu hapu walked away from the
344 Grey to the Secretary ofState, 2 March 1847, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 15, pp 181-182,
345 Taranaki: From our correspondent, 5 March 1847 in the Nelson Examiner, 13 March 1847. Te Atiawa at
Wellington had been active in supporting those atTaranaki inmaintaining the stand they had made in their
agreement with FitzRoy in 1844. In 1846 the Company's Agent atNew Plymouth reported that, "Letters have
been received from the Wellington chiefs urging the Natives here not to abandon their hold on MrSpain's Block."
(Wicksteed toWakefield, 5 February 1846, NZC 105/5, No. 4/46 enclosed inJanuary Report, ANZ, Wellington).
346 They issued warnings toJosiah Flight, Benjamin Wells and John George Cooke who remained on Puketapu
land, tomove into the FitzRoy block (Draft letter ofMcLean to the Governor, n/d [c. March 1847], McLean Papers,
qMS·1205, ATL, Wellington).
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meeting "without any change of mind."? This left the Governor negotiating with Ngamotu
hapu for further land for settlement?"
Given the firm resistance ofNgamotu hapu to giving up any further land for British settlement,
their offer of land beyond the FitzRoy block is at first sight extremely puzzling. It was reported
the day after their public meeting with Grey that Ngamotu people "after many inquiries .., came
over to [sic] Governor's views and surrendered all their land between Sugar Loaves and
Waiwakaiho."349 Another version of events simply stated that Ngamotu people met with the
Governor and "gave up all their claims to land.'?" Further investigation suggests that this offer
was prompted by practical, political, economic and social considerations and marked a
significant point in the adjustment of these hapu to British settlement on their lands at New
Plymouth. This new agreement with the Crown was a political compact through which
Ngamotu attempted to cement their existing relationship with the settlers, and with the new
Governor, against possible competition from other hapu returning to the dlstrlct.:" The
agreement; the relationships it affirmed; the purchase money and the land they were to retain
as Native reserves all promised to continue the economic and social benefits of western
goods, culture and technology which had already been experienced through participation in the
developing capitalist economy ofthe district.
With the Ngamotu offer on the table, Governor Grey left the district instructing the inspector of
police, Donald McLean, to complete the purchase." McLean was instructed that "every effort
should be made to acquire for the European population those tracts of land which were
347 Draft letter ofMcLean tothe Governor, n/d [c. March 1847], McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington. The
argument that Te Atiawa who had left Taranaki before the Company's transactions had lost their right to the land
through conquest byWaikato was one which had been influential in Spain's 1844 decision torecommend that the
Company's Ngamotu deed byconfirmed. For the Waitangi Tribunal's analysis of this argument see The Taranaki
Report, 1996, pp 31 - 34, 36 - 37.
348 Grey toMcLean, 5 March 1847, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 17, p 184.
349 Taranaki: From our correspondent, 5 March 1847, in the Nelson Examiner, 13March 1847.
350 Journal ofHHTurton published in the Taranaki Herald, 5 September 1855.
351 The Waitara rangatira, Wiremu Kingi Rangitake, led a heke ofnearly 600 Te Atiawa on a return toWaitara,
they left Waikanae on 17April 1848 and reached Waitara on 16 November 1848 (Ann Parsonson, 'Nga Whenua
Tautohetohe 0 Taranaki: Land and Conflict in Taranaki, 1839 - 1859' revision of report NO.1 tothe Waitangi
Tribunal: 'The Purchases ofMaori Land in Taranaki, 1839 - 1859', commissioned bythe Waitangi Tribunal,
Wellington, 1991, pp 92 - 92 also see Gore-Browne to the Duke ofNewcastle, 4 December 1860, BPP, Vol. 12,
pp 181 -182).
352 Donald McLean had formerly held the position ofDistrict Protector ofAborigines (Parsonson, 1991, P73).
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awarded to the New Zealand Company by Mr Spain ... if possible, the total amount of land
resumed for the Europeans should be from 60, 000 to 70, 000 acres."? The Government
would then issue a Crown grant to the Company for the blocks acquired. McLean was to begin
negotiations immediately "with those parties who have given their assent to it [these
arrangements], including the Natives who have offered a tract of land for sale to the south of
the Sugar Loaves.'?" This acknowledges not only the Ngamotu offer for what would become
the Grey block but also an offer from Taranaki iwi to purchase the area which become known
as the Omata block. It was clearly Grey's intention that McLean make Native reserves in the
blocks acquired. Grey stated that he planned to reserve "to the several tribes who claim land in
this district tracts which will ample suffice for their present and future wants" and instructed
McLean to be sure to take account of the acres he reserved and to ensure that land of equal
(or greater) extent was purchased outside the limits of the Company's claim to compensate."
McLean was to pay no more than one shilling six pences per acre, and the purchase money
was to be paid to Maori in annual installments over three orfour years.:"
The Ornata Purchase, August 1847
The Omata purchase was rapidly concluded with the signing ofadeed between the Crown and
the Taranaki iwi (whose interests predominated over those of Ngamotu hapu of Te Atiawa in
this purchase) on 30 August 1847. The block, containing 12,000 acres, was purchased for
£400 to be paid in three annual instalments?" The boundaries of the Omata block are shown
in Figure 4. The most pressing concerns of those who were party to this agreement were not
relationships with the settlers but rather inter-iwi relationships. Therefore this agreement
became a new means for the iwi to achieve their political ends in tribal struggles for mana and
resources. In April 1847, McLean reported
353 Instructions from Grey to McLean, 5 March 1847, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 17, P184.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
This purchase price was extremely low given that the market rate for town and suburban land atNew Plymouth in
May 1846 was £2.5.0 per acre and even rural land was fetching £1.5.0 per acre (Wells, 1878, p 138).
357 Deeds - No.7, Omata Block, Omata District, 30 August 1847, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki Province.
94
that they were desirous the Europeans should at once possess the country from
Tapuwai to the town so that the Puketapu tribe who continue their deadly enemies
should be driven from there in consequence that they were squatters on the land and
that they should not retain it any 10nger.358
What this makes clear is that the iwi and hapu involved perceived the purchase as a means of
ridding their land ofPuketapu hapu (who had been occupying part of it) by installing settlers on
the land lnstead."
Native Reserves in the Omata Block
No specific Native reserves were named in the Omata deed nor was their any clause
promising that Native reserves would be created. McLean reported that the sellers made no
requests for reserves." According to McLean this was because the Taranaki iwi were "large
possessors of land.'?" But the month after the Omata deed was signed McLean proposed,
subject to the Governor's approval, "that one [reserve] of five or six hundred acres for the use
of the Natives generally, should be laid out, in order to make ample provision for them."362 If
fact two reserves were made in this block: Ratapihipihi Native Reserve No.5 (371 acres) and
Ruataku Native Reserve No.6 (10 acres), so the total land reserved was substantially less
than McLean originally proposed. That Ruataku contains burial places strongly suggests that
signatories to the purchase deed did make a request some time after September 1847 to have
the area reserved>" These reserves are shown in Figures 4 and 5.
McLean's later decision to make reserves in the Omata block was related to the block's
position outside the Company's original claim. Because the land lay south of New Plymouth
outside the Company's 1840 block the immediate pressure on McLean from the Company and
its settlers to acquire the block was considerably lessened. So it is unlikely, unless the sellers
pushed for them, that the Crown would have felt it necessary to offer to make reserves in the
Omata block in order to conclude this purchase. However, it seems that McLean regarded
358 Mclean diary entry Monday 19 April 1847, Mclean, 0, Diaries, box 1, ATl, Wellington.
359 Itappears that Mclean rather missed this point: the willingness of the Taranaki iwi to part with the land
appears tohave been interpreted by Mclean as asign that they were "favourably disposed towards the
Europeans." (Mclean to Captain Henry King, 17 April 1847, MA-MlP-NP 1, No. 47/6, ANZ, Wellington).
360 Deeds - No.7, Ornata Block, Ornata District, 30 August 1847 in Turton's Deeds, Province ofTaranaki.
361 Mclean tothe Colonial Secretary, 13 September 1847, IA 1/74, CS 47/1801, ANZ, Wellington.
362 Ibid.
363 Research file 'Ruataku', Te Atiawa Tribal Council, New Plymouth.
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these reserves as a 'safety valve' to relieve pressure on land within the Company's block. He
hoped that these reserves set aside for the general use of Maori (not specific hapu as in the
later Grey purchase) would absorb a large number of resident Maori and those who threatened
to return from the Wellington region.364 This would "obviate to some extent the difficulty of
making large reserves within the surveyed and chosen limits of the Company."365 Politically it
was wise for the Crown to appear generous in its provision for Maori in the hope of
encouraging those resisting the sale of their coveted lands north of the Waiwakaiho to make
offers of land.
The Grey Purchase, October 1847
The successful conclusion of the Grey purchase from Ngamotu hapu depended upon the
provision of Native reserves that were acceptable to the hapu and to the Company and its
settlers. Ngamotu hapu had very definite ideas about the position and extent of the reserves
that they wanted within the Grey block. This put McLean under considerable pressure to make
the reserves requested orface the prospect ofnegotiations for the purchase breaking down.366
Ngamotu hapu refused to allow the survey of the block until the reserves had been finalised.367
To ensure that their agreement over reserves was honoured people from Ngamotu hapu
accompanied the surveyor Edwin Harris as he cut the boundaries of the reserves "and were
thus on the spot to protest if their wishes were not met." 368
These pressures led McLean to consistently characterise the Ngamotu hapu position regarding
reserves as extreme. Soon after he began negotiations he reported that "it is with difficulty I
have succeeded in obtaining land from the Ngamotu tribe of sufficient extent to make
permanent provision for Natives and meet the wants of the Europeans.'?" McLean claimed
that this was because of "the extravagant and urgent claims of the Natives on the one hand
364 He may have been making reserves for Maori generally so as toaccommodate both Taranaki and Te Atiawa
iwi returning to the province, orhe may simply have been folloWing the practice of the Company whose tenths
reserves were not allocated tospecific hapu orcommunities.
365 McLean to the Colonial Secretary, 13September 1847, IA1/74, CS 47/1801, ANZ, Wellington.
366 Wells, 1878, p 142.
367 McLean reported that Te Atiawa living in town, were "most difficult toplease in the reserve proposed for them
and even wished toprevent the survey from going on till all their wants were acceded to." (Draft of letter McLean,
15April 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington).
368 Harris tothe Colonial Secretary, 9August 1847, IA1/74, 47/1589, ANZ, Wellington.
369 Draft letter ofMcLean to Grey, 18 June 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington.
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and the various interests of resident and absentee proprietors within the surveyed limits of the
Company on the other."370 He went on to state that his "greatest difficulty has been in making
the Native reserves.'?" Overall, the hard bargaining caused McLean to conclude that his
"proceedings [were] very much retarded from the faithlessness and insincerity of the Ngamotu
tribe. "372
At the same time McLean was under considerable pressure from the New Zealand Company
and the settlers to conclude a purchase. They expected McLean to protect the 'rights' of
settlers to sections that had already been selected. McLean was forced to admit that in making
reserves that were acceptable to Ngamotu hapu he was "giving up a few sections chosen by
settlers and absentees on which they [Te Atiawa] have cultivations as reserves for tnem.?"
His admission demonstrates that the Company's initial survey was not erased by FitzRoy's
refusal to accept the validity of the Company's claim and the subsequent laying out of the
FitzRoy block. The Company's plan remained as a 'ghost grid': an unseen but potent vision of
British settlement that Company officials and settlers regarded as both an ideal and avalid and
enforceable definition ofindividually owned parcels of land.
Although Ngamotu hapu were forced to push McLean hard for the sections they wanted
reserved, and in the process risk creating ill feeling towards their communities amongst
government officials and settlers, the community at Moturoa was successful in having,
"wakawiti" [Wakawhitiwhiti] which McLean described as "their favourite Pah" included in the
reserve.'?' However, others, men of mana, found it necessary to hold out, refusing to sign the
deed of sale, until they received the land they desired to have reserved. Te Rangikapuoho (E
Rangi), achief ofNgamotu, wished to have asection on which he had cultivations reserved for
him. He met with McLean who granted him the section: only then did "Erangi and some of his
people" sign the deed and receive their share ofthe payrnent.:"
370 Ibid.
37! McLean tothe Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1847, MA-MLP-NP 1, No. 47/6, P46, ANZ, Wellington.
372 McLean diary entry, nld [1847], in McLean, D, Diary, Notes, Box 1,ATL, Wellington.
373 Draft letter ofMcLean toGrey, 18 June 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington.
374 McLean tothe Governor, 12 April 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington.
375 McLean tothe Colonial Secretary, 16 October 1847, IA1/74, CS 47/2200, ANZ, Wellington.
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The Grey purchase deed was finally signed at New Plymouth on 11 October 1847 by 28
people. The block contained 9778 acres and the total purchase price paid was £390, ofwhich
£130 was paid immediately, leaving the balance to be paid in two annual installments.?' The
Crown justified the low level of this purchase payment by restating the old argument used by
the New Zealand Company: that Native reserves provided for Maori were to be the real
payment for land ceded to the Crown. That is, Maori would receive an unearned increment: the
proximity ofthe reserves to the benefits ofcivilization, public works and British emigrants would
cause the value of Native reserves to rise rapidly?" There may have been a genuine
conviction that by the time the purchase price had been fully paid, as Grey put it, "the lands
reserved for the Natives will become so valuable as to yield them some income, in addition to
the produce raised from those portions ofthem that they cultvate.?" However, there was also
a large element ofexpedience in these arguments. Grey believed that he could keep the cost
to the Crown nominal by buying land so far in advance of British settlement that Maori would
not have had enough contact with settlers to demand anything like the market value of the
land.379
376 Absentees inWellington received part ofthe 1848 installment. (Deeds - No.8, Grey Block, Grey and Bell
district, 11 October 1847, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki province and The Taranaki Report, 1996, p 45).
377 Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 15 May 1848, BPP, Vol. 6, [1120], P25.
378 Grey to McLean, 5 March 1847, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 17, P184.
379 Ibid.
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Figure 6: Map showing the sections aggregated to form Native reserves in the Grey
Purchase, 1847 (these Native reserves can also be seen in Fig. 4) (source: HHTurton,
Plans of Land Purchases in the North Island of New Zealand, Vol. II, 1878, microfilm
edition, ATL, Wellington, n/d)
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Native Reserves in the Grey Block, 1847
The English version ofthe Grey purchase deed stated that "the Governor agrees to reserve for
us certain lands within the boundaries which have been herein set forth and surrendered
altogether to him: that is to say which have been surveyed and agreed upon by ourselves and
Mr McLean for us." It then described three reserves: 'at Moturoa' (200 acres), 'at Rotokari' (250
acres) and 'at Waiwakaiho' (460 acres). 380 These later became known as Moturoa Native
Reserve No.1, Ararepe Native Reserve No. 2 and Puketotara Native Reserve No. 3
respectively. The surveyor, Edwin Harris, gave a description of each reserve that sheds some
light on the reasons why those particular places were reserved. He noted that Moturoa Native
Reserve NO.1 included "a pah", most likely Otaka pa, and Waitapu (sometimes known as
Waahitapu) urupa, as well as 56 acres of "the estate claimed by the late Richard Barrett which
has been cultivated and in the possession and occupation of the Natves.?" The front portion
of the reserve abutted the sea, and this would have maintained access to canoe landing
places, fisheries and kaimoana reefs.382 Harris reported that Ararepe Native Reserve No.2, "at
Rotokari, better known as Barrett's Lagoon, is favourably situated for the Natives, the land
being well adapted for their mode of cultivation and adjacent to the Lagoon from which they
are supplied with eels and other fresh water fish.?" Puketotara Native Reserve No.3, 250
acres ofwhich was forested and abutted the Waiwakaiho River, would have given access to a
variety oftraditional food resources." These Native reserves are shown in Figures 4 and 5.
McLean and Ngamotu arranged for a fourth Native reserve to be set aside in this block. This
was later to be known as Ratahangae Native Reserve No.4. The reserve consisted ofasingle
50 acre suburban section abutting the Waiwakaiho River seaward of the Puketotara Native
reserve. Partly it was reserved because it had been set aside as one of the Company's tenth
380 Deeds - No.8, Grey Block, Grey and Bell district, 11 October 1847, Taranaki province, Turton's Deeds.
381 Harris to the Colonial Secretary, 9August 1847, IA1/74,47/1589, ANZ, Wellington. The section originally
selected by Barrett isshown as section 1on the map inFigure 3. Acomparison ofFigure 3 with Figure 6 confirms
that this section became part ofMoturoa Native reserve No.1.
382 Atthe same time 120 acres were reserved especially for "Barrett's widow and children that they should have in
exchange for above land atMoturoa ablock of120acres beyond and immediately adjoining the limits ofMr.
Spain's award, forming with two other sections within that award acontinuous block, ofwhich a considerable
portion was cultivated by Mr Barrett" (Ibid). Rawinia Barrett was ahigh-ranking woman ofNgati Te Whiti. It is likely
that she regarded this land not simply as her property but to be owned communally with her hapu.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
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reserves and, as McLean noted it remained occupied by Maori?" However McLean also
wished "to provide for absentee claimants returning from the south who might not be [illeg] to
go on to the general reserves.'?" He reasoned that if it was not needed by Te Atiawa returning
to the district then "it would be convenient as [a] planting ground for Natives visiting the
settlement on trading orother expedifions.?"
The Crown's Native Reserves Policy in the Ornata and Grey
Blocks, 1847
Introduction
The Native reserves made by the Crown in the two 1847 purchases continued the Company's
emphasis on the creation and allocation of Native reserves as a key means of containing,
controlling and assimilating Maori. While these aims remained constant there were significant
changes in the nature of Native reserves created to achieve these goals. Changes in the type
of reserve the Crown created and allocated to Te Atiawa reflected the need for policy to adapt
to the realities ofhow Te Atiawa communities were living in Taranaki. However, such changes
also had the potential to undercut the Crown's agenda of assimilation. This potential was
strengthened by a range of civic pressures exerted by settlers and by the New Zealand
Company. These pressures continued to multiply and intensify as the township expanded in
the 1850s and as Te Atiawa began to be perceived as a threat to the security of the
settlement. '
Governor Grey's Native Reserve Policy, 1847·1848
In March 1847 Governor Grey publicly outlined the Native reserve policy that the Crown would
use in its forthcoming purchases in Taranaki. In marked contrast to the often small, scattered
reserves in the FitzRoy block, these would be "large, continuous reserves.'?" This meant that
the practice of making a relatively large number of very small (one acre or less) reserves to
385 Acomparison ofthe Company's suburban reserves in Figure 3with the reserves in Grey block shown in
Figure 9 shows that this section was originally set aside as a tenth reserve.
386 McLean's provision for absentees was most likely a response tofears ofa flood ofTeAtiawa returning to the
province which had been sparked bythe return ofWiremu Kingi and his people toWaitara inNovember 1848, He
hoped that a reserve for them would lessen the likelihood offurther claims on the Company's land, and disruption
to settlers. He noted that "should this contingency not arise itwould be convenient as planting ground for Natives
visiting the settlement on trading orother expeditions." (Draft letter ofMcLean to Grey, 18June 1847, McLean
Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington),
387 Ibid.
388 Journal ofHHTurton published in the Taranaki Herald, 5 September 1855,
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protect land under cultivation at the time of the purchase was ebanooneo.?" Governor Grey
emphasised that these reserves would be "for the separate families" or hapu, "one each for the
people of Moturoa, the Town, Waiwakaiho, and Port Nicholson."390 This was an important
change from the Company's tenths reserves and even from the Native reserves in the FitzRoy
block, which were created for Maori in general. Whereas the Company's tenths had been
selected for Maori in a lottery by Company officials these reserves would be selected by the
people lhemselves?"
There are signs that, even as early as 1847, the Crown was shifting away from a policy in
which it was the location and size of the Native reserves that were critical to their function of
assimilating Maori. Instead it was moving towards a policy in which the individualised title to
the reserves was their most significant characteristic. In 1848, Grey signalled his intention to
"register" the reserves as "the only admitted claims of the Nafives.?" This involved giving
Maori "plans of these reserves ... with certified statements that they were reserved for their
use, which documents are somewhat in the nature of a Crown title to the lands specified in
lhern.?" Grey's intention, as he explained it himself, appears tohave been tocreate a sort of
intermediate title between customary title and a Crown grant, which would accustom Maori to
holding land in Crown-derived title without making it appear that the Government was imposing
anew form of.tenure upon them.394
Grey's attempts to individualise the title to Native reserves in Taranaki in 1848 failed. On
Grey's instructions McLean did begin issuing plans of the reserves in the FitzRoy and Grey
blocks, but these did not seem to contain any certification of the reserves, although oral
assurances that the reserves was secured to Te Atiawa were made. When McLean went to
make the final payment for the FitzRoy block to Te Atiawa atapublic meeting in October 1847,
Te Atiawa asked him "whether the land reserved for them under Captain FitzRoy [sic] award
389 Unlike the Company 'deeds' and the FitzRoy agreement, no provisions for setting aside cultivations was made
inthe Omata orGrey purchase deeds.
390 Journal ofHHTurton published in the Taranaki Herald, 5 September 1855.
391 Ibid.
392 Governor Grey toEarl Grey, 15August 1848, BPP, Vol. 6, [1120], P25.
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid.
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should be continued for them forever."395 McLean assured them "individually and collectively"
that the reserves were "strictly considered as their reserve and fully confirmed to them from His
Excellency."396 Yet, this did little to clarify the exact nature of the title of Native reserves and
the reserves in the FitzRoy, Omata and Grey blocks continued to be held collectively by Te
Atiawa hapu until the processes of the New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 defined
individual owners.
The Implications of Grey's Native Reserve Policy
The focus of the Crown's Native reserve policy remained on confining Maori to the reserves.
As aconsequence Maori were expected to move off land they were cultivating within the block
acquired and locate their communities permanently and exclusively on the Native reserves. In
1848, Governor Grey indicated that the signatories to deeds ofcession and their children "shall
forever occupy the reserves assured to thern.?" The surveyor Edwin Harris was responsible
for conveying the Crown's policy to Te Atiawa. He had cut the boundaries of the reserves "in
the presence of the Natives" and reported that he had ensured that Te Atiawa "distinctly
understand that they comprise their only permanent lands within the present purchase.'?" To
facilitate the occupation of the reserves it was arranged that Te Atiawa would be given one to
two years "for their final removal" from their scattered cultivations, "by which time they will have
ample time to start cultivations and erect houses on the reserves.'?" It is not clear whether
this period of adjustment was something that Te Atiawa pressed for or whether the Crown
proposed it, but by 1854 McLean was able to report that the reserves were "generally
occupied."?"
395 Draft letter ofMcLean, 10October 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington.
396 Ibid.
397 Governor Grey toEarl Grey, 15 August 1848, BPP, Vol. 6, [1120], P25,
398 Harris to the Colonial Secretary, 9August 1847, IA1/74, 47/1589, ANZ, Wellington. As early as June 1847,
McLean was reporting that Maori "seem to understand and enter into these arrangements some of them are
preparing to establish themselves on their reserves" (Draft letter ofMcLean, 4 June 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-
1205, ATL, Wellington).
399 Harris to the Colonial Secretary, 9August 1847, IA1/74, 47/1589, ANZ, Wellington. Also draft letter of
McLean, 4 June 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington.
400 Chief Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 29 July 1854, Turton's Epitome, 0-41. What emerges is that
there were anumber ofspecial cases brought forward by Te Atiawa atthe time ofthe signing ofthe deed which
led to some special arrangements being made (Draft letter ofMcLean, 10 October 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-
1205, ATL, Wellington).
103
However, the reserves continued to evolve in response to the realities of settlers and Te
Atiawa sharing the space around the township of New Plymouth. In particular there was a
growing preference by government officials and some Te Atiawa for Native reserves with
natural boundarles.?' This was a response to high survey costs, and to the tensions caused
by disputes over stock trespassing on cultivations. In 1852, the resident magistrate at New
Plymouth reported that one of the reasons why Maori were resistant to selling their land and
"admitting Europeans amongst them" was that they feared that "their cultivations would be
trespassed upon by the cattle of the setllers."?" He suggested that Maori would "feel better
satisfied were reserves made for them between natural boundaries so as to prevent as far as
possible any dispute between them and Europeans."?' A newspaper report from 1847 also
acknowledged that because the reserves had been made for Maori at Nelson and Wellington
"in large blocks of their own selection, with well-defined boundaries, there is less chance of
future disputes arising between them and the settlers who may occupy contiguous secnons."?'
The allocation of reserves to hapu groups rather than to the Maori sellers as asingle group did
reflect agrowing awareness by Crown officials that some adjustments to the actual nature and
location of Maori communities in Taranaki were required. However, even Native reserves held
communally by hapu remained problematic for Te Atiawa because the rights bestowed on the
communities. to which the particular reserve was allocated cut across original use rights. The
Crown presumed these rights could be and were extinguished by the purchase but tikanga
demanded that these existing rights take precedence. There was some official recognition of
this problem; Governor Grey for instance admitted that Native reserves as understood by the
Crown were "ill adapted to their [Maori] existing notions". He observed that "many chiefs feel a
401 This practice was not unique, during the 1850s proposals were made to confine Maori settlement in the area
between Bell Block and Waitara to a 700 acre reserve between the Mangaoraka and Waiongana Rivers, and to
persuade Maori tosettle on the north bank of the Waitara River leaving the south side for settler allotments.
(McLean to the Civil Commissioner, 5August 1852, MA-MLP-NP 1, P143, ANZ, Wellington and CWRichmond to
Parris, 6 July 1857, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GHScholefield (ed), 1960, Vol. 1, P282 respectively).
402 Flight toMcLean, 31 July 1852, CS 52/99, ANZ, Wellington.
403 Ibid.
404 Extract from the New Zealand Spectator &Cook Strait Guardian, 20 March 1847, BPP, Vol. 8, (570),
pp 16-17.
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great repugnance to go upon lands belonging to other persons, if their reserves should be
selected in such sltualions.?"
For Te Atiawa the existing rights of hapu still living in the Wellington region to land at home
contained in Native reserves also needed to be considered. Ngamotu hapu refused to take the
first payment for the Grey purchase because "their absentee relatives who had written them
from Wellington should be dissatisfied if they did not also participate in the payment."?'
Because such notions ofseemingly invisible generational rights were so alien to British cultural
and legal practices Crown officials, like Governor Grey, tended to see any attempts by Te
Atiawa in Wellington and elsewhere to assert such rights as simply motivated by financial gain.
Grey reported that since the FitzRoy purchase:
various individuals of the Ngatiawa tribe, (which is a very numerous tribe) anxious to
share in the expected payment, have been locating themselves temporarily at
Taranaki; and every separate family of the tribe has been sending up some persons to
look after their interest. These individuals have been quarrelling amongst themselves;
regarding their respective claims; and in order that there might be much to pay for,
have prevented the Europeans occupying any addllional land.?"
Grey was either unable or unwilling to understand that Te Atiawa then living in Wellington
could have rights to land in Taranaki as well as in Wellington. During a public meeting with Te
Atiawa in March 1847 Grey became indignant when a young man from Waiwhetu (in the Hutt
Valley) claimed land atTaranaki when he had been 'liberally' provided for in Wellington.408
Marginalisation and Te Kawau Pa
As previously discussed the idea of larger reserves for Maori had its origins in settler pressure
to be able to select adjacent sections of land. In 1842, in response to this pressure the
Company had proposed that reserves should be aggregated into blocks.?" Although larger
reserves held by communities were likely to be economically more viable for Maori, they were
to some extent an even poorer match for the way in which Maori had traditionally held use
405 'Memorandum on the Native Reserves atWellington byGovernor Grey', 14 September 1866, Turton's
Epitome, 0-16.
406 Donald McLean diary entry, n/d [1847], in McLean, 0, Diary, Box 1,ATL, Wellington.
407 Grey tothe Secretary ofState, 2 March 1847, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 15, P183.
408 Governor Grey toEarl Grey, 4 March 1847, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, NO.9.
409 Extract from a letter from Wakefield toWicksteed, 10October 1842, BPP, Vol. 2, P379.
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rights. Small, scattered reserves did in some ways mirror the scattered nature of use rights
within a rohe. Therefore, there may have been some reluctance amongst Te Atiawa to
abandon the pattern of scattered reserves in favour of larger blocks. McLean noted that at
Moturoa there was adivision ofopinion amongst the people, some "wished to have lands here
and there and everywhere and others of them, I think the majority, desired to have a
continuous block right into the bush."!"
One of the consequences of the aggregating of reserves into larger blocks was that more of
them were located on suburban and rural land at some distance from the town of New
Plymouth itself. This aggregation is shown clearly in Figure 6. Larger reserves on suburban
and rural sections threatened to spatially marginalize Maori from British settlements. Once the
Crown abandoned its practice ofmaking small reserves scattered amongst settler sections the
marginalisation of Maori through the provision of larger reserves threatened to undermine the
Crown's assimilation agenda. It appears that by 1851, after the Grey block reserves had been
created and settled by Maori, the Maori presence in the township itself was reduced. H R
Richmond commented in 1851 that "we see very few of them [Maori] about the town, although
there isapah close by." Instead many were "employed in agricultural operations" by settlers in
the rural area around the settement.?'
There were both practical and ideological reasons for locating reserves on the fringe of the
British settlement. From a practical perspective it was impossible for the Crown to allocate
town sections as Native reserves in the Grey purchase simply because all the town land had
already been included in the FitzRoy block in 1844. The sections in that block which had not
been reserved for Te Atiawa had been handed over to the Company to dispose of to settlers.
Ideologically there were strong pressures on government officials from the Company and its
settlers to keep Native reserves at a distance from the town so that they would not interfere
with settlement. McLean was careful to reassure Grey that the pieces of land selected as
410 McLean to the Governor, nld, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington.
411 HRRichmond toCWRichmond, 20 April 1851, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed),
1960, Vol. 1,P93.
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reserves were "in such situations as are least likely to interfere with the settlers", and that "all of
them [are] removed as far as practicable from lands chosen by seltlers,"!"
The aggregation of reserve land into larger blocks and the very small number and extent of
town sections set aside as reserves for Te Atiawa in the 1844 FitzRoy agreement both resulted
.in the marginalisation of Te Atiawa communities. In turn these policies were compounded by
the unease of settlers in New Plymouth about the 'savage other' in their midst. This unease
found expression in attempts to remove Te Kawau Pa and its Maori inhabitants from the New
Plymouth Township. Te Kawau Pa was located at the mouth of the Huatoki Stream, opposite
the ancient pa and urupa ofPukeariki (appropriated as a signal stationj.?' By the mid-1850s it
was a populous pa, with a Methodist chapel and a wooden house which was used by iwi for
accommodation when they came into town.t" (See the painting and photography showing the
Pa in this period in Figures 12 and 13). Its establishment was the result of an earlier initiative
by the New Zealand Company to clear the area it laid out as a township of Maori settlement.
Te Kawau Pa was not a numbered Native reserve, but in 1844 it was agreed that Te Atiawa
would have the land on which the pa was built in exchange for a number of places that they
had inhabited in the Huatoki valley.415
In general the settler community at New Plymouth found Te Kawau pa repugnant to its early
Victorian values and cultural practices. Such distaste was evidence of an inherent tension
between notions of assimilation and the early Victorian humanitarian beliefs that underpinned
such notions. These humanitarian ideals helped British colonists make sense of their
relationship with indigenous people and they were a key means by which they attempted to
412 Draft letter ofMcLean to Grey, 18 June 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington. Asimilar
agreement was made in the Ornata purchase, McLean reported that the completion ofthe payment was tobe on
the condition "that within that time they will [the sellers] abandon all their claims and cultivations thereon towhich
proposed condition there isevery probability ofthem acceding."
413 Itappears that the Huatoki valley, around which the town ofNew Plymouth was laid out, was an area
particularly favoured by Te Atiawa. An 1844 census by the Protector ofAborigines for Taranaki, Donald McLean,
shows that out ofatotal Maori population of140 men, women and children living between Paritutu and
Waiwakaiho, 84 (60 percent) were living in the Huatoki area (Census ofthe Native Population atMoturoa, Huatoki
and Waiwakaiho on the 17thofOctober 1844, qMS-1192, P8, ATL, Wellington). Pukeariki is shown renamed as
Mount Elliot on aplan "Town ofNew Plymouth', signed byOctavius Carrington (surveyor) the 22 March 1859
(MapCoIl832.295bje/1859/Acc.23000, ATL, Wellington).
414 McLean toCooper, 10 August 1854, MA 24/16, ANZ, Wellington.
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position Maori in relation to themselves. In particular the settlers "affirmed and recreated their
own identity" as belonging to a society with "a superior culture and commercial mode of
subsistence." 416
However, one of the consequences of these beliefs was that they enabled the colonizers to
construct Maori as the savage 'other' while at the same time considering them as fellow human
beings who they had a responsibility to assist to raise up the ladder of civilisation. The picture
of 'savagery' as the childhood of all civilizations presented by the stadial model was inherently
ambivalent and as a result encounters with indigenous people could provoke various
conflicting reactions in the colonists: "like a photograph album of one's juvenile years it could
excite nostalgia and romanticism, but also embarrassment and rejectlon."'" Given these
tensions within the prevailing ideologies shaping attitudes towards Maori it is unsurprising that
the Crown and settlers at New Plymouth attempted both to marginalize and assimilate Te
Atiawa.
Some settlers publicly expressed their rejection of the Maori community at Te Kawau. In one
incident in 1852, McLean recorded that' Maori from Te Kawau pa had come to him to report
that "they have been prevented erecting chimnies [sic] and making other lmprovements."'"
Some ofthe settlers had informed them that "the Governor would not allow them to occupy the
pa as they had no right to the site, and that they would shortly be deprived of it." 419 There
were also complaints regarding a "slaughter-house" on "the Kawau Reserve" in 1855, and a
newspaper editorial from 1859 complained that the township would never be improved "while
public cemeteries, tanneries, piggeries, and that emporium of filth, the Maori pa, exist in the
heart of the town."?" Newspaper comments from 1858 indicate some level of settler hostility to
the pa on the grounds of the fire risk. The editor of the Taranaki Herald argued that any laws
415 In 1852, McLean explained that the land "was given tothe Natives inexchange for town land they occupied by
Mr Wicksteed's permission when acting as New Zealand Company's agent" (Ibid).
416 Maloney, 2001, p 153.
417 Ibid, P158.
418 McLean toCooper, 10 August 1854, MA 24/16, ANZ, Wellington.
419 Ibid.
420 District Commissioner Halse, 9 September 1855, 55/C9 in MA 2/3, ANZ, Wellington and the Taranaki Herald,
Editorial 2July 1859 respectively. Similar complaints were made by settlers inNelson regarding the Maori
hostelries in that township ('Report from Commissioners atNelson', 2June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E-4, P2).
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passed as a "precaution against fire which may be insisted upon amongst ourselves must be
to a great extent nullified if the Maories [sic] are to continue to be exempt from the operation of
so salutary a law."?' He urged that Maori be required to replace all their raupo buildings with
wooden ones, or what would "be more preferable, their pa would be removed to some spot
where it could no longer endanger our principal town buildings." This, he argued, would be
"highly expedient" "if for sanitary reasons only."422 However, the provincial council was unable
to apply its Thatch and Straw Buildings Ordinance to Maori settlements because of restrictions
in the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852.423
Ideological unease and civic concerns were mingled with a pragmatic competition between
settler and Te Atiawa communities because the site of the pa was both commercially valuable
and symbolic of who held the power and authority over the township. In 1859, J C Richmond,
then the Taranaki provincial secretary, suggested privately that if the iron sand industry ever
become established and viable, and the "government's relations with W[iremu] Kingi and other
foreign powers [allowed for] the extension of the place [New Plymouth]" then "it would well
repay the corporation ofNew Plymouth to buy the Kawau pa and occupy the two acres ofsand
between it, the sea and the Haatokl."?' John Whiteley, the Wesleyan missionary at New
Plymouth, commented that when he had moved permanently to the province in 1857, he "was
sorry to find a Native pa in the middle of the town, that pa stretching right across Currie Street
and occupying a considerable portion ofGill Street." He considered that such a locality was "so
very objectionable in every respect as a residence for Natives."425 It is likely that Whiteley was
implying both that the pa was taking up a prime position in the township and that it was
421 The Taranaki Herald, Editorial 2 October 1858.
422 Ibid, This was areference to the Thatch and Straw Buildings Ordinance 1858, The Ordinances ofthe Province
ofTaranaki (formerly New Plymouth), Session I, 1953-54 to Session XIV, 1865 - 66, to which are added the Land
Regulations of the Province and the Imperial Acts, relating to the Constitution ofNew Zealand, printed under the
authority ofthe government ofthe province ofTaranaki, byGWWoon, New Plymouth, 1867, p 130.
423 Provincial councils were specifically prohibited from passing any legislation "affecting lands of the Crown, or
lands to which the title of the aboriginal Native owners has never been extinguished" (The New Zealand
Constitution Act 1852,15 &16Victoria, c.72 Chapter LXXII, 30June 1852 in The Statutes of the United Kingdom
ofGreat Britain and Ireland: with notes, references and an index, A.D. 1852, pp 356 - 371, s. 19).
424 The Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, Vol. 1 (1769 -1869), 1990, P366 and JCRichmond to CW
Richmond, 22December 1859, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed), 1960, Vol. 1, pp 504-
505. The first attempts tosmelt the black iron sand atNew Plymouth were made in1848 and attempts persisted
until 1901 but the venture proved uneconomic (Tullet, 1981, pp 57- 58).
425 Whiteley to Charles Brown, 20 February, IA 1/1865/2334, ANZ, Wellington.
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undesirable for a large community of Maori to be located in the heart of the British
settlement?'
Te Atiawa Understandings of the Native Reserve Policy
Evidence suggests that Te Atiawa understandings of the reserve scheme in the Omata and
Grey blocks were decidedly mixed. In particular the distinction between Native reserves and
other land within the blocks they had sold to the Crown remained unclear for many Te Atiawa
people. The cultural framework within which Te Atiawa interpreted the agreements they
entered with the Company and Crown most likely led them to believe that they had simply
allocated the newcomers a set of use rights which would sit alongside but not subsume their
own patterns of use. The idea that their use rights would be confined to particular surveyed
parcels of land, and that each settler would have exclusive rights to their own sections
remained, for Te Atiawa, a profoundly alien way of organizing land use. In any case, with little
in the way of fences and dwellings in many parts of these blocks, the distinction between
reserves and settler sections would have been difficult tograsp.
Given these cultural and physical realities it is unsurpnsmg that Te Atiawa individuals
continued to use land outside the reserves. In April 1847, McLean wrote to Mrs Creagh
apologising for 'old Erangi' cultivating so close to her section and promising that he would
induce him to leave altoqetner.?' In November 1852, William Billing complained that a party of
Maori had been squatting on his 50 acres for nearly two years and that his numerous attempts
to get local officials to remove them had failed.428 It appears that this was not an uncommon
pattern. In Wellington in January 1847, it was estimated of the 639 acres and 2 perches of
Maori cultivations in the district, the majority (528 acres, 1 rood and 12 perches) were on
sections belonging to settlers, while only 25 acres 1 rood and 30 perches were on Native
reserves." In 1852, this practice was still widespread enough for the inspector of police at
New Plymouth to discuss it in a report to the Colonial Secretary. He noted that persuasion
426 The effect ofmilitary pressures on the alienation of the pa will be discussed inchapter 7. Tau notes the role
that the lack ofNative reserves inChristchurch itself played in marginal ising Ngai Tahu (Tau, 'Ngai Tahu - From
'Better Be Dead and out ofthe Way', 2000, p 223),
427 McLean to Mrs Creagh, 22 April 1847, McLean, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington.
428 William Billing to the Editor on 15 November 1852, the Taranaki Herald, 17 November 1852,
110
alone was sometimes successful in removing Maori from sections claimed by settlers but "in
many cases it has been the practice of owners of sections to give a douceur to the Natives to
induce them to go off."430 These incidents demonstrate that it took quite some time for many
TeAtiawa people to fully comprehend that Pakeha ideas about the possession and use of land
differed fundamentally from their own. After land sales had been completed government
officials had attempted to make it clear to Te Atiawa that the Native reserves were the only
land Maori had any right to. However, it is likely that it was only when individual settlers began
asserting their exclusive rights to their sections by refusing access across the land or its use
for cultivations orgrazing that Maori began to confine themselves to the reserves.
One of the consequences of these practical demonstrations of the new way in which land use
was to be ordered was that Te Atiawa and settler began to negotiate a sharing of the land at
New Plymouth. An incident at Moturoa in 1852 illustrates how the successful resolution of
disputes could build positive relations between Maori and Pakeha neighbours. Mr Bayly owned
sections adjoining part of Moturoa Native Reserve No.1 and wished to erect a boundary fence
between his property and the reserve. Bayly had attempted to get Ngamotu hapu to erect a
portion of the fence by citing the provisions of the Fencing Ordinance, which provided for the
sharing of fencing costs. When Ngamotu hapu initially refused the matter was referred to the
resident magistrate and then to the Governor, who ruled that Maori should not have to pay for
part of the fence because they were not "availing" themselves of the fence. In the end
Poharama Te Whiti was approached by Henry Halse, inspector of police, and Poharama
agreed to arrange for the men of the hapu to help construct the fence.?' Therefore, such
negotiations had the potential to end in peaceable divisions of space, and even for co-
operative social and economic relationships between individual settlers and Maori. However,
such encounters also had the potential for inter-cultural misunderstandings and tensions,
competition for land and for the spatial marginalisation of Maori communities.
429 Ofthese 25:1 :30 acres, 22:2:0 were on Town reserves and 2:3:30 atLower Hutt and Waiwhetu ('Report on
Port Nicholson Cultivations by WA McCleverty, as at1January 1847', BPP, Vol. 6, (892) P39).
430 Cooper toAndrew Sinclair, 28 June 1852, Sinclair Papers, MS-Papers-1947, ATL, Wellington.
431 Flight toAlfred Domett, 29 January 1852, JC-NP 53/3, P7, ANZ, Wellington.
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Utilization of Native Reserves in the FitzRoy, Ornata, Grey Blocks, 1844·
1858
The utilisation of Native reserves by the Maori communities and individuals towhom they were
allocated has been largely ignored in the existing historiography. This is a consequence of
historical investigations having been carried out in the context of claims to the Waitangi
Tribunal. What has been considered important in that process was how the reserves were
created, whether they were adequate for Maori needs and how they were alienated from Maori
ownership. Yet an investigation of the ways in which Maori utilised their Native reserves is
necessary if a more detailed picture of the complex three-way interaction between the political,
economic and social visions and needs ofTe Atiawa, the Crown and the settler community in
Taranaki is to emerge. This involves further teasing out the notions of assimilation, modernity,
autonomy, dependence, marginalisation, co-operation and competition held by all parties to
illuminate the points ofconvergence, tensions, and contradictions between these visions.
Native Reserves as Sites for Ngamotu hapu Economic Activity
Ngamotu hapu developed adual mode ofutilising the Native reserves in the 'town' blocks. By
living on Native reserve land, growing produce, selling and exporting that produce, hiring their
labour and machinery and exchanging goods and money with other whanau, hapu and iwi Te
Atiawa individuals and communities were able to participate in the capitalist and traditional
Maori economies. Te Atiawa individuals and hapu also entered leases and lease-like
arrangements with settlers for certain portions of these reserves. The mutually compatible
desires of Ngamotu hapu for economic equality and self-determination, and of settlers for
suburban land for small farms, facilitated these arrangements.
Practically and philosophically Ngamotu hapu were well placed to use the Native reserves they
had been allocated in the 1840s for economic development. Economic prosperity met their
needs for self-determination and material equality with the settlers as well as their desire to
maintain their mana within the tribal world. They had already had the experience and material
assets that would enable them to take advantage of the developing capitalist economy in
Taranaki. In the 1830s they had formed a successful economic partnership with Dicky Barrett
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and his whaling crew and exported and imported a range ofwestern qoods.?' They maintained
a land base (albeit reduced, and ultimately inadequate) in the form of Native reserves, and the
hapu and its whanau formed a cohesive pool of labour to work the land. They had already
established a friendly relationship with the settler community who provided a source of goods,
technologies and knowledge, as well as a market for the goods and services Ngamotu hapu
were able to supply. The infrastructure built by the settler community, such as roads and
shipping networks, enhanced Ngamotu hapu economic opportunities. The purchase goods and
cash from the transactions with the Company in 1840, the FitzRoy agreement in 1844 and the
Grey purchase in 1847 provided a significant injection of capital. There is some evidence to
suggest that Ngamotu hapu spent this money on stock and agricultural equipment with an eye
to future economic development. On at least two occasions McLean noted that sellers
receiving payment had spent the cash received on stock and agricultural equipment?'
Ngamotu hapu in particular and Te Atiawa generally, were thriving in the capitalist economy in
the decade and a half between 1845 and 1860.434 In 1852, McLean noted that "the Natives
have considerable resources of their own; their stock is increasing; they are comparatively
numerous in this district."435 The reality was that Te Atiawa wielded significant economic power
in the fledgling settlement at New Plymouth; this as much as anything confirmed for McLean
that the policy of larger reserves was necessary. He reported to the Colonial Secretary that
"they contribute so much to our exports and revenue that even on that head alone they have
great claims to our consideration." 436
Indeed by 1853, Te Atiawa were receiving over £2800 in payment for produce from New
Plymouth's two principal mercantile firms and were expected to earn about £5000 in 1854.437 G
432 Awell researched but novelistic account ofthe period oftrading and Whaling atNgamotu before 1833 can be
found inCaughey, The Interpretator: The Biography ofRichard 'Dicky' Barrett, 1998, pp 21 - 40.
433 McLean to the Chief Protector, 17 December 1844, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, No.4and McLean tothe
Colonial Secretary, 16 October 1847, IA 1/74, CS 47/2200, ANZ, Wellington.
434 Elsewhere in the province, Ngati Ruanui were accumulating economic wealth, bringing their wheat and pigs to
New Plymouth tosell, and engaging in wage labour to buy even more cattle (Parsonson, 1991, P102, citing
Journal ofWilliam Woon, 1830 - 59, 31 March, 26 May and 15 July 1851).
435 McLean toSinclair, 12August 1852, Sinclair Papers, MS-Papers-1947, ATL, Wellington.
436 Ibid.
437 General Report ofCooper to the Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0126,
ATL, Wellington.
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S Cooper, the assistant district land purchase commissioner, described "Ngatiawa" as "the
richest of all the neighbouring tribes" with a population of about 1000 who between them
owned 150 horses, 250 to 300 head of cattle, 40 carts, 35 ploughs, 20 pairs ofharrows and 3
winnowing machines. They were also using their new wealth to build western style dwellings,
Cooper reported that they had "erected 10 wooden houses, with 10 more to be started at
once."438 Some were extending their land base by purchasing land at public auction. He noted
at least two cases where Maori had brought land at public auction, or were leasing township
land.439
The economic wealth being generated by the Ngamotu hapu was all the more impressive
because by 1854 the Crown had acquired all the land belonging to them between Paritutu and
Bell Block. This left only the Native reserves on which to live, support their communities and
generate a surplus to sell locally or export. By 1859, the year before war broke out in the
province, Te Atiawa owned numerous and diverse stock and agricultural machinery. It is clear
from the places Benjamin Wells listed in his 1859 inventory ofTeAtiawa communities and their
assets that Ngamotu hapu were living exclusively on their reserves. The people living at
Puketotara (Native Reserve No.3) and Pukenui (Native Reserve No. 14) had 45 acres in
cultivation, stocked with 17 horses, 14 pigs, serviced by 5 carts, 5 ploughs and 2 harrows. At
Ararepe (Native Reserve No.2), Ratapihipihi (Native Reserve No.5) and Moturoa (Native
Reserve No.1) Te Atiawa had 109 acres under cultivation, owned 17 horses, 16 horned cattle
and 16 pigs, as well as 14 carts, 9 ploughs and 4 harrows.?" At least some of this wealth was
being fed by wages earned by individuals who hired their labour to settlers. In 1851, H R
Richmond noted that many Maori "are employed in agricultural operations, clearing, driving
438 Ibid.
439 Ibid. Hone Ropiha Te Kikeu received a Crown grant for section 1445 Town ofNew Plymouth (0:1 :1) on 9
September 1857 and Hakopa Tikerangi received a Crown grant for section 957 Town ofNew Plymouth (0:1:1) on
9 December 1858 ('Crown Grants Issued to Natives: New Plymouth', AJHR, 1862, E-10, P28).
440 Wells, 1878, p 177. In 1854 Cooper had noted that Te Atiawa owned no flourmills and he speculated that the
reason for this was that "itpays them better tosell their wheat in the English market." (General report ofCooper to
Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0126, ATL, Wellington). However, in1855
the people atWhareroa had raised the £200 needed to employ WBishop, a millwright ofWhaingaroa, to build a
flour-mill for them (C WRichmond toWBishop (millwright, Whaingaroa), 29 December 1855, in The Richmond-
Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield, (ed), 1960, Vol. 1,P186). Whareroa was in the Tarurutangi block, adjacent to
and just north ofthe Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks, purchased by the Crown in 1859 (Tarurutangi purchase deed in
Maori, 4 January 1859, MA-MLP, 6/1, pp 146 -150, ANZ, Wellington).
114
bullock carts, etc., by the settlers." They also solicited labouring work by calling from farm to
farm."!
These figures from 1859 seem to indicate that the Maori economy in Taranaki was robust
enough to withstand the sharp economic downturn that occurred in the mid-1850s. In August
1856, John Whiteley complained to McLean that the Maori had little income to give to the
church because of the failure of the produce rnarket/" It appears that one of the primary
reasons for this crisis in the market was the lack of demand for potatoes in Australia as the
Victorian gold rush came to an end.443However, the crisis does not appear to have been
severe or prolonged, C W Richmond reported that "The crisis seems to be passing without
commercial disaster, but trade has everywhere been very dull."444
The Leasing of Native Reserves by Ngamotu Hapu to Settlers
The other means by which Ngamotu hapu utilised the Native reserve land on the town side of
the Waiwakaiho not required for kainga and cultivations was through leasing to settlers. There
appears to have been a willingness on both sides to enter such arrangements. Comments by
the superintendent of the province in 1856 that if Maori received individual Crown titles they
"would go into partnership, I think, with the Europeans" imply that economic partnerships
between Maori and settlers may have been already springing up. 445 In 1854, Commissioner
Cooper reported that:
many of the reserves are now and have been for several years lying totally
unproductive, and a desire has recently been manifesting itself on the part of the
Natives to let them to the settlers. Atthe present moment negotiations are pending for
the leasing of some of these plots ofground, and leases have recently been executed
for others, on terms ofadvantage to both parties. 446
44\ HRRichmond to CWRichmond, 20 April 1851, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GHScholefield (ed),
1960, Vol. 1, P93.
442 Whiteley to McLean, 18 August 1856, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0634, ATL, Wellington.
443 CWRichmond toJ Chamberlain, London, 16 November 1856, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH
Scholefield (ed), 1960, Vol. 1, p 241.
444 Ibid.
445 Evidence ofCharles Brown to a Board Appointed by His Excellency the Governor to Inquire into and Report
upon the State ofNative Affairs, 22 April 1856, BPP, Vol. 10, pp 558 - 559.
446 Cooper toColonial Secretary, 19 June 1854, Turton's Epitome, D-42.
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By 1858, it was reported that about 205 acres of Native reserve land had "already been let or
leased by the Natives to settlers, who have been in possession for several years, the Natives
receiving the rents.'?" Not agreat deal is known about many ofthese leases, but several can
be identified because they became newsworthy for various reasons. Amongstthese was the
lease between Poharama Te Whiti and the people at Ngamotu and Richard Brown for a piece
of land on the Moturoa Native Reserve for awhaling stalion.'" Poharama and his people also
leased land at Moturoa to a settler called Loveridge (however the land was subject to a claim
by the Wesleyan Mission at Ngamotu). Near the Waiwakaiho River Wiremu Te Ahoaho leased
parts ofPukaka and Raiomiti Native Reserves No. 18 and No. 23 to Daniel Bishop."
For Ngamotu hapu the quest for economic independence and self-determination did not
preclude co-operation with settlers; on the contrary, such arrangements over Native reserves
fitted very well with cultural notions of relationship, rights and obligations between tangata
whenua and manuhiri. This pattern of co-operative economic relationships between Te Atiawa
and individual settlers began in the 1840s. One example that has come to light isthat of Josiah
Flight, later resident magistrate and administrative officer for the Native reserves
commissioners, and his business partner, William Devenish. They had bought their land north
of the Waiwakaiho River from the New Zealand Company, but continued to farm it even after
other settlers- had been relocated onto land within the FitzRoy block in 1844. Puketapu hapu
chief, Te Whaitere Katatore, in whose rohe the land was located, made it clear to government
officials that he wanted the men to remain as part of his communlty.t" The relationship was
one of mutual benefit. In return for land to farm and the protection of Katatore, Flight and
Devenish "accommodated themselves to Puketapu expectations", for example, "their bullocks
and cart [were] requisitioned to cart Puketapu hapu wheat, Katatore's wheat stacked in Flight's
rickyard for threshing, his bread brought for baking in the oven."?' It is unclear how rapidly
447 'Report from Commissioners at New Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E·4, P12.
448 Draft letter ofMcLean, 18 June 1847, McLean Papers, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington.
449 McLean to Turton, 6July 1847, MA-MLP-NP 1,ANZ, Wellington, and the Taranaki Herald,
15 October 1859 respectively. Several other were noted in Charles Brown to McLean, 19June 1854, MS-Papers-
0032-0178, ATL, Wellington.
450 Minutes ofmeeting, Saturday 3August 1844' Donald McLean papers, folder 1, ATL, Wellington.
451 Ann Parsonson, 'The Fate ofMaori Land Rights in Early Colonial New Zealand: The Limits of the Treaty of
Waitangi and the Doctrine ofAboriginal Title', inLaw, History and Colonialism: The Reach ofEmpire, Diane
Kirkby and Catherine Coleborne (eds), Manchester University Press, Manchester (UK), 2001, P180.
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these types of relationships evolved into western-style commercial arrangements in which the
settler tenant paid rent to the Maori owner(s). Nor is it clear whether elements of exchange or
tribute in kind remained part of agreements between individual Te Atiawa and individual
settlers.
Native reserves became sites where economic and social relationships between Te Atiawa
and settlers were established and conducted on the basis of both traditional Maori
understandings about use rights and social obligations, and British notions of leasing. To some
extent these leases functioned as 'gates' through which Maori and settlers could move
between 'the Maori world' and 'the settler world'. Of course Native reserves were not the only
sites where this interchange occurred. In the period between 1840 and 1860, there was a
significant degree of separation between the Maori world and the settler world. Each sphere
occupied different physical and cultural locations in Taranaki and had its own forms of social
and economic organisation, but these separate 'worlds' were also interdependent and
permeable. Native reserves as 'gates' between these two 'worlds' should be considered
alongside other opportunities for people to move between these spheres: in particular the
constant activities of trade, of buying and selling goods and services; or the much more
permanent and lasting 'infiltrations' effected by marriage and later by education and
employment
For the settlers who leased Native reserves from Te Atiawa, attitudes towards Maori and their
reserves were deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, these leases were extremely useful; they
offered settlers the use of highly sought after suburban fern land in the vicinity of New
Plymouth. Politically, leasing from Maori was an important means for settlers to assert their
rights to deal with Maori and their land against Crown pre-emption and control of the land
trade. To some extent this practical and political gain, and the sometimes lasting relationships
of goodwill and respect between particular settlers and particular Te Atiawa individuals,
mitigated against unease about Maori as the 'savage other'.
On the other hand, New Plymouth settlers often found other manifestations of Te Atiawa
economic self-determination less than convenient. For example, settlers perceived that the
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convenience of Maori wage labourers in breaking in the land and expanding the British
settlement was undercut by the fact that such employment was supplying Te Atiawa with an
incorne.t" This was a concern because it was widely believed that Maori economic
independence was a threat to the supply of land that was needed to establish and expand the
British settlement. With an assured income it was feared Te Atiawa would become increasingly
reluctant to sell any more of their land to the Crown and/or demand higher prices before they
would consent to a sale. Therefore, New Plymouth settlers put pressure on the Government
and the Company to increase British immigration so that there would be asteady flow of British
labourers. In this way Te Atiawa would be forced out of the labour market, and made
amenable to selling land to the Crown.?'
Obstacles to theUtilization of Native Reserves for Economic Development
Ngamotu hapu faced obstacles in realising the commercial value of Native reserves in the
'town' blocks. The Crown's attempts to intervene to stop settlers leasing Native reserves
illustrates the way in which the Crown considered it necessary to cut off any regular supply of
income to Maori. The Crown's primary reason for this policy was that, like New Plymouth
settlers, it considered that incomes from rents would make Te Atiawa reluctant to sell further
land for settlement. This agenda constrained Te Atiawa desires for long-term independence
and material and social equality with the settlers. Yet despite it Te Atiawa individuals continued
as landlords and a number ofco-operative relationships between individual Maori and settlers
flourished.
Prohibition on Leasing Native Reserves
From the inception of the colony the Crown had legislated to ensure that it had firm and
exclusive control over dealings in land.?' In 1846, the Native Land Purchase Ordinance
effectively prohibited settlers from purchasing, leasing orentering into similar agreements with
Maori for land still in Native title (the actually wording of the Ordinance was "any Land not
452 There was ashortage ofBritish labour in the settlement and Te Atiawa entered the labour market tosupply
this shortage and by offering towork for lower rates were able toundercut settlers who hired their labour
(Parsonson, 1991, p 95).
453 Ibid. Watson and Patterson have offeredan analysis ofthe way inwhich Maori in the Wellington region were
ultimately excluded from positions ofcontrol in wage labouring and marketing ofgoods (M KWatson and BR
Patterson, 'The Growth and Subordination ofthe Maori Economy in the Wellington Region ofNew Zealand,
1840 - 1852' Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 26, No.3, 1985, pp 521 - 545).
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comprised within a Grant from the Crown'j.'" These restrictions were re-enacted in the New
Zealand Constitution Act 1852. Under section 73 of that Act no one was permitted to occupy,
use, purchase or lease any land "of or belonging to, or used or occupied by them [Maori] in
common as tribes or communities,'?' The official reason was "that private contracts between
Maori and non-Maori would endanger the peace of the Colony because of uncertainties about
title and the meaning of connacts.?" In Taranaki the superintendent, Charles Brown, voiced
similar concerns and added the fear that leases or arrangements made between two
individuals would later, after the Maori individual had died or been "removed", be disputed by
the other owners of the reserve. He argued that if the Government sanctioned leases then the
provincial government would be called upon to resolve such disputes, putting it and central
government in a situation where they were forced tochoose between the rights of settlers and
Maori.458
The Crown's most powerful reasons for prohibiting the leasing of Native reserves were the
need to assert control over the economic activity of Maori and over the attempts by settlers to
acquire land directly from Maori. Both were seen as a threat to the future success of the
Crown's large-scale acquisition ofMaori land. The leasing ofNative reserves was regarded as
'the thin end of the wedge'. It was feared that if the practice was not stopped settlers would
blatantly ignore the provisions ofthe Land Purchase Ordinance and deal in Native land directly
with Maori.459 If Maori had a reliable and adequate source of income to sustain their
communities and develop their economy then, it was feared, they would strongly resist selling
land to the Crown. McLean reprimanded Cooper for sanctioning leases for Native reserves
because:
it implicates the Government in transactions that I have strenuously opposed in all
parts of the Island, and that I have successfully resisted at Auckland ... we may
454 See discussion of the establishment ofthe Crown in New Zealand inChapter 2.
455 The Native Land Purchase Ordinance, 1846, The Ordinances of the Legislative Council ofNew Zealand and of
the Legislative Council of the Province ofNew Munster, 1841 - 1853, Government Printer, Wellington, 1871.
456 The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, s. 73.
457 Parsonson, 2001, P177.
458 Charles Brown toMcLean, 19 June 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0178, ATL, Wellington.
459 Ibid.
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abandon the idea ofgetting any good land in future from the Natives if we allow them
to lease their reserves."
McLean intended to block the leasing of reserves in order to force Maori to give up all land
held in common in customary/Native title, and instead hold land only in individualised title. His
goal was that Te Atiawashould be made to "feel the utter unavailability of land held in common
that they might more fully appreciate and regard what they individually purchase with security
of tenure."?" The way to make customary land 'unavailable' was to extinguish its title by
purchase.
Despite the Native Land Purchase Ordinance 1846 and Brown's attempt to enforce it in
Taranaki, there was little the Crown could do to stop settlers and Maori entering leases for
Native reserves. The needs of both Te Atiawa and settlers were met by such arrangements,
and neither had any intention ofgiving up the economic advantages they had gained. Strictly
enforcing the ordinance required that settlers with existing leases for Native reserve land
surrender them, however this would have invited considerable protest from Maori and settlers.
Cooper reminded McLean that "in fact the Natives would not now consent to surrendering their
leases" and the surrender of leases would cause a great deal ofcontuslon.t" In any case the
Crown's ability to enforce the ordinance was limited. After protests from missionaries worried
about the status ofthe land that they occupied, and from the inhabitants ofAuckland, Governor
Grey "promised to apply the law sparingly, to punish only disreputable lessees."463 The
ordinance specified that only the Surveyor General or specially authorised officers could bring
cases to the court, and between 1846 and 1850 only three such officers were appointed in the
whole counfry.?" The outcomes in the few cases brought before the court deterred officials
from bringing further cases, and did nothing to deter settlers from entering leases for Native
reserves (these cases will be discussed further in chapter 5).
460 McLean toCooper, 12July 1854 in McLean Letterbook, Private Correspondence, 1854 - 47, pp 1073 - 1074,
ATL, Wellington.
461 McLean toCharles Brown, 12 July 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0178, ATL, Wellington.
462 Cooper toMcLean, 19June 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL, Wellington.
463 Weaver, 'The Construction ofProperty Rights on the Imperial Frontier: the case of the New Zealand Native
Land Purchase Ordinance of1846', in Law, History, Colonialism: The Reach ofEmpire, Diane Kirkby and
Catherine Coleborne (eds), Manchester University Press, Manchester (UK), 2001, P228.
464 One ofthese officers was Donald McLean, inspector ofpolice atNew Plymouth (Weaver, 2001, p231).
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Graph 1: Pie Graph showing the Percentage of all Native Reserve
Acres by Type of Land
mSuburban
o Town
IIIIiIRural and
Rural/Suburban
45.73%
The Effect of the Location of Reserves on theirEconomic Viability
The potential of the Native reserves to provide an enduring economic base was also
problematic. Primarily this was because the amount and quality of Native reserves allocated to
Ngamotu hapu in the FitzRoy, Omata and Grey blocks that were serviced by infrastructure and
within easy reach of the township of New Plymouth and its markets was strictly limited. In fact
Ngamotu hapu had almost no land within the boundaries of the New Plymouth town. Ofthe 47
Native reserves that had been created by 1858, only six were town land. These six reserves
contained only 25.76 acres. In terms of the total reserve acres allocated to Te Atiawa in the
five blocks in this study, town reserve acres accounted for less than one percent (0.60 percent)
of the total. The largest of these reserves was Native Reserve No.10 that contained 10 acres.
But this was a large steep hill pa of little economic use to Maori, and in any case it was taken
for a military barracks in 1855. These figures are shown on graphs 1 and 2 below.
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Graph 2: Bar Graph comparing the Percentage of Native
Reserve Acres by type of land in the FitzRoy, Ornata and Grey
Blocks and the Waiwakaiho and Hua Blocks
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The reality for Te Atiawa was that the majority of their reserve acres were rural land. Nearly 50
percent (47.62 percent) of the total reserve acres were rural sections (this can be seen in
graphs 1 and 2 above). Ifwe consider the Puketotara Native reserve No.3, which was mixture
of suburban/rural sections, to have the same characteristics as rural reserves in terms of:
quality of land, distance from the settlement, limited access by road, and overall desirability in
Atfirst glance Ngamotu hapu communities seemed better supplied with suburban land, with 32
of the 47 reserves being comprised of suburban sections. Yet this was only 1545.30 acres
which made .up less than 40 percent (38.63 percent) of the total reserve acreage. This
proportion fell below 30 percent (29.20 percent) in the blocks closest to the town of New
Plymouth (FitzRoy, Omata and Grey blocks). These reserves too were relatively small, in the
FitzRoy block which immediately surrounded the township, ranging in size from only 0.5 acres
(Native Reserve No. 13) to 86 acres (Pukeweka Native Reserve No. 17). This means that Te
Atiawa had been allocated only a very limited amount of land in the very location that Native
reserves could most have benefited them (this can be seen on graphs 1and 2 above).
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the rental market this swells to about 60 percent (60.77 percent). This meant that the cards
were heavily stacked against Te Atiawa because at least half of Te Atiawa reserve land was
economically disadvantaged, if not economically marginal. The economic success of the
Ngamotu hapu before 1860 was remarkable given how disadvantaged they were by the very
small proportion oftheir Native reserves that were in the most desirable oreconomically useful
locations. However, had Ngamotu hapu been allocated a more generous portion of suburban
reserve land it is likely that their economic growth would have been considerably accelerated.
Conclusion
The creation and allocation ofNative reserves in North Taranaki in 1847 was characterised by
extensive negotiations between the Crown and hapu over purchases and reserves. These
negotiations took place in a climate ofpressure from settlers for more land for settlement and
in particular for the recovery of the Company's original block. The Native reserves created by
the Crown in the Grey and Omata purchases of 1847 continued to reflect the original intention
of the Company to assimilate Maori by intermingling them with the settlers. The practices of
aggregating reserves into larger blocks at a distance from sections held by settlers, and
negotiating their location with Maori were firmly embedded in Crown policy by 1847. Rather
than create reserves for Maori generally, reserves were created for specific Maori
communities. However, Governor Grey intended that the reserves be held in a title "somewhat
in the nature ofaCrown grant." This was the first sign ofashift towards a policy ofassimilation
through the individualisation of title. Native reserves became the vanguard of the Crown's
wider Native policy of individualising the title to all land held by Maori.
For their part Ngamotu hapu (and Te Atiawa generally) developed a dual mode of utilising the
Native reserves to generate wealth: by occupying them and by leasing some of them to
settlers. However this expression of economic independence was considered a threat to the
expansion of British settlement because it was believed that if Te Atiawa had a steady income
they would be reluctant to sell further land to the Crown. Therefore the Crown intervened to
attempt to cut off the flow ofcash from rents by making it illegal for settlers to occupy or lease
Native land, and these provisions were applied to Native reserves in Taranaki. Prompted by
the same fear settlers also attempted to exclude Maori from wage labouring in the province.
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However these attempts were ineffectual against the leasing of Native reserves and reserves
became key sites for inter-cultural economic and social relationships.
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Figure 6 Crown "purchases" 1844 - 60
Figure 7: Map showing the boundaries of the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks, 1853-
1854 (source: The Taranaki Report, 1996, fig. 6)
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Chapter 4: Crown Reserves and the Re-purchasing Scheme in the
Waiwakaiho and Hua Blocks, 1853 - 1854
Introduction
Over the brief period between 1853 and 1855 the Crown attempted to fundamentally change
the nature of Native reserves and the way in which they would function to assimilate Maori.
The Native reserves and other land to be retained by hapu in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks
of 1853 - 54 illustrate how this change took place. An examination of the extent to which the
Crown was able to replace Native reserves created for Maori with land that Maori re-purchased
from within the block and received a Crown grant for suggests that the Crown's policy and
implementation were significantly shaped by hapu responses to the re-purchasing scheme.
Other circumstances also require investigating in assessing the success of the Crown's new
policies, in particular by Te Atiawa demands for certain land to be reserved and by the need to
resolve potential conflicts between settler claims to land in the block and Te Atiawa occupation
of various portions of it. The effect of these political agendas on Te Atiawa choices about the
location and extent of reserved and re-purchased land highlight gaps between Crown.
promises, hapu expectations and the final outcome of the Native reserve allocation in these
blocks. An examination of what hapu responses to the re-purchasing scheme suggest about
their priorities and visions for their communities' economic and social standing in relation to the
settlers at New Plymouth illustrates both the way in which hapu responses to the scheme
might have been viewed by the Crown as demonstrating a desire to be 'civilised' and
assimilated; and how hapu and Crown visions of the future were Ultimately based on
profoundly different assumptions.
Crown Purchasing in Taranaki in theearly 1850s
By 1852, the politics of purchase, and consequently the politics of Native reserves allocation,
were considerably more complex and more intense than they had been just afew years before
in 1847. The settlers' desires remained focused on the recovery of the Company's claimed
land as far north as Waitara.465 In particular, calls for the Crown to purchase more flat coastal
465 William Halse, the Company's agent inTaranaki, commented that although settlers had taken upland further
south in the Omata district they had a "natural prejudice" against "any permanent diversion ofcapital and labour
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fern land for farming from TeAtiawa became increasingly vocal when no further acquisitions of
land to the north immediately followed the 1847 Omata and Grey purchases.
This pressure was driven by the reluctance to break in rough bush-clad land when fern-
covered land which was flatter, more fertile, closer to the coast and required less labour and
equipment to survey it and to break it in was potentially availabie.?" In 1849, leading figures in
the settler community wrote to Governor Grey urging him to take action so that "strenuous
efforts may be made, both by the Government and the New Zealand Company, to repurchase
lands in this district between Waiwakaiho (the boundary of Governor FitzRoy's block) and
Waitara."467 The establishment of provincial government in August 1853 in Taranaki in the
wake ofthe passage of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 strengthened the power of the
settler lobby.468
At the same time opposition amongst Te Atiawa to selling any further land to the Crown was
strengthening. A group of Puketapu hapu people erected a 40 feet-high carved pou on the
north bank of the Waiwakaiho River. McLean himself interpreted this as a measure "to prevent
the Europeans from acquiring more land in that direction."469 Grey's stormy meetings with
Puketapu hapu and Waitara people in 1850 where offers to sell land were made by Ihaia
Kirikumara and Matiu, the brother of Wiremu Kingi, and adamantly opposed by others,
strengthened the resolve of many Maori against selling their land.470Despite this opposition
from the Waitara, and the other districts between that river [Waitara River] and the Waiwakaiho, where nearly the
whole oftheir land was situated." (William Halse toWilliam Fox, 13August 1850, NZC 105/10, No. 59/50, ANZ,
Wellington).
466 In January 1850, when Grey arrived in New Plymouth, William Halse, the Company's Agent "urged on him the
settlement's need for land. Itwas true that the Company still had 15,000 acres atitsdisposal from previous
purchases, but it was timber land, unsurveyed, and the settlers wanted open plains - and especially the land
between Waiwakaiho and Waitara. This land was surveyed, there were roads, and the Waitara River would be a
good trading port. (William Halse toWilliam Fox, 21 March 1850, NZC 10519 No. 22/50, ANZ, Wellington).
467 J Flight, GCutfield and others to Grey, 18July 1849, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, No. 11. By December
1849, Mclean reported that the settlers "are growing daily more anxious for the acquisition of land inthe direction
ofWaitara are holding public meetings tourge the Government tocommence purchasing operations there."
(Mclean to the Colonial Secretary, 18December 1849, qMS-1198, ATl, Wellington).
468 Parsonson, 1991, P120. Another public meeting was held inFebruary 1853 todecide how best to put their
case for another purchase tothe Governor. The outcome was a letter toGovernor Grey urging him to take action
toacquire fern land "sufficient for the more pressing wants of this settlement" (Parsonson, 1991, p 105 and the
Taranaki Herald, 2March 1853).
469 Mclean tothe Colonial Secretary, 11 October 1849, MA-MlP-NP 1, ANZ, Wellington.
470 For a full account ofGrey's visit see Parsonson, 1991, pp 96 - 98.
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settlers continued to push the Crown to negotiate and complete another major purchase. By
August 1852, McLean and his assistant land purchase commissioner, G S Cooper, were in a
round of intense multiple negotiations with Puketapu hapu and others for land at Mokau, at
Warea and at Mangaoraka north of Bell Block.?' It was in this political 'pressure cooker' that
the Waiwakaiho and Hua purchases were transacted.
The Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks and the Native reserves within them came to be treated as
one block by Crown officials. Only a month after the purchases were completed Commissioner
Cooper expressed the opinion that the claims of the sellers in the two blocks were "so mixed
up it isnecessary to view it as one purchase."?" However, for the sake ofclarity when dealing
with the various arrangements made regarding Native reserves in these blocks they have been
dealt with separately in this section ofthe chapter.
The WaiwakaihoPurchase, 1853
Both Ngamotu hapu and Puketapu hapu had interests in the Waiwakaiho block and McLean
and Cooper were unable to secure a public accord from both hapu. Instead they resorted to
dealing "privately and secretly" with various groups within these hapu, and making payments to
them for areas within the Waiwakaiho block in order to precipitate an offer to sell a larger
block.!" One ofthe outcomes ofthese negotiations was the signing ofthe Waiwakaiho deed at
New Plymouth on 24 August 1853 by 315 people. The block was later estimated to contain 16,
500 acres. The purchase price recorded in the deed was £1200 that was paid as a lump sum
after the signatories refused to take it in installments. On 16 January 1854, Te Atiawa in the
Wellington and Cook Strait regions signed a deed for land which was contained within the
Waiwakaiho block (italso covered some ofthe area that later became the Hua block). McLean
transacted the deed and the purchase price recorded on the deed was £1000, of this £800 was
paid immediately with the remaining £200 to be paid by McLean on his return from Auckland.?"
471 Parsonson, 1991, P106.
472 General report ofCooper to the Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0126,
ATL, Wellington.
473 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p48. Asummary ofthese deals, payments and offers in both the Waiwakaiho and
Hua blocks can be found in The Taranaki Report, 1996, pp 48 - 50 and in Parsonson, 1991, pp 105 -120.
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Despite these deeds of cession not all sections of Ngamotu hapu agreed to be party to the
purchases. The influential Wellington chief, Te Puni, who was connected to Ngati Te Whiti and
Ngati Tawhirikura hapu signed the Waiwakaiho to Mangati deed in Wellington but sent his son,
Henare Te Puni, to Taranaki to oppose the sale. By August 1852, Te Puni and his people were
threatening to occupy (ifnot already in occupation on "all the land between Mangaone and the
sea, including te kete iwi to which only ishis claim admitted, apiece altogether of I should think
about 500 acres more or less ofmagnificent land."475 The occupation expanded and continued
into the 1860s despite numerous attempts by the Crown to induce the people to agree to the
purchase and accept reserves.?" The area occupied is shown on Figure 8. This protest had a
significant impact upon the allocation of Native reserves in the Waiwakaiho block and on
delays in surveying the reserves.
Native Reserves and the Re-purchasing Scheme in the Waiwakaiho Block
Unlike the Grey purchase in 1847, no specific Native reserves were agreed upon or surveyed
before the Waiwakaiho deed was signed in August 1853. Instead the deed contained ageneral
promise that reserves would be made. According to Lyndsay Head's translation this clause
read:
Mr Cooper agrees, in accordance to our land agreement which has been sent by the
Governor to him, that some places of land are to be reserved for us, for the Maori
people; they are those which are immediately to be written in the colour red upon the
map ofthe land on completion ofthe survey.?'
Cooper subsequently created Waiwakaiho Native reserves a, A to N. It appears that these
reserves were in fulfilment of this promise. The Waiwakaiho to Mangati deed signed by Te
Atiawa in Wellington made no mention of Native reserves. However, as will be discussed later
in this chapter, some of the Waiwakaiho reserves were allocated to individuals resident in
Taranaki and their absentee relatives who were planning to return to Taranaki from the Cook
474 Deeds - No. 14, Waiwakaiho toMangati, Grey and Bell districts, 16 January 1854, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki
province.
475 Cooper toMcLean, 29 August 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL, Wellington.
476 See for example Cooper toMcLean, 23 January 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227; William Halse
toMcLean, 18April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0318; Cooper toMcLean, 16May 1854, McLean
Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, all atATL, Wellington also Wells, 1878, p 155.
477 The only known copy of the deed is in Maori and this translation appears in Parsonson, 1991, P113.
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Strait area. ·In addition to the Waiwakaiho reserves created by Cooper the Crown also made
two further reserves for Maori: Waiwakaiho or Katere (505.98 acres) and Manganaha (55
acres) at some time between 1865 and 1887.478 These were situated on the land which Te
Puni and his people had occupied and appear to have been made in a final arrangement with
them to cease their occupation (see Figure 8).
Neither the Waiwakaiho deed nor the Waiwakaiho to Mangati deed contained any provision for
those who signed the deed to buy back sections within the block from the Crown (as was the
case in the Hua deed discussed below). However, as we shall see later in this chapter,
portions of the Native reserves created by Cooper in the Waiwakaiho block were subsequently
re-purchased from the Crown by individuals for whom the reserves had been created.
The Hua Purchase, 1854
The purchase deed for the 14, 000 acre Hua block was signed at Ngamotu on 3 March 1854
by 129 people from both Puketapu and Ngamotu hapu. The purchase price paid was £3000, of
this £2000 was paid to the signatories immediately. 479 Four Native reserves were specifically
named in the deed: Paraiti (50 acres), Hua (100 acres) (later divided into Oropuriri and
Hoewaka), Tapuirau (50 acres) and Upokotauaki (50 acres). In addition a fifth reserve known
as Hoehoe ,adjoining Upokotauaki was made. Although it appears on schedules of Native
reserves for this block and Harris has documented itstitle history the circumstances around its
creation are unknown.?"
In addition to the reserves specified, any further land in the block that Te Atiawa signatories to
the deed wished to retain was to be acquired through re-purchasing sections from the Crown.
Although it is not stated in the deed, the purchasers would then receive a Crown grant for the
land. The deed stated that from the purchase money received,
478 The earliest document relating tothese reserves isthe notice ofintention to bring them before the Native Land
Court in1887 (New Zealand Gazette, No. 30, 1887, P611). Acertificate oftitle was issued toHenare Te Puni and
6others on 8 October 1894 (CT 29/39, Land Transfer Office, New Plymouth), The first title for Manganaha was
issued to the Public Trustee on 23 February 1905 (CT 55/48) (Harris, 1991, p 19).
479 Deeds - No. 15,Hua Block, Grey and Bell district, 3 March 1854, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki Province and The
Taranaki Report, 1996, p 50,
480 Harris, 1991, pp Vi, 6, 15 -17, 'Return ofGeneral Reserves for the Natives, which have been made in
Cessions ofTerritory to the Crown', AJHR, 1862, E-10, P7.
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the sum of(1000) one thousand pounds we leave with Mr Cooper to purchase land for
us when this land is surveyed ... the regulations under which we shall purchase these
lands isto be at the rate of (10) ten shillings per acre it is also agreed to by Mr McLean
and Mr Cooper that this land shall not be offered to the public until we shall have made
our selecfions.?'
This resulted in Te Atiawa individuals buying discrete sections that did not form part of any of
the reserves named in the Hua block. These sections were never considered to be Native
reserves but simply lands held in Crown title by Maori in the wake ofthe purchase.
481 Deeds - No. 15, Hua Block, Grey and Bell District, 3 March 1854, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki Province.
Figure 8: Map showing the Native reserves made in theWaiwakaiho block, c. 1854.
Typed labels and shading (as per the key) were added bytheauthor (sources: MapColI
832.2gbbd/[1848)/Acc.2797, ATl, Wellington and Harris, 1991).
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The Crown's Native Reserve Policy in theWaiwakaiho and Hua Blocks,
1853-1854
By the time it purchased Hua blocks from Te Atiawa in March 1854 the Crown had decided to
employ a substantially different method of creating and allocating Native reserves from that in
the 1847 purchases. Governor Grey's 1848 attempts at an ad hoc individualisation of title after
the reserves were created had evolved into a systematic policy whereby only limited Native
reserves or, it was hoped eventually, no reserves would be made. Instead Maori were to use a
portion of the purchase money paid to them to 'buy-back' or 're-purchase' sections of the land
that they had just sold to the Crown. In this way individual Crown-derived titles to 'reserves'
would be created, and aCrown grant would be issued toMaori owners.
Crown officials in Taranaki saw immediately the difference between this method and the old
system of Native reserves. Commissioner Cooper explained to the Colonial Secretary that
whereas:
Under the old system portions of land were set apart for a number of Natives, all with
common right of cultivation and occupation but none ofwhom could alienate or clearly
define his rights '" now each man has an individual piece of land which he can
dispose of as he pleases, and issecure and atpeace with his neiqhbour.?"
However, the Crown did not acknowledge that the immediate consequence for Te Atiawa was
that "the profits of their sales were largely consumed in their purchases of land from the
Crown."483 Nor did the Crown openly acknowledge that Maori were expected to re-purchase
land atthe market rate, when the payment they had received for the land had been far lower.?'
The origins of this policy appear to lie in McLean's Native land policy in Hawke's Bay in 1851.
From that district McLean reported that he had told a chief that Native reserves, public
reserves and a reserve for acanoe-landing place were to be made "and every facility would be
afforded them of re-purchasing land from the Government."485 This was clearly connected to
482 General report ofCooper to the Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1854, Mclean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0126,
ATl, Wellington.
483 Parsonson, 1991, P124.
484 Suzanne Cross and Brian Bargh, Whanganui District, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, 1996,
pp 18 and 20.
485 Mclean to the Colonial Secretary, 29 December 1851, BPP, Vol. 8, [1476], pp 63 - 64.
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his suggestion to Grey in 1850 that one way in which Maori might be persuaded tosell more of
their land to the Crown would be to provide some way for them to purchase land from the
Crown after sales had been completed. McLean argued that the ability for Maori to re-
purchase land from the Crown would allay:
the fear of their not being able at any future period to re-purchase land once sold by
them, however necessary it may be for their existence; moreover, they have found in
many instances that they could not purchase or retain the most significant spots for
cuItivation.486
It seems that after a decade of colonisation Maori were voicing their concerns and making
more exacting demands upon the Crown in negotiations over land than they had done in the
1840s. But most of all there was a growing understanding that Pakeha viewed these
arrangements as a permanent separation of Maori from the land. Therefore, this policy may
have appeared necessary to McLean as a means by which the effects of the permanent nature
of the sales could be softened.
McLean then applied his idea of re-purchasing to the provision of Native reserves in the Hua
purchases in Taranaki. In a letter a few days after the Hua deed was signed early in March
1854, McLean outlined the re-purchasing policy and put forward its advantages. He provided a
range of politically motivated justifications for adopting the policy in Taranaki at this particular
time. It is clear that the re-purchasing policy for Native reserves was an attempt to minimise the
amount ofdesirable land locked up in Native reserves (and thus unavailable tosettlers). This is
unsurprising given the considerable pressure that settlers at New Plymouth were exerting on
the Crown to acquire land north of the Waiwakaiho River, and in particular at Waitara. In the
case of the Hua block, McLean noted that "instead of having extensive reserves, which would
monopolise the best ofthe land" TeAtiawa had agreed to use £1000 ofthe purchase money to
exercise their "pre-emptive right of selection at ten shillings an acre.'?" The desire to prevent
the allocation of 'excessive' reserves was coupled with an assumption that land re-purchased
and held by Te Atiawa in title from the Crown would quickly be sold by Maori individuals to
settlers, thus increasing the supply of land. The superintendent of the province certainly
486 Chief Commissioner tothe Colonial Secretary, 7 March 1854, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 40.
487 Ibid, P198.
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expected a steady flow of "individual pieces" of land in the Hua block to come onto the market
and suggested to McLean that all such sales "should be by auction stating terms of credit etc.
so as to get the owner the tip top price."?"
Ofequal importance in this climate of pressure was the hope that the re-purchasing scheme,
with its promise ofCrown grants, would offer a significant incentive for Te Atiawa to sell further
land to the Crown. Cooper was later called to respond to settler dissatisfaction with the amount
of land in the Waiwakaiho block, especially the amount of coastal fern land, which had been
reserved for Maori and the portion subsequently re-purchased by them in this block. He
reminded the settlers that atthe time the block was purchased in 1853, "it was looked upon as
a matter of great importance to make a commencement in any direction and on almost any
terms inthe hopes of its leading to further purchases." In particular:
it was also at that time believed that dealing liberally with the Natives in the matter of
reserves in this [Waiwakaiho] block might operate as an inducement to the
Mangaoraka, Waiongana, and Waitara people to sell some of their much-coveted
lands as it was hoped their opposition might become less obstinate when they saw
that really nothing more was asked for, orsought tobe obtained from them, than those
lands which were of no use to themselves ortheir cbildren.'"
In this way, the Crown envisaged that the Company's original block would be rapidly
recovered. McLean assured the Colonial Secretary that the policy "will lead without much
difficulty to the purchase ofthe whole of the Native lands in this province."?"
A system that individualised the ownership of the land Maori retained had several other
advantages for the Crown that, although less important; should not be overlooked. If each
individual had sections of land in his orher own name it would, McLean argued, "dispense with
the necessity that existed under their former precarious tenure and customs of living in
confederate bands in large pas, ready at a moment's notice to collect and arm themselves
either for defence or depredation.?" This suggests that the re-purchasing scheme was
perceived as going some way towards neutralizing the military threat that Te Atiawa appeared
488 Charles Brown toMclean, 13June 1854, Mclean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0178, ATl, Wellington.
489 Cooper tothe Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43.
490 Chief Commissioner tothe Colonial Secretary, 7 March 1854, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1 No. 40, P198.
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to pose to the British settlement at New Plymouth. In general terms any means which
persuaded Maori to abandon tribal warfare and live in peace amongst themselves would also
have been viewed as a step towards 'civilisation' and assimilation. The re-purchase scheme
also offered the Crown fiscal benefits. The large sum of money it had paid out in purchasing
the land would be effectively recycled back into its coffers because the purchase consideration
"will be chiefly expended by them in re-purchasing land from the Crown."492
This change ofpolicy marked a watershed in the evolution of the Crown's notion of how the
Native reserves would function to assimilate Maori. The emphasis permanently shifted away
from reserves as a mechanism to physically intermingle Maori property with that of the settlers
to encourage Maori to adopt British economic and social habits. Instead, in the Crown's
revised vision of the Maori future, assimilation into the Anglo-settler State depended upon Te
Atiawa individuals holding land in a Crown title. Native reserves were to be the 'pilot scheme'
to introduce Maori to individualized title, which would, it was hoped, lead to a widespread
enthusiasm amongst Maori for holding land in this form of title. There was perhaps the
assumption that if Maori held property as individuals then tribal society would be gradually
transformed into a society that more closely resembled that of the settlers. The fact that all
land in the colony would then be easily tradable was no small benefit of this new means of
assimilation .. However, as with all pilot schemes, the outcome was far from certain. In 1858,
McLean admitted that Native land legislation, and by implication the policies behind it, were
decidedly experimental. He cautioned that:
it is impossible to ignore the fact that their [Native land legislation] success, as a
means of civilizing and ameliorating the condition of the Natives, is problematic; and
that until time shall have tested their merits, they must be regarded simply as an
experiment.493
491 Chief Commissioner tothe Colonial Secretary, 7 March 1854, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1 No. 40, P198.
492 Ibid. McLean emphasised toCooper that this would enable the purchase money to be paid back toTreasury
who could then make it available for further purchases in the province (draft letter from McLean toCooper, 1May
1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL, Wellington).
493 Memorandum bythe Native Secretary, 13 October 1858 inBPP, Vol. 11 (492), P49.
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Table 1: Table Showing the Proportion of Native Reserves in the Waiwakaiho Block
reserved by Commissioner Cooper and Re-purchased byTe Atiawa
Name of Acres Acres Total Reasons for the reserve being
reserve and reserved Re-purchased acreage created
who reserved of 'Native
for Reserve'
a (Te Puia) 50 acres?" Nil 50 acres Promised as reserve byGovernor
Matini Tupoki Grey prior to purchase (would have
and Wi Ropiha been excepted from sale if not
reserved)
A (Purakau) 50 acres Nil 50 acres Was part ofowner's promised 100
Hone Ropiha acres seaward (he gave up the
other 50 acres inorder tosecure
this reserve)
B (Raupiu) 100 acres Nil 100 acres Was old Company 10th reserve
Wi TeAhoaho owner refused togive up his claim to
it (would have been excepted from
sale if not reserved)
C 100 acres 100 acres 200 acres Was owner's promised 200 acres
Hone Rophia inland. Owner offered tore-
and party purchase 100 acres
D 25 acres Nil 25 acres In exchange for cultivations on Mr
Rawiri Motutere Smart's section and for claims in the
and Wi Kawaho FitzRoy block
d Nil 5acres 5 acres In exchange for cultivations on MrSt
AUbyn's section. Re-purchased bya
Karoraina and male relative of the two female
Ani owners
E 40 acres Balance over 50 acres For claims in the FitzRoy and Grey
Hopataiha 40 acres blocks
(presumably 10
acres tomake
a50 acre
section)
F 20 acres 30 acres 50 acres Originally tohave 50 acres in
Matini Tupoki common with owners ofFA and I.
Owner opted for20 acre reserve
and 30 acres re-purchased tomake
a 50 acre section
FA 20 acres 30 acres 50 acres Originally tohave 50 acres in
Wi Tana common with owners ofF and I.
Owner opted for 20 acre reserve
and 30 acres re-purchased tomake
a 50 acre section
494 Figures and comments for this table come from the map inFigure 9 (MapCoIl832.2gbbd/[1848]/Acc 2797,
ATL, Wellington); Cooper tothe Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43 and 'Memorandum
byMrCooper', 8 December 1854, Turton's Epitome, encl. in0-43.
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Name of Acres Acres Total Reasons for the reserve being
reserve and reserved Re-purchased acreage created
who reserved of 'Native
for Reserve'
G 75acres Nil 75 acres For absentees from Nelson
Kirihipu,
Herewini and
Hohia
H(Whatapiupiu) Nil 50 acres 50 acres For absentees but Cooper refused
Poharama toreserve the land soowner offered
tore-purchase the whole section
I 20 acres 30 acres 50 acres Originally tohave 50 acres in
Wi Ropiha common with owners ofFand FA.
Owner opted for20 acre reserve
and 30 acres re-purchased tomake
a 50 acre section
J (Whatapiupiu) 500 acres Nil 500 acres A reserve was promised atthe
Wi Tako signing ofthe deed atWellington
K 50 acres Nil 50 acres For claims inGrey block and to
More induce owners to move offMrJ
Webster's section atWatitiri.
L (Rekereke) 100 acres 100 acres 200 acres Was owner's 200 acres inland.
Wi Te Ahoaho Owner offered tore-purchase 100
and his relatives acres.
M(Araheke) 500 acres Nil 500 acres Areserve was promised for
Te Ropiha absentees atthe signing ofdeed in
Moturoa and his Wellington.
.relatives
N(Mangorei) 50 acres Nil 50 acres A reserve was promised atsigning
Hohua and ofdeed in New Plymouth forowners
Manahi who had no land tosettle on.
TOTAL ACRES 1700 acres 355 acres 2055
acres
The Selection and Allocation of Native Reserves in the Waiwakaiho Block
Commissioner Cooper was responsible for the location and size of the Native reserves in the
Waiwakaiho block. Cooper emphasised this somewhat defensively to McLean in 1855, stating
that the "re-emptive rights ofselection were not given to these Natives ... the only reserves not
selected by me being Waerengapoka, and the latter being the only one taken in opposition to
my wishes.?" Table 1 above demonstrates that over half of the reserves in the Waiwakaiho
block were created by Cooper as a means ofsolving a variety ofpressing concerns. A number
of reserves were made to fulfill promises previously made for particular places to be reserved;
to accommodate absentees returning to the district and to facilitate the removal of Te Atiawa
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from sections that settlers still regarded as having been selected by them in the 1840s. Almost
all of the reserves that did not fall into this category were in fulfillment of agreements Cooper
had negotiated with particular hapu leaders.
Te Atiawa choices about the location, size and number of reserves they received were to a
large extent constrained by Cooper. However, it is also clear that Cooper's selection of the
reserves generally occurred in the context ofhard bargaining with Te Atiawa individuals. In the
case of the 100 acre reserve for Hone Ropiha, Cooper reported that he chose it to adjoin that
belonging to Wiremu Te Ahaoho. But Hone Ropiha bargained, proposing to give up 50 of his
acres there if he could have Purakau Waiwakaiho A as a reserve, and McLean eventually
sanctioned this arranqement.'" In other cases hapu leaders simply refused to part with sites
they laid claim to or had been promised would be reserved for them well before the purchase
deed was signed. The 100 acres (Raupiu Waiwakaiho B) reserved for Wi Te Ahoaho was land
that he simply insisted had to be reserved. Cooper stated that they were reserved because
they were sections that "Wi Te Ahaoho and his brother never would have given up, and they
would have been excepted from the sale had they not been promised as reserves."?' These
sections are shown as Company tenths reserves in Figure 3 however they had recently been
occupied by asettler, Mr Nairn.498
Commissioner Cooper also attempted to use the location and allocation of reserves to break
up the occupation of a large area of the block by Henare Te Puni and his people who were
protesting about the original purchase ofthe land.?" This occupation was causing considerable
discontent amongst New Plymouth settlers, and was a serious obstacle for the Crown which
needed to get the land rapidly surveyed and opened for selection to pacify settlers and
generate funds for purchasing much coveted land towards Waitara. The Crown became
increasingly frustrated, and Cooper used the power of selection to attempt to break up Te
495 Cooper to the Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, D-43. Here Cooper isreferring to
Raupiu Waiwakaiho B, two former Company tenths sections which Wi Te Ahoaho refused to give up his claim to.
496 Cooper tothe Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, D-43.
497 Ibid.
498 Ibid.
499 Figure 9shows the extent ofthe land occupied by Te Puni and several Native reserves that Cooper created
within that area.
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Puni's resistance. Cooper frankly admitted that he purposely selected Hone Ropiha's 200
acres (Waiwakaiho C) "within the boundaries disputed by Henare Te Puni and party, because
he has much influence over them."50o Cooper then offered Hone Ropiha a deal on the price per
acre for the 100 acres he wished to repurchase to "induce him" to exercise his influence with
Te Puni "to its fullest extent?" Cooper also selected the 50 acre reserve (Waiwakaiho K) for
More and his family within the boundaries of the land disputed by Henare Te Punj,502
In the Waiwakaiho block the Crown found it necessary to make reserves in an attempt to
correct various problems that had arisen on the ground. There were situations where Cooper
created reserves to satisfy the needs of individuals whose interests in the FitzRoy and Grey
blocks had not been recognised at the time of those purchases. He also created reserves in
order to persuade Maori to move off sections that had been claimed by settlers. In one
instance, a 50 acre reserve was made by Cooper (Waiwakaiho K) for More and his family "to
induce them to remove from Mr J Webster's section atWaititiri," he also thought that they had
some claims in the Grey block.503 In another case, a reserve of 25 acres (Waiwakaiho D) for
Rawiri Motutere and Wiremu Kawaho was noted as land "in exchange for a cultivation on Mr
Smart's farm, for which they had not been paid at the FitzRoy purchase."?' The number of
these cases is an indication of the considerable mismatch between the concept of Native
reserves as ,bounded parcels of land and the scattered and intersecting use rights of Te
Atiawa.
In several cases prominent Te Atiawaindividuals were able to persuade Cooper to reserve
particular significant places for them and their people by citing previous oral agreements with
Governor Grey. Presumably, Cooper or McLean then approached Grey, who then
remembered, and verified these promises to those individuals. Te Puia Waiwakaiho a was
made by Cooper for Matena Tupoki and Wiremu Ropiha because it was the section at the
500 Cooper to the Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43.
501 Ibid.
502 Ibid.
503 Ibid.
504 There was also Waiwakaiho E, 40acres reserve for Hopataia, "for all his unsatisfied claims in the FitzRoy and
Grey purchases, including Mr. 81. Aubyn's section." There was a 5acre (Waiwakaiho d) that was reserved for two
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mouth of the Waiwakaiho River that Grey promised them "years ago" that they would have "if
the land was ever sold to the Crown.'?" Cooper noted that the land would have been excepted
from the sale if it had not been set aside as a reserve; clearly this site was one which was so
significant to Te Atiawa that they insisted on it being reserved. 506
Concern about future events also prompted the Crown to regulate the location and extent of
the Waiwakaiho Native reserves. Cooper made a number of sizable reserves for Te Atiawa
migrants expected to return and live permanently inTaranaki. The Crown feared that a flood of
migrants would settle anywhere they chose on the block, ruining the careful negotiations for
reserves and re-purchased portions of those reserves. This was the reason Cooper gave for
making Waiwakaiho J (500 acres) for Ropiha Moturoa and his Wellington relatives, and
Waiwakaiho G(75 acres) for Kirihipu and Herewini and their relalives.:"
The Waiwakaiho purchase was acknowledged amongst Crown officials as a preliminary to
acquiring the more valuable land at Waitara.508 Therefore, the allocation of reserves in the
Waiwakaiho block was often an attempt to secure and maintain the co-operation of individuals
who had particular influence with their hapu or iwi. In particular, the Crown was keen to
cultivate the support of those who could influence the Waitara people to sell land, orpersuade
absentees not to return and take up further land. It also used reserves to repay those seen as
deserving of a reward for persuading their own people to sell the Waiwakaiho block to the
Crown. Cooper justified the decision to make such "liberal" reserves for Hone Ropiha and
Wiremu Te Ahoaho and their relatives on the basis that "these men individually deserve liberal
women, Kororaina and Ani, "in exchange for cultivations on Mr Sl. Aubyn's section, inoccupation of Mr Chilman."
('Memorandum ofCommissioner Cooper', 8December 1854, Turton's Epitome, encl. toD-43).
505 Matini Tupoki signed the FitzRoy deed inNovember 1844, in1847 he was living atMoturoa. He had interests
inthe FitzRoy block - he signed the deed ofsale for Te Kawau Pa incentral New Plymouth in1862 and he is
listed as part owner ofNative Reserve No. 21 with Wi Ropiha in1866. In 1868 he wasliving atTe Henui and
owned cattle for which he held a registered brand. He isburied on Te Puia Waiwakaiho 8. Wiremu Ropiha signed
the FitzRoy deed inNovember 1844, and was part owner of Native Reserve No. 21 with Matini Tupoki in1866. A
Crown grant for Te Puia Waiwakaiho 8, was eventually issued to him on 9April 1894, ante-vested to 7June 1887.
506 Cooper tothe Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, D-43.Another example would appear
to be apromise made in 1847, during negotiations for the Grey block, when Maori approached McLean
requesting that a pa, cultivation site and urupa on the property ofMr Grover atWaiwakaiho be reserved for them
(McLean to King, 18 May 1847 and McLean to Henry Halse, 20 May 1847 both inMA·MLP-NP 1, ANZ,
Wellington).
507 Cooper to the Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, D-43.
508 Ibid.
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treatment at the hands of Government, as it was almost exclusively owing to them that the
purchase was effected." Both men were to have 300 acres of reserves made in their name,
100 acres at the seaward end of the block and 200 acres inland.509 Te Ropiha Moturoa was
allocated one of the largest reserves in the block, Araheke Native Reserve M (500 acres). It
appears that the reason for this was that he "had used his influence very successfully with the
absentees in this neighbourhood," and most importantly Cooper believed that he would be
useful when it came to persuading those at Waiongana to sell their land.?"
By contrast those who fell out of favour, orwere seen as obstructive or too demanding ran the
risk of being penalised by having their requests for reserves denied. Poharama Te Whiti was
one of the leading chiefs of the Ngamotu hapu. However, when he asserted his chiefly
authority within his rohe in opposition to the purchase arrangements he was labelled as difficult
and obstructive. Poharama headed a party of prominent men including Wiremu Ropiha, Matini
Tupoki, Wi Kawaho and Rawiri of Te Kawau Pa who called on Cooper to protest about the
boundaries of the Hua block offered by Karira who belonged to Puketapu hapu. On that
occasion Commissioner Cooper berated Poharama, telling him that he should be ashamed of
his behaviour. Although Poharama later apologised he was firm in his opposition, informing
Cooper that he had decided "to rub out all the boundaries on the ground."51l Cooper
characterised Poharama's actions as spiteful and motivated by petty jealousy and patronisingly
disregarded his concerns: "I fancy he is agood fellow in the main, 'and when his fitofsulks is
over he will cause little orno lrouble.?" Given all of these incidents, it is interesting tosay the
least that when Poharama requested a reserve for migrants, Cooper refused to make one, and
Poharama resorted to re-purchasing 50 acres instead (Whatapiupiu Waiwakaiho H).513
509 Wi Te Ahoaho was seen as influential. He signed the Hua deed, but was also shown as part owner with his
brother Hemi Poaka ofPukaka Native Reserve No. 18, and Raiomiti Native Reserve No. 23 ('An Account of
Native Reserves in the Province ofTaranaki together with the Owners thereof, AD 1,1866/610, ROB, Vol. 136,
pp 52169 - 52177) and therefore important to the Crown's negotiations for further land.
510 Cooper to the Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43.
511 Cooper to McLean, 12 September 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL, Wellington.
512 Ibid. Cooper's negative opinion ofPoharama was probably compounded by adispute between Poharama and
aTaranaki Maori. Poharama had allowed aman from the south to cultivate on part ofMoturoa reserve, but the
man had "joined Creed's party." So Poharama had pulled up his crops and burnt them. Although Poharama's
actions were a totally appropriate exercise ofautonomy for achief ofhis standing, Cooper reported that
"Poharama's conduct isasad trouble. He isbecoming quite unmanageable" (Ibid).
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The Re-purchasing of Portions of Native Reserves in theWaiwakaiho Block
It is clear from Cooper's reports regarding the allocation of Waiwakaiho reserves and the
unsigned, undated plan of the reserves shown in Figure 8 that individual Maori for whom
Cooper had selected reserves re-purchased a portion of their reserve from the Crown.?' The
Taranaki provincial council committee into the Waiwakaiho block stated that 1,784 acres had
been reserved by Cooper, "395 acres are, according to agreement, to be purchased by them
at 10 shillings per acre before any portion is given out to setters,'?"
An analysis of the reserves made by Cooper in the Waiwakaiho block in terms of the
proportion of each reserve re-purchased by Te Atiawa reveals that 355 acres, nearly 20
percent (17.27 percent) of the total 2055 acres shown as reserved was land within the
reserves re-purchased by Te Atiawa. The overwhelming majority, 1700 acres (82.73 percent)
of the reserve land in the block remained land set aside by the Crown as Native reserves. Of
the 17 reserves created at this time over half (9 of the 17 or52.94 percent) consisted totally of
land reserved by Cooper. Well over a third of the reserves (6 of the 17 or35. 29 percent) were
reserves created by Cooper in which Te Atiawa had re-purchased a portion of the reserve. The
remaining two reserves, 11.76 percent of the total number of reserves made, were reserves
made by Cooper but completely repurchased by TeAtiawa.
All the reserves in which Te Atiawa did not re-purchase a portion of the reserve, were cases
where Cooper was forced to make a reserve by a previous promise to Te Atiawa, Te Atiawa
pressure or the need to solve situations where Te Atiawa were occupying sections selected by
settlers. On the other hand, all the reserves where Te Atiawa did re-purchase part of the
reserve were those which were considered to be allocated to chiefs and their kin simply in
fulfilment of the promise in the deed to make reserves. The only exception to this pattern was
Waiwakaiho E that was created for Hopataia "for all his unsatisfied claims in the FitzRoy and
513 Cooper tothe Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43.
514 Cooper gave adetailed account ofthe location and size ofthese repurchased sections and noted which
individuals had repurchased them. 'Memorandum byMrCooper', 8 December 1854, Turton's Epitome, encl. to
0-43 and Cooper to the Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43.
SIS 'Report ofa Special Committee ofthe Provincial Council ofNew Plymouth on the Purchase ofthe Waiwakaiho
Block, n/d [c. May 1855], Turton's Epitome, 0-41 A. There can be no doubt that they are referring tothe
Waiwakaiho rather than the Hua block as they accurately quote the deed and the price paid toWellington people
for their interests in the block.
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Grey purchases, including Mr St. Aubyn's secfion.?" However, in this case 40 acres were
reserved for Hopataia in compensation for his claims, and it was agreed that he would pay for
any acres in excess of this. Given that a section was 50 acres it is more than likely that he
would have re-purchased no more than 10 acres. (Table 1 above provided the basic data for
these calculations).
It is almost certain that this re-purchasing took place after the Hua deed was signed; its re-
purchasing provision widely known amongst Te Atiawa with interests in the Waiwakaiho and
Hua district; and work begun on translating that provision into reality. Although the second
deed conveying land in the Waiwakaiho block to the Crown was signed in Wellington in
January 1854 the reserves were still not laid out in July 1854. C W Richmond commented on
28 July that "the friendly party [as opposed to Te Puni and his people] are sowing wheat and
planting potatoes on the Waiwakaiho block." He had heard that both Cooper and Hone Ropiha
had agreed to this in order to stop Te Puni and his people planting their crops and expanding
the area they held. However he also reported that "other people [other settlers?] say that as
the reserves are not marked out the Natives are allowed for the first year to crop what land
they choose?" [emphasis added]. It was not until November 1854 that Cooper reported that
he had "settled all the reserve questions at the Waiwakaiho and handed the block to Halse and
the superintendent?" In the mean time those who had been allocated reserves in the
Waiwakaiho block would have heard, and even been involved in, the selection of re-purchased
sections in the Hua blocks. In May 1854 the survey of the Hua block was said to be complete
enough for them to select their sections and throughout June, JUly and August those
selections took place before the block was opened for selection by settlers on 17 August
1854.519
516 Memorandum by Mr Cooper', 8 December 1854, Turton's Epitome, encl. in 0-43.
517 CWRichmond to Charles Brown, 28 july 1854, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed),
1960, Vol. 1,P151.
518 Cooper to McLean, 2November 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL, Wellington.
519 Cooper to McLean, 16 May 1854 and Cooper to McLean, 12 June 1854 both McLean Papers, MS-Papers-
0032-0227; William Halse to McLean, 22 July 1854 and William Halse to McLean, 25 August 1854 both in
McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0318 respectively, all atATL, Wellington.
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It seems likely that these events in the adjacent block unfolding at the same time as the
Waiwakaiho reserves were being created prompted those who were allocated reserves in that
block to approach Cooper to request that they be permitted to re-purchase part of the reserves
already set aside for them. Cooper later recalled several examples of these requests, for
example before Cooper had selected inland reserves of 200 acres for Hone Ropiha and Wi Te
Ahoaho "they both expressed a wish to purchase one hundred acres of their respective
reserves."?' In another case, Cooper had decided to reserve one 50 acre section for Matini
Tupoki, Wi Tana and Wi Ropiha, they reportedly, "objected to holding the land as tenants in
common, and asked for separate reserves of twenty acres each, and for permission to
purchase thirty more, so that each might have asection.'?'
By the time Te Atiawa began re-purchasing portions ofthe Waiwakaiho Native reserves the re-
purchasing policy had been officially adopted in the Hua block. Therefore it is unsurprising that
Cooper reacted favourably to requests to re-purchase portions of the reserves. In 1855 he
recounted that he "willingly acceded" to the request by Hone Ropiha and Wi Te Ahoaho to re-
purchase portions of Waiwakaiho C and Rekereke Native Reserve L, as he "had been
specifically instructed by you [McLean] to encourage as much as possible the purchase of land
by Natives under the Government requlallons.?" In the case of Matini Tupoki, Wi Tana and
Wi Ropiha who each offered to re-purchase afurther 30 acres toadd to the 20 acres each had
been allocated as reserves Cooper recalled that he agreed in order "to encourage the
purchase of Crown lands by Nafives.?" It is likely that influential individuals were particularly
encouraged to re-purchase land in the hope that their example would motivate the iwi as a
whole to embrace the concept of individual land ownership. This policy was explicitly stated in
McLean's instructions to the District Land Purchase Commissioner Robert Parris in 1857.
Parris was instructed that:
520 Cooper to the Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43.
521 Ibid.
522 Ibid. Grey made Land Regulations on 4 March 1853 that lowered the price ofland outside Hundreds to10
shillings per acre (or 5shillings per acre for land certified as hilly orbroken). These regulations applied torural
land inthe New Plymouth province from September 1853 (Parsonson, 1991, fnt p 123).
523 Cooper to the Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43.
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every possible facility should be afforded to the young and more intelligent Natives to
acquire land by re-purchase from the Crown; in order that their present system of
communism may be gradually dissolved; and that they may be led to appreciate the
great advantage ofholding their land under a tenure more defined and more secure for
themselves and their posterity than they can possibly enjoy under their present
intricate and complicated mode ofholding property."
Paradoxically, there was a clear intention on the part of Commissioner Cooper to facilitate the
rapid alienation ofthe re-purchased portion of these reserves. In doing so Cooper constrained,
and in some cases vetoed, Te Atiawa choices of the size and location of this portion of the
reserve. For instance, Cooper selected the 100 acre re-purchased portions for Hone Ropiha
and Wiremu Te Ahoaho "at a less distance inland than probably they otherwise would have
been, as I felt sure that the purchased half of each reserve would in a very short time come
into the market?" In the case of the 30 acres to be re-purchased by Matini Tupoki, Wi Tana
and Wi Ropiha in their reserves (Waiwakaiho F, FA and I respectively) Cooper assured McLean
that he had "selected the lands in their present position, knowing they would soon come into
the market, with which view I specially provided that the twenty-acres reserves should be at the
end ofthe sections fronting on the river, as being the least valuable portions ofthe land.?"
Cooper's practice of selecting the re-purchased portion ofthe reserve to facilitate its alienation
is problematic. On the one hand it had the potential to dramatically and rapidly reduce the land
hapu retained in the wake of the purchase, and considering this was all the land they
possessed for the future sustenance and development oftheir communities this would suggest
that their long-term interests were poorly served by such apractice. The deliberate selection by
Cooper of the most valuable piece as the portion that would be alienated seems designed to
favour potential settler buyers, leaving Te Atiawa with the least valuable (and probably poorer
quality) land as 'reserves'. However, Cooper may in fact have considered that the rapid sale of
the more valuable portion was profitable for Te Atiawa sellers. Cooper justified his practice in
the case of Hone Ropiha and Wi Te Ahoaho commenting that he "could not see why the
difference in value between the Government price of 10 shillings and that which commonly is
524 'Instructions toDistrict Land Purchase Commissioner [Robert Parris] relative to purchase ofland from the
Natives atTaranaki', 26 August 1857, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 57, pp 211 - 213.
525 Cooper to the Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1855, Turton's Epitome, 0-43.
526 Ibid.
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obtained in New Plymouth should not as well be received by aboriginal Natives" rather than a
British speculator who would make a fortune and leave the colony. Cooper was of the opinion
that the right ofMaori "to a share in the benefits arising from the settlement and improvement"
of the settlement was "at least as good as that of any immigrant settler whatsoever.'?" Te
Atiawa in the Hua block, and probably in this block as well, also expressed a strong desire to
be treated as equals with the settlers. When told by Cooper that the Government was
considering putting restrictions on selling in the Crown grants for re-purchased sections Te
Atiawa reportedly replied "that if they brought their land and paid for it the same as the whites.
why should they not be equally free to sell it aqain.?" Cooper was forced to admit that any
proposal to make grants of the life interest for the present generation only would "have a very
mischievous effect" and that "it would not be safe to do more than oblige them to conduct any
sale or leasing of their lands, through the medium of my office.?" This demonstrates that the
re-purchasing scheme highlighted the classic tensions between the Crown's duty to protect
Maori interests and the rights ofMaori as British clnzens."
Although Cooper reported in November 1854 that he had settled all matters relating to the
Waiwakaiho reserves this was not the case (this will be discussed in the following chapter in
relation to the work ofthe Native reserves commissioners). However it is worth noting here that
in all cases, the part reserved by Cooper and that re-purchased by Te Atiawa came to be
regarded simply as a Native reserve. Cooper's successor, Robert Parris, concluded that
because of the "complicated nature of the arrangement" in which there was "no definition of
what part is reserve orwhat part has been paid for, but merely the quantities mentioned, and
both marked off in one allotment, without any distinction" it would be best to treat them as
reserves.?'
The Native Reserves in the Hua Block
The Hua deed and official correspondence make an interesting distinction between the nature
of the land in the reserves named in the deed and that of the sections to be re-purchased by
527 Ibid.
528 Cooper toMcLean, 16May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL, Wellington.
529 Ibid.
530 Ward, 1997, p 276.
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the signatories. It is clear that the reserves themselves were set aside for hapu because they
were the actual pa, surrounding cultivations and associated urupa of the communities living on
the block. Shortly after the deed was signed McLean referred to these reserves reporting that,
"instead of having reserves of several thousand acres they have been satisfied with three
hundred acres round their pas.'?" In contrast the deed indicates that the sections to be re-
purchased would be land that hapu "may require for culfivation.?"
It appears that work began on surveying these reserves shortly after the deed was signed in
March 1854. By 3 April Cooper noted that the survey of the Hua block was progressing well
and that the surveying ofthe reserves was complete." The nature ofthese reserves suggests
that hapu were already in residence at the time the deed was signed. Two years later, during
the conflict amongst Puketapu hapu, John Whiteley recorded that his circuit "is now composed
of a number ofpas orstockades, each little settlement being converted into a military fortress
for [the] security of [the] inhabitants." Amongst these pa he lists three of the Hua Native
reserves: Upokotauaki, "Te Horopururi" [Oropuriri] and Paritj,535
Re-purchased Sections in the Hua Block
It is not entirely clear how many sections were re-purchased by Te Atiawa individuals in the
Hua block under the re-purchasing provision of the Hua deed. The Taranaki Report stated that
"in the end, Maori obtained 1800 acres in over 1000 allofments.?" This was derived from the
report ofJohn Rogan the surveyor, who stated in June 1855 that "the Native selections already
amount to 1676 acres which have been divided into 101 allotments, and there yet remain 124
acres to be divided between three claimants, which will complete the Native selections in the
above [Hua] district?"
531 Parris to McLean (Private), 12 December 1859, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0009, ATL, Wellington.
532 McLean to the Colonial Secretary, 7 March 1854, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1 No. 40, P198.
533 Deeds - No. 15, Te Hua Block, Grey and Bell district, 3 March 1854, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki Province.
534 Cooper to McLean, 3April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, ATL,Wellington.
535 Wesleyan Mission Society Reports: New Plymouth Circuit, November 1856, Wesleyan Mission Society
Reports 1856 - 1863, ATL, Wellington.
536 The Taranaki Report, 1996, p 50.
537 Rogan to the Chief Commissioner, 14 June 1855, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, enc!. inNo. 51, pp 206 - 207.
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The selection of land by Te Atiawa individuals in the Hua block was not nearly as
straightforward as Rogan's final report would suggest. Several issues lea to considerable
frustration and delays for hapu. As in the case of Native reserves as far back as the New
Zealand Company tenths, many Te Atiawa continued to operate on the basis ofexisting rights
to land and resources in the Hua block, and these could not be made to harmonise with the
imposition ofagrid of individually owned sections. Rogan noted, as he began the surveying of
those sections, that he anticipated delays "owing principally to the Natives adhering to their
respective claims to the land, as it stood originally, and it is in most cases impossible tosurvey .
the different allotments so as to make them come to certain Maori land marks.'?" This
comment needs to sit alongside the reported enthusiasm of hapu for the re-purchasing of
sections, as it points out that understandings about the scheme were not uniform amongst the
hapu involved. There was indeed a considerable level of support by hapu for the prospect of
re-purchasing land from the Crown and holding it in Crown-derived title. In April 1854, Cooper
reported that those who had signed the Hua deed had voluntarily
laid up a further sum ofone thousand pounds, out of the £2000 paid for the Hua block
[that is minus the £1000 initially set aside for re-purchasing], to be expended in
competing with the English settlers for additional land, when the block shall be thrown
open for general selecton." -
The large amount of land re-purchased by Te Atiawa from the Crown as Native reserves and
as individual sections is an indication of how appealing the repurchasing scheme was to Te
Atiawa hapu at a practical level. The most attractive aspect of the scheme for Te Atiawa was
evidently the assurance in the deed that they would have a-pre-emptive right to select their
sections for re-purchase before the land was offered to the settlers for selection.s" A few
weeks later McLean confirmed that selections had been made "in accordance with a pre-
emptive right secured by the Natives in the deed of sale of the Hua purchase.'?" However,
this did not amount to an altogether unconstrained choice of land. Cooper took measures to
ensure that Te Atiawa were unable to select all the most desirable land at the seaward end of
538 Rogan toMcLean, 19January 1855, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540, ATL, Wellington.
539 General report of Cooper tothe Colonial Secretary, 29 August 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers- 0032-0126,
ATL, Wellington.
540 Deeds - No. 15, Te Hua Block, Grey and Bell district, 3 March 1854, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki Province.
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the block. In June 1854, he reported that he had "succeeded in carrying out to some extent the
principal of parallel lines to regulate the Native and European selections, so that Maori will not
have more than two-thirds of the best land.?" Despite the fact that this may have been
contrary to the expectations ofhapu regarding the pre-emptive right ofselection it was, if it was
carried out, a generous share of the most viable land in the block. Cooper's 'parallel lines'
initiative appears to have been, to some extent, a negotiated compromise. In discussing an
attempt by a settler, William Hulke, to induce a Puketapu chief Raniera to sell a large area of
fern land (presumably on the basis that Raneria was going to re-purchase it and then convey it
to Hulke) it was reported that Cooper's appeal to Raniera "induced him to abide by his word to
share the open land with theEuropeans.'?"
Te Atiawa understood that not only did they have the right to first selection for land in the block
using their £1000 purchase fund but also that those who had the cash could also purchase
land in the block from the Crown. Cooper informed them that this was not the case, and that
"those who have no share in the £1000 must wait till the Company's land orders are satisfied
and that they can then come in and purchase in regular course.?" What portion of the £1000
should be allocated to whom caused considerable debate and division amongst Te Atiawa,
and the Crown's interpretation of the extent of the pre-emptive right left others angry and
dissatisfied.54~
The other significant cause offrustration for hapu re-purchasing sections in the Hua block was
the delay inthe issue ofCrown grants. As soon as Rogan finished the survey of the sections in
June 1855 he submitted a plan showing each section with the claimant's names to Halse and
to Carrington so that' Crown grants could be made. A few days later McLean asked central
government to instruct the Crown commissioner at New Plymouth to have Crown grants issued
to Te Atiawa.?" However, nothing appears to have been done. In 1861 Robert Parris, who had
541 Chief Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 19 June 1854, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 51, P206.
542 General report ofCooper to the Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers- 0032-0126,
ATL, Wellington.
543 William Halse to McLean, 22 July 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0318, ATL, Wellington.
544 Cooper to McLean, 12 June 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032·0227, ATL, Wellington.
545 Ibid.
546 Chief Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 19 June 1855, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1,
No. 51, P206. It unclear from this letter but it is likely that it was William Halse, the district commissioner of
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replaced Cooper as district land purchase commissioner, reported that the reason that Crown
grants had been delayed in the Hua block was because the surveyor had intended to take a
road through some of the sections but faced opposition from the Maori owners of the sections.
Parris argued that any attempts to issue grants before the road was laid off "may lead to
difficulties and litigation herealter.?" An 1862 schedule of Crown grants promised for land in
the Hua block lists 1714.5 acres of land to be issued in Crown grants to a total of 70
individuals. Of these 70 individuals, only 27 (38.6 percent) can be shown to have received a
Crown grant for sections in the Hua district, the names of the remaining 43 (61.4 percent)
could not be traced toaCrown grant in this district. 548 However, it is possible that many more
people re-purchased lands than those listed on the 1862 schedule. When the Crown grant list
for Taranaki was examined for all Maori who received Crown grants for land in the Hua district
there are an additional 62 individuals who appear to have re-purchased sections in the Hua
block.'" Such were the delays in issuing Crown grants that some did not receive them until the
early 1880s.
The Implications of theRe-purchasing Policy for Visions of Assimilation
and Citizenship
Introduction
Questions about how they might use their land, engage with British law, and construct
concepts of citizenship now that British settlers and the new colonial State had arrived were
the larger issues Te Atiawa communities were working through during the late 1840s and the
1850s.550 Both Ngamotu hapu and the Crown shared a desire for 'equality' between the two
communities and for Maori to develop into a 'modern' people. But the means by which these
conditions were to be reached depended upon two very different mechanisms. The Crown's
Crown lands and Octavius Carrington, surveyor, who were involved in processing Crown grants.
547 Parris to McLean, June 1861, MA-MLP-NP 1,pp 258-259, ANZ, Wellington.
548 The listofnames on the 1862 list ofCrown grants promised for re-purchased lands in the Hua block were
cross-matched with the Taranaki Crown Grant listto determine the ratio ofthose promised Crown grants for re-
purchased lands and those who actually received them. (Taranaki Crown Grants: An Index toLand Records,
microfilm compiled by Noeline Carey, New Zealand Society ofGenealogists, Auckland, New Zealand, c. 1991).
549 Admittedly some of these may be individuals who appear on the 1862 listunder another name, but the
majority are probably other individuals.
550 Much of the discussion that follows draws upon Lyndsay Head's recent work inwhich she pointed out the
importance of issues ofmodernity and citizenship for 'friendly' Maori communities in this period. The essence of
argument has been used here to propose a Ngamotu vision of their future that forms areply to that being
assumed by the Crown initsNative reserve policy in this period.
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route to modernity, peace and equality was to be via assimilation; essentially Maori were to be
absorbed into the dominant settler culture, economy and political framework. The route the
Ngamotu hapu proposed to take to equality and modernity was to be via self-determination:
retaining their rangatiratanga but creating a joint economic and social world with the settlers. It
seems that the Crown failed to see this distinction and often presumed that because Ngamotu
hapu embraced its fundamental prerequisites for modernity they were also willing to be
assimilated.
The Crown's Perspectives
The provision of Native reserves through a re-purchasing policy embodied three prerequisites
for the assimilation of Maori individuals into the Anglo-settler society, This trinity: individualised
title, submission to British law, and the franchise, defined the means by which Maori individuals
would be regarded by the Crown as 'full' British subjects and citizens, and by association it
formed the Crown's notion of how Maori were to become rnodern.?' Henry Sewell, Attorney-
General and designer of the New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, summed up connections
between individualised title and assimilation in 1857 when he gave his opinion that:
so long as they [Maori] remain in their present tribal state, you could do nothing with
them; they are mere wanderers. If you can fix them upon portions of their land, and
give them individual titles, you make settlers of them, you assimilate their condition to
that ofEuropeans.?"
Sewell's comments are indicative of the Crown's assumption that the communal model by
which Maori organised their spiritual, social and economic world was utterly unsuited to the
new world. Based on this assumption the Crown formulated policies designed to discard, or
persuade Maori to discard, that model and replace it with a new structure founded upon on
individual ownership ofproperty and the rights ofa citizen in ademocratic State.
As the settlers achieved responsible government from the mid-1850s, the extension of British
law over Maori communities came to be regarded as an essential means by which Maori would
55! McLean considered that the individualization of title would lead Maori "to take an interest (from being qualified
to take part) in the political institutions ofthe Colony." (Chief Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 7 March
1854, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 40, P198),
552 Evidence ofSewell to aSelect Committee on the New Zealand Company Loan, 7July 1857, BPP, Vol. 10, I.
245, P158.
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become assimilated into the British settler society. Government officials explicitly linked the
extension of British law to the extinguishment of Native (communal) title over blocks of land by
purchase. In particular establishing control over Maori communities was considered impossible
while they held land in Native title because:
The lands which are not as yet purchased from the Natives, are not under the control
either of the general or the provincial legislature until they have been purchased from
the Natives; they remain absolutely beyond the control of either the general or
provlncial leqislafure.?'
It was understood that once a block of land was acquired "the Natives residing thereon
become virtually incorporated with the European settlers, become amenable to English law,
and imperceptibly recognise the control of the Government in their various transactions.,,554 In
1859, Governor Gore Browne considered that he had the right to "declare the Queen's law to
be in force as far as the extreme boundary of the land over which the Native title is extinct.,,555
From this immediate control of the Maori. population some Crown officials articulated a larger
vision of the future. Taranaki Resident Magistrate Josiah Flight argued that settlers would
never "have any solid peace or enjoy quietness in New Zealand until British law be proclaimed
and maintained not only as supreme, but as the only one.,,556 Not only must Maori be "forced
to submit" to British law they should "also be brought to feel that they enjoy the protection of
our laws snd qovernrnent.?" In this way equality between Maori and settler would be
established and they would have protection for "their persons and property."558 This,
according to Flight, should ensure peace and Maori "would soon be found exerting a friendly
rivalry indeveloping the resources of this fine country."559
The third element in the Crown's understanding of what Maori required to be assimilated was
the right to vote, and thus to have some voice in the affairs of the colony. Most officials were of
553 Ibid, I. 114, P150.
554 'Memorandum Relative to the Organisation ofthe Native Land Purchase Department' [Donald McLean],
15 June 1854, Turton's Epitome, Auckland, A-1, No. 50.
555 Gore Browne to the Lord Stanley, 9June 1858, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, No. 22.
556 Flight to CWRichmond, 22 March 1858, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GHScholefield (ed), 1960,
Vol. 1, P372.
557 Ibid.
558 Ibid.
559 Ibid.
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the opinion "that a Crown grant, or at least some sort of individual land tenure was a pre-
requisite for enfranchisement" although this was not authoritatively and categorically laid down
until 1859 when the Crown Law Officers decided that not even householders could claim
voting privileges in respect of land not held under a Crown title."560 In some quarters opinion
was also expressed that Maori submission to British law should be regarded as a necessary
condition for the franchise to be granted. A Taranaki newspaper editorial in 1858 considered
that Maori should not "be admitted to the full exercise of the franchise" until they were
"cognisant and amenable to our laws.?" Only then, it argued, would it be appropriate for them
to take part in the voting for the decision-makers who framed such laws. It followed that if
Maori remained "in a tribal state" they were not yet ready for full franchise and so could not be
"safely admitted to the full privileges of British subjects.?" These arguments continued despite
article 3 ofthe Treaty declaring Maori to be British subjects, and section 2 of the Native Rights
Act, 1865 which deemed all Maori to be "natural-born subject[s] of Her Majesty to all intents
and purposes whatsoever.?"
Te Atiawa Perspectives
Ngamotu hapu can also be said to have held three particular conditions as fundamental to their
view of how self-determination and modernity could be achieved. First, their concept of the
future depended upon embracing and upholding peace. Head has argued that through
Christianity, communities like the Ngamotu hapu had been taught that peace amongst iwi and
hapu was the prerequisite for being 'civilised': for being 'modem'J" Implicit in this foundation
was the way in which "Christianity offered a model of governance where peace was protected
by law, and where revenge was the responsibility of the state.?" This is important in
illuminating one of the reasons Ngamotu hapu communities had for choosing to come under
British law.566 Yet, not all members of the hapu held this view. There was an awareness by
many ofthe connections between the selling of land and the extension ofBritish control. Some
560 0 GHerron, 'The Franchise and New Zealand Politics, 1853 - 58', Political Science, Vol. 12, No.1, 1960,
pp 29 - 30.
561 The Taranaki Herald, Editorial, 9 January 1858,
562 Ibid.
563 The Native Rights Act 1865, No. 11, s. 2.
564 Head, 2001, P102.
565 Head, 2001, P103.
566 Wells, 1878, pp 175 -176.
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reportedly feared that the alienation of land and the extension of British law might work to
reduce their autonomy and affect their ability to continue to hand down traditional use rights to
their descendants. In 1856, McLean reported that many Maori had
a desire to maintain a portion of the country where they can assert their own
independence, and they are anxiously concerned in reference to the inheritance of
their children. The idea is that those Natives who have alienated their lands to the
English have also alienated their nationality, and become subject to the power of the
British.567
In parallel to this underlying ideology suggested by Head was the demonstrated desire of
Ngamotu hapu to engage with the newcomers in their rohe and to share the space in a way
that would benefit all parties. The ways in which Ngamotu hapu engaged with the settlers, the
Company and eventually the Crown were grounded in concepts of tangata whenualmanuhiri
relationships, and their associated rights and obligations. Inherent in these relationships were
notions of rangatiratanga and mana which implied that Maori and Pakeha had an equitable
relationship where the parties were inter-dependent but each would have a necessary degree
of political and economic self-determination. From these assumptions and values sprang the
Maori wish to be treated in the same manner as Pakeha settlers by the government. These
may have been the underlying motivations of Te Atiawa in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks,
and may account for their surprising initial enthusiasm for the re-purchasing scheme; and that
this was read by the Government as an endorsement of the assimilation policies that this
scheme aimed tofacilitate.
These twin strands, a belief in both peace and relationships as the foundations ofcivil society,
combined to produce a third: the idea that the place of settler and Ngamotu hapu communities
could be tied together using the traditional device ofwhakapapa. Head's work suggests that by
re-imagining and enlarging the concept ofkinship, Ngamotu hapu could tie themselves and the
settlers into a joint whakapapa where all were governed by British law which had its origins in
the Christian God they shared and flowed down through the Queen, Governor and
qovernrnent" Combined, these three strands offer an explanation for the source of Ngamotu
hapu notions of equality between themselves and settlers. Considered in this light, the
567 Evidence ofMcLean to a Board Appointed byHis Excellency the Governor to Inquire into and Report upon the
State ofNative Affairs, 17April 1856, BPP, Vol. 10, P577.
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apparent willingness ofmany Te Atiawa individuals to obtain Crown-derived title to land can be
seen as both an expression of their desire to deal with their land as freely as settlers were able
to, and a desire to participate as citizens in the decision-making process by obtaining the right
to vote. This desire for equality with settlers is apparent in Te Atiawa dissatisfaction with the
rate at which Crown grants for repurchased land in the Hua and Waiwakaiho blocks were
being issued to them. It is also evident in their reaction to suggestions from government
officials that their Crown grants should confer only limited property rights upon them.569
Utilization of Native Reserves in theWaiwakaiho and Hua Blocks, 1853-
1858
As discussed in the previous chapter Te Atiawa were enthusiastic and successful participants
in the developing capitalist economy in and around New Plymouth in the 1840s and 1850s.
The Native reserves provided both land on which to cultivate a variety of crops for their own
consumption and local trade and export and well as land which could be leased to settlers to
provide an cash income and build and maintain co-operative economic and social relationships
with particular settlers. Despite the difficulties associated with the allocation of Native reserves
in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks at least some of these reserves were being used directly by
Te Atiawa. In 1859 Benjamin Wells listed Te Atiawa communities and their assets noting that
the people living at Mangati [on the Bell block], Te Hua and Waiwakaiho had 608 acres in
cultivation, owned 53 horses, 144 horned cattle, 258 pigs, as well as 28 carts, 26 ploughs, 12
harrows and 3 threshing machines. 570
Although over 40 percent (44.27 percent) of the Native reserves in these blocks consisted of
economically viable suburban fern land and these accounted for nearly 65 percent (64.56
percent) of all suburban reserve acres in the study area. It is likely that very little if any of the
568 Head, 2001, pp 110 - 116, 120.
569 It is likely that Te Atiawa reaction was fueled bythe experience ofWiremu Tako Ngatata, a chief ofNgati Te
Whiti and Ngati Tawhirikura residing atKumutoto atWellington. In 1852, he had applied for and received aCrown
grant for his reserve lands atKumutoto. (Colonial Secretary tothe Native Secretary, 26 January 1852, Turton's
Epitome, 0-31 and Chief Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 29 July 1854, Turton's Epitome, 0-41). Itmay
have been this land for which hereceived a grant for his and his wife's lifetime only inthe early 1850s, when he
reportedly, "threw down the useless piece ofpaper and exclaimed: 'You buy as much as you can ofour lands and
then try tocheat us out of the rest." (The People ofMany Peaks, Vol. 1(1769 - 1869), 1991, P69).
570 HRRichmond toCWRichmond, 20 April 1851, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed),
1960, Vol. 1,P93.
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reserves were being leased to settlers before 1860. These were in reasonably sized blocks
(around 50 acres) but were in a relatively economically marginalised location in relation to the
settlement of New Plymouth. A map from early 1860 shows that these blocks were
substantially underdeveloped with few roads and only a small coastal enclave of settler
farmers, and the whole of the area inland of Devon Road was marked as "wild lands" (see
Figure 10). This under-development was the result of a combination of circumstance: the
1850s Puketapu hapu disturbances and later settler fears of attack during armed conflict; the
unresolved occupation ofa large area adjacent to the Waiwakaiho by Te Puni and his people,
and the still unissued Crown grants for reserves and sections in this block.
Conclusion
There was a significant development in the method of creating and allocating Native reserves
in the Waiwakaiho and Hua purchase of 1853 -1854. Te Atiawa agreed to re-purchase parts
of the reserves created for them in the Waiwakaiho block and to use a portion of their
purchase payment from the sale of the Hua block to re-purchase sections in that block in
addition to the reserves named in the Hua deed. The re-purchasing scheme used to 'buy-back'
land in these blocks from the Crown, created 'reserves' in Crown-derived title. This shifted the
focus of Crown reserve policy away from assimilation by intermingling and emulation towards
assimilation through Maori individuals holding title to land. This policy implied (and often
promised outright) a right to select the re-purchased land where Te Atiawa wished before the
block was opened to settlers. In reality however, hapu choices about the location and extent of
re-purchased land were circumscribed by Crown officials whose regulation of the allocation of
reserves and re-purchased land was motivated by a variety of political considerations
associated with land settlement.
The wider context of this policy was the Crown's underlying assumption that a state of
modernity in which there would be peace and equality between the cultures relied upon the
assimilation of Maori. By the 1850s it was considered that assimilation depended upon
persuading Maori to abandon their communal social model and replacing it with one founded
upon individual property and citizenship rights. This new model had three principal
components: individual land titles, submission to British law, and franchise. At the same time
Te Atiawa were concerned with their future in this new world and continued to pursue their own
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vision of modernity. Like the Crown they were concerned with economic and political equality
with the settlers, but in contrast to the policies of the Crown they regarded their future as one
governed by self-determination rather than assimilation. Peace protected by British law was to
be coupled with relationships with settlers in which Maori and Pakeha would be autonomous
and equal, but share the resources and benefits of the land and of British culture with one.
another. Outwardly Te Atiawa goals were so similar to those of the Crown that the Crown often
mistook their acceptance of aspects of its Native reserve policy as signs of their desire to be
assimilated. The variety of ways in which land was 'reserved' in these blocks and their exact
legal status was to cause considerable confusion to the commissioners who would begin
administering them from the late 1850s.
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Chapter 5: The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856,
Te Atiawa and the beginning of theCommissioners'
Administration
Introduction
The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 represented the Crown's first systematic and
statutory process for the management of Native Reserves. Its passage so early in the life of
New Zealand's parliament suggests that some urgency was felt amongst settler
representatives regarding the introducion of an effective system of administration. Therefore,
the reasons for this urgency and how these reasons translated into the provisions of the Act
require further exploration in the context of the Crown's use of Native reserves as a primary
means ofcivilising and assimilating Maori. The way in which the Act defined Native reserves is
particularly significant in light of the prevailing confusion about their purpose and legal status.
But these definitions also had consequences for the way that the commissioners later
appointed under the Act in Taranaki approached their administration of the reserves in the
province, forcing them to confront the issue of whether Native title over the reserves in the
Taranaki had been extinguished ornot.
The assessment of the commissioners in Taranaki was that their immediate task was to bring
the Native reserves under the operation of the Act with the assent of the Te Atiawa inhabitants
of the particular reserves. The procedures they used to gain these assents and the
consequences of those assents for the legal status of the reserves illuminates something of
the gap between the theory of the Act and its practical application in a particular local context.
A statistical analysis reveals the pattern of reserves coming under the Act over time and an
explanation of these patterns can be found in an examination of the commissioners' approach
to this task, the circumstances which assisted them, and those which constrained them. Of
particular significance in this province was the constraining effect of periods ofwar and unrest
and Te Atiawa mistrust of the commissioners and their process. These factors need to be
weighed against the way in which relationships between the commissioners and Ngamotu
communities and Te Atiawa-settler arrangements to lease the reserves contributed to reserves
being brought under the Act. The weighing ofall of these various factors provides some insight
into both the role the commissioners in Taranaki actually took in administering the reserves
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and the reasons why Te Atiawa brought so many of their reserves under the Act. A statistical
comparison of the reserves under the Act and those which remained in Te Atiawa control is
able to test the hypothesis that settler pressure for suburban reserve land to lease had a
significant impact upon Te Atiawa decisions about which reserves to bring under the Act.
Having brought a number of reserves under their administration the commissioners faced
pressure from central government to issue Crown grants to Maori for reserves. Again the
reasons why Crown grants were issued for reserves in Taranaki and the number and location
of those reserves held under Crown grant illustrates the ways in which local circumstances
shaped the Crown's administration ofthe reserves.
The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 and the Native Reserves
Amendment Act 1862
The Origins of the New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856
The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 was the first statute to define what Native
reserves were, and to set in place a mechanism for their management. It was passed early in
the life of the colony's parliament, which was established in 1854 after the grant of
representative government under the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (and the
establishment of provincial government in 1853).571 The General Assembly was composed of
politicians representing local settlers, and so must have been well aware of the limitations
upon provincial governments' power to pass legislation to control Native reserves, and the sort
of frustrations that such limitations had caused in provinces like Taranaki. Although the
Constitution Act allowed provincial councils to pass ordinances for "the peace, order and good
government" of the province it forbade them from making laws "affecting lands of the Crown, or
lands to which the title of the aboriginal Native owners has never been extinguished."572 In
essence, they could only pass legislation affecting private property held under a Crown grant.
So when the General Assembly met in 1856, after having been able to accomplish little when it
first met in 1854, some of the first pieces of legislation itpassed were to regulate Native land.
The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 was rapidly followed by the Native Territorial
571 The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852.
572 Ibid, s.xviii and s. xixrespectively.
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Rights Act 1858 (later disallowed), and the Native Lands Act 1862. 573 Each of these Acts
contained provisions for the individualisation of title to Native land, though their powers were
circumscribed. Once a Crown grant was issued to individual Maori, the collective Native title
was extinguished; the land ceased to be Native land and became ordinary fee-simple privately
owned land. It could then be directly leased or purchased by settlers from Maori and had the
added benefit of being able to be regulated by provincial ordinances. At a time when the
Crown was experiencing increasing difficulty in purchasing large blocks of land from Maori the
prospect ofbeing able to legislate for the issue ofCrown grants to Maori for unsold Native land
and Native reserves held great appeal to the settlers as aquick way ofgetting Native land into
the market.
The settler representatives' overriding concern with the land issue may explain the general
trend in the legislation they introduced in the first few years of the parliament's life, but it does
not explain why the relatively obscure group of lands known as Native reserves came tobe the
target of legislation. Not enough is known about who called for the Act to be drawn up, but
from the journals of Henry Sewell, the Attorney General, who framed the Act, it is clear that
one of the chief concerns of government at this time was reducing the financial burden of
Native affairs on the country's revenue. Native reserves may have been legislated for so
rapidly because they were perceived as being one area where all that was needed to generate
a revenue stream was an effective system ofmanagement.
Sewell's discussion of the position of Native reserves concentrated on the issue of income
generation and on individualising title to the reserves in order to assimilate Maori. Sewell
agreed with the prevailing settler opinion that the Native reserves had been poorly managed
but, unlike settlers in New Plymouth, he did not conclude that poor management had arisen
from a surplus of Native reserves.?' Instead his legal training led him to argue that a lack of
such legislation at the time the reserves were created had resulted in "no care [having] been
573 Ward, 1973, pp 107-108.
574 The Taranaki Herald, 3 December 1856. Settler opinion as reflected innational and local newspapers
suggests that there was awidespread feeling that anew system for managing the Native reserves was needed.
The editor of the newspaper the New Zealander commented that the need for measures for managing Native
reserves had long been felt (The New Zealander, 28 June 1856).
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taken to provide for their legal rnanaqement.?" He described the reserves as being "left
utterly without regulation" and as lying "scattered all over the colony [as] undefined and
unmanageable wastss.?" He asserted that this had resulted in the reserves being in "a state
of utter neglect,,577 or being misused, as "instrumental to some purposes of [Government]
jobbery.,,578
Beneath Sewell's immediate observation about the deficiencies in Native reserves
management lay a belief in the necessity and desirability of assimilating Maori into the settler
culture. Sewell considered that if the reserves were properly managed there "ought to be an
ample fund for all Native purposes."?" The dream of Native affairs being self-funding through
the reserves had begun with the creation of Company tenths and the earliest attempt by the
Crown to manage them under trustees to generate rents which would pay for institutions -
schools, hospitals and hostels to facilitate the assimilation of Maori. With a new settler
parliament that was reluctant to grant the Governor more money for Native affairs the need to
generate and use revenues from Native reserves for these purposes was a particularly strong
pressure at the time Sewell was framing the Act. 580 In July 1856, CWRichmond, the Native
Minister, urged Governor Gore Browne to be "looking to a proper system of management of
the Native reserves as an eventual substitute and a means of relieving the Civil List from that
charge [i.e. funding Native affairs].,,581 Sewell, no doubt aware of these debates, complained
that institutions for Maori had been funded from the colony's income and even worse had been
wasteful and ineffective.582
Aside from the practical need and political expediency of generating enough funds to relieve
the State of the burden offinancing facilities for Maori, Sewell's overriding ideological concern
was how the reserves might best be dealt with in order to individualise their title. Sewell was
575 Sewell journal entry, 21 September 1855 in The Journal ofHenry Sewell 1853 -7, WDavid Mcintyre (ed),
Vol. II, Whitcoulls Publishers, Christchurch, 1980, p 178.
576 Ibid.
577 Ibid.
578 Ibid.
579 Ibid.
580 Ward, 1973, p 93.
581 CWRichmond tothe Governor, 23 July 1856, BPP, Vol. 10, P633.
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clear that the most important power of the Act was the ability to give Maori "lands in severalty;
so taking the first step to lift them out of their present merely animal state of communism, into
the position ofcivilised communities, starting from the 'family' as the social unit.?" When later
questioned before a select committee of the House of Commons, Sewell was of the opinion
that this was "the most important and indeed only way of preventing their [Maori] exlincfion.?"
Further elaborating, he stated that their assimilation depended upon settling them "upon
portions of their land" and giving them "individual titles." 585 The processes outlined in the Act:
the assent of Maori inhabitants to bringing their reserves under the operation of the Act, the
extinguishment of Native title over the land, and the issue of Crown grants were, to Sewell, a
complete mechanism to achieve this ultimate goal.586 Therefore, it would seem that the Act
was primarily concerned with assisting in the transformation of Maori into westernized
individuals holding small sections of land in a grant from the Crown. In other words, Native
reserves were considered as merely a transitional phase between customary, communal
Native title and Crown-derived, individual title.
Parliamentary Debate Surrounding the New Zealand Native Reserves Bill
The record of the parliamentary debate on this Bill is very brief, and a search of newspapers
for the period did not produce a fuller account. This is rather a mystery considering that the
chairman of the Legislative Council committee remarked that, "he was exceedingly happy to
see the great and lengthy consideration that has been bestowed upon it. No Bill had as yet
engaged so much of the time of the Council.?" Despite this lengthy debate only minor
amendments were made to the majority of the Bill's provisions in committee. C W Richmond
seemed tosum up the general feeling when he wrote that:
The Native Reserves Bill passed through the House of Representatives with its
unanimous assent. It is generally regarded as a very valuable measure, no less as
582 Sewell journal entry, 29 June 1856, in The Journal ofHenry Sewell 1853 -7, Mcintyre (ed), Vol. II, 1980, pp
251-252.
583 Ibid. Property held in severalty being defined as "belonging to one person where the share ofeach person can
be ascertained and the other owners excluded from it."(Peter ENygh and Peter Butt (eds), Butterworths Concise
Australian Legal Dictionary, 2nd ed., Butterworths, Sydney, 1998).
584 Evidence ofSewell to a Select Committee on the New Zealand Company Loan, 7July 1857, BPP, Vol. 10,
I. 244, P158.
585 Ibid, I. 245, P158.
586 Ibid, I. 236, P157.
587 3July 1856, NZPD, 1856 -1858, P251.
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conducive to the elevation of the Natives and providing for their requirements, than on
the grounds ofgeneral policy.?"
This seems to signal ageneral consensus that the mechanism outlined in the Bill would indeed
provide the effective system of reserves management being called for.
The actual provisions ofthe Bill were somewhat overshadowed in debate by the overwhelming
concern shown about the section of the Bill that dealt with the power of the Governor. Section
18 of the Bill, which stated that "Every act which is authorised or required to be done by the
Governor under this Act shall be done only with the advice and consent of the Executive
Council of the Colony", was hotly debated. Governor Gore Browne had confirmed that he
would retain control of 'Native affairs' in the belief that this was necessary for the sake of the
peace and stability of the colony." As a result those opposed to the wording of the section as
it stood simply stated that it impinged on the sole power of the Governor over Native affairs.
Those who supported the section as it stood fought against the removal of the part of the
clause which would give the ministry the ability to regulate the power of the Governor, with all
that implied for increased settler control of decisions relating to land. They argued that Native
reserves did not qualify as Native affairs, and therefore should not automatically fall within the
Governor's sole control.
Itwas in this context that the Bill was described as not being "a Native question." The reserves
themselves, it was argued were either lands "to be placed under trusteeship", lands "which did
not belong to the Natives" or waste lands ofthe Crown which the New Zealand Constitution Act
1852 specifically stated were to be controlled by the General Assernbly" The Governor
refuted the argument that Native reserves were waste lands of the Crown, stating that by
definition waste lands were only those lands "which have been acquired from the Natives and
transferred to the local Government, over which the Governor's responsible advisers have full
588 CWRichmond to Governor Gore Browne, 23 July 1856, BPP, Vol. 10, pp 632 - 633.
589 This also had the advantage ofensuring that the expense ofdefending the colony remain with the Colonial
Office and did not create an insupportable financial burden on the fledgling New Zealand State. Dalton, 1967,
pp 38 - 39.
590 Thomas Houghton Bartley (member for Auckland) and Frederick Whitaker (member for Auckland), 3July
1856, NZPD, 1856 -1858, P250 - 251 and CWRichmond tothe Governor, 23 July 1856, BPP, Vol. 10, P633
respectively.
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power.'?" Although such arguments were utilised in the course ofthis wider struggle for power
between the Governor and the ministry they also indicate something of members'
understandings about the purpose and status ofNative reserves. If read in this light they reflect
the ambivalent legal position Native reserves held at this time.
The Provisions of the New Zealand Native Reserves Act1856 and the Native Reserves
Amendment Act1862
Despite debate about the relative degree of power that the New Zealand Native Reserves Act
1856 Act gave to the Governor and to the settler ministry the immediate decision-making
authority over Native reserves was to be vested in the district commissioners appointed under
the Act. The Act provided for their appointment by the Governor; gave them legally enforceable
powers to dispose of and manage Native reserves; and set in place processes by which these
officials were able to exercise those powers. Each commission was to have no fewer than
three commissioners appointed toconduct business under the Act.592 The commissioners were
then permitted to appoint their own clerks."?
The provisions of the Act indicate that the commissioners ultimately were to be responsible to
the Governor. The commissioners for each district were required to publish an annual report in
the provincial gazette giving an account of revenue and expenditure, and the Governor was
authorised by the Act to appoint an auditor of such accounts.?' It appears that although they
were ultimately responsible to the Governor, the commissioners were under the supervision of
the Native Department, headed after August 1856 by Donald McLean with T H Smith as his
Assistant Native Secretary.?' McLean could still be instructed directly by the Governor and
dismissed by him. However, as heads of government departments generally did, McLean
passed all correspondence through the ministers to the Governor. This gave the settler
ministers access to information about Native reserve decisions. 596
591 'Memorandum byResponsible Advisers on Native Affairs', 29 September 1858, BPP, Vol. 11, pp 36 - 51.
592 The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, No.1 0,ss. 1- 2.
593 Ibid, S. 3.
594 Ibid, s. 11 and s.12respectively.
595 One of the few surviving circulars toNative Reserves Commissioners was written byTH Smith inhis capacity
as Assistant Native Secretary (Thomas HSmith toCommissioners ofNative Reserves, Taranaki, 23 April 1857,
MA 4/3, circular 139, pp 93 - 95, ANZ, Wellington).
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The Act made no provision for Maori involvement in the management of the reserves nor was
there any legal requirement for Maori wishes to be considered in decisions about the disposal,
by lease or sale, of Native reserves. In some places, notably in Wellington, the Governor did
appoint Maori leaders as commissioners. This was a rarity, and none were appointed in
Taranaki. The paternalistic attitude of Sewell probably accounts for Maori being excluded from
the management of their reserves. Sewell expressed the opinion that the Native reserves
"belonged to the Crown; and were vested in the Crown for the benefit of the Natives, just as if
they were infants or lunatics, not having legal capacities."597 This exclusion of Maori from the
statutory mechanisms for administering Native reserves was particularly problematic given that
commissioners were "usually local settlers" who were likely to be influenced by or subscribe to
views prominent in settler and governing circles.!" In particular commissioners were exposed
to the notion that Maori ought to be encouraged to sell all their 'surplus lands', and to hold land
in a Crown grant which could be easily alienated.
The integrity of the commissioners was particularly important given the scope of their activities
and the procedures that they were required to follow laid out in the 1856 Act. Section 6 of the
Act defined these powers of "full management and disposition" as the ability to "exchange
absolutely, sell lease or otherwise dispose of such lands in such manner as they in their
discretion shall think fit, with a view to the benefit of the aboriginal inhabitants for whom the
same may have been set apart.?" Although the word 'trust' does not appear anywhere in the
Act, and the word 'trustee' appears only once in relation to commissioners appointing trustees
for endowment lands, the wording of this section required the commissioners to exercise their
powers ofmanagement and disposal in away which "benefits" the Maori for whom the reserve
orreserves in question had been set apart. 600 This implied that there was some conception of
the management of reserves as a trust-like arrangement. The evidence for such an intention
amongst government ministers is extremely slender. Remarks by the chairman of the
Legislative Council committee, in the course of the debate on the Act, suggest that at least
some parliamentarians considered the Governor was the trustee for Maori in regard to the
596 Dalton, 1967, p 38.
597 Sewell journal entry, 4April 1853, in The Journal ofHenry Sewel/1853 -7, Mcintyre (ed), Vol. I, 1980, p 229.
598 Ward, 1973, p 93.
599 The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, No.1 0, s. 6.
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reserves, rather than the commissioners fhemseives.": However, Johnson concluded that
these phrases in the Act "denoted an implied trust relationship." 602 He may have overstated the
case by arguing that "the power to alienate land violated the fundamental trust relationship"
between the Crown and Maorj,603 However, he was more justified in concluding that, "it is
difficult to reconcile the realities of permanent alienation with the professed intentions of
beneficial administration ofMaori reserves and the Government's fiduciary duty." 604
The potential for the Governor, the ministers and commissioners to act, wittingly orunwittingly,
against the interests of Maori in dealing with reserves was far more apparent in the Native
Reserves Amendment Act 1862 which remained in force until it was repealed by the Native
Reserves Act 1882. 605The 1862 amendment Act revoked the powers vested in commissioners
under the 1856 Act and placed all their powers in the Governor. However, the Governor could
and did appoint commissioners in the provnces.?" The Imperial Government considered that
without some control on the Governor as a trustee the risk of harm was considerable. The
Colonial Office was seriously concerned that the 1862 Amendment Act effectively made the
Governor the sole uncontrolled trustee of the reserves. The Duke of Newcastle expressed his
concern to Governor Grey in 1863, comparing this trust with the standards of trusteeship in
England and finding it wanting:
Even in England it is thought necessary that the administration of any important trust,
affecting the management of large landed property, should be vested in some
permanent body unaffected by the politics ofthe day, and it would be held very unsafe
to vest such atrust in the ministry for the time being.60?
600 Ibid, s. 8.
601 3July 1856, NZPD, 1856 - 1858, P251.
602 Johnson, 1997, p 26.
603 Ibid.
604 Ibid.
605 The record ofdebate around this Act gives nodetails as tothe reason forthis amendment. (NZPD, 1861 -
1863, pp 591, 605, 638, 659, 663, 668 and 1862 votes and proceedings, AJLC, 1862, P60).
606 It is uncertain why the Governor revoked the commissioners' powers atthis point. Commissioner George
Swainson, a Native Reserves Commissioner in the Wairarapa indicates that itwas the continual threats of
resignation byNative Reserves Commissioners who held other official positions and did not have time and
resources todo the job properly which prompted this changed in the legislation. (Swainson tothe Native Minister,
21 May 1866, Turton's Epitome, D-103) However, Butterworth and Butterworth argued that it was the sale ofa
Native reserve toone ofthe commissioners atNew Plymouth and similar abuses ofpower bycommissioners
elsewhere which prompted the law change (G V Butterworth and SMButterworth, The Maori Trustee, The Maori
Trustee, Wellington, 1991, p 11).
607 The Duke ofNewcastle toGrey, 26 February 1863, Turton's Epitome, D-84.
168
He believed that the risks were even higher in New Zealand because of "the nature of the
peculiar trust, which lies especially exposed to the varying impulses of popular feeling, and, if
unjustly or even inconsistently administered, may rouse the most dangerous kind of
discontent?" Despite these grave doubts the Act was given assent.
The Appointment of Commissioners of Native Reserves for Taranaki
Although the New Zealand Native Reserves Act was passed in 1856 it was not until April 1858
that Robert Parris (district land purchase commissioner), George Cutfield (superintendent of
the province), Henry Halse (inspector of police) and John Whiteley (Welseyan Methodist
missionary) were appointed as Native reserves commissioners for the province of Taranakl.?"
Josiah Flight (resident magistrate) was later appointed to assist them in their work as
commissioners. The commissioners already knew one another and had worked with one
another in a variety of official and private spheres before they were appointed as
commesioners.?" In fact they had become thoroughly enmeshed in local society, forming a
network of alliances amongst themselves and with other settlers. In small, isolated,
predominantly agricultural communities like New Plymouth these relationships enabled men to
prosper in business, farming and politics, in churches and in the military."! It was common for
men to gain employment through family and friends and such networks were invaluable for
making a living because the market for official and professional positions was cornpeflfive.?"
Given this context it is not surprising that these men recommended one another for the
position and that this appears to have had a considerable impact on the appointments. After
reading about the passage of the New Zealand Native Reserves Act in the newspaper in July
608 Ibid.
609 New Zealand Gazette, No. 12, 1858, P56.
610 Robert Parris, Josiah Flight, Henry Halse and John Whiteley were all involved inthe series of1850s disputes
within Puketapu hapu, north ofNew Plymouth (Wells, 1878, pp 158 -165).
611 Margot Fry, Tom's Letters: The Private World of Thomas King: Victorian Gentleman, Victoria University Press,
Wellington, 2001, pp 11 and 77. Rollo Arnold argued that New Plymouth more than any other Company
settlements remained apredominantly agricultural settlement, and the pattern ofthe bush/country/town economic
region, adistinctly New Zealand pattern, was clearly defined and persisted around New Plymouth longer than in
other Company settlements (Arnold, 1994, p 183).
612 Fry, 2001, pp 74-75. Also see Raewyn Dalziel, 'Emigration and Kinship: Migrants to New Plymouth, 1840 -
1843, NZJH, Vol. 25, No.2, 1991, pp 112 • 128 for discussion regarding kinship bonds amongst New Plymouth
settlers.
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1856, Flight wrote to McLean to express his opinion that what was needed were men who had
a thorough knowledge of Maori language and cusiorns.?" He suggested that the resident
Wesleyan Methodist missionary, Henry Hanson Turton was a suitable person, if he could be
persuaded not to return to England.614 In November the following year, Cutfield wrote
recommending that Whiteley (who had succeeded Turton at the Wesleyan mission at
Ngamotu) be appointed/" Whiteley was offered the position the following month (Cutfield had
already been appointed) and he in turn recommended that the other commissioner be Flight,
Parris or Halse." Whiteley later admitted that he considered Flight to be the most suitable
candidate because the others all had an "official connexion ... with Native affairs.,,617 It
appears that Flight was not appointed because C W Richmond who made the formal
recommendation to the Governor had already put Parris' and Halse's names forward before he
became aware of Whiteley's strong preference for Flight's appointrnent-" In any case,
Richmond thought this was probably for the best because as resident magistrate Flight "may
often have cases in his court in which the commissioners will be interested."619 It appears that
McLean then appointed Flight "to obtain the assent of the Natives to their reserves coming
under the operation of the Act" and Whiteley wrote to McLean supporting Flight's employment
inthis latter capacity.620
The Legal Status of Native Reserves and the Work of the Native Reserves
Commissioners in Taranaki
Legal Status of Native Reserves and the New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856
The 1856 Act distinguished between reserves over which Native title had been extinguished
and those over which it remained. In common law Native or aboriginal title was (and is) a pre-
existing tribal property right which continued to be defined by Maori customary practices and
613 Flight toMcLean, 27 July 1856, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0276, ATL, Wellington.
614 Ibid.
615 Cutfield toMcLean, 9 November 1857, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0239, ATL, Wellington.
616 Whiteley toMcLean, 17 December 1857, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0634, ATL, Wellington.
617 Whiteley toCWRichmond, 2January 1858, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed), 1960,
Vol. 1,p 335.
618 CW Richmond toWhiteley, 28 January 1858, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GHScholefield (ed), 1960,
Vol. 1,P342.
619 Ibid.
620 Whiteley toMcLean, 22 December 1858, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0634, ATL, Wellington.
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was not affected by the general introduction of English law.?' Neitherwere Native title and its
inherent bundle of property rights displaced or extinguished by the Crown's acquisition of
sovereignty in New Zealand.622 The 1856 Act defined Native reserves as "lands [that] have
been and may hereafter be reserved and set apart for the benefit of the aboriginal inhabitants
thereof."623 Those reserves over which Native title had already been extinguished were defined
as having been "reserved orset apart for the benefit of the said aboriginal inhabitants." The Act
empowered commissioners to administer these reserves irnmedately.?' Reserves over which
Native title had not been extinguished could include not only those that had been "reserved or
set apart" for the benefit of Maori inhabitants but also cases "where upon any sale of lands by
Natives a certain portion of the district sold shall have been or shall be specially excepted out
of such sale." The Act required the commissioners to obtain the assent of the inhabitants of
these reserves to bring the reserves under the operation ofthe Act.625
These distinctions were important to the work of the Taranaki commissioners because they
determined whether the commissioners could simply administer the reserves or whether they
had to begin instead to gain the assent of the Maori inhabitants of the reserves to bring them
under their admnisfratlon.s" While the reserves remained in Native title they remained in Te
Atiawa ownership and control. In theory at least Te Atiawa were free to exercise the full range
ofproperty rights over them. Once district commissioners had anumber ofreserves under their
administration they could administer the reserves in ways which would assist the assimilation
621 The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 defined Native land as "land oforbelonging to, orused oroccupied
bythem [Maori] incommon as tribes orcommunities" (The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, s.73).
622 McHugh, 1991, P97. Nevertheless, Native title and its entailed property rights was entitled to protection under
the common law and could be extinguished inonly two ways. First, the Crown may extinguish it bystatutory
means, orsecondly it may be relinquished bythe Native owners in the process ofselling land tothe Crown
(McHugh, 1991, P135).
623 The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, No. 10, preamble. Although itwas intended toapply toallNative
reserves, some were subsequently ruled as not coming under the Act. The status of the McCleverty reserves
made for Te Atiawa in Wellington was confused. However, the Attorney General ultimately ruled that they were
not Native Reserves "within the meaning ofthe New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856" (The Native Reserves
Commissioners tothe Attorney General, 23 June 1859, Turton's Epitome, 0-63). In later Acts, where adefinition
ofNative reserves was required, up toten specific categories ofreserves were defined bythe circumstances or
processes oftheir creation (The Native Lands Act 1865, No. 71 and the Native Lands Act 1867, No. 43).
624 The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, No.1 0, s. 6.
625 Ibid, s. 14.
626 Ibid.
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of Maori. In particular they could begin leasing the reserves, collecting the rents and applying
them to the building ofschools, hostels and hospitals, orissuing Crown Grants to Maori.
The Legal Status of Native Reserves in the FitzRoy, Ornata and Grey Blocks
The Taranaki commissioners were quite sure that the Native reserves in the FitzRoy, Omata
and Grey blocks remained in Native title. In 1858, they stated that: "the Native title subsists
over nearly the whole of the reserves, only 37 acres having been alienated to the
Government."627 The commissioners' certainty about the legal status of the reserves in the
FitzRoy, Omata and Grey blocks was unusual at a time when there was a remarkable level of
confusion amongst Crown officials over the issue. They were confused both about what Maori
understood the nature of the title to reserves to be and about the actual legal status of the
reserves.?" The situation was complicated further in Taranaki by the overturning of the New
Zealand Company's 'purchase' and the creation of the FitzRoy block. At the time of the
FitzRoy agreement in 1844, the technical position was that the Native title in Taranaki land had
been extinguished by the New Zealand Company's purchases. But the Crown did not enforce
this extinguishment; therefore the FitzRoy agreement was treated as a purchase, which
extinguished the Native title of land within the boundaries of the FitzRoy block.?" The Omata,
Grey, Waiwakaiho and Hua deeds all had the legal character ofdeeds ofcession.?"
The primary question with regard to the legal status of the Native reserves within these
purchase blocks was did the reserves remain in Native title or had that title been extinguished?
627 'Report of the Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858 E-4, P12. Comments at the end
ofthis report indicate that the report dealt only with the reserves in the 'town' blocks. Therefore their certainty
about the legal status of the reserves applied only to those in the 'town' blocks.
628 This uncertainty isdemonstrated bythe way that McLean's request toHenry St Hill, formerly a Crown
appointed administrator ofNative reserves in Wellington, in 1852 to find out, "In what light do the Natives regard
those reserves, that isdo they consider that their title to them has been extinguished ornot, orwould they
suppose that they have only a right tothose they are actually occupying" (McLean to St. Hill, 18July 1852, qMS·
1194, ATL, Wellington).
629 The Crown deemed the Native title tobe extinguished over all the land in the Company's original deed, which
left the way open for the Crown totake up the difference between the Company's original claim and that granted
toit as wasteland ofthe Crown, However, the political reality in Taranaki made it impossible for the Crown to
enforce itstitle tothis 'wasteland'. Alan Ward argued that the Crown realised that the 'social cost' of trying to
enforce this claim was likely tobe high and that itwould be wiser toletit 'revert' toMaori (Ward, 1997, pp 87-
88).
630 Deeds. No.7, Omata Block, Ornata District, 30 August 1847; Deeds- No.8, Grey Block, Grey and Bell
District, 11 October 1847; Deeds - No, 14, Waiwakaiho toMangati Block, Grey and Bell District, 16January 1854
and Deeds - No. 15, Te Hua Block, Grey and Bell District, 3 March 1854 all in Turton's Deeds, Taranaki Province.
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The effect of a deed of purchase was to extinguish the Native title of any land included within
the purchase. Native reserves lay physically within the boundaries of the blocks of land
purchased, but did this mean that the title over them was extinguished? For Crown officials in
the 1850s there appeared to be no simple answer to this question. The case ofRichard Brown,
accused ofdepasturing sheep on part of Moturoa Native Reserve in April 1855, demonstrates
the range of opinions held on the legal status of Native reserves by Crown and local
government officials and settlers. The inspector of police, Henry Halse, had laid the charge
against Richard Brown under the Native Land Purchase Ordinance 1846 in response to a
public notice issued by the Superintendent of the Province, Charles Brown. That notice
declared that the lease ofNative reserves was illegal under the Constitution Act 1852 because
that Act prohibited all dealings with Native land, which it defined as 'the property of tribes or
communities.":
There was considerable debate about whether this definition and prohibition could be said to
apply to Native reserves. In contrast to the superintendent's opinion, the Land Purchase
Commissioner G S Cooper considered that the Act was "intended to apply only to lands the
Native title to which has not been extinguished, and the Native reserves within purchased
districts would not have been contemplated as coming within its meaning."632 The provincial
solicitor stated that the Moturoa reserve was "kept back by the Natives [at the time of the sale]
with the concurrence of the government for their own use," therefore "this collective title
subsisted unaltered in the reserve." 633 The editor of the Taranaki Herald later expressed the
opinion that "the ordinance was enacted to prevent the Natives obtaining a revenue from lands
they refused to sell, not to prevent them letting their reserves,"?'
There was some official recognition for the position that purchase had not extinguished the
Native title over Native reserves within the purchase blocks. In 1858, Governor Gore Browne
631 Parsonson, 1991, p 195.
632 Cooper tothe Colonial Secretary, 19 June 1854, Turton's Epitome, 0-42.
633 Parsonson, 1991, P196. The provincial attorney re-examined the case several months later and concluded
that there had been "no transfer ofthe lands comprised in that reserve tothe Crown" and that the reserves
"appeared tohave been simply excluded from the purchase. The original title would therefore remain
unextinguished." (The Taranaki Herald, 5January 1856 reporting on meeting ofthe provincial council on 20
December 1855).
634 The Taranaki Herald, 10January 1857.
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implied that his understanding was that Native reserves were excepted from the sale and
therefore remained in Native title. He confessed that he was "most anxious to acquire land at
New Plymouth" and could foresee "no permanent peace until the Native title is extinguished
(with [the] exception of the necessary reserves) over all the lands between the town and the
Waitara River" [emphasis added]:" McLean also appears to have been ofthe opinion that the
reserves had been excepted from the sale, he reported that "ample reserves have been
excepted by them for their own use, and those are generally occupied by them."636 However,
on another occasion McLean implied that the process of creating Native reserves was
intended to extinguish the existing customary right to the use of land and resources.'" A 1900
schedule of Taranaki Native reserves would also appear to support the view that Native title
remained over the reserves. The schedule has a column headed "State how such lands
became Native reserves - viz., by grant from the Crown, or by being exempted from
surrounding lands sold or ceded."?' All these reserves in the 1844 to 1847 purchases were
described in this column as having been made by Maori exempting them from the purchase
block.
By entering arrangements with Te Atiawa to lease or use Native reserves at New Plymouth
settlers also implied that they regarded Te Atiawa as having retained title over the reserves. In
1852 Mr Bayly, a settler at Ngamotu with land adjoining the Moturoa Native Reserve,
attempted to have Te Atiawa owners of the reserve pay a portion of the costs of a fence
between his land and the reserve. He cited as support for his request the Fencing Ordinance,
which required the 'proprietor' or owner of adjoining property to pay part of the costs of a
shared boundary fence.639 Evidently Bayly regarded Te Atiawa as the owners ofthe reserve.?"
635 Gore Browne toLord Stanley, 9 June 1858, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, No. 22.
636 Chief Commissioner tothe Colonial Secretary, 29 February 1854, Turton's Epitome, 0-41.
637 McLean stated that "the claims ofthe original Native owners of the land comprised in these reserves should be
entirely extinguished so as toprevent their exercising an exclusive right over them." (Draft letter ofMcLean to
Grey, 18June 1847, No. 47/3, qMS-1205, ATL, Wellington).
638 'Schedule ofNative Reserves as at21 st October 1899: Taranaki Land District', AJLC, 1900, Appendix No. 20,
pp 55- 58.
639 Flight toAlfred Domett, 29 January 1852 [1853?], JC-NP 53/3, P7,ANZ, Wellington.
640 The matter was brought to the attention ofthe Governor who replied that Maori should not be required to pay
any ofthe costs because they did not "avail themselves ofthe fence." Grey too described the land as "the Native
land in question" (Ibid).
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The Legal Status of the Native Reserves in theWaiwakaiho and Hua Blocks
The legal status of the Native reserves in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks was even less
straightforward. In their 1858 report the commissioners expressed no opinion about whether
the Native title over reserves and the re-purchased portion of the reserves in the Waiwakaiho
block, and other repurchased sections in the Hua block, had been extinguished. At this time
they were not dealing with the reserves and adjacent re-purchased sections in the Waiwakaiho
block simply because they "have not yet been laid out because of the fact that 1200 acres
included in this block, [is] being withheld by Te Puni's Nalives.'?" It also appears that they did
not regard the sections re-purchased by Te Atiawa in the Hua block as Native reserves as they
mention them only as an aside after discussing re-purchased reserve land in the Waiwakaiho
block.'" The provincial attorney was of the opinion that the re-purchased sections in the Hua
blocks were "no longer Native land because the land had passed to the Crown and had been
re-purchased by the Natives under the general regulations." 643
The number ofdifferent categories of reserve and re-purchased sections complicated the legal
status of the reserves in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks, In addition to the Waiwakaiho
reserves made by Cooper and the re-purchased portions of those reserves, there were in the
Hua block a number of reserves specified in the Hua deed. A series of 1890s Supreme and
Appeal Court cases testify to the continued and unresolved confusion about the title to these
reserves. Judge Prendergast's decision in the 1896 case Te Pohe Mokoare v Davy and the
Public Trustee suggests that the primary means ofdistinguishing between reserves over which
Native title remained and those over which it had been extinguished was to identify which had
been made by exclusion from sale and which had been made by the Crown within the
purchased block.644 So reserves like Paraiti named in the Hua deed were considered tohave
641 'Report of the Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E·4, P12.
642 Ibid.
643 The Taranaki Herald, 5January 1856 reporting on meeting of the provincial council on 20 December 1855.
644 Te Pohe Mokoare v Davy and the Public Trustee [1896]14 NZLR 533 - 537. Te Pohe Mokoare was the
daughter and successor ofHone Ropiha. The Public Trustee was named in the case because hehad been
dealing with the four Native reserves inwhich Te Pohe Mokoare had an interest: Purakau, Paraiti, Whatupiupui
(all in the Waiwakaiho block) and Ratahangae Native reserve No, 4 (in the Grey block). The Court attempted to
answer the question ofwhich ofthese reserves the Public Trustee had jurisdiction over, and therefore which of
the reserves he could be said tohave avalid objection tobeing dealt with bythe Native Land Court. But the case
was also an attempt bythe Maori plaintiff totry toestablish which of the Native reserves Maori still had jurisdiction
over. It appears that Maori saw the Land Court as a means to regain control of reserve lands (The Evening Post,
Wellington, 25 March 1896),
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been excluded from the sale by Maori as a sacred place.?" Therefore it and other sacred
places specified in the deed "were not made over to lhe Government ... consequently the
Native title was not then extinguished."646 In contrast, Purakau Waiwakaiho A was set aside for
Maori from the land within the block, when the block was ceded to the Crown.?" The purchase
extinguished Native title over the whole block; the Crown made reserves for the benefit of
Maori within the block on land that was Crown land, so the reserves were Crown land/" Itmay
be added that despite the Prendergast's decision, confusion continued: the 1900 schedule of
Native reserves classified this reserve as one made by Maori exempting it from the
purchase."
The Assent Procedure for Bringing Native Reserves under theAct
Having determined that the Native reserves in the 'town' blocks remained in Native title the
commissioners set out to gain the assent of the inhabitants ofthe reserves to bring them under
the Act. The Act required the assents be obtained by the commissioners, reported upon,
adopted by the Governor and published in the government gazette.650 However the procedure
for gaining the assent of inhabitants of reserves was not as clear-cut as the wording of the Act
suggested, and the issue of exactly who should give their assent was debated amongst the
commissioners. They considered that the reserves had originally been allocated to Te Atiawa
collectives, but they differed as to whether every single individual Maori who had signed the
purchase deed ought to give their approval when a reserve was to be brought under the Act.
Josiah Flight, the officer charged with gaining such assent, believed that in each case "it is
necessary for all who sold the block to convey the reserves" by signing the assent?'
However, Commissioner Parris argued that this would be "inexpedient, and inadvisable." 652
Parris considered the reserves to be similar to unsold Maori land in that the rights to reserves
were likely to be just as keenly contested in Maori communities as the rights to land not yet
purchased by the Crown were. He was of the opinion that in the process of allocating the
645 Te Pohe Mokoare v Davy and the Public Trustee [1896] 14NZLR 534.
646 Ibid, 536.
647 Ibid.
648 Ibid.
649 'Schedule ofNative Reserves as at21 51October 1899', AJLC, 1900, Appendix No. 20, pp 55 - 56. The case
had its sequel in Inre Purakau Block [1898] 16 NZLR 507 - 508.
650 The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, No. 10, s. 17.
651 Parris to the Superintendent, 12 April 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1, P210, ANZ, Wellington.
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reserves the decision regarding which communities would occupy various reserves had "been
left to their own [Maori] mutual arrangements, in addition to which, there was always a verbal
understanding, which I am of opinion is better not to disturb."653 Therefore, he implied that it
would be better if Maori were left to settle their individual claims over the reserves "among
themselves." 654 Parris appears to have raised the matter with the Native Minister, C W
Richmond in 1859, as Richmond replied agreeing with Parris that "there is no occasion under
the Native Reserves Act to obtain the consent of every Native who signs a deed whereby a
reserve is made." Instead, he suggested that it seemed "sufficient if all those who are
recognised by the Natives themselves as having an interest in a reserve concur in its cession
to the Queen for the purpose of the Act."655 Parris seems to have had the upper hand in this
debate, with Flight suggesting a compromise whereby those not directly interested in a
particular reserve would sign a specially inserted clause in the assent. Parris decided instead
to recommend "that a few of the leading men not interested in the reserve to be alienated,
should sign as witnesses."?"
Clearly it was considered expedient that enough of the people interested gave their assent to
make a lasting, binding and uncontroversial transaction, and representatives from the wider
tribal community witnessed the assent. However, if too many people were involved itwas
feared that this would open the field up "encouraging additional clalms.?" It seems that the
commissioners were relying on Te Atiawa to know who the owners ofeach reserve were rather
than making an extensive public inquiry amongst the tribe. It is highly likely that this lack of
inquiry meant that some rightful owners were excluded from the process of assent. In all
probability such exclusion became permanent because once people were listed on the assent
as inhabitants of a reserve those individuals came to be regarded by the Crown, and perhaps
by Te Atiawa communities, as the 'owners'. Since reserves were brought under the Act before
they were sold, one suspects that these individuals on the list became those whose permission
652 Ibid.
653 Ibid.
654 Ibid.
655 CWRichmond toParris, 27 August 1859, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed), 1960,
Vol. 1, P485.
656 Parris toCWRichmond, 9 july 1959, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed), 1960, Vol. 1,
P465.
657 Parris tothe Superintendent, 12 April 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1,P210, ANZ, Wellington.
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was needed for a sale to be concluded, and that these were the individuals who received the
purchase price. Thus in this insidious way the reserves were on their way to becoming
individual rather than tribal possessions, just as the Crown desired, though not just through the
issuing ofCrown grants as had been envisaged.
The Legal Effect of the Assent
The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 indicates that the assent had a twofold effect:
first, "to declare such lands to be subject to the provisions of this Act, and to appoint
commissioners for the management thereof' and secondly, "the land to which the same [the
assent] shall relate shall be conveyed to Her Majesty, her heirs and successors.'?" The
question needs to be asked, why it was necessary for the reserves to be conveyed to the
Crown, that is, for the Native title over them to be extinguished? Could they not simply have
been brought under the management of the commissioners? A possible answer may be found
in Sewell's intention for the Act to be a mechanism for individualising title. The extinguishment
of Native title would have been regarded as the necessary legal step in the process of issuing
Crown grants (the Crown could not issue a title to asection of land unless it held title).
CWRichmond the Native Minister, considered it a legal necessity to have Maori convey their
reserves to the Crown at the same time as they gave their assent to bring them under the
operation of the Act. He pointed out to Governor Gore Browne that this provision needed tobe
included in the Act because "the 73rd clause of the Constitution Act requires that all land
acquired from the Natives shall be ceded direct to Her Majesty." 659 The wording of the assent
notices the Taranaki commissioners published in the New Zealand Gazette for the period 1859
to 1861, when the 1856 Act was the sole legislation in force, demonstrates that the processes
carried out under the Act did indeed convey the reserves in question to the Crown and
extinguish the Native title.660
658 The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, No. 10, s.14and s. 17respectively.
659 CWRichmond tothe Governor, 23 July 1856, BPP, Vol. 10, P633.
660 Reports were filed byJosiah Flight, the resident magistrate, and state that "they [aboriginal inhabitants whose
names appeared below] being desirous ofbringing the same under the operation of the said Act, have executed a
conveyance of the same land in favour ofHer Majesty. The reporter has therefore the honor torecommend that
such portion of the reserve as isdelineated on the plan drawn in the margin of the [copy on deed ofconveyance
sent herewith, should be brought under the operation of the said Act." [emphasis added] (See for example New
Zealand Gazette, No. 16, 1859, P109).
178
At first sight it appears that the Native Reserves Amendment· Act 1862 repealed the
requirement for Maori to convey the reserve to the Crown.'" However, aclose reading of
section 7 ofthe 1862 Act reveals that the process ofassent as the method ofextinguishing the
Native title was retained. Instead of a conveyance the Act provided for the Governor to issue
an Order in Council declaring assent to have been obtained, the title of the reserve
extinguished and from the date of such Order in Council the reserve was to "vest in Her
Majesty for the purposes and subject to the provisions of the said Act as altered by this Act
and that as effectually as if the same had been ceded and conveyed by such aboriginal
inhabitants to Her Majesty."662 However the assent form which was reprinted as part ofat least
one gazette notice in 1862 contains no reference to the reserve now being vested in the
Crown; it simply states that those who signed the assent "agreed that the said reserve shall be
brought under the provisions of the Native Reserves Amendment Act 1862."663 This
progressive lowering of the threshold for transparent process potentially increased the
possibility of Maori signatures being obtained without the individuals signing the assent
understanding its full ramifications for the change in title to the reserve.
Native Reserves brought under the Operation of theAct
General Patterns, 1859·1874
Between 1858 and 1872, the commissioner brought under the operation of the Act (and under
their administration) 20 of the 47 Native reserves that then existed in the five blocks that are
the subject of this thesis.'" These 20 reserves represented slightly more than half (52.72
percent) of all the reserve acres allocated to Te Atiawa in these blocks. What is noticeable in
this process isthat the notices ofassent for groups ofreserves were signed either on the same
date or only days apart. This suggests that the commissioners held negotiations with
communities over all the reserves in which they had an interest. It may suggest that that
661 The Native Reserves Amendment Act 1862, No. 14, s.6.
662 Ibid, s. 7. This technical change is reflected in the words of the post-1862 gazette notices for Taranaki
reserves: compare a December 1862 gazette notice that simply stated that the reserve was now subject tothe
provisions of the said Act (New Zealand Gazette, No. 41, 1862, P357). Two 1866-1867 Orders inCouncil stating
that the title was extingusihed and the reserve would "vest in Her Majesty for the purposes and subject tothe
provisions of the said Native Reserves Act 1856" (New Zealand Gazette, No. 46, 1866, P318).
663 Ibid.
664 A list of reserves, their acreages and the gazette notices bringing them under the Act are listed inAppendix 3.
A list of reserves not brought under the Act and their acreages appears in Appendix 4.
179
Graph 3: Cumulative Frequency Graph of Work of the
Native Reserves Commissioners at Taranaki, 1858 • 1872
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something precipitated negotiations over one reserve and the commissioners took the
opportunity to persuade the community to bring their other reserves under the Act at the same
time.665
A significant number of reserves were brought under the Act between the commissioners'
appointment in 1858 and the end ofJanuary 1860. In this period six reserves came under the
Act, that is, just over one quarter (28.57 percent) of the 21 reserves orparts of reserves which
eventually came under the Act.666 No further reserves were brought under the Act until June
1862 when two further reserves came under the Act. After this there was another lull in the
commissioners' activity: between June 1862 and April 1866 no further reserves came under
the Act. This was followed by a very active 16 months in 1866 and 1867 when a further 10
reserves, representing almost half (47.62 percent) of the total, were brought under the Act.
From 1867 the rate at which assents were obtained slowed considerably: after this a further
two reserves came under the Act in 1872 and the final reserves in 1874.667 This is illustrated
by graph 3 below.
665 Atable showing the reserves and the names of those who signed the notice ofassent for each reserve
appears in Appendix 5. This demonstrates that many ofthe reserves brought under the Act on the same day
belonged tothe same community of people.
666 One reserve, Ararepe Native Reserve No.2, was brought under the Act in two separate portions.
667 The reserves brought under the Act are listed in Appendix 3 in order by the date they came under the Act.
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As discussed in chapter two, land at New Plymouth was surveyed into quarter-acre town
sections on which the township itself was located, beyond these lay the suburban sections
each containing 50 acres, and on the fringe of the surveyed district a band of 50 acre rural
sections. Overall, just over half (51.96 percent) of the reserve land that was brought under the
Act was rural land. A further 25.35 percent was suburban land, closely followed by reserves
that were a mixture of rural and suburban land (22.03 percent). Less than one percent (0.66
percent) of the reserve land brought under the Act was town land. This is illustrated on graph 5
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Pattern of Reserves coming under the Act byLocation and Type of Land
There was a remarkable difference in the percentage of reserve acres in the 'town' blocks
(FitzRoy, Omata and Grey Blocks) brought under the Act and that of reserve land in the
Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks." Over 65 percent (65.25 percent) of the reserve acres that
came under the Act were in the 'town' blocks, and only 34.75 percent in the Waiwakaiho and
Hua blocks. Less than ten percent (8.95 percent) of the reserve acres that remained outside
the commissioners' administration were in the town blocks. This was in marked contrast to the
Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks where 91.05 percent of the reserve acres were not administered
by the commissioners. These patterns are illustrated by graph 4 below.
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34.06 percent of all the reserve land in that block not brought under the Act, was rural land.
These patterns are illustrated by graph 6 below.
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The Commissioners' Desired Role: The Pro-active Approach
The Taranaki Native reserves commissioners' reported intention was to take a pro-active
approach to persuading Te Atiawa of the merits of bringing their reserves under the operation
of the Act. This is evident from their first and only surviving report filed less than six months
after their appointment. In this report they were quick to reassure the Native Department that,
"every exertion will be made by us to recommend the Natives to give such assent."669 The
commissioners explained that now. that peace between factions of Puketapu hapu had been
established they were keen to visit Maori settlements and take the opportunity, "of seeing
those who are interested in the reserves, and trying to induce them to avail themselves of the
advantages ofthe ACt."670
Graph 6: Bar graph comparing the percentage of reserve
acreage in different blocks not brought under the operation
of the New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 by type of
land.
669 'Report from Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E-4, P12.
670 Ibid. The peace the commissioners referred to was the re-establishment ofpeace inJune 1858 (the month
they were writing their report) amongst Puketapu after the killing ofthe Puketapu chief Katatore by one ofhis
relatives (Parsonson, 1991, pp 160 and 163).
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However, evidence suggests that some Te Atiawa individuals with interests in the reserves
were also visiting the commissioners in New Plymouth to discuss the reserves. In 1859 Parris
noted that he was unable to give his attention to Te Teira's offer to sell the Pekapeka block at
Waitara because he had been "beset for the last fortnight by Natives, on questions respecting
Native reserves that have not been alienated.'?' It is unclear whether Te Atiawa were initiating
contact with the commissioners or following up discussions that had been held while the
commissioners were visiting the reserves.
Parris felt a particular urgency about bringing of the reserves in the Waiwakaiho blocks that
contained a re-purchased portion under the Act. He realised that despite Cooper's November
1854 report that the reserves in the Waiwakaiho blocks were settled this was not the case.
These particular reserves had not been surveyed nor were those for whom they had been
made able to occupy the reserves.'" In order to solve both these problems Parris considered
"that they should be alienated to the Crown, and brought under the operation of the Native
Reserves Act 1856."673 It appears that he had reached an agreement with the owners of nine
reserves in early July 1859 to bring them under the Act. It is likely that these were the owners
of the two reserves wholly re-purchased, the six reserves partly re-purchased and the wholly
reserved land belonging to Wi Tako Ngatata (see Table 1 in previous chapten.?' He promised
to put the owners of these reserves in possession on the condition that they "paid up the
balance due on the quantity re-purchased" and brought the reserve under the Act.675 However
a comparison of the partly reserved/partly re-purchased reserves in the Waiwakaiho blocks in
Table 1 and those brought under the Act suggests that Parris was ultimately unable to
persuade the owners of these nine reserves to bring them under the Act. This was despite
making this one of the pre-requisites for Te Atiawa owners to gain possession of the reserves.
With the notable exception ofWaiwakaiho J belonging to Wi Tako Ngatata, only Waiwakaiho C
eventually came under the Act but that was not until 1874.676
671 Parris toCWRichmond, 19 November 1859, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed), 1960,
Vol. 1,P499.
672 Parris toCWRichmond, 6July 1859, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GH Scholefield (ed), Vol 1, 1960,
pp473-474.
673 Ibid, P474.
674 Ibid.
675 Ibid.
676 New Zealand Gazette, No. 55, 1874, P701.
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Factors Constraining the Commissioners' Pro-active Approach
The Effect of Periodic War
The pattern ofwar and uneasy peace in the province severely constrained the extent to which
the commissioners could take a pro-active approach. As the commissioners' report of June
1858 makes clear, the pro-active approach was dependent upon access to Te Atiawa
communities and this access was only possible in the absence of war. The effect of this
constraint is evident in the patterns of reserves being brought under the Act. In the brief period
ofpeace throughout 1859 and the first two months of 1860 aconsiderable number of reserves
came under the operation ofthe Act. Conversely, from the month before the outbreak ofwar in
the first week of March 1860 until peace was made in March 1861, and during the unsettled
period of late 1861 and early 1862 no further reserves were brought under the Act. Quite
obviously astate ofwar meant that Crown officials were busy with other matters; it was unsafe
to travel to Te Atiawa pa; and Te Atiawa communities were scattered and uprooted, making it
difficult to locate people with interests in the reserves. However, the period of inactivity on the
part of the commissioners from 1863 to 1866 cannot be attributed to the constraints of war. It
was most likely a result of the lag between the implementation of the 1862 Amendment Act,
which dismissed the commissioners appointed in 1858, and the reappointment of Robert Parris
as sole Native reserves commissioner early in 1866.677 The remarkable rate of reserves
coming under the Act in 1866 - 1867 may have been the result of the commissioner finally
being convinced that the theatre ofwar had shifted permanently away from New Plymouth and
Waitara.
Te Atiawa Attitudes to the Reserves Act and its Process'es
The attitudes ofTe Atiawa hapu towards the operation of the Act and the commissioners are
not entirely clear. However, there is evidence of a level of mistrust of the process amongst Te
Atiawa but it is difficult to gauge exactly how much impact this mistrust had upon the
commissioners' efforts to persuade inhabitants of the reserves to bring them under the Act.
Neither is it clear how mistrust amongst Te Atiawa affected the total number of reserves
brought under the Act and Te Atiawa choice of such reserves. It seems that Te Atiawa had
misgivings about the Act even before the commissioners had brought any reserves under it in
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Taranaki. In June 1858 the commissioners commented that "the appointment of two or three
influential chiefs as commissioners, would be likely to secure the confidence ofthe Natives and
facilitate the working of the Commission."678 This implies that the commissioners sensed
suspicion, or at the least, caution amongst Te Atiawa, orwere anticipating such reactions. On
the other hand the commissioners may have been responding to local support for such an
appointment. The month before the editor of the Taranaki Herald had noted that Maori chiefs
had been appointed as commissioners in Wellington and that Poharama of Ngati Te Whiti
would be a good candidate for the post in Taranaki.?" However nothing was done about this
suggestion.
Disquieting stories about the commissioners' dealings with Te Atiawa reserves in Wellington
may have been circulating in Taranaki even before Wiremu Tako Ngatata's highly publicised
visit to the province in mid-1859 alerted Te Atiawa to the possible outcomes of the
commissioners' work. Wi Tako had interests in reserves on both sides of the Waiwakaiho as
well as in reserves in the Wellington region. He was an influential and chiefly man educated in
Te Atiawa knowledge and British customs. He was literate and had adopted a western lifestyle,
and was later one of the first Maori members of the Legislative Council. In 1859 he travelled
through Taranaki gathering support against Te Teira's offer to the Crown of land at Waitara,
and more generally encouraging Maori not to sell land to the Crown. He reportedly urged the
people not to bring reserves under the Reserves Act alleging that the government
has left him without an acre of land to call his own, in the Wellington district, and
furthermore, that the reserves which had been made for them have all been taken
from them - upon this subject he warned the Natives of this district to be careful lest
that should be their fate also."?
Henry Halse believed that Wi Tako was referring to Wellington tenths that had been
exchanged and handed over tosettlers, not reserves that had come under the operation ofthe
Act. Halse was concerned that Te Atiawa who listened to Wi Tako did not understand this
677 New Zealand Gazette, No. 13, 1886, pp 82 - 83.
678 'Report from Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E-4, P12.
679 The Taranaki Herald, 1 May 1858.
680 Parris to McLean, 20 June 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1, P120, ANZ, Wellington.
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distinction and that confusion and suspicion was been created. "The misfortune is", explained
Halse,
that the Natives as a body don't understand the relative positions of the various
powers in the country and at once charge Government with being guilty of bad faith
with them. The Native Reserves Act 1856 happened to be explained to the Natives at
the very time they were smarting about the Wellington provlnce.?'
In the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks Te Atiawa's greatest fear appears to have been that the
Crown would take the reserves unless Te Atiawa could complete the re-purchase payments for
them. 682 Halse's comments to McLean about the situation indicate, at least from his
perspective, just what a significant impact Te Atiawa mistrust was having on the
commissioners' pro-active approach to bringing reserves under the Act. Halse was convinced
that under the circumstances "the less we [the commissioners] move in the matter the better"
reasoning that "hunting" out the owners of reserves would arouse "groundless suspicions" of
the government's intentions. He had grave doubts about the viability of the Act in Taranaki
stating that he was ofthe opinion that "it can only be partially brought into operation in this ever
agitated district."683
The effect of the New Zealand Wars in reinforcing Te Atiawa misgivings about the
commissioners and the Crown's procedures for administering the reserves cannot be
underestimated. It is true that the owners of these reserves were predominantly Maori whom
the Crown classified as 'friendly', that is, those who were most willing to sell land for settlement
and to come under the jurisdiction of British law. Later, at the outbreak ofwar, most swore an
oath of allegiance to the Queen, and in many cases joined imperial troops and settler militia
against 'rebel' portions of Te Atiawa. However, these categories of 'friendly' and 'rebel' were
not fixed; many individuals moved, for their own reasons, between the two groups, going out to
fight with 'rebel' kin and returning and swearing allegiance again. Others welcomed and
sheltered 'rebel' kin in pa and settlements during the hostilities. Ngamotu hapu were closely
bound by whakapapa to the hapu of Te Atiawa amongst whom dislocation, loss of life, land
and kainga must have engendered bitterness. It is not hard to imagine that these feelings
681 Henry Halse toMcLean, 20 April 1859, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0314, ATL, Wellington.
682 Ibid.
683 Henry Halse toMcLean, 13 December 1858, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-314, ATL, Wellington.
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spilled over into the relationship between Ngamotu hapu and representatives of the Crown.
The actions of the commissioners before and during the war may also have engendered
mistrust. In particular, it is likely that Whiteley's support of Te Teira's right to sell land at
Waitara; and Parris's pivotal role in pushing through that purchase against the will of the larger
Waitara communities had anegative impact on their relationship with many Te Atiawa people.
In addition to ageneral climate ofmistrust and bitterness caused by war and later confiscation
there was particular confusion and anxiety about the possible confiscation of Native reserves
under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863. The Crown officials themselves seemed to have
been confused, orat least careless, about whether the purchase reserves were included in the
confiscation. Certainly, the three 'town' blocks (FitzRoy, Omata and Grey blocks) and the
Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks fell within the boundaries of the Middle Taranaki confiscation
district, and they were not specifically excluded from confiscation proclamation.s" Janine Ford
concluded that the proclamation for the 'Middle Taranaki district'
excepted all the lands within the proclaimed boundaries held under grant from the
Crown. Yet the Crown grant issued to the New Zealand Company for the FitzRoy,
Grey and Omata blocks on 8 April 1850, had 'saved and always excepted and
reserved all the Native and other reserves situated within the said blocks'. Thus, the
confiscations were not effective over the purchased land, but were effected over the
Native reserves.?"
Evidently this was a technical oversight: where reserves were included in lands claimed in the
Compensation Court officials noted on such applications that these lands were "old
government lands."?" However, the effect of the proclamation was to enshrine this anomaly
between the land granted by the Crown to the Company and the reserves excluded from the
Crown grant.
684 New Zealand Gazette, No.3, 1865, P16. It should be noted that the Compensation Court SUbsequently satto
determine who was 'loyal' and therefore tobe compensated with returned land inselected blocks (the Oakura
blocks and the Waitara South block) within this confiscation district. Neither of these blocks fell within the
purchases discussed inthis thesis (Janine Ford, 'The Decisions and Awards ofthe Compensation Court in
Taranaki, 1866 -1874, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1991).
685 Ford, 'Title Histories ofthe Native Reserves made inthe FitzRoy, Grey and Ornata Purchases' 1991, p 11.
686 Letter of application, 1June 1864 titled in red in English "Hekiera TeRangikatuta &Others, TeArakaitai, and
other places (Govt. land near Te Henui)", ROB, Vol. 113, P43470. Letter ofapplication, 13 June 1864 titled in red
inEnglish "Hekiera Te Rangikatuta &others for Te Kawau &other places (old claims sold toGovt.)", ROB, Vol.
112, P43468. Application on form titled inred in English "Claiming Herangi in the town ofTaranaki sold long ago,
the site of the Hospital", ROB, Vol. 113, P43571. This appears to refer to the Barrett Street hospital site
(Otumaikuku Native Reserve No.9).
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Several explanations for Te Atiawa applications to the Compensation Court for purchase block
Native reserves present themselves. It is possible that the applicants believed, or had heard
rumours, that the reserves were to be taken. Certainly, the military in 1866 had been gathering
information on which reserve owners had been 'rebel' and which had been 'loyal'. For reserve
owners this would have aroused adeep suspicion about the Crown's intenficns.t" Possibly the
general uncertainty about the fate of the reserves meant that people felt that it was better to
make an application to protect reserves just in case the government planned to take them.
Alternatively, some owners may have had agrievance over a reserve that had previously been
taken or sold and seen this new court as a possible avenue of redress. This may have been
the case for those applicants who wrote to the court about Te Kawau Pa.
Factors Facilitating the Commissioners' Pro-active Approach
The Effect of the Commissioners' Relationships with Ngamotu Hapu Communities
It is striking that, in contrast to commissioners of Native reserves in other provinces, at least
two of the Taranaki Native reserves commissioners were fluent in te reo Maori, and all had
(and continued to have) close and frequent contact with Maori communities in a variety of
official and private capacltes."These relationships and abilities would certainly have assisted
the commissioners in attempts to persuade Te Atiawa to bring reserves under the Act. In some
cases strong' and trusting relationships with the people in charge of this process may tosome
extent have countered TeAtiawa mistrust of the process itself.
Parris and Whiteley appear to have been the two dominant figures amongst the
commissioners, and both had close and extended dealings with Te Atiawa during the
purchasing of land in Taranaki in the pre-war years. Parris was a public figure amongst both
settler and Maori in Taranaki. Before his appointment as Native reserves commissioner, he
had been active in provincial politics, holding the position ofprovincial treasurer for the first six
687 'An Account ofNative Reserves in the Province ofTaranaki together with the Owners thereof', AD 1,
1866/610, RDB, Vol. 136, pp 52169 - 52173 lists the owners ofall the Native reserves in the study area and
comments on those owners in terms of their 'rebel/ loyal' status.
688 It isclear that having so many ofthe commissioners fluent in Maori was asignificant advantage to attempts to
bring reserves under the Act inTaranaki. The Otago commissioners, clearly lacking these skills, comment that
"we were and must be much crippled in our attempts tocommunicate with the Natives for the want ofa paid
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months of 1857 where his tenure as treasurer coincided with Cutfield's term as superintendent
of the province.?" Parris was fluent in te reo Maori and familiar with Maori tikanga. He had
managed Bishop Selwyn's farming project for Maori at St John's College in Auckland prior to
his arrival in Taranaki in 1852.690 His various positions as military commander ofa Maori militia
unit, military interpreter, district land purchase commissioner and judge in various courts all
brought him into direct negotiation with a number of Te Atiawa leaders, and meant that he
formed close relationships with some of them and their communnies.?' This contact was
sustained over almost thirty years. After the Native Reserves Amendment Act 1862 was
implemented in 1864 he remained in sole charge of the reserves for the central government in
his capacity as Civil Commissioner, a position to which he was appointed in September 1865,
and held until July 1875.692 In 1867 he acquired the site for Opunake and negotiated with Te
Whiti-o-Rongomai for the completion of the coast road in 1871.693 He retired from public life in
1876.694
John Whiteley's association with Te Atiawa stretched back to before the signing of the Treaty
of Waitangi when he had been based at Kawhia as a Wesleyan Missionary and had made
regular visits to Te Atiawa at Ngamotu. 695 In January 1840 he had visited the newly
established European settlement at New Plymouth to conduct services and negotiate with
interpreter, who would be always atour command." ('Report of the Commissioners of Native Reserves for the
Province ofOtago, 21 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E-4, P13).
689Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, Vol. 1 (1789 -1869), 1990, P335. Parris' appointment and resignation
as provincial treasurer (Tarananki Provincial Gazette, 1857, Vol. IV, No.3, P7 and Vol. V, No. 14, P45
respectively). Cutfield held his position as Superintendent concurrently with his work as a Native reserves
commissioner from 14January 1857 to24 May 1861 (Cyclopeadia ofNew Zealand: Industrial, Descriptive,
Historical, Biographical, Vol. 6Taranaki, Hawkes Bay and Wellington, Horace J Weeks Ltd., Christchurch, 1908, p
43).
690 Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, Vol. 1 (1789 - 1869), 1990, P335.
69\ Cyclopeadia ofNew Zealand, Vol. 6, 1908, P122 and McLean toCWRichmond, 31 August 1860, in The
Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GHScholefield (ed), 1960, Vol. 1, P631. Parsonson states that Parris was
appointed district land purchase commissioner inJUly 1857 (Parsonson, 1991, P181). Notice ofappointment as
judge ofCompensation Court (Taranaki Provincial Gazette, 1866, Vol. XIV, No. 15, P99).
692 On 4August 1863, a proclamation signed byGovernor Grey declared that all powers inNew Zealand Native
Reserves Act 1856 was tobe "vested in and may be exercised bythe Governor" as from 1 September 1863
(Taranaki Provincial Gazette, Vol. XI, No. 19, 1863, P39). Appointment ofRobert Parris toposition ofcivil
commissioner for the District ofTaranaki dated 2 September 1865 (Taranaki Provincial Gazette, Vol. XIII, No. 24,
1865, P89). Also see Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, Vol. 1(1789 - 1869), 1990, P335.
693 Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, Vol. 1 (1789 - 1869), 1990, P335.
694 Cyclopaedia ofNew Zealand, Vol. 6, 1908, P122.
695 George Gilmour Carter, John Whiteley: Missionary Martyr, Wesleyan Historical Society, Auckland, 1955, p 8.
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Maori at Ngamotu for land for a missionary staten." He finally moved to New Plymouth in
1855697 and rapidly established acircuit ofMaori communities where at least the majority were
Wesleyan followers, and he continued regularly preaching in, and visiting these communities
throughout the wars of the 1860S698• By the time he was appointed a Native reserves
commissioner in 1858 Whiteley had acted as an interpreter for other government cfflcials.?"
He would have known Te Atiawa leaders and communities intimately. In particular, Whiteley
performed many Maori baptisms and burials and amongst the families involved were a
considerable number who later brought Native reserves under the AcUoO Others also knew him
and Josiah Flight through a Total Abstinence Society they founded amongst Maori at New
Plyrnoulh.?" However, he was on less than cordial terms with Te Atiawa members of the
Church of England at Waitara. In 1860 he spoke strongly against Wiremu Kingi Rangitake,
urging him to surrender his resistance to the Crown over the disputed sale of the Pekapeka
block at Waitara and continued, in the early months of the first Taranaki War to visit the
villages ofWiremu Kingi's supporters preaching against 'rebelllon.?"
A closer examination of Te Atiawa communities and individuals bringing their reserves under
the Act suggests that Parris' and Whiteley's influence as commissioners, spread like a ripple
through communities that owned a number of reserves. In particular, several specific
connections between individuals whose names appear on the consent notices and the various
commissioners are apparent. For example, the first people tobring their reserves under the Act
were those with connections to both Ngamotu, where Whiteley's mission station was located,
696 Carter, 1955, pp 8- 9.
697 Ibid, P10.
698 His journal for February 1860 shows that he regular visited Puketotara, Te Kawau, Katere, Mahoetahi, Te
Puata and Waitara Heads (Journal ofReverend John Whiteley, 5, 6 and 19 February 1860, Pukeariki Public
Library Archive, New Plymouth).
699 Graham Brazendale, John Whiteley: Land Sovereignty and the Land Wars ofthe 19th Century, Wesleyan
Historical Society ofNew Zealand, Orewa (NZ), 1996, P36.
700 At Puketotara (on Native Reserve NO.3 ofthe same name) Whiteley buried three children ofPaora and
Meretini between July 1867 and Feb 1868 (Methodist Deaths, card index, New Plymouth Genealogical Society
Library). Both Paora and Meretini's names appear on a listofowners who brought Puketotara Native Reserve No.
3under the Native Reserves Act on 24 November 1866 (New Zealand Gazette, No.9, pp 70 -71). Another of
those who brought this reserve under the Act was Karira, aNative policeman whom Whiteley buried on 17
September 1867 (Methodist Deaths, card index, New Plymouth Genealogical Society Library).
701 Carter, 1955, p 11.
702 John Stenhouse, 'Religion, Politics, and the New Zealand Wars, 1860 - 1872', in God and Government: The
New Zealand Experience, Rex Adhar and John Stenhouse (eds), University ofOtago Press, Dunedin, 2000, p 31
and Sally McLean, A History of the Ngamotu Mission and the Grey Institute Trust, 1992, p56.
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and to Te Kawau pa which Whiteley regularly visited and where a Wesleyan chapel was built
by Maori in 1857.703 Typical of the kinds of associations Native reserve owners had with
Whiteley were those of Harieta Wright, Louisa Wright, and Kipa Ngamoke. They brought
'Pakikora' (Pukekura) Native Reserve No. 12 under the operation of the Act on 22 September
1859.704Harieta Wright's father was Te Munu, a chief of Ngamotu hapu, who was also one of
the original owners ofPukewarangi Native Reserve No. 20. She was asister to Te Munu Kipa
ofNgati Tawhirikura hapu who also had lands in the Hua block.705 Harieta married the whaler
John Wright, and had been widowed at the end of December 1858. Whiteley was the minister
who buried her husband at Waitapu urupa at Ngamotu on 2 January 1859.706Louisa Wright
was their only child and Kipa Ngamoke was most likely her close relallve.""
Commissioner Henry Halse, and Josiah Flight, the commissioners' assistant, both had strong
connections with Te Atiawa communities through the appointment of and cooperation with
Native assessors (Maori leaders appointed by the Crown to assist the resident magistrate).708
The resident magistracy (a position held by Flight), the armed police force (under the
command ofHalse as inspector ofpolice) and the Native assessors were closely connected?"
Alan Ward suggests that through Native assessors, resident magistrates became intertwined
with Maori communities because
their [Native assessors] working with the resident magistrate helped identify him as
part of the local community, particularly where he involved himself sympathetically with
the people and treated his Assessors as responsible Lieutenants. In such
circumstances the taking of disputes before the court did not appear to local Maori as
an appeal outside their group; group cohesion, still important to all but a few thrusting
and ambitious people, was not lrnpaired."?
703 WA Chambers, Samuel Ironside inNew Zealand, 1839 - 1858, Ray Richards/Wesleyan Historical Society,
1992, p 240.
704 Notice ofassent, 22 September 1859, New Zealand Gazette J No. 47,1861, P288.
705 Native Land Court Minutes J Taranaki Book 3,pp 321 - 323, hearing atNew Plymouth on 10June 1887 in
relation toPukewaranql Native Reserve 20.
706 The Taranaki Herald 8January 1859.
707 Probate ofJohn Wright, 21 March 1859 J R2/91 J Land Transfer Offlce, New Plymouth.
708 A list ofNative Assessors for North Taranaki noted that they were appointed byFlight and were under his
jurisdiction ('List ofNative Assessors Appointed in the Native Districts with their Salaries', AJHR, 1862, E-1,
Appendix 1). Flight was appointed resident magistrate in 1852 and retired from the position in1868 (Scholefield
(ed), A Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, 1940, Vol. 1, P268).
709 The resident magistrate/Native assessor system and the Native police force, which had been established
under the Constabulary Ordinance of1846, began atthe same time (Ward, 1973, pp 74 - 75).
710 Ward, 1973 J p 77.
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Flight, similarly, would have formed close working relationships with many of the prominent
men who owned reserves in both the 'town' and Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks, and could
certainly use these relationships in his negotiations over reserves being brought under the Act.
It is clear from reports ofresident magistrates in other provinces that assessors were seen as a
way to influence the Maori community. Ward characterized magistrates like Flight as "political
and intelligence agents" who "established what were essentially diplomatic contacts with the
principal chiefs, gauging their reactions to movements by the Government or the Kingite
leaders. "711
So it is not surprising that the names ofTe Atiawa leaders feature prominently on lists of those
who brought reserves under the Act, and that a high proportion of those leaders were also
Native assessors, Te Waka was appointed Native assessor around 1850.712 His name appears
on gazette notices bringing Puketotara Native Reserve No.3, part Ararepe Native Reserve No.
2, and Marangi Native Reserve No. 24 under the Act.713 Poharama Te Whiti was the principal
chief of the people at Ngamotu and was appointed as a Native assessor for the village of
Hongihongi at Ngamotu in April 1850.714 He was also well acquainted with Parris through his
involvement in the purchase of the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks and his interests in
Whatapiupiu Waiwakaiho H.7IS Another man, Tahana Papawaka, had been a Native assessor
since at least 1859.716 He married Ngapei Ngatata, the sister of Wiremu Taka and Wiremu
Tana Ngatata. Along with her siblings, his wife had interests in Purakau Native Reserve No. 16
711 Ward, AShow ofJustice, 1973, p 141.
712 The Taranaki Herald, 28 August 1860.
713 New Zealand Gazette, No.9, 1867, pp 69 - 70; New Zealand Gazette, No. 16, 1858, P109, and New Zealand
Gazette, No. 46,15 August 1866, pp 317 - 319 respectively.
714 For his appointment as Native assessor, see 'List ofNative Assessors Appointed inthe Native Districts with
their Salaries', AJHR, 1862, E-1, Appendix 1.He is listed as the chief of the 'friendly' community atMoturoa in
1864 ('Friendly Natives and places on [sic] settlement ofNew Plymouth', AD 1, 1864/2089, ANZ, Wellington), a
chiefs ofTe Atiawa in 1868 (Bowen to the Duke ofBuckingham, 17 March 1868, AJHR, 1868, A-1, P59 encl. 2in
No. 36), and as one ofthe chiefs ofthe people between Paritutu and Waiwakaiho in 1870 ('Return ofthe Tribes of
the North Island', AJHR, 1870, A-11, P7).
715 'An Account ofNative Reserves in the Province ofTaranaki together with the Owners thereof, AD 1,
1866/610, ROB, Vol. 136, pp 52169-52177.
716 Tahana was listed as one ofthe chiefs ofTe Atiawa people living between Omatiki and Waiwakaiho in1870
('Return of the Tribes of the North Island', AJHR, 1870, A-11, P7). Also see Wells, The History of Taranaki, 1878,
p 175. He is listed as Native assessor in the 1869 and 1880 editions ofthe Taranaki Almanac and Official
Directory, compiled and published for the proprietor ofthe "Taranaki Herald" by WHJ Seffern, New Plymouth. He
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and in the Waiwakaiho J reserve.717 Kipa was appointed Native assessor for the village of Te
Hua, August 1854 and is listed as Native assessor in the Taranaki Almanac of 1869.718 He
gave his consent to bring Ratahangae Native Reserve No.4, part Ararepe Native Reserve No.
2, Pipiko Native Reserve NO.8 and Te Henui Native Reserve No. 15 under the operations of
the Act. 719
Ngamotu Hapu Motives forBringing Reserves under the Act
It isdifficult to know what meanings various Te Atiawa individuals and communities ascribed to
the agreement to bring reserves under the Act. However despite a lack ofsources revealing Te
Atiawa motives it is possible to make some comment about the impact of their motives on the
patterns of assents obtained by the commissioners. It is possible that the initial burst of
assents (1859 -1860) may reflect a level of initial enthusiasm by some Te Atiawa for this new
process, or at least a willingness on their part to try this new arrangement with the
commissioners.
We have already noted the link between lease arrangements made privately between settlers
and Te Atiawaindividuals for reserve land and the bringing of reserves under the Act, and this
will be given further attention in the following section. Here it may be noted that there was a
strong connection between periods of war and peace in the province and settler demand for
leases. Periods ofpeace may have led to more lease arrangements and hence more reserves
being brought under the Act. Those with reserves in the immediate vicinity of the town, and to
the south, an area where settlers felt safer from the dangers of tribal conflict north of the
Waiwakaiho, were the first to bring their reserves under the Act. It was also in this area where
settler farming and roads were best developed and this may have increasesd demand from
settlers for the sort of additional leasehold land that Ngamotu people and their reserves could
supply.
also appears on the civil listin 1880 ('Additions tothe Civil List Authorised since 8th October 1879', AJHR, 1880,
8-9, Appendix D).
7I7 Wi Tako conveyed part Waiwakaiho J to Ngapei Ngatata wife of Tahana of Mangaone and to Mary Skelton
wife ofGeorge Augustus Skelton (R 18/916, 29 July 1884, Land Transfer Office, New Plymouth).
718 'List ofNative Assessors Appointed in the Native Districts with their Salaries', AJHR, 1862, E-1, Appendix 1.
Kipa islisted as the chief ofa 'friendly' community atWaiwakaiho in1864 ('Friendly Natives and places on [sic]
settlement ofNew Plymouth', AD 1,1864/2089, ANZ, Wellington).
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It is also possible that bringing reserves under the Act held other political meaning for Te
Atiawa. Late in 1859 at a public meeting Kipa, the prominent Katere leader and Native
Assessor, had declared that the Maori would extend the limits within which they recognised
British law to include the Waiwakaiho block. 720 Waiwakaiho communities may have then
brought reserves under the Act as agesture to confirm their commitment to that decision (and
to the peaceful and joint community inherent in Ngamotu hapu views of their future sharing of
their rohe with the settlers).
The Commissioners' Actual Role: Intermediaries between Ngamotu Hapu and the
Settlers
Although the Taranaki Native reserves commissioners had begun their work with a pro-active
approach they quickly realised that they would be confined to an intermediary role between the
parties, confirming new and existing leases. The large proportion of reserves being leased by
Te Atiawa by 1858 was the result ofTe Atiawa need to utilise the reserves togenerate income
from rents, and it coincided with a market demand for leasehold land amongst the settlers at
New Plymouth. The reserves had become the central economic resource of these hapu and it
is likely that they became even more significant to the Te Atiawa iwi as whole after the
confiscation of the remainder of their rohe in 1865. Ngamotu hapu also (as already
demonstrated) had both a desire for on-going mutually beneficial relationships with the settlers
and adesire 'to achieve economic equality and self-determination.
For their part, New Plymouth settlers had long complained that there was not enough land for
their needs, though in reality much of the land purchased by the Crown had not sold when it
came up for aucfion.?' But what was really in demand was relatively flat fern land in the
vicinity for roads and settlements. Employment was scarce and as a result agricultural
labourers and tradesmen had an increasing desire to own smallholdings to grow food and
raise livestock for domestic consumption and to generate cash to purchase imported qoods.?"
719 New Zealand Gazette, No.9, 1867, pp 69 -70; New Zealand Gazette, No. 16, 1858, P109; New Zealand
Gazette, 1861, pp 288 - 289 and New Zealand Gazette, No.9, 1867 pp 70 - 71 respectively.
720 Wells, The History of Taranaki, 1878, pp 175 - 177.
721 In fact atone point the boundaries of the town ofNew Plymouth were reduced because ofthe number of
vacant sections held by absentee owners (The Taranaki Herald, 25 June 1859).
722 Watson and Patterson, 'The Growth and Subordination of the Maori Economy in the Wellington Region', 1985,
p 524.
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Suburban lands were perfect for these smallholdings, being generally fern lands, close enough
to roads to get supplies from town and produce to markets, and within reach of other small
farmers. In Taranaki demand for this land was intensified by the lack of surrounding pastoral
lands which could have provided rural estates. 723 In any case, the alternating states of war
and uneasy peace in the province throughout this period meant that it remained difficult to
break in and keep large rural estates productive.
These circumstances strongly suggest that the most significant factor in the commissioners'
decision to accept the role of intermediaries in the leasing process was the fact that, as
indicated earlier, Te Atiawa and settlers were already dealing with each other over Native
reserves. This placed Te Atiawa firmly in control of those reserves. The commissioners
themselves admitted that Te Atiawa already leased about 205 acres of the 'town block'
reserves to settlers, and that these arrangements had been in place for several years with Te
Atiawa receiving rents.?' In addition to these firmly established leases Te Atiawa were
occupying and cultivating a further area of about 450 acres on reserves in the 'town blocks',
with the balance of the reserves on the town side of the Waiwakaiho River being "unoccupied
and waste.'?" This control signalled asteadfast understanding by Te Atiawa that the reserves
belonged to them and that they were free to exercise at least some of the property rights of
owners with regard to them.
In addition the commissioners were under considerable local pressure to validate existing
leases between Te Atiawa and settlers. The Taranaki Herald expressed the strong feeling
amongst settlers even before the commissioners were appointed that the primary purpose of
the Native Reserves Act was
to get rid of the anomalous disadvantages under which the Natives labour in regard to
the lands which have been reserved for their U$~ and benefit. ... The Act of the
General Assembly purports to legalize the disposal of land said to be under the ban of
the "Native Land Purchase Ordinance?"
723Arnold, New Zealand's Burning, 1994, p 183.
724 'Report from Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E-4, P12.
725 'Report from Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E·4, P12.
726 The Taranaki Herald, 14November 1857.
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As prominent members of the settler community the commissioners could hardly fail to have
heard these opinions and they might have been influenced by them in the way they operated
under the Act.
These expectations were part ofwider local agitation aimed at getting the government to agree
to allow settlers to negotiate directly with Maori for the purchase and lease of land in
Taranaki?" This agitation might suggest that the settlers were in fact upholding the freedom of
Maori to lease their reserves without the constraints of the Native Land Purchase Ordinance.
However, settlers were far more concerned with finding a means ofacquiring further land from
Maori more rapidly than the Crown was able to. As already discussed settlers were frustrated
over the Crown's land purchasing in Taranaki. New Plymouth settlers had complained
persistently that the Crown's land purchase officers in Taranaki were slow and ineffectual and
they were dissatisfied by the amount of land purchased and the time which it took to make that
land available for selection. After the Grey purchase in 1847 it took another six years before
any land north of the Waiwakaiho was purchased and the opening up of that land for selection
was slow.?" Frustrations mounted from the mid-1850s onwards until the Tarurutangi block
purchase in 1859, and the attempt to purchase Waitara that led to war in 1860.
Within six months of beginning their work these realities bought the commissioners to the
realisation that they would be required to sanction existing leases. They reported that they had
little choice but to bring "such lands under the operation of the Act, and placing the occupants
on a legal footing." To declare such leases illegal and invalid would, as the commissioners
admitted, "not be prudent." 729 They would risk angering Te Atiawa, whose unsettled and
'warlike' state had so recently caused the settler community to appeal to the government for
troops to garrison the township. Just as importantly they would have angered settler tenants,
the commissioners' friends, kin, business and political supporters and allies. The fact that the
727Atapublic meeting in March 1859 the Superintendent Richard Brown questioned the Governor about the
possibility of leasing unpurchased land directly from Maori south ofNew Plymouth who had indicated their
Willingness toenter agreements with settlers. (Public Meeting atNew Plymouth 10March 1859 reported inthe
Taranaki Herald, 19March 1859).
728 'Report ofa Special Committee of the Provincial Council ofNew Plymouth on the Purchase ofthe Waiwakaiho
block', n/d; Cooper tothe Colonial Secretary, 19 June 1854 and Cooper tothe Chief Commissioner, 11 August
1855, D-41A, D-42 and 0-43 respectively, Turton's Epitome.
729 'Report of the Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, p 12.
197
Taranaki commissioners' report is dominated by such details demonstrates how conscious
they were of the stronghold Te Atiawa already had over the reserves. This is in marked
contrast to commissioners in other provinces who do not even mention Maori initiatives in
regard to the reserves. While the Nelson commissioners were intent on civilising and
assimilating Maori by using the proceeds from the reserves to strengthen and augment
institutions for Maori improvement, there is not a hint of such rhetoric in the Taranaki
commissioners' report. Political considerations appear to have been uppermost for them. 730
The commissioners' policy with regard to new leases is not so easy to determine but it appears
that itwas common for settlers and Te Atiawa who had arranged a lease between them to then
approach the commissioners. A letter from John Whiteley to Governor Gore Browne in 1861
attempted to explain how his fellow commissioner, Robert Parris, had come to purchase Native
Reserve No. 9.731 In making a lengthy defence Whiteley gave a detailed explanation of how
the commissioners operated. He remarked that "generally a Native owner will have a Pakeha
friend to whom he wishes to let or sell, the bargain will be partly made and they come to us for
our approval. If the bargain is fair we are in duty bound to meet the wishes of the Native."732 In
this particular case, Whiteley informed the parties
that nothing could be [sic] only through the commissioners and as a friend I assisted
More in taking the necessary steps to bring his reserve under the operation of the
Native Reserves Act in order that it might be leased according to his wishes to his
friend Edqecornbe.?"
If this was a typical case, then it suggests that wherever possible the commissioners used the
opportunity such encounters provided to persuade Te Atiawa to bring their reserves under the
730 'Report ofthe Native Reserves Commissioners atNelson' 2June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E-4, pp 2- 4.
731 Whiteley's letter seems to have been aresponse to that ofTheophilus White, then deputy auditor and member
for Omata on the Taranaki Provincial Council. This letter has not survived but there isa Maori Affairs inward letter
register entry recording the receipt of the letter (TWhite, 'Respec the alleged improper proceedings ofCom Nat
Res Taranaki', 28 September 1861, 61/234 in MA 2/4, ANZ, Wellington). Theophilus White's resignation as
deputy auditor and as member ofprovincial council for Omata and his appointed as provincial treasurer (Taranaki
Gazette, 1863, Vol. XI,
No. 26, P60).
732 Whiteley to Gore Browne, 28 September 1861, John Whiteley Papers, MS-Papers -0484-5, ATL, Wellington.
733 Whiteley toGore Browne, 28 September 1861, John Whiteley Papers, MS-Papers-0484-5, ATL, Wellington.
An earlier draft ofthis letter containing passages cut from the version apparently sent is also included inthis file.
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Act. It is uncertain whether inhabitants of reserves voluntarily brought reserves under the Act
when no lease was pending.
Despite Whiteley's comments it is not altogether clear how significant the desire to enter new
leases with settlers was in Te Atiawa decisions to sign assents. In particular it is unclear
whether the Native Land Purchase Ordinance 1846 had any impact on the number of
landlords and tenants coming to the commissioners to have their lease arrangements
approved. Leases that had not been sanctioned by the Native reserves commissioners were
illegal, and the settlers concerned were liable for prosecution under the Native Land Purchase
Ordinance. It is possible that some reserves were brought under the Act because settler
lessees feared prosecution, especially since by 1858 several settlers in Taranaki had already
been prosecuted under this ordinance for depasturing stock on Native reserves." However,
Magistrates imposed the minimum possible fines, and all of these fines were later remitted at
the request of the settlers fined. 735 The commissioners themselves showed no desire to
enforce the Ordinance despite their view that all the reserves remained in Native title. Like
other officials, they appear to have been uncertain whether the ordinance did in fact apply to
Native reserves. In 1862 Parris wrote for guidance as to whether the Ordinance was to be
enforced?"
The 1846 ordinance was repealed by section 3of the Native Lands Act 1865.737 Taking this as
a signal that settlers were now free to openly and legally deal directly with Maori for the lease
of land, some settlers saw a new business opportunity as intermediaries between reserve
owners and settlers wanting to lease. Edwin T Woon, a licensed interpreter from Wanganui
who had been involved in land purchasing for the Crown in that region, began touting for
business as an agent in Taranaki, citing the passing of the Native Lands Act. 738 Although the
734 Proceedings of the Resident Magistrate's Court on 20 and 24 April, reported in the Taranaki Herald, 2 May
and 16May 1855.
735 Charles Brown defended his actions as superintendent, explaining that Richard Brown had been
prosecuted because ofacomplaint brought bya Maori, but that he as superintendent had remitted his fine
after Brown applied to the Governor. The superintendent then, for the sake ofjustice, remitted the fines of
White and Honeyfield, inwhat he described as "analogous cases" (The Taranaki Herald, 17January 1857).
736 RParris, 29 April 1862, 62/378 in MA 2/4, ANZ, Wellington.
737 The Native Lands Act 1865, No. 71.
738 Robyn Anderson, Report on Whanganui Iwi and the Crown, 1865 - 1880, for the Crown Forest Rental Trust,
October 1999, p 16citing the Evening Herald, 21 August 1868 and the Taranaki Herald, 6January 1866.
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reaction of Taranaki commissioners to this enterprise is not known other Native reserves
commissioners were concerned. George Swainson, Native Lands Commissioner and former
Native Reserves Commissioner in Wairarapa, sent a copy of this advertisement to central
government to draw the attention of Native Minister to Woon's activities. However, the
government did not see fit to take action against Woon; the note on this copy of the advert
reads simply, "I think it better not to lnterfere.?"
Crown Granting of Native Reserves to Te Atiawa
The Native reserves commissioners in Taranaki had the opportunity to more directly and
rapidly individualise not just the ownership but the title to these reserves by issuing Crown
grants for them to Maori. The 1856 Act gave the commissioners the power to "make a
conveyance [the word 'grants' is used in the marginal notes to this section of the Act] or lease
in severalty ofany lands within the limits of their jurisdiction to any ofthe aboriginal inhabitants
for whose benefit the same may have been reserved or excepted.'?" Effectively this allowed
for each owner to hold an exclusive share in a reserve thus taking the first step towards the
conversion ofcustomary title into individually held, Crown-derived title, and making this Act the
Crown's first statutory mechanism for individualising title to Maori land. In fact the Native
Reserves Act was initially the only legal mechanism for the issue of Crown grants to Maori. In
1858 Commissioner Searancke reminded McLean that promises of Crown grants for Native
reserves had been used to persuade Maori to sell land at Waikanae, but no grants had yet
been issued. McLean confirmed that although the Governor had no legal power to issue Crown
grants in that situation, "the object, however, in this case, can be indirectly attained through
'The New Zealand Native Reserves Act, 1856', if the Natives will agree to hand over the
reserves to the commissioners for the Province of Wellington, appointed under the aforesaid
Act for this purpose,'?"
Ultimately Native reserves were to be at the vanguard of tenure conversion through the
issuing of Crown grants. A surviving directive sent to all Native reserves commissioners in
739 Woon's advertisement, Wanganui 6September 1865, comment by George Swainson on 12September 1865
and reply by'WS'on 13September 1865, MA 24/21, ANZ, Wellington.
740 The New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856, No. 10, s. 15.
741 Chief Commissioner toCommissioner Searancke, 22 August 1858, Turton's Epitome, 0-53.
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1859 makes it clear that they were explicitly instructed by central government to individualise
title to reserves. The Assistant Native Secretary reminded commissioners of "the advantages
which would result from a subdivision of the Native reserves, or what would still be better if
practicable, the individualisation of certain portions of them."742 In 1862, when William
Swainson was appointed as Native reserves commissioner in the Wairarapa, Alfred Doniett
informed him that his duties would include
The survey ofNative reserves, lands of half-castes and other lands, roads etc ofwhich
surveys may be required by government; the preparation of Crown Grants, leases and
other documents in connection with these lands which may require plans to be placed
thereon, and to assist in the work ofenquiring into and individualizing Native title.743
In addition there was a clear public expectation that the commissioners would use the Act to
individualise title to assist in the assimilation of Maori. The editor of the newspaper the New
Zealander believed that the Act would open up
a legitimate and most worthy means of giving vitality to that idea ofprivate property -
already beginning to obtain sway over the Native mind, and which alone can break
down the vicious system of communism which now [sic] the last great barrier to the
speedy and peaceful and profitable colonization of these islands, if not to the gradual
and beneficial amalgamation ofthe two races?"
The Crown's .policy direction was also clear: future reserves were to be land that Maori had re-
purchased from the Crown and would hold in a Crown grant. It was felt that this would lead to
"their present system ofcommunism" being "gradually dissolved", bringing Maori "the great
advantage of holding their land under a tenure more defined and more secure for themselves
and their posterity than they can possibly enjoy under their present intricate and complicated
mode ofholding property.'?"
742 Smith to Commissioners ofNative Reserves, Taranaki, 23 April 1857, MA 4/3 circular 139, pp 93 - 95, ANZ,
Wellington.
743 Johnson, The Trust Administration ofMaori Reserves, 1997, p42 citing MA 4/5, P13, ANZ, Wellington.
744 The New Zealander, 28 June 1856.
745 'Instructions toDistrict Land Purchase Commissioner [Robert Parris] relative toPurchase ofLand from the
Natives atTaranaki', 26 August 1857, AJHR, 1861, Taranaki, C-1, No. 57, pp 211 - 213.
201
Despite these powers, instructions and expectations, few Crown grants were in fact issued for
Native reserves in Tarsnakl." Of the 49 reserves in these purchases only six were wholly or
partly included in a Crown grant to Te Atiawa before the 1887 Native Land Court sitting which
dealt with these reserves for the first time, and in three of these cases the grant involved only
part of the reserve. Five of the six reserves or part reserves were Crown-granted to a Maori
owner or owners under the Native Reserves Act 1856. One reserve was granted to Maori
owners under the Crown Grants Act No.2, 1862. Four out of the six reserves (or part
reserves) Crown-granted under the Native Reserves Act 1856 had been brought under the Act
prior to the Crown grant (the exceptions were Native Reserve No. 7 belonging to
Ngarongomate, and Purakau Native Reserve No. 16 belonging to the Ngatata whanau). The
Native reserve (Purakau Native Reserve No. 16) whose Crown grant was issued under other
legislation was not brought under the Native Reserves Act prior to aCrown grant being made.
These six reserves(or part reserves) Crown-granted represented less than twenty percent
(16.99 percent) ofthe Native reserve lands in the five blocks dealt with in this thesis. Almost all
those reserves Crown-granted to Te Atiawa owners (five out ofsix) were in the 'town' (FitzRoy,
Omata and Grey) blocks. Of these five 'town' block reserves four were suburban lands (of
these two, were parts ofNative Reserves Nos. 18 and 23 which were adjacent to one another,
the others were Native Reserve No.7 and Purakau Native Reserve No. 16). The other was a
rural reserve, part Ratapihipihi Native Reserve No.5, in the Omata block, south of the town of
New Plymouth. All the suburban reserve land Crown-granted to Te Atiawa was on the fringe of
British settlement between the Henui and Waiwakaiho and the modest size of the sections
meant that it represented only about a third (34.08 percent) of all the Native reserve land
Crown-granted to them. The majority (65.92 percent) lay in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks.
The sixth reserve was a very large rural one, Whatapiupiu Waiwakaiho J of 540 acres in the
Waiwakaiho and Hua block, which accounted for almost two-thirds (65.92 percent) of all
reserve land Crown-granted to Te Atiawa.
It is interesting that only one of the 24 reserves in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks were
Crown-granted to Maori. This may be explained by the fact that the Crown had already
746 The full statistical analysis from which the figures used in this discussion appear inAppendix 9.
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Graph 7: Bar graph comparing the percentage of reserve acreage
in different blocks by type of land Crown-granted to Te Atiawa
before 1887
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promised Crown grants for these reserves as a condition of their creation. So both Maori and
the Crown probably felt that they would simply wait for those grants to be made. In terms of
the type of reserve land Crown-granted to Maori, the vast majority (84.61 percent) was rural
land, the remainder (15.39 percent) was suburban land. No town land or rural/suburban land
was Crown-granted to Te Atiawa in this period. In the 'town' blocks the ratio ofCrown-granted
rural land to suburban land was fairly even (49.68 percent v,s 50.327 percent respectively). In
the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks none of the suburban reserves were Crown-granted, with all
the land granted to Te Atiawa was contained in one large rural reserve. These patterns are
illustrated by graph 7 below.
Avariety of local circumstances constrained the commissioners in making Crown grants. One
factor was the legal and administrative difficulties (and long delays) in getting Crown grants
issued in this period. As already discussed in the previous chapter, there were significant
delays in the issuing of Crown grants promised to Maori for reserves and re-purchased
sections in the Hua block in 1854. Some were not issued until the 1890s. The legal difficulty of
making these Crown grants promised to Maori was recognised by central government but
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remained unresolved in 1862.747 The fact that these difficulties were not insuperable is
demonstrated by the fact that the commissioners in Taranaki successfully made a number of
Crown grants under the Act. In the case of Native reserves the difficulty of defining those
entitled to the land was reduced by the fact that in the process of gaining assent to bring
reserves under the Act the commissioners had already ascertained the 'owners' of reserves.
Potentially this meant that it would be quicker and easier to issue aCrown grant.
In almost every case where the commissioners recommended a Crown grant be issued toTe
Atiawa for Native reserve land itwas order to provide a Crown-derived title to settler buyers of
all or part ofa reserve. For asale to be completed Maori first had to have a Crown-derived title
in order to alienate it to the settler. Parts ofPukaka Native Reserve No. 18 and Raiomiti Native
Reserve No. 23 were issued in a Crown grant to Wiremu Te Ahoaho so that a sale of part of
the reserves could be concluded with the lessee." This was probably a satisfactory
arrangement for Te Ahoaho. He had cash in hand from the sale to his long-term tenant, Daniel
Bishop, and a secure title to the rest of the reserve. In a similar case, a Crown grant was
issued to Ropata Ngarongomate a chief of Ngatitairi hapu of Taranaki iwi for Native Reserve
No. 7.749 Once again the grant was made so that a sale to a settler could be concluded?"
However, in the case of part of Ratapihipihi Native Reserve No.5 no sale was involved and it
is uncertain how it came to be Crown-granted to the owners. It is possible that the high
standing of the owners enabled them to successfully apply for agrant. One ofthose named on
747 After the establishment ofresponsible Government legal officials decided that the Governor had no power to
issue Crown grants toMaori except in return for payment in the same manner as they were issued to settlers.
(Gore Browne toEdward Cardwell, 22 August 1864, BPP, Vol. 14, [3425], P206. Also see McLean toGore
Browne, 5September 1862, BPP, Vol. 14, [3425], P207.
748 A Crown grant was issued toWi Te Ahoaho for 48:2:37 being part Native Reserves 18and 23 under the
Native Reserves Act 1856 on 2 December 1872, ante-vested to16 May 1857 (G1 0/364, Land Transfer Office,
New Plymouth). Part Native Reserve 23 was sold toDaniel Bishop ofHua for £200 on 15November 1872
(R11/411, Land Transfer Office, New Plymouth).
749 Ropata Ngarongomate was considered bythe Crown tobe one ofthe 'leading men' of the Taranaki iwi in 1868
(Bowen tothe Duke ofBuckingham, 17 March 1868, AJHR, 1868, A-1, encl. 2 inNo. 36, p 59). In 1870 he is
described as one ofthe chiefs of the Ngatitairi, ofTaranaki iwi amongst the people liVing between Paritutu and
Hauranga ('Return of the Tribes ofthe North Island', AJHR, 1870,
A-ii, P7).
750 A Crown grant was issued toRopata Ngarongomate on 30 October 1877 ante-vested to3January 1870
(G13/180, Land Transfer Office, New Plymouth).
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the grant was Ngarongomate who would receive a grant a few years later for Native Reserve
No.7, the other three were members ofthe influential Porutu family ofWellington.751
It is worth noting that all those who held Crown grants for reserve lands however briefly (most
often the grant was made after the land had been sold and was simply back-dated) were
prominent Te Atiawa leaders whom the Crown considered to be 'friendly'. As already
discussed in relation to the re-purchasing scheme in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks, the
commissioners may have considered that these men were the most suitable to receive Crown
grants because they would act as examples, encouraging more Maori to apply to have their
reserves individualised in this way. The high rank and 'loyal' status of these men undoubtedly
gave them greater power in the process. Wi Te Ahoaho and Ropata Ngarongomate had
assisted government officials at the time of the sale of the Waiwakaiho and Omata purchases,
and had long been employed as Native Assessors. It is uncertain whether other Te Atiawa
people requested Crown grants for reserves and were denied them, or whether these men
were the only ones interested in obtaining a grant. This seems unlikely however, because a
large group of Te Atiawa who had interests in Puketotara Native Reserve had taken steps to
subdivide the reserve amongst themselves, with many individuals holding their own sections
and receiving all the rents from those secfions.?" It is therefore likely that many of them may
have wanted ,a Crown grant for their portions.
A particular issue here is to what extent Maori men and women were acting as individuals, or
acting as trustees or 'front people' for a whole whanau or hapu, The commissioners
themselves were under the impression that:
in some cases the common interest of a family or tribe, for whom the reserves were
made, ismonopolised by afew members who by exercising an arbitrary authority over
the land, nullify the interest ofless influential members ofthe tribe orfamily.753
751 A Crown grant for part Ararepe Native Reserve NO.2 (140:1:38) was issued toRopata Ngarongomate, Ihaia
Porutu, Henare Piti Porutu and Wiremu Rangiawhio Porutu under the Native Reserves Act 1856 on 16 June 1872
(812/17, Land Transfer Office, New Plymouth).
752 'An Account ofNative Reserves inthe Province ofTaranaki together with the Owners thereof,
AD 1,1866/610, RDB, Vol. 136, pp 51269 - 51277.
753 'Report from Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E·4, P12.
~....
~ .
'."
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However, the commissioners were not necessarily privy to the arrangements Te Atiawa
political entities were making for the management of their reserves and these individuals may
have been appointed by whanau or hapu to act on their behalf. On the otherhand, ihis could
well be a sign of the increasing pursuit of property and power by Maori individuals·acting
without the sanction ofthe group ofowners. Crown grants may have been perceived by Maori
as giving them security oftenure; or as away to have the rights ofparticular hapu and whanua
officially recognised at a time when 'there was little in the way oftitle deeds oreven leases. Yet
it isalsopossible that some individuals considered a Crown grant to be recognition ofmana or
a new status symbol. Crown grants may also have appealed to some because they allowed·
sales of reserves without going through the commi~sioners. As early as 1854 Cooper noted
that Te Atiawa in the Hua block had reminded him of his and McLean's prornlses that they
would be able to sell land in the same way as Pakeha?" A'iack of sources makes it,
impossible to speculate further.
As with the allocation ofNative reserves in the Waiwakaiho block, a favourable reputation with
the Crown could help a request for a Crown grant while unfavourable status could have ihe '
opposite 'effect. Ii may have been the case that those with 'rebel' connections were unable to
obtain Crown grants. Domett instructed Native Reserves Commissioner Swainson in 1862 that
he was to give his
whole attention towards forwarding the views and interests respecting the lands of
those Natives who are the avowed friends of the Government and loyal subjects ofthe
Queen. You will not, of course, manifest any inimical feeling towards'disaffected
Natives; but you will simply decline toassist them ·in any way.7SS
Clearly there would be few reserves in Taranaki in which at least some owners might not be
considered 'disaffected', and indeed an 1866 Army department schedule of reserves with·
comments on owners rebel/loyal status confirms thls.7S6
754 Cooper to Mclean, 16 May 1854, Mclean Papers, MS·Papers·0032·0227, ATl, Wellington..
755 Johnson, The Trust Administration ofNative Reserves, 1997, p42 citing MA 4/5, p13, ANZ, Wellington.
756 'An Account ofNative Reserves inthe Province ofTaranaki together with the Owners thereof, AD 1,
1866/6,10, ROB, Vol. 136, pp 52169 - 52173.
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Conclusion
Government instructions to the commissioners and public expectations emphasised that the
New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 was a mechanism for the issue of Crown grants to
Maori. Yet the commissioners in Taranaki made relatively few Crown grants. Those they did
make were not issued out of any adherence to policy but to complete a sale of all or part of a
reserve to asettler buyer. The commissioners were unable to effect a wholesale conversion of
title from customary communal title to individualised Crown-derived title. However what the
assent process did do Was effectively individualise ownership by listing owners who signed the
assent tobring a reserve under the Act. In order to be able to administer the Native reserves in
Taranaki the Native reserves commissioners had to persuade Te Atiawa to give their consent
to bringing their reserves under the operation of the Act. The location and type of reserve land
brought under the Act suggests that many reserves may have come under the commissioners'
administration through proposed leases.
Cases where Te Atiawa lived on one portion of a reserve and leased the other portion were
almost confined to reserves that had been brought under the Act. This suggests that one or
both parties to these leases felt some need for the commissioners as intermediaries should the
arrangement become difficult. However, it may be thaUhese reserves had been brought under
the Act before these arrangements were made, and that this is merely coincidence. To some
extent the commissioners were faced with well established leases of Native reserves and had
little choice but to act as intermediaries and sanction existing leases. However, it appears that
when settlers and Te Atiawa came to the commissioners with a new lease arrangement the
commissioners refused to sanction the lease until the reserve under had been brought the Act.
Evidence suggests thatthe commissioners took a pro-active approach, visiting Te Atiawa on
the reserves and persuading them to bring all the reserves the community owned under the
Act. The commissioners were severely constrained by periods of war and unrest in the
province, and in these periods few if any reserves were brought under the Act; conversely in
periods ofpeace the number of reserves coming under it increased dramatically. The personal
connections that the various commissioners had with Ngamotu hapu communities were also
undoubtedly influential in shaping which reserves came under the Act.
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However the commissioners were not entirely successful in their approach. Little more than
half of all the reserves in the FitzRoy, Omata, Grey, Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks came under
their administration; the rest remained in Te Atiawa ownership and control. Amongst some
Ngamotu people there was considerable mistrust of the commissioners and their
administration. This mistrust must be seen in the wider context of the damage wrought to
social trust between the two communities by the Taranaki wars. But there was also aparticular
fear that the reserves would be confiscated by the Crown along with other land in the province,
or in some cases, that they would be taken by the commissioners for non-payment of the re-
purchase price. This clearly impacted upon the success of the commissioners. As a result of
these factors the ownership and control of the Native reserves remained split between Te
Atiawa and the Crown with distinct differences in the amount, location and type of reserve land
each controlled.
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Chapter 6: The Utilization of Native Reserves byTe Atiawa and
Settlers in Taranaki, 1858 -1875
Introduction
The Native reserves in the 'town' and Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks were utilised in a variety of
ways by Te Atiawa: they were variously occupied by hapu, leased to settlers or sold. A closer
examination of the circumstances that prompted this range of utilisation is required if a
coherent understanding of how Te Atiawa managed their reserves is to emerge. It is
particularly important to consider the selling of reserves in the context of Te Atiawa strategies
for utilising the reserves as a resource. It is easy to see the selling of land simply as an
alienation and loss: as the end point ofa particular reserve's history. Yet this misses anumber
of important questions. Firstly, to what extent did economic circumstances prompt hapu to sell
reserves and what impact did the size, location and quality of reserves have on these
decisions? Secondly, what effect did pressure from settlers and the agendas of the
commissioners have on which reserves were sold, and finally what did the selling of reserves
mean to Te Atiawa reserve owners in in terms of their relationship with the purchaser? An
analysis of the number and location of Native reserves sold and the roles that Te Atiawa
owners and the commissioners played offers further insight into the decisions to sell certain
reserves and the factors that constrained TeAtiawa choices.
The selling of Native reserves was, statistically at least, a relatively uncommon means of
utilising the reserves; leasing and occupying reserves were by far the most common form of
use yet thus far we have only the most general idea about which Native reserves Te Atiawa
were living on and which were being leased. A further statistical examination of the utilisation
of all the reserves in the 'town' and Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks in 1867 and in 1874 provides
an insight into the spatial patterns of reserve utilisation and how these changed over time. In
particular differences between Native reserves controlled by Te Atiawa and those administered
by the commissioners are highlighted. This makes it possible to examine the extent to which
decisions about which Native reserves were to be leased or partly leased impacted upon
where Te Atiawa communities were able to live. It isclear from the previous chapter that settler
demand for suburban reserve land near New Plymouth seems to have been an important
factor in bringing about lease arrangements for reserves and that this probably then influenced
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which reserves came under the Act. This analysis of utilisation patterns provides an
opportunity to further examine these connections between market demand and the pattern of
leasing. If there are indeed connections between the two then this may also illuminate the
extent to which Te Atiawa engaged with this demand by leasing reserves; the costs and
benefits of this engagement to hapu; and to what extent hapu were able to manage their
reserves tomaximise benefits and negotiate pitfalls.
Ultilising the Reserves and Decisions to Sell Reserves
Native Reserves Sold: Acreage, Location and Type of Land
Between December 1859 and November 1872, nine Native reserveswere wholly or partly
sold?" Seven ofthese were in the area surrounding the town of New Plymouth; only two were
in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. The seven reserves in the town blocks represented over
two-thirds (67.42 percent) of the total reserve land sold and over 60 percent (62.79 percent) of
this was suburban land. The two reserves in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks represented only
about one-third (32.58 percent) of all the reserve land sold. However all of the land in these
two reserves was suburban land. Altogether the reserve land sold represented 5.15 percent of
the total reserve acreage allocated in the 'town' and Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. These
patterns are illustrated in graph 8 below.
Graph 8: Bar Graph Comparing the Proportion of Types of
Native Reserve Land sold in various Locations between 1859
and 1872
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757 The full statistical analysis from which the figures in this discussion are taken appears inAppendix 6.
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Understanding Te Atiawa Decisions to sell Reserve Land, 1859 -1872
Decisions by Te Atiawa individuals and hapu to sell some of their Native reserves during the
Taranaki Wars and the decade that followed need to be viewed in the over-arching context of
the impact of war, confiscation and dislocation on the economic capacity of hapu. These
events generated and, to some extent perhaps, exacerbated existing problems with the
management of debt and restricted access to loans to fund development. These factors in
particular constrained continued hapu participation and success in the capitalist economy.
Therefore, it can be argued that the selling of reserves was, in the worst circumstances, a
means of survival, but in less pressing situations a positive strategy on behalf of hapu (albeit
one with serious long-term implications) to overcome financial constraints and fund the
development oftheir most viable reserves.
A full examination of the dynamics of the Te Atiawa economy lies beyond the scope of this
thesis and remains one ofthe most obvious gaps in our understanding ofthe iwi in the colonial
period. However it is instructive to examine the broad patterns of Maori economies in other
provinces and assess how well these seem to fit what is known about the Te Atiawa economy
after 1860. Paul Monin has discussed some ofthe risks faced by Maori heavily engaged in the
capitalist economy in this period in Hauraki. He concluded that Hauraki Maori found
themselves caught in "an inexorable spiral of vigorous commercial enterprise,extravagant
investments in schooners and flour mills, mounting debts, growing alcohol consumption, and
land sales, as the only way to extinguish debts.'?" Monin argued that cultural factors
contributed to this deepening economic crisis. He suggested that Maori at Hauraki frequently
over-stretched themselves by employing western goods and assets in traditional rivalry and
displays of tribal mana and therefore were particularly vulnerable to disasters and the
fluctuations ofthe colonial market?"
However, Te Atiawa do not appear to have over-extended themselves in this way. So far no
evidence of large-scale investment by Te Atiawa in Taranaki in fragile assets such as ships
and flourmills has emerged. But many of the factors which Monin identified in relation to rising
levels ofdebt - dependence on export markets, the desire for western goods to employ in inter-
758 Paul Monin, 'The Maori Economy atHauraki, 1840 -1880', NZJH, Vol. 29, No.2, 1995, P202.
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hapu exchange, and spending on alcohol - may have contributed to financial stress amongst
Te Atiawa. It isuncertain to what extent alcohol contributed to debt and poverty in Taranaki. Te
Whiti-o-Rongomai and Tohu Kakahi at Parihaka did forbid drunkenness and decided that all
alcohol brought to Parihaka was to be shared free and pUblicly with meals.760 This suggests
that some leaders did perceive alcohol as a problem. Maori and alcohol were also perceived
as a problem by some Pakeha: Whiteley and Flight worked together to form a total abstinence
society for Maori in Taranaki in 1864.761
As already discussed in chapters 2 and 3, TeAtiawa had prospered during the 1850s, owning
considerable numbers of stock, high status agricultural equipment (ploughs, harrows and
threshing machines), and carts which provided opportunities to enter the capitalist economy as
service providers. However by the 1860s a growing level of poverty and debt amongst Te
Atiawa hapu is evident. In this context it appears that some Native reserves were sold simply
to provide immediate financial relief or to clear the most pressing debts. The number ofentries
in the Maori Affairs series letters registers that recorded requests for government money, or
reimbursement, to buy food for communities is evidence that the Taranaki Maori community as
awhole suffered aconsiderable level ofpoverty during the two decades from 1860 to 1880.762
These letter, entries indicate that some hapu found themselves unable to stretch beyond
subsistence. Some had difficulty maintaining themselves while away from home, requesting
provisions during their attendance at the Compensation Court in 1866763 , and there was one
occasion when destitute Maori were sent to the hospltai?" Poverty had the potential to
interfere with the ability ofhapu to provide for guests and fulfil similar cultural obligations. The
civil commissioner frequently sent accounts of money expended to provide food for Maori
759 Ibid, P207.
760 In 1870 Te Whiti is recorded as having said to the people, "Ifyou have taken silver, then indeed you will be
lost. What good have you got when you stretched forth your hand for it? Did it not turn you topoisonous drink
which maddened you? And then where was the land ofyour fathers?" cited inMarten Hutt, Te Iwi Maori me te inu
Waipiro: He Tuhituhinga Hitori - Maori &Alcohol: AHistory, Heath Services Research Centre/ALAC, Wellington,
1999, p 41.
761 Carter, 1955, p 11.
762 The letter register entries quoted in the following discussion appear infull in table inAppendix 7. Unfortunately
the actual letters themselves have not survived.
763 66/910dated 8 May 1866 in MA 2/7, ANZ, Wellington.
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visiting the rohe, in 1868 the civil commissioner provided food for visiting South Island Maori
and for "starving Chatham Islanders" who had arrlved" Food supplies were also sent to
Taranaki from TeAtiawa living in the Cook Strait reqion.?"
Amongst these entries indicating the worsening economic situation amongst Te Atiawa are a
number of requests by Te Atiawa owners of customary land and Native reserves which make
explicit connections between economic hardship and the wish to sell land. For example,
Ropata Ngarongomate wrote requesting that he be allowed to sell Native Reserve No.7, giving
his reason as a wish to use the money from the sale to pay his debts.?" When Pipiko Native
Reserve NO.8 was sold in 1859 the purchase money was paid in two installments. The share
of one of the owners, Manahi, in the second installment received in January 1862, was paid
directly to Mrs Hoskin. It seems likely that this was in repayment ofadebt.768 In 1867, the civil
commissioner recommended that Maori be allowed to sell 150 acres of land at Waitara at once
because they were in want offood?"
Beyond these cases of most pressing want were a number of instances where Te Atiawa
Native reserve owners asked the Native reserves commissioners tosanction agreements they
had made with settlers to purchase small reserves in order to provide capital to develop other
larger, more viable reserves. In 1859 More, the owner of Otumaikuku Native Reserve No, 9,
asked Commissioner Whiteley to allow him to sell the reserve, "because he wanted money at
once with which to purchase a plough bullock for the cultivation of his other lands.?" In part
More's course of action arose out of a lack of means to raise capital by loans. Certainly the
option of selling must have been tempting since Te Atiawa had already experienced the
injection of large sums of capital into their communities. However, like many of the reserves
allocated to Te Atiawa in the FitzRoy block, Otumaikuku was poor quality land, and simply too
764 80/3857 dated 15 November 1880 inMA 3/13; 80/4158 dated 21 December 1880 in MA 3/13 both ANZ,
Wellington.
765 68/884 dated 22May 1868 inMA 2/8; 68/1475 dated 3September 1868 in MA 2/8 ANZ, Wellington
respectively.
766 68/1474 dated 3October 1868 inMA 2/8, ANZ, Wellington.
767 RNgarongomate, Taranaki, 15 April 1875, 75/2242 inMA 3/8, ANZ, Wellington.
768 Taranaki Provincia/ Gazette, Vol. XVI, No, 1,1868, P10.
769 67/841dated 4 June 1867 inMA 2/8, ANZ, Wellington.
770 Whiteley toGore Browne, 28 September 1861, John Whiteley Papers, MS-Papers-0484-5, ATL, Wellington.
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small to be economically viable.": These reserves had generally been set aside because they
were either awaahitapu oran area under cultivation.
If the reasons for wishing to sell reserves are now clearer, the question of who had the right to
sell and whose interests the sellers were conveying orbelieved they were conveying are still at
issue. As already noted, as early as 1858, the commissioners in Taranaki had noted in the
context of leasing and receiving rents that certain individual owners were most involved in
lransactlons.?" It is uncertain whether the individuals and very small groups ofindividuals who
made requests to sell reserves were simply acting as representatives and trustees for the
wider kin-group with interests in the reserves or whether they were acting as individuals. It is
quite possible that Maori acted as individuals for their own economic and cultural reasons. It
may have been, as in the case ofearlier sales to the Crown, that these individuals perceived
that being accepted as the seller meant that their mana as a right holder/owner was being
recognised.
The Commissioners' Role in the Sale of Native Reserves
Commissioners' Responses to Te Atiawa Requests
In many cases the Taranaki Native reserves commissioners sanctioned the sale of reserves in
direct response to requests from Te Atiawa. In 1861, John Whiteley assured the Governor that
decisions to sell reserves were only made where Te Atiawa had requested the commissioners
to do so:
We do not decide to sell, lease or let for the benefit of the public but at the request of
the Native owners and for their respective benefit. And in consultation with the Natives
and with the approbation of the Governor we are perfectly at liberty to sell lease or let
in any way we may consider best for those whom we represent. 773
That the commissioners considered Te Atiawa requests to be a significant factor in their
procedures suggests that local concerns and practicalities were influential in their decision-
making regarding sales. Foremost among these practicalities was the fact that the reserves
were providing homes for Maori and the wholesale disposal of reserves would have left the
771 Whiteley described the reserve as "very broken, [and having] been denounced as very inferior (Ibid).
772 'Report from Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E-4, P12.
773 Whiteley toGore Browne, 28 September 1861, Whiteley Papers, MS-Papers-0484-5, ATL, Wellington.
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commissioners with the problem of where Te Atiawa were going to live. As noted previously,
Te Atiawa had been allocated very few town reserves, and most of these were sold during the
1859 -1861 period while the Crown was clearing the township of Maori. The commissioners
feared that displacing Te Atiawa by selling further reserves would led to pressure for more
reserves to be made in blocks of land sold in the future. This would then reduce the amount of
prime land for settlement. As already discussed in chapter 5, the commissioners themselves
had multiple close connections with Te Atiawa communities and would have been anxious to
avoid conflict that could damage these relationships, render them ineffectual in their official
and civic functions, and impact on important relationships with fellow settlers. To make
unilateral decisions to sell Native reserves would put these relationships in jeopardy by
provoking strong protest if not outrage from Te Atiawa. These concerns would certainly have
been reinforced by recent incidents that had seen Te Atiawa regarded as a security threat to
the settlement.
It is worth noting that Native reserves commissioners in other provinces seemed less
influenced by the possible reactions of Maori in the approach they planned to take. Both the
Otago and Nelson commissioners had plans that involved wide reaching changes to the
allocating and management of the reserves, and in contrast to Taranaki, neither of their
reports refleoted any feeling ofbeing constrained by existing Maori control ofthe reserves. The
Otago commissioners reported that to aid the assimilation of Maori they were in favour of
extingUishing the Native title to all the reserves, dividing them amongst Maori, and giving each
individual aCrown grant for the portion allotted to fhem.?' In Nelson the commissioners took a
different approach. They decided that their duty under the Act to benefit Maori was best
fulfilled by determining which reserves ought to remain as permanent living places and
endowments for Maori, and then selling the rest. They had calculated that investing the
proceeds from the sales would make abetter return than rents could provide.?'
774 The commissioners expressed the hope that this would lead to Maori settling inone place, ernulallnq
Europeans, receiving educational and religious instruction, increase their "desire for improving the worldly
circumstances" and encourage "self-respect, and obedience and respect to the ordinances ofLaw and good
Government." ('Report ofthe Commissioners ofNative Reserves for the Province ofOtago', 21 June 1858,
AJHR, 1858, E-4, P13).
775 'Report from Commissioners atNelson', 2June 1858, AJHR, 1858, E·4, P2.
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The Taranaki commissioners' responsiveness to Maori requests to sell reserves, and the
opportunity this seemed to provide for Te Atiawa to participate in the process were
undermined by the commissioners' sole power to make decisions about the sale of reserves.
In practice the commissioners used this power to delay granting requests when it was
considered politically expedient, that is when selling a reserve did not fit with the agendas of
the settler majority. In 1858, the commissioners reported that although there were owners of
reserves who were keen to sell, they were withholding their permission for the time being
because "it would be the means of creating claims in the unpurchased districts either for
reserves or re-purchases at a nominal price, and of increasing the difficulties of
negotiations."776 However, it is interesting that the pattern of reserve sales corresponds closely
with that of reserves being brought under the Act. This suggests that patterns of war and
peace in the province and their impact on the commissioners' ability to visit Te Atiawa
communities also affected which reserves were sold and when (see graph 3).
The commissioners were also influenced by avariety of local pressures to get rid of the Native
reserves in and near the township of New Plymouth. In Taranaki, settler attitudes towards
reserves scattered amongst their own sections were deeply ambivalent. Essentially, leasing
was the only use reserves were seen to have. In every other way Native reserves were
considered a cost and a nuisance to the settler population. The editor of the Taranaki Herald,
on hearing that the 1856 Act had been passed, described the Native reserves as
situated in the heart of the settled districts, and '" mostly in the true sense of the term
a public nuisance ... The impracticality of dealing with lands so situated is a serious
and growing evil to the community, and neutralizes in some instances the best efforts
to carry on Public Works. 777
The issues for settlers (including the Native reserves commissioners) were not ideological
ones about the communal nature ofreserves but focused around the economic cost to settlers
of thistles, roads, and fences on or through unoccupied or 'neglected' reserves. In 1857 the
superintendent, later Native reserves commissioner, George Cutfield, complained to McLean
that the provincial council was spending £10 per year to eradicate thistles from Native
776 'Report from Commissioners atNew Plymouth', 26 June 1858, AJHR, 1858, P12.
771 The TaranakiHerald, 14 November 1857.
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reserves." John Whiteley also noted that "the thistle [on Native reserves] was left to grow and
spread to the great injury ofadjoining land, and the Government was yearly put to the expense
of eraclcalion.?" Richard Brown complained that unoccupied Waiwakaiho reserves "were
nurseries for propagating the Scotch thistle, and entailed on the back of settlers the expense
ofmaking and maintaining six miles of road through them, to which road the Native proprietors
were not liable to contribute."780 Where the communal tenure of reserves was raised as an
objection the considerations were pragmatic. In December 1859, the editor of the Taranaki
Herald expressed himself "extremely glad" at the notice of public auction of Native reserves
including Pipiko and parts of Moturoa and Ararepe. His reasons were that, amongst other
things "the tribal tenure under which they are claimed is afruitful source ofcontention amongst
the owners" and that "disputes are always occurring with the owners ofneighbouring land from
want ofboundary fences.,,78!
In conclusion, as discussed previously the Act implied a trust-like arrangement. Therefore the
question arises as to whether the power of the commissioners to make the ultimate decision
about the sale of a reserve was in conflict with good trusteeship? The designer of the Act,
Henry Sewell certainly did not think so. When he included these provisions he wrote that he
wanted to avoid the situation which had occurred in England, where lands were locked in
trusts which were then unable to respond to changing circumstances ("a law of Mortmain").782
But when the commissioners' right to make the final decision about the sales; significant settler
pressures for the commissioners to sell reserves; the lack of Maori commissioners and
insufficient checks and balances within the process of securing assent to such decisions were
combined, the potential was for decisions made by the commissioners to be ultimately harmful
to the long-term economic and cultural interests of iwi.
778 Cutfield toMclean, 6 February 1867 [1857] Indeed in1858 tenders were called forbythe provincial secretary
for the eradication ofScotch thistle on Native Reserves No.3and NO.4 (Taranaki Provincial Gazette, Vol. VI, No.
15, 1858, P82). The tender was won by the lessee ofsubdivisions 8 and 46 ofPuketotara Native Reserve No.3,
SMatthews (Taranaki Provincial Gazette, Vol. VI, No. 18, 1858, P95 and Commissioner's Native Reserve
Accounts, Taranaki Provincial Gazette, Vol. XVII, No.2, 1869, pp 7-10). .
779 Whiteley toGore Browne, 28 September 1861, Whiteley Papers, MS-Papers -0484 -5, ATl, Wellington.
780 Public Meeting atNew Plymouth, 10 March 1859 reported in the Taranaki Herald, 19 March 1859.
781 The Taranaki Herald, 3 December 1859.
782 Sewell journal entry, 29 June 1856, The Journal ofHenry Sewel/1853 -7, Mcintyre (ed), Vol. II, 1980,
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Exchanging andSubsuming Small Reserves
On a number of occasions the negative opinions about Native reserves combined with other
practical considerations to prompt the commissioners to move quickly to deal with small
reserves. These reserves were the result of Governor FitzRoy having reserved small areas
that had been cultivations at the time ofthe 1844 agreement. Robert Parris observed that "this
class of reserves has given the Government from time to time a great deal of trouble.?" The
trouble was that they were in the middle of sections so settlers found them inconvenient but
could not legally occupy oruse them, and they were too small to be economically viable for Te
Atiawa. By selling, exchanging and subsuming these reserves the commissioners were in fact
mopping up the last vestiges of. the tenths-like scheme implemented in the 1844 FitzRoy
agreement.
As afirst step in getting rid of these reserves the commissioners actively sought to bring them
under the AcU84 Then the reserves could be sold, exchanged or incorporated outright into the
settler-owned sections surrounding them. Information in official sources documenting the fate
of such reserves is often contradictory. This would suggest that few of these arrangements
were formally recorded at the time they were made. Marangi Native Reserve No. 24 was sold
to the settler on whose section it was situated. In this case the settler offered what the
commissioners considered a fair price, the section was not publicly auctioned and Te Waka,
an influential chief then living at Puketotara, but formerly of Te Kawau pa, was paid the
purchase money for the reserve." In many other cases compensation in land or cash is
supposed to have been given but there is no hard evidence that this actually occurred. It
appears that Native Reserve No. 13, a half acre reserve almost adjacent to Pukenui Native
Reserve No. 14, was owned by Timotu. Itwas handed over to the settler owner of the section
and an equivalent area of land was given within the Pukenui Native Reserve No. 14 in
cornpensatlon.t" All that is known of the fate of Native Reserve No. 19 is a note on a
pp 251-252.
783 Parris tothe Native Secretary, 28 April 1868, Turton's Epitome, 0-118.
784 Parris noted that "I have caused this reserve [Marangi Native Reserve 24], with three others, tobe brought
under the Native Reserves Act for management in the usual form" (Ibid).
785 Ibid and 'An Account ofNative Reserves in the Province ofTaranaki together with the Owners thereof,
AD 1, 1866/610, ROB, Vol. 136, pp 52169 - 52173.
786 'Return ofLands under the Operation of the Native Reserves Act 1882, Available for Administration Purposes,
Native Trust Office, Wellington', 8 July 1911, MA-MT 6/12, ANZ, Wellington. This isclearly shown on 'New
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schedule, "supposed to be disposed ofby exchange and compensation in other land.?" The
nine acres of Native Reserve No. 21 were "exchanged for Town sections 2043 - 2045 and
2062 - 2064 on 6 December 1852" (before the commissioners began their work), and these
were rapidly sold before a Crown grant was issued to Maori owners for fhem." The fate of
Native Reserve No. 22 is also uncertain: the schedule comments that it was "1 acre on settler
section - no doubt compensated for", and notes that Native Reserve No. 25, also one acre,
was "compensated for by exchange for other land which forms part ofNo. 7 reserve.'?"
The Sale of Larger Native Reserves
Some requests by Te Atiawa individuals to sell reserve lands were granted rapidly, while
others made repeated requests over a period of years before the reserve was finally sold."?
Given the pressure from settlers and government to clear the town of Maori as war
approached it is unsurprising that requests by Te Atiawa individuals to sell reserves in 1859
and 1860 were quickly acted upon by the commissioners. The request ofowners to sell Pipiko
Native Reserve No.8 was reported on 18 October 1859, it was sold less than two months later
by public auction on 17 December 1859.791 Action was so swift in the case of Manawawai
Native Reserve that the commissioners only reported the request of owners to sell a month
after the sale had been completed. 792 It was in fact sold by public auction on 17 December
1859 and a Crown grant was later issued to John Dingle (the notice of auction notes that the
reserve was adjacent to Dingle's property) under the New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856
on 20 June 1862.793
Plymouth Street Plan, nld [c. 1860s] MapColl-832.295gbbd/186?/Acc 3308, ATL, Wellington as is an enlargement
in "compensation for throwing open Lemon Street."
787 'Return ofLands under the Operation of the Native Reserves Act 1882, 8 July 1911, MA-MT 6/12, ANZ,
Wellington.
788 Ibid.
789 Ibid.
790 The letter register entries quoted in the following discussion appear infull in a table inAppendix 8.
791 59/574 dated 18 October 1859 inMA 2/4, ANZ, Wellington and the Taranaki Herald, 10 December 1859.
792 It isclear from anotice ofauction in the Taranaki Herald that Manawawai was part ofArarepe Native
Reserve 2(The Taranaki Herald, 10 December 1859) and 60/52 dated 17 January 1860 inMA 2/4, ANZ,
Wellington.
793 A Crown grant was issued to John Dingle for part Ararepe Native Reserve No.2(53:0:00) under the New
Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 on 20 June 1862 (R 3/299, Land Transfer Office, New Plymouth).
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Yet there were a number of other cases where requests by Maori to sell reserves were
repeatedly reported by the commissioners over a period of several years before a sale was
actually made. Itwas first reported in December 1862 that Te Atiawa had expressed a wish to
sell part of Pukenui Native Reserve No. 14, which lay close to the Te Henui Steam bounded
by Hobson and Watson Slreets.?" The matter was raised again in 1864, and appears again in
1877.795 Even after this series of requests no sale of the reserve land at Pukenui was made.
The case ofNative Reserve No.7, a75 acre reserve owned by the Taranaki chief and Native
Assessor Ropata Ngarongomate at the intersection of South and Devon Roads almost
adjacent to the Moturoa Native reserve, was similar. The decade of delay suffered by
Ngarongomate is puzzling considering what an influential man he was. His first request to sell
the reserve was reported by Parris in 1862.796 In 1866, the civil commissioner again reported
that Ngarongomate wished to sell some land to pay his debts." In 1868, a letter register entry
recorded that the reserve was brought under the Act because "Natives wish to sell.'?" Further
letters relating to the request by Ngarongomate to sell are recorded in 1868. It was revisited
again in 1877, when a Crown grant was finally arranged for Ngarongomate to enable him to
sell the reserve."
The leasing of Native Reserves to Settlers and the Occupation of Reserves
byTe Atiawa
Introduction ,
Those Native reserves that had not been sold, exchanged or subsumed and which had not
been brought under the operation ofthe Act remained in control ofNgamotu napu. These hapu
leased and occupied various portions of the town, suburban and rL!ral reserves in the 'town'
and Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. It isnecessary to delineate these patterns in order to explain
why certain reserves were utilised in a particular way. This will allow the complexity of
794 Robert Parris, 1December 1862, 6211091 inMA 214, ANZ, Wellington.
795 64/1679 dated 16September 1864 inMA 2/6 and 77/4411 dated 27 November 1877 inMA 3/10,
both ANZ, Wellington.
796 Robert Parris, 31 December 1862, 63/27 in MA 2/4, ANZ, Wellington.
797 Civil Commissioner, Taranaki, 21.December 1866, 67/315 in MA 218, ANZ, Wellington.
798 68/340 dated 19 February 1868 in MA2/8, ANZ, Wellington. No gazette notice bringing the reserve under the
Act has been found so this has not been able tobe confirmed.
799 68/1237 dated 4 August 1868; 68/1377 dated 3 September 1868; 68/1813 dated 27 November 1868 all inMA
2/8, ANZ, Wellington. Also 75/1748 dated 15 April 1875; 75/2242 dated 15 April 1875 and 75/3465 dated 1July
1875 all inMA 3/8, ANZ, Wellington. The reserve was sold two years prior to this grant toJ Veale on 29
September 1875 for £350 (R 12/823, Land Transfer Office, New Plymouth).
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Ngamotu hapu management of their reserves to be more fully understood. In turn, their
management of reserves in their control needs to be compared with the patterns of utilisation
of the reserves that the Crown controlled (that is those directly administered by the
commissioners).
Source of Data and Method of Analysis
Native reserve schedules published in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of
Representatives have been used as the basis for the statistical analysis that follows. Where
these schedules cannot supply data on the utilisation of a particular reserve other schedules
and accounts have been used to supplement the data. Only two schedules, those from 1867
and 1874, gave comparable data on how the reserves were being used. Therefore, all that can
be presented here are two snap-shots ofNative reserve usage in Taranaki. For each of these
years each reserve was placed in a category from the remarks made against it on the
schedule. Itwas found that reserves fell into the following main categories: wholly unoccupied,
wholly occupied by Te Atiawa, wholly leased to settlers, and partly leased to settlers with the
remainder occupied by Te Atiawa.
In addition, the 1874 schedule divided the reserves into two groups: those vested in the Crown
(here it became evident from gazette notices that all these reserves were those which had
been brought under the Act) and those vested inTe Atiawa, that is not brought under the Act.
Using gazette notices ofassent it was possible to accurately divide the reserves on the 1867
schedule into these groups as well. The 1874 schedule also categorised each reserve by type
of land: Town, suburban, suburbanlrural, and rural. Using this schedule and historical maps of
New.Plymouth it was possible to tag the reserves on the 1867 list with these categories as
well. As a number of reserves did not appear on either schedule these were put into
categories using title history accounts by Janine Ford and Aroha Harris, Native reserve
accounts, and other archival reports and schedules.soo Occasionally even all these sources
failed to indicate how a reserve was being used in 1867 and 1874 and such reserves were
placed in the "no comment" category. In a number of instances sources gave conflicting data;
SOD Ford, 1991; Harris, 1991,
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where schedules were in conflict with accounts, the accounts have been taken as the more
reliable source since these involved the collection and distribution of rents.
It must be emphasised that the categories of utilisation in official sources reflect settler cultural
constructs of land use, This is important as the raw data used here is only available in official
sources, compiled by settler officials whose cultural view of land meant that they classified any
reserve not being cultivated oroccupied as 'unoccupied'. This does not mean that the reserve
was unused by Te Atiawa. For example, remote bush reserves and reserves which consisted
of coastal sand dunes were classified on this basis as 'unoccupied', yet it is very likely that Te
Atiawa people used remote rural bush lands for hunting and gathering, and as a place of
refuge in times ofthreat. Sand dunes were also traditionally used as temporary burial places in
this coastal area.aol
Research Hypothesis
The historical data already examined regarding the leasing of Native reserves by Ngamotu
hapu to settlers suggests that patterns of utilisation reflect differences in the market demand
and desirability of the land. It suggests that there was a positive co-relation between
desirability and distance from the township of New Plymouth. That is, we would expect that
significantly more town or suburban reserves would be leased to settlers, and that the rate of
leasing for these types ofreserves would be higher in the "town' blocks than in the Waiwakaiho
and Hua blocks, Rural reserves would be less likely to be leased to settlers, and rural reserves
in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks the least likely to be leased..The statistical analysis also
sought to provide some insight into how these patterns of utilisation were affected by who
owned and controlled the reserves, In particular how would the patterns of utilisation of the
reserves owned and managed by the Crown and those owned and managed by Maori reflect
differences and similarities in responses to market demands?
Patterns of Utilization, 1867 and 1874
This section provides a summary of the patterns revealed by the statistical analysis. All the
figures used in this section and in the discussion that follows in the remainder of the chapter
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are included in tables in Appendix 10. Several terms and abbreviations used in the text, graphs
and tables require further explanation. Four variables have been used in the analysis:
utilisation, location, type of land and control.
. 'Utilisation' has been abbreviated on the graphs as follows:
e wholly unoccupied (WUO)
e wholly occupied by Maori (WOM)
• wholly leased (to settlers) (WL)
e Partly occupied by Maori, remainder unoccupied (POM/UO)
CII Partly leased (to settlers), remainder's use unknown (PLlUK)
III Partly unoccupied, remainder leased (to settlers) (POU/PL)
• sold (SOLD)
CII exchanged for other land (EX)
e taken for military purposes (TMP)
CIl subsumed into settler sections (SUB)
• burial ground (BUR)
III no comment made in sources (NC).
'Location' refers to whether reserve land used for a particular purpose was located in the 'town'
blocks, that IS in the FitzRoy, Grey and Omata blocks (FOG) or in the Waiwakaiho and Hua
blocks (WH). 'Type of land' refers to whether the reserve land used for a particular purpose in
a location was town (T), suburban (S), rural/suburban (R/S) or rural.(R) land. 'Control' refers to
whether the reserve was in Crown control, orthat ofTe Atiawa.
Changes in Overall Patterns of Utilization over Time
In 1867, 44 percent of the Native reserves listed were wholly or partly unoccupied; this
dropped significantly to 20.52 percent by 1874, that is less than half of what it had been in
1867. Almost a third (32.12 percent) of all the Native reserve land listed in the schedule in
1867 was wholly or partly occupied by Te Atiawa. However Te Atiawa wholly occupied only
801 Boulton, 'Bell Block/Hickford Park: Historical Research and Land Title History', Commissioned byThe New
Plymouth District Council, Parks Department, August 1994 and written for Te Roopu 0 Te Atiawa Rohe
Development Trust, New Plymouth, citing personal comment by Grant Knuckey, pp 48 - 49.
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802 This included reserves partly occupied byMaori/partly unoccupied; partly occupied byMaori/partly leased and
reserves wholly occupied byMaori (for full figures see tables inAppendix 10).
803 This included reserves partly occupied byMaori/partly leased and reserves that were wholly leased.
804 It should be noted that between 15 and 30 percent of the known reserves in these blocks were not listed in
these schedules.
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6.90 percent of these. By 1874 the overall figure had risen only slightly to 33.99 percent.'" In
1867 about a third (32.28 percent) of the Native reserve land listed was wholly or partly leased
to settlers.803 This rose veryslightly in 1874 to 35.01 percent'?' But the proportion of land
wholly occupied by Te Atiawa had risen to 14.76 percent. These patterns are shown on graph
9 below.
Changes in the Overall Patterns of Utilization in Native Reserves Controlled by
Te Atiawa
In 1867,62.51 percent of the Native reserves listed as controlled by Te Atiawa were wholly or
partly unoccupied; this dropped to 37.46 percent in 1874. In 1867, 15.34 percent of all the
Native reserve land controlled by Te Atiawa was partly or wholly occupied by them. Te Atiawa
communities wholly occupied the majority (12.27 percent) of this. By 1874, this figure had
dropped very slightly to 14.41 percent but Te Atiawa wholly occupied all of this. In 1867, the
proportion of reserve land in Te Atiawa control that was being wholly or partly leased to
settlers was 17.28 percent. The great majority (13.56 percent) of this was wholly leased
reserves. By 1874, Te Atiawa were leasing only 13.56 percent of the reserve land in their
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control, and all of this was in reserves that were wholly leased to settlers. These patterns are
shown on graph 10 below.
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Graph 10: Bar graph comparing the overall proportions of
Native reserve land used in various ways and controlled by Te
Atiawa, 1867 and 1874
Changes in the Overall Patterns of Utilization andLocation in Native Reserves
Controlled by the Crown
In 1867 over a third (36.14 percent) of the Native reserves listed as controlled by the Crown
were wholly' or partly unoccupied; this dropped dramatically to just 2.60 percent in 1874. In
1867, nearly half (47.80 percent) of all the Native reserve land listed in the schedule as
controlled by the Crown was partly or wholly occupied by Te Ati.awa. However they wholly
occupied only 4.07 percent of the total Crown-controlled reserve acres. By 1874 Te Atiawa
were wholly or partly occupying 47.39 percent of the Crown-controlled reserves but the
proportion ofthis they wholly occupied had risen significantly to 13.30 percent. In 1867, over a
third (37.71 percent) of the reserve land in Crown control was being wholly or partly leased to
settlers: the majority of this (28.64 percent) was in reserves partly leased to settlers and partly
occupied by Te Atiawa. By 1874, the proportion of reserve land controlled by the Crown and
wholly or partly leased to settlers had risen significantly to 49.99 percent. Of this none involved
reserves that were wholly leased to settlers. These patterns are shown on graph 11 below.
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Graph 11: Bar graph comparing the overall proportions of
Native reserve land used in various ways and controlled by the
Crown, 1867 and 1874
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Overall Changes in Utilization by Location
Utilisation can be further examined by comparing what proportion of the reserve land being
utilised for a particular purpose was located in the FitzRoy, Omata and Grey blocks (FOG
blocks) compared to the proportion located in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks (WH blocks). In
1867 the majority of reserve land that was unoccupied lay in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks
(79.49 percent). Only 20.51 percent of the unoccupied reserve land was located in the blocks
closest to the town. This trend was even more pronounced by 1874 when 88.44 percent of
unoccupied reserve land lay in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks and only 11.56 percent in the
'town' blocks. In 1867, all reserve land controlled by the Crown and wholly occupied by Te
Atiawa was located in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. By 1874 this had changed markedly: a
third (33.09 percent) of the reserves wholly occupied by Te Atiawa were in the 'town' blocks.
However, two-thirds (66.91 percent) remained in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. All reserves
partly occupied by Maori and partly leased to settlers were in the 'town' blocks. This did not
change between 1867 and 1874. However, this was not the case with reserves wholly leased
to settlers. In 1867 these were almost equally likely to be located in the 'town' blocks (53.17
percent) as they were to be in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks (46.83 percent). This balance
had radically shifted by 1874 when 94.74 percent of all wholly leased reserves controlled by
226
13 FOG
IlIIWH
Type of usage
Type of usage
o
~~O ~o~ ~v ~~o ~q,V ~~+ ,y.q,v QV<:> I()- .....# C:J~<Q ~v <Q~4;-
q,O q,O q, q,'S f::j
100
o
~~o~o~ ~v~~o :IV s: Q~V oS> I()- .....~ t::J~<Q ~v <Q~4;-
q,O q,O q, q,'S f::j
Graph 12: Bar graph comparing the overall proportions of Native
reserve land utilised for various purposes by block location in
1867
Graph 13: Bar graph comparing the overall proportions of Native
reserve land utilised for various purposes by block location in
1874
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the Crown were in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks, and only a tiny proportion (5.26 percent)
were in the 'town' blocks. These patterns are shown on graphs 12 and 13 below.
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Graph 14: Bar graph comparing the overall proportions of
Native reserve land utilised for various purposes and
controlled by Te Atiawa by block location, 1867
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Change in Utilization by Location for Native Reserves ControlJed by Te Atiawa
In 1867, the overwhelming majority of reserve land controlled by Te Atiawa and unoccupied lay
in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks (94.38 percent), with just 5.62 percent located in the blocks
closest to the town. This trend continued in 1874, but was moderated somewhat with 88.88
percent of the unoccupied reserve acres controlled by Te Atiawa remaining in the Waiwakaiho
and Hua blocks, and 11.11 percent located in the blocks around the town. In 1867, the great
majority of all reserves controlled and wholly occupied by Te Atiawa were located in the
Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks (83.33 percent), with only 16.67 percent located in the 'town'
blocks. By 1874 all the reserves wholly controlled and occupied by Te Atiawa were in the
Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. In 1867 all reserve land in Te Atiawa control and partly leased to
settlers and partly occupied by them was in the 'town' blocks. By 1874 there were no recorded
cases of Te Atiawa controlled reserves where they were living on part of the reserve and
leasing part to settlers. In 1867 Te Atiawa-controlled wholly leased reserve land was
predominately located in the Hua and Waiwakaiho blocks (72.44 percent). However, more
reserves were wholly leased in the 'town' blocks than in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks, but
their total area was small so they accounted for only asmall proportion of 'town' blocks. These
patterns strengthened significantly over time: by 1874 Waiwakaiho and Hua land made up
94.74 percent of all the Te Atiawa-controlled wholly leased land. These patterns are shown on
graphs 14 and 15 below.
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Graph 15: Bar graph comparing the overall proportions of
Native reserve land utilised for various purposes and
controlled by Te Atiawa by block location, 1874
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Change in Utilization by Location for Native Reserves Controlled by the Crown
In 1867 the two-thirds (66.40 percent) of reserve land controlled by the Crown and unoccupied
lay in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks with just one-third (33.60 percent) located in the blocks
closest to the town. This trend had strengthened by 1874 when 82.64 percent of the
unoccupied reserves controlled by the Crown lay in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks, and
17.36 percent in the 'town' blocks. All the reserves controlled by the Crown and wholly
occupied by Te Atiawa lay in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks in 1867. This was considerably
reversed by 1874 when approximately two-thirds (65.77 percent) of the Crown controlled
reserve land wholly occupied by Te Atiawa were in the 'town' blocks and just 34.23 percent in
the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. In 1867 the majority (63.91 percent) of reserve land in
Crown-control being wholly leased to settlers was in the 'town' blocks. By 1874 the Crown was
no longer wholly leasing any of the Native reserves in its control. All Crown-controlled Native
reserves that were being partly leased and partly occupied by Te Atiawa in 1867 and in 1874
were in the 'town' blocks. These patterns are shown on graphs 16 and 17 below.
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Graph 16: Bar graph comparing the overall proportions of Native
reserve land utilised for various purposes and controlled by the
Crown by block location, 1867
Graph 17: Bar graph comparing the overall proportions of
Native reserve land utilised for various purposes and controlled
by the Crown by block location, 1874
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There were marked differences in the types of land that were wholly unoccupied depending
upon who controlled the land. In 1867 virtually all of the wholly unoccupied reserve land
controlled by the Crown was rural land, regardless ofwhich blocks it was located in. By 1874
this had not changed markedly. However 86.14 percent of Te Atiawa-controlled wholly
Graph 19: Crown-controlled
Wholly unoccupied reserves by
type of land, 1867
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Graph 21: Crown-controlled
Wholly unoccupied reserves by
type of land, 1874
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Graph 20: Crown-controlled
Wholly unoccupied reserves by
type of land, 1867
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Graph 18: Te Atiawa-controlled
Wholly unoccupied reserves by
type of land, 1867
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Land Wholly Occupied by TeAtiawa
In 1867 all the reserves (regardless of block location) controlled and wholly occupied by Te
Atiawa were suburban land. However, by 1874 Te Atiawa were not controlling and wholly
occupying any reserve land in the 'town' blocks. The reserve land they did control and wholly
occupy in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks remained prominently suburban (83.50 percent),
with 16.50 percent being rural land.
unoccupied reserve land in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks was rural land, with 13.86 percent
suburban land. In the 'town' blocks, wholly unoccupied reserve land controlled by Te Atiawa
was all suburban land. These trends strengthened by 1874 when all the wholly unoccupied
reserve land in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks controlled by Te Atiawa was rural land, and
98.29 percent of that in the 'town' blocks remained suburban. These patterns are illustrated on
graphs 18 to 21 below.
I Town
I Suburban
§)Rural
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Graph 25: Crown-controlled
reserves Wholly occupied by
Maori by type of land, 1874
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Graph 23: Crown-controlled
reserves Wholly occupied by
Maori by type ofland, 1867
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Graph 24: Te Atiawa-controlled
reserves Wholly occupied by Maori
by type of land, 1874
Graph 22: Te Atiawa-controlled
reserves Wholly occupied by Maori
by type of land, 1867
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In 1867 all the reserve land controlled by Te Atiawa and wholly leased to settlers in both the
'town' and Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks was suburban land. This continued to be the case in
1874. In 1867 the Crown-controlled reserves in the 'town' blocks being wholly leased to
Te Atiawa were not wholly occupying any reserve land controlled by the Crown in the 'town'
blocks in 1867, but all of the Crown-controlled reserve land they were wholly occupying in the
Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks was suburban land. By 1874 Te Atiawa were wholly occupying
some Crown-controlled reserve land in the 'town' blocks but itwas all rural land. In addition the
Crown-controlled reserves they continued to wholly occupy in the Waiwakaiho and Hua block
remained 100 percent suburban land. These patterns are shown graphs 22 to 25 below.
I Suburban
c~: Rural
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settlers were also predominantly (86.17 percent) suburban lands, and all of the land wholly
leased in the Hua and Waiwakaiho blocks was suburban land. By 1874 the Crown was not
wholly leasing any of the reserves in its control. These patterns are illustrated by graphs 26 to
29 below.
I Town
I Suburban
Rural
Graph 26: Te AtJawa-controlied
Wholly Leased reserves by type of
land,1867
Graph 27: Te Atiawa-controlled
wholly leased reserves by type of
land,1874
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Graph 28: Crown-controlled Wholly
Leased reserves by type of land,
1867
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Graph 29: Crown-controlled wholly
leased reserves by type of land,
1874
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Partly Occupied byTe Atiawa/Partly Leased to Settlers
All the reserves that Te Atiawa controlled and were partly occupying and partly leasing to
settlers in 1867 were in the 'town' blocks and all were suburban land. By 1874 Te Atiawa were
not partly occupying/partly leasing any ofthe reserves in their control. All the reserves in
Crown control and partly occupied by TeAtiawa/partly leased tosettlers in 1867 were also in
the 'town' blocks; 79.55 percent was reserves ofrural/suburban land and 20.45 percent was
suburban land. This remained fairly consistent: by 1874 the suburban proportion was risen to
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Graph 31: Te Atiawa controlled
reserves, Partly occupied by Maori
and partly leased by type
ofland,1874
Graph 33: Crown-controlled reserves,
Partly occupied by Maori and partly
leased by type
of land, 1874
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Graph 32: Crown-controlled
reserves, Partly occupied by
Maori and partly leased by type
of land, 1867
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Graph 30: Te Aliawa-controlled
reserves, Partly occupied by Maori
and partly leased by type
ofland, 1867
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26,55 percent so that the rural suburban proportion dropped to 73.48 percent. These patterns
are illustrated by graphs 30 to 33 below.
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Patterns of Utilization and the Costs and Benefits of Leasing Native Reserves
Introduction
The patterns of utilisation of Native reserves indicate that Ngamotu hapu consistently made
decisions to capitalise on demand from settlers for suburban land to lease. However this
competition for suburban reserve land and the decisions which resulted from it had significant
adverse effects upon the location of Te Atiawa communities, pushing them onto reserves
further from the economic centre of New Plymouth and separating them socially from the
settler community. To some extent the effect of this marginalisation was somewhat mitigated
by three developments. Firstly, by the sharing of a large proportion of suburban reserves
between Te Atiawa communities and settler tenants and secondly, by the establishment ofTe
i Suburban
,0, Rural/Suburban
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Atiawa communities on contiguous suburban reserves in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks.
Finally the income provided by rent (collected directly or collected and distributed by the Native
reserves commissioners) enabled communities to continue some degree ofparticipation in the
local economy. However, these benefits must be weighed against the loss of control and
ownership of reserves caused by the processes of the Act, and decreasing incomes from
rents.
Te Atiawa Loss of Suburban Native Reserves around New Plymouth
The type and location ofreserve land being leased was heavily influenced by the high demand
for suburban land close to the town of New Plymouth. This is illustrated by the predominance
ofsuburban reserves in the FitzRoy, Omata and Grey blocks amongst the reserve land wholly
or partly leased to settlers. As has been argued in the previous chapter, Ngamotu saw the
benefits of leasing Native reserves to settlers in terms of confirming and strengthening
economic and social relationships. However, despite these advantages the statistical analysis
shows that this resulted in Ngamotu hapu retaining little suburban reserve land around New
Plymouth.
In 1867 all of the suburban reserves in the 'town' blocks were being wholly orpartly leased to
settlers. Te Atiawa had been allocated a total of 27 suburban or rural/suburban reserves
spread across the 'town' blocks and the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. In 1867, 16 were wholly
or partly leased to settlers. Of the remaining eleven, six had been sold, exchanged or
subsumed. This left only five suburban reserves that were not being leased, one ofwhich was
unsuitable for leasing because it was simply sand dunes (Pukeweka Native Reserve No. 17).
and the other was only one acre (Native Reserve No. 22). Ofthe three that remained, one was
wholly occupied by Te Atiawa (Purakau Waiwakaiho A). This left only two suburban reserves
that could have been leased to settlers but were not (Te Puia Waiwakaiho a and Waiwakaiho
C); both were in the less desirable Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. However this situation had
changed quite markedly by 1874, when ten viable suburban reserves (five ofwhich were in the
'town' blocks) are not recorded as leased or partly leased to settlers. If these reserves were
being leased it seems strange that they were not recorded as such on the 1874 schedule.
Presuming that the schedule is a comprehensive one and these reserves were not being
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leased it raises the question whether this demonstrates a fall in demand from settlers for
reserve land, orthe termination or breakdown ofa large number ofexisting leases.
By 1874 Te Atiawa found themselves in asituation where they had lost ownership and control
over the majority of the commercially valuable town, suburban and rural/suburban reserves
around the township of New Plymouth by bringing them under the operation of the New
Zealand Native Reserves Act. What is especially telling is that of the 26 reserves that
remained in Te Atiawa control by 1874 only 10 were in the 'town' blocks. Only four of these
could be said to have been viable (the other six having been taken for military purposes,
exchanged, sold orsubsumed orcomprised sand dunes). These 10 reserves represented just
9.83 percent of the reserve acres in Te Atiawa control. By contrast the Crown controlled 23
reserves, 16 of which were in the 'town' blocks. These represented 62.41 percent of the
reserves brought under the Act. This demonstrates the extent to which Te Atiawa surrendered
control ofthe reserves around the township norder to be able to lease them to settlers.
The statistics regar~ing the amount of reserve land partly leased/partly occupied by Te Atiawa
which Te Atiawa were directly leasing to settlers suggests that Te Atiawa communities had
difficulty persuading settlers to enter arrangements of this kind where Maori and Pakeha were
neighbours. Conversely these types of arranqementswere far more likely to take place on .
reserves which were leased via the commissioners. In 1867 Te Atiawa were wholly leasing
directly to settlers far more reserves (246.64 acres in seven reserves) than the commissioners
(147.09 acres in six reserves). However the situation was completely reversed for reserves
partly leased/partly occupied by Te Atiawa. Te Atiawa-controlled reserves in this category
amounted to just one reserve of75 acres, while the commissioners controlled 704 acres in two
reserves being used in this way. The disparity was even more marked in 1874 when Te Atiawa
controlled no reserves partly leased/partly occupied by them, whereas the Crown controlled
794.73 acres in four reserves in this category. It is not easy to know what to make of these
trends. One possible explanaton is that after the breaches of trust between the two
communities during the Taranaki Wars (these are discussed further in the next chapter) one or
both parties felt a need for the assurance the formalised arrangement involving the
commissioners provided should disputes arise.
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The predominance of suburban land in the 'town' blocks amongst reserves wholly or partly
leased to settlers reflects the positive economic and social aspects ofthis location. However, it
equally reflects the relatively limited appeal that the Waiwakaiho and Hua reserves had for
settlers. Two factors are clearly significant in this regard. Firstly armed conflict in the region
made settlers reluctant to lease land north of the Waiwakaiho. However after 1868, when
military operations in the province shifted to the campaign against Titokowaru on the Nga
Ruahine land of the Waimate plains in South Taranaki, there was a slowly increasing sense
that the war in North Taranaki was over. In response Imperial troops were finally withdrawn
from New Plymouth in 1870.805 These circumstances may explain why two suburban reserves
in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks were wholly leased to settlers in 1874.
However, even with a greater certainty of peace the Waiwakaiho and Hua reserves were of
limited appeal to most settlers because access to them was very difficult. In the 1860s there
was a well-developed network of roads in the area between Paritutu and Waiwakaiho (the
town blocks) stretching right back almost to the base of Mount Taranaki and settlers' farms
tended to be close to those roads. In contrast the coastal Devoll Road remained the only road
in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks in this period (see Figure 10). This restricted access to
reserve lands was coupled with other factors such as the delay in laying out of the Waiwakaiho
and Hua reserves, lack of road access to them, and the high proportion of inland reserves
which were rugged and/or forested.
805 James Cowan, The New Zealand Wars: AHistory of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period, Vol. II,
Government Print, Wellington, 1983 (reprint), p 179 and Nigel Prickett, Maori and Pakeha Fortifications of the First
Taranaki War, Records of the Auckland Institute and Museum,
Vol. 31,1994, P10.
Face paqe- Figure 10: Map showing thedistrictsof New Plymouth, Bell Blocks and
Waitara, c. 1860. The area south of theWaiwakaiho River had aconslderable network of
roads and numerous settler farms. Incontrast thearea north of theWaiwakaiho lacked
roads and apart from a small area of coastal land was largely 'wild lands'. Note that the
coastal strip of cleared land was still verynarrow after nearly 20 years of British
settlement (source: Untitled undated map, c. 1860, BPP, Vol. 12, between p 14and p 1)
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The Compensating Benefits of Leasing and Occupying Larger Native Reserves
Te Atiawa found one solution to the dilemma posed by a desire to remain in occupation of
prime suburban reserves while still retaining the economic and social benefits that leasing
reserves to settlers provided. Both objectives could be achieved by leasing portions of larger
reserves to settlers and occupying the remainder themselves. By utilising them in this way Te
Atiawa secured a place for their own communities alongside settler tenants with whom they
could co-operate in economic activity, and whose rents provided some cash income which
could be used to develop the area of the reserves which they occupied. It also allowed Te
Atiawa communities to continue to exploit the resources of the coast, rivers and forests. In
1867 Moturoa Native Reserve No.1 and Puketotara Native Reserve NO.3 were partly leased
to settlers and partly occupied by Maori; by 1874 Pukaka Native Reserve No. 18 and Raiomiti
Native Reserve No. 23 (adjacent reserves dealt with as asingle reserve by its principal owner,
Wiremu Te Ahoaho) were added to this group. So part leasing and part occupying was a
productive and realistic compromise which enabled Te Atiawa to balance the stronger market
forces operating in the 'town' block, particularly with regard to their suburban reserves, with
their own desire to occupy and cultivate economically favoured reserves.
Once again purely economic factors may not have been the only motivations for Te Atiawa
management of these reserves. Part leasing/part occupying enabled Te Atiawa to continue to
liveln locations that contained pa and urupa that connected them to their tupuna. The part
occupation and part leasing solution for larger suburban reserves was also in keeping with the
active desire of Te Atiawa to live in close and co-operative relationship with selected settlers.
The pro-active and pre-arranged nature of lease arrangements between individual Te Atiawa
and settlers, the lack of assimilationist rhetoric in the report by the commissioners in Taranaki,
and the Crown's clearance ofthe township of Maori, all suggest these arrangements were Te .
Atiawa rather than Crown initiatives.
Established Te Atiawa Communities on the Hua Native Reserves
Although Te Atiawa communities were not generally able to exclusively occupy suburban
Native reserves on the town side of the Waiwakaiho River they were able to establish their
communities on the Native reserves in the Hua block. In both 1867 and 1874, Te Atiawa were
. only wholly or partly occupying one-third of all the Native reserve land. In 1867 they were
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wholly occupying six reserves containing a total of 294.03 acres, this had increased to eight
reserves covering 609.75 acres by 1874. Three of these eight reserves remained in Te Atiawa
ownership and were reserves named in the Hua deed: Tapuirau, Oropuriri and Paraiti. In
addition Te Atiawa were occupying two Hua deed reserves that they had brought under the
1856 Act, Upokotauaki and Hoehoe. In 1874 Maori owned, controlled and occupied Tapuirau,
Hua [Oropuriri & Hoewaka], Parati and Purakau Waiwakaiho A as well as Mangorei
Waiwakaiho N, a large rural reserve on the Waiwakaiho side of The Meeting of the Waters.806
In addition they continued to occupy the Crown vested reserves ofUpokotauaki and Hoehoe.
In 1867 Upokotauaki and Hoehoe were within the area being withheld by Te Puni and his
people, and Tapuirau and Hua [Oropuriri &Hoewaka] formed an almost contiguous block of
land in a crescent shape on the north and inland sides of the block which was being withheld
by Te Puni. These three reserves were fiat or gently rolling fertile fern lands that could be
farmed as a unit to support a Maori community; they were within walking distance ofkaimoana
reefs, and the Waiwakaiho River and Mangaoraka Stream for food gathering. Devon Road, the
main link between New Plymouth and Waitara along which supplies could be transported and
agricultural produce brought in to market for sale, also bisected them.
Sound economic reasons for Te Atiawa choosing to cultivate these reserves are relatively
easy to assess, but traditional cultural and political motivations were also at work in these
decisions and these are less easy to reach firm conclusions about. All of these reserves had
long histories of Te Atiawa occupation. Tapuirau, Oropuriri, and Paraiti had been set aside in
the Hua deed because they contained pa, urupa and cultivations on which Te Atiawa were
living atthat time. Nearby Purakau Waiwakaiho A had been set aside as a reserve by Cooper
because the owners had refused to part with it. Recent archaeological excavations on
Oropuriri have revealed three large houses, each one older than the other, the oldest being
pre-European.?" Paraiti is awaahitapu and was most likely politically important as it is close to
the boundary between hapu ofNgati Tawhirikura and ofPuketapu.
806 The Meeting ofthe Waters is the place atwhich the Mangorei Stream flows into the Waiwakaiho River near
the main highway coming into present day New Plymouth from the south.
807 Personal communication, Dr Simon Holdaway, Senior Lecturer inArchaeology, University ofAuckland, August
2001.
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A number of factors combined to make it possible for Te Atiawa to choose to settle on these
suburban reserves. Perhaps most obviously their location north of the Waiwakaiho River at a
distance from the town, and their closeness to the unsettled Maori territory beyond the Bell
Block made them less desirable for settler lessees. However, settlers certainly did have land
on the coastal strip between Katere and Bell Block as early as 1860 so some other forces
must have been at work keeping settlers from wholly leasing these suburban reserves on the
inland side ofDevon Road. Although the reserves which Te Atiawa were occupying here were
suburban land, a circa 1860 map shows that in fact they were still bush covered at that point,
which would certainly have discouraged settler lessees. While the bush cover was not
prohibitive, control and 'hostile' occupation by Te Atiawa certainly was. Both Hoehoe and
Upokotauaki reserves are shown on this map as 'Native land'; as this includes the area which
later became Katere Native Reserve it is clear that this was the area being withheld by Te Puni
and his people (compare Figure 8 and Figure 10).
The Income from Native Reserve Leases
To some extent the rents from Native reserves should have been an easy and dependable
source of income which benefited hapu whose decisions to lease their suburban reserves at
New Plymouth resulted in a degree of marginalisation from the town itself. In addition to the
cash income leases also provided a means of confirming and deepening relationships with
individual settlers. However evidence suggests that the level of income, its reliability and its
distribution all reduced the expected benefits for hapu.
Te Atiawa derived a cash income from the reserves they leased directly to settlers and from
those that they brought under the Act which were leased on their behalf by the commissioners.
As already discussed this situation was extremely unusual when compared with the
administration of reserves and distribution of rents in other provinces. In practice this meant
that the rents collected from reserves brought under the Act were handed over to Maori
owners (after the commissioners had deducted a 2% percent management fee).
Commissioners had nothing to do with collecting rents from tenants on reserves that remained
in Native title. This isevident when we compare the 1867 schedule of Native reserves with the
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1867 accounts for Native reserves.?" All the reserves for which there were entries on the
commissioners' published accounts are listed together on the 1867 Schedule. The schedule
notes that the proceeds were to be paid to a "Native Reserve Fund for Natives interested",
however the published accounts show clearly that the commissioners were paying the rent to
specific named individuals for each reserve."? A separate list on this schedule is headed
"Reserves over which Native title is not extinguished", the proceeds from these reserves were
to be paid to "Native owners." Presumably Te Atiawa were collecting the rents from these
reserves themselves as none of these reserves appear on the commissioner's published
accounts for that year.
Revenue from rents were neither reliable nor sufficiently large to sustain Te Atiawa
communities or to enable them to participate on equal terms in the developing capitalist
economy of the province. A combination of factors were responsible for the reduction in the
overall income from Native reserve rents: an economic decline in the province from 1869 - 70
and delays in Te Atiawa owners receiving rents which was the result of Crown systems of
collecting and distributing them. Firstly, deterioration in the general economy affected tenants'
ability to pay rents. This led to many tenants becoming seriously in arrears and, in some
cases, annual rents for reserves being reduced by the commissioners to protect settler tenants
and Maori landlords. Parris commented in 1872 that:
in consequence of the hardness of the times and the general depression of business I
have had great trouble in collecting the rents for the last three years" [He frequently
repeated demands for rent] "and the only other alternative, would be to distrain, but
such acourse would be fatal for poor families struggling hard to get through difficulties,
and adverse to the interests of the Natives interested in the said reserves, as the
process of distraint would result in. the estates being left without a tenant, with little
chance ofobtaining another, and once abandoned all improvements, buildings, fences
&c., would fall into astate ofdllapldallon.t"
808 'Return ofLands Vested in the Governor', AJHR, 1867, A-17, pp 12 - 13and 'An Account ofallMonies
Received and Paid bythe Commissioners ofNative Reserves, New Plymouth, New Zealand, from 1st January to
the 31st December, 1867',8 May 1868, Taranaki Provincial Gazette, Vol. XVII, No.2, 1869, pp 7 -10.
809 By 1872 atleast there were official receipts for rents paid, an example found isinMaori and English, and
witnessed byWilliam Rennell, Parris' clerk. (Taranaki Rent Receipt, 1872, NR 72 -103, MA-MT 6/25,
ANZ, Wellington).
810 Parris toCharles Heaphy, Wellington, 13 August 1872, NR 72·98, MA-MT 6/25, ANZ, Wellington.
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These difficulties are also evident in the commissioners' accounts which show that even in
1867 a good portion of tenants were four or more months in arrears with rents, and in many
cases annual rents were reduced in 1869 or 1870.811 Given the economic climate it is likely that
Maori collecting rents from tenants on reserves they still controlled would have experienced
similar difficulties.
Commissioner Parris had clear and sound reasons for reducing the rents on Native reserves
administered by the Crown, however reduced annual rental led to an overall reduction in hapu
incomes. In the period from 1869 to 1871 the annual rental charged for Native reserves fell
sharply. For example the annual rental for section 8 of Puketotara Native Reserve No.3 fell
from £7 per annum in 1868 to £5.12.0 in 1870 and 1871. Likewise the annual rental for section
46 of this reserve was £18 in 1868 but it had fallen to £14.8.0 in 1870. Waiwakaiho Native
reserve F was being leased for an annual sum of £20 in 1868 but by 1871 tenants were only
required to pay £16. This downward trend was typical, but in a number ofcases the amount of
rent received each year is so erratic it is almost impossible to tell what the annual rental had
been set at. This reduction in rents obviously reduced the purchasing power of Te Atiawa
owners. A large reserve brought in between £16 and £25 per year in rents, with smaller
sections earning between £2 and £6 per year. To put this in perspective, the rent from a larger
reserve, if pooled and used communally, would purchase two horses in 1868, and the small
reserve owner could purchase eight sheep for £4 or a hogshead of beer for £5.10.0. 812 It is
somewhat difficult to assess whether these were considered at that time as major purchases,
but from the prices ofeveryday food items (around sixpence per lb.) they would appear to be
some ofthe more expensive itemsavailable.
The payment of rents by the commissioners to Te Atiawa was not always timely or reliable.
This was no doubt a consequence of the commissioners' difficulties in collecting the rents.
However the distribution of rent to Te Atiawa owners was slowed by a requirement under the
1862 Amendment Act that commissioners pay all rents collected to Treasury, and then apply to
811 'An Account ofall Monies received and paid bythe Commissioners ofNative Reserves, New Plymouth, New
Zealand, from 1st January tothe 31 st December, 1867', Taranaki Provincial Gazette, Vol. XVII, No.2, 1869,
pp7-10.
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Treasury when they needed to make payments of those rents to Maori owners or draw on
them to provide facilities for Maori. It appears that this system was in place in Taranaki as all
the published accounts in the Taranaki Provincial Gazette (for 1867 - 1871) use the phrase
"cash paid to ... as per receipt forwarded to Treasury" or "cash paid ... as per voucher
forwarded to Treasury." As William Swainson, a commissioner in the Wairarapa, pointed out
this was highly impractical as well as being nonsensical to Maori who came asking for their
rents, often on the same day as the tenant had paid them to the commissioners. In comments
in the margin of this memorandum Charles Heaphy, the Commissioner of Native reserves
charged with overseeing the reserves in the North Island, admitted that this was his
experience, and that as a result commissioners were paying Maori out of their own funds while
waiting for money to be sent back from Treasury."?
Finally, the practice of paying rents to each individual owner with interests in a reserve had a
significant impact upon the ability of hapu communities collectively to use the revenues from
reserves. The commissioners distributed rents to the individual owners of the reserves whose
names had been listed in the gazette notice that gave assent to bringing the reserve under the
commissioners' acmlnistranon.'?' By the time the first accounts submitted by the Taranaki
commissioners were published in 1868 (for the 1867 year), Puketotara Native Reserve No.3
had been subdivided into sections and the rent from these was paid to individuals or couples.
Often it is impossible to know just how many individuals were receiving rent as the accounts
stated that rent was paid to "one and others." The practice of paying individuals rather than
allocating the rents simply to a community meant that as original owners passed away,
offspring and other relatives became entitled to succeed and receive payment of rent. As a
consequence the number of owners grew and the rents were further dissipated while the
amount each individual received on rent day grew smaller and smaller, becoming progressively
less useful source of income.
812 Table No. 43 'Table showing the average prices ofprovisions and live stock in New Zealand, inthe year 1868',
Statistics ofNew Zealand for1868, Wellington, Government Printer, 1869, ,
813 George Swainson toMantell, 10May 1865, MA-MT 1,1A128 ANZ, Wellington. 'Heaphy was appointed to his
position byNative Minister Donald McLean in 1869 (Johnson, 1997, p 55),
814 Atleast by1872 there were official receipts for rents paid. The example found is in Maori and English, and
witnessed byWilliam Rennell, Parris', clerk. (Taranaki Rent Receipt, 1872, NR 72 -103, MA-MT 6/25, ANZ,
Wellington). '
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Conclusion
Te Atiawa owners chose to utilise their reserves in avariety ofways. Some disposed ofsmaller
reserves in order to raise the capital they needed to make the larger reserves viable. This was
a consequence of many of the reserves in the 'town' blocks being too small and on land of
poor quality that made them economically viable. Growing levels ofdebt and poverty amongst
Maori added to the pressure on Te Atiawa to offer their reserves for sale through the
commissioners. In Taranaki all these factors were greatly intensified by the huge loss of land
and agricultural resources caused by war and confiscation.
Statistical analysis has demonstrated conclusively that the reserves wholly or partly. leased to
settlers were overwhelmingly those situated near the town of New Plymouth between Paritutu
and Waiwakaiho. Te Atiawa were faced with the dilemma of how to capitalise on settler
demand for this land as leasehold and the cash income this would provide, while still retaining
occupation ofat least some of this fertile accessible land for their own economic activities. The
relatively low proportion of suburban reserve land initially allocated to them intensified this
pressure.
Te Atiawa did find solutions that enabled them to retain reserve land and generate income.
The rents from the reserves that were wholly or partly leased and administered by the
commissioners were paid to the individuals identified as owners. Te Atiawa owners also
collected and distributed rents from reserves they had not brought under the Act. This situation
was in contrast to other provinces where the conmlssioners retained rents for Native
purposes. However rents were vulnerable to economic downturns, which led to tenants falling
into arrears with their rents, and reductions in annual rents to keep tenants on the reserves.
The practice of paying rent to individual owners meant that as time went on the list of owners
entitled to ashare ofthe rent increased and the share ofeach individual decreased.
In the wake ofsales to the Crown, Te Atiawa were able to retain a sizeable community on
contiguous suburban reserves in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks. This enabled viable farming
and access to the main road into New Plymouth. In the case ofa number of large reserves Te
Atiawa were able to lease part to settler tenants and use the remainder themselves. While this
had a number of advantages it is also apparent that the vast majority of such reserves had
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been brought under the operation ofthe 1856 Act and its 1862 amendment. As aconsequence
the title and control of these reserves had passed permanently to the Crown. Thus in
capitalising on the strong demand by settlers for this land as leasehold Te Atiawa unwittingly
alienated the reserves. Nevertheless the short-term benefits were apparent. Aside from the
economic benefits of a cash income, this arrangement had the advantage for Te Atiawa of
retaining sites of cultural and spiritual significance while fostering inter-cultural relationships
which fitted well with their notions ofreciprocal relations and ashared future with the settlers.
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Chapter 7: Native Reserves as Sites for Maori/Pakeha
Relationships: The Effect of War on lnter-cultural Relationships at
New Plymouth
Introduction
Lease arrangements between TeAtiawa and settlers were at the heart ofquestions about how
and why Native reserves in Taranaki were brought under the Crown's administration and the
kinds ofstrategies Te Atiawa adopted for utilising the reserves. The economic aspects ofthose
leases have been explored in the preceding chapters but always woven around those
economic imperatives were the social aspects of the relationships that ·Ieases confirmed and
sustained. There is a need to examine particular examples of these relationships between
Maori landlord and settler tenant in terms of the ways in which social obligations between the
individuals involved found expression. Then to ask what enabled these particular people to
expand the boundaries of their social trust to include someone ofthe other culture. This private
sphere of inter-cultural relationships sited around Native reserves should be set in the wider
context of public attitudes of the settler and Te Atiawa communities towards each other. In
particular there is a need to examine what impact the Taranaki Wars, which began at Waitara
over the sale of the Pekapeka block in March 1860, had on private and public inter-cultural
relationships, and how this might explain the changing place of Te Atiawa communities within
the New Plymouth township.
Pre-war (1858 -1859)
Kanohi ki Kanohi: Native Reserves and inter-cultural Relationships in thePrivate Sphere
A closer examination of lease arrangements for Native reserves at New Plymouth indicates
that many leases were founded upon, expressed and furthered pre-existing relationships
between individual Ngamotu people and individual settlers. As aconsequence leases were not
solely economic compacts but also encompassed a social bond that suggests that those
involved had found ways to co-operate with and, to some extent, include members of the other
culture in their lives.
Te Atiawa individuals favoured leasing or even selling Native reserve land to settlers with
whom they were already well acquainted. Often these were settler men who had established
relationships with Maori communities in the course of their work as government officials.
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Leases and sales of Native reserves to these men were a way in which 'friendly' Te Atiawa
individuals and communities continued and strengthened their position as allies of the settlers.
More particularly, these transactions represented attempts to create a joint community with
settlers and the Government while retaining the rights and responsibilities of tangata whenua.
At a practical level there was probably an expectation on the part of Te Atiawa people that
infiuential settlers incorporated into their communities could in return be called upon for
assistance.
The lease between More (Morley), a Moturoa man (one of the Te Atiawa owners of
Otumaikuku Native Reserve No. 9 close to the township of New Plymouth) and a Mr
Edgecombe illustrates this pattern. Commissioner Whiteley, who knew More because he lived
near the mission station at Moturoa, described Edgecombe as "a Pakeha friend of his
[More's]"?" According to Whiteley it was very common for the lessee of a Native reserve to
already have a well-established relationship with the Maori owner; coming to Whiteley
accompanied by their "Pakeha friend" with a deal between them already stuck.'" In this
particular case Whiteley noted that "More wished Edgecombe to have it."817 Whiteley also
described Edgecombe as "an old [illeg] servant, friend and interpreter." Clearly Edgecombe
was bilingual and this was an important skill that enabled him to function as an intermediary
between Maori and settler spheres. In this respect he was part of a relatively small group of
settlers before 1860 - missionaries, surveyors, traders and government officials - whose
positions required and facilitated ability in te reo Maori. These people worked at the junction
between the two cultures, and that position was particularly favourable for developing
relationships with individual Maori that spilled over from professional contact into the private
sphere.
815 Whiteley to Gore Browne, 28 September 1861, Whiteley Papers, MS-Papers-0484-5, ATL, Wellington.
Interestingly, this isarare instance where the relationship between Maori and Pakeha individuals ismemorialised
inthe street names ofmodern New Plymouth. Morley Street (the transliterated version ofMore which Whiteley
notes inbrackets in his 1861 letter) and Edgecombe Street are close to one another inthe vicinity ofwhat was
once Otumaikuku Native Reserve (compare Byrnes, 'Affixing Names to Places', 1998, p 23).
816 Ibid. .
817 Ibid.
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The lease agreement between More and Edgecombe broke down during the first Taranaki War
of 1860 - 1861 (the effect ofwar on this relationship will be discussed in the following section).
However, what is interesting in this context is that the settler who took up the lease after
Edgecombe surrendered it was another intermediary, the Native reserves commissioner,
Robert Parris. It could certainly be argued that the reason Parris, rather than any other New
Plymouth settler, became the lessee was that as commissioner he was immediately privy to
the surrender of the lease and was able to capitalise on that information by offering to take it
over. Whiteley explained that when the arrangement between More and Edgecombe broke
down, Edgecombe found that "he could make nothing of the land [and] requested the
commissioners to release him from his aqreernent.?" Parris wanted the land because he had
"a small piece in that neighbourhood."819 Parris can be viewed as an opportunist,using this
information and the fact that with the province at war, and the town fortified against Maori
invaders, More would most likely have had few ifany other settlers willing to lease the land.
However, there are other possible interpretations of the agreement between More and Parris
over the lease and sale of the reserve. It is likely that by entering a lease with Parris, and later
selling the reserve to him, More was confirming and strengthening a relationship between
himself and the Native reserves commissioner. By bestowing a temporary, and later a
permanent, ,use right upon Parris, More was incorporating Parris into his kin network.
Historians have noted that similar relationships between Maori and settler individuals in other
parts of New Zealand had been remembered by hapu over generations. In the 1840s, settlers
leased large areas of customary Maori land from Waikato chiefs' for sheep and cattle runs.
Here the settlers paid rent in cattle or sheep, which were distributed to the various hapu.
The fact that cattle, given in payment might be give names underlines the fact that
such transactions were not seen as simply commercial. The names of the animals -
also passed on in oral histories - reinforced the association ofthe people with the land
and with Pakeha whom they allowed to live there, who also found a place in the
histories because their payments recorded recognition of the rights of those in whose
communities they lived. In short, leasing arrangements were acculturated; they
underlined hapu association with and control of the land."?
818 Ibid.
819 Ibid.
820 Parsonson, 2001, p 183.
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This cultural perspective raises the possibility that More expected Parris to remain on that land,
and in that way continue his relationship with More and his relatives.
It is not possible to know to what extent Parris was aware of the kind of cultural interpretation
More may have put upon the lease and sale of the reserve. However, both Parris and More
probably had some intellectual understanding of each other's perspective on the transaction
given that they lived in close proximity to the other's culture and frequently crossed the
boundaries between their two worlds. Yet it is unlikely that a mental acknowledgement of the
cultural ways of the other party was enough to make either More or Parris modify their
behaviour in the agreement. Therefore More may have experienced a sense of betrayal at
Parris' subsequent actions. Parris paid the purchase price but the reserve was rapidly
transferred to the provincial council. 821 In March 1862, the superintendent of the province
asked Parris how soon the Pipiko and Otumaikuku reserves could be handed over to the
province for the purposes of Education reserves. 822 By 1871 both reserves were listed in the
Taranaki Education Reserves Act 1871 as "waste land of the Crown reserved from sale as
having not yet been granted by the Crown.'?"
A number of settler men married Te Atiawa women and as a result of these relationships
entered the Te Atiawa world more fully and permanently than men like Edgecombe or Parris
whose occupations drew them into contact with Te Atiawa individuals. Marriage bound those
settlers more tightly to Te Atiawa communities as the men became part of the whakapapa of
the hapu and blood ties were formed. Along with these ties came rights and responsibilities. In
821 No sale deed was executed because "the Government having considered it unnecessary. Deeds ofcession to
the Crown were obtained for these reserves in the year 1859 bringing them under the operation ofthe Native
Reserves Act 1856" (Parris to the Sub-Treasurer, New Plymouth, 31 March 1863, MA-MLP-NP 1, P262, ANZ,
Wellington). Ward indicates that "the reserve was taken from Parris [by the Government] but returned not to the
original Maori owners, they being deemed to have received full payment for it, but to the province." (Ward, A
Show ofJustice, 1973, p 151). However an 1866 schedule ofNative reserves states that itwas "sold toprovincial
government" ('An Account ofNative Reserves in the Province ofTaranaki together with the Owners thereof, AD,
1,1866/610, RDB, Vol. 136, pp 52169 - 52177).
822 Parris to the Chief Land Purchase Officer, 25 March 1862, MA-MLP-NP 1, P259, ANZ, Wellington.
823 The Taranaki Education Reserves Act 1871, No, 21, s. 4 and schedule 2. Later the same year warrants and
titles were issued to the Commissioner ofSchools for the Taranaki Provincial District for both Pipiko Native
Reserve No, 8and Otumaikuku Native Reserve NO.9 (Warr 183 and Warr 184, both 14 November 1871, Land
Transfer Office, New Plymouth).
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a number of cases these men were given the right to utilise Native reserves owned by the
hapu. Richard Brown, a local trader and whaler, had married a Te Atiawa woman.?' There
appears to have been unanimous agreement amongst the people of Moturoa that he could
graze his sheep on their Native reserve there. 825 Brown's relationship with the community who
owned the Moturoa reserve seems to have been robust and enduring. It had already survived
a major dispute with the chief Poharama Te Whiti in 1847. At that time Brown had a whaling
station on Maori land atMoturoa, and he was paying rent to the community for the use of that
land. There seems to have been a series of disputes between Brown and Ngamotu hapu and
he was asked to give up the station at the end of the whaling season. Although Brown offered
to increase the rent to be allowed to stay Poharama rejected his offer.826 The robust nature of
Brown's arrangements with Ngamotu hapu strongly suggests that it went beyond a purely
economic agreement. Despite this dispute, almost a decade later Brown was depasturing his
stock on the Moturoa reserve.
Marriages between Te Atiawa women ofrank and settler men ofstanding in the New Plymouth
community were certainly strategic alliances for Te Atiawa hapu. By incorporating influential
settlers into their hapu and whanau Te Atiawa reserve owners were able to call on these men
to represent their interests in the settler sphere. Captain John George Cooke had married into
the prominent Ngatata whanau. His marriage to Ngapei Ngatata, the sister of Wiremu Taka
and Wiremu Tana Ngatata, had involved him in hapu affairs for better and for worse. Before
the promised arrival of Commissioner Spain in New Plymouth in 1844 Cooke was living on
land allocated to him by the New Zealand Company on the coast between Katere and the Bell
Block. Here Ngapei had built her own house. Te Atiawa were infuriated by settlers proceeding
onto land they considered that they had not sold to the Company. As a result, perhaps seeing
all Pakeha as members ofthe 'guilty tribe' they asserted their right by sending a large party of
armed men to fell trees and maim cattle on Cooke's section. Cooke was also caught up in
inter-hapu politics; part of the protest came from Puketapu hapu who objected to the fact that
Ngati Te Whiti, a rival hapu in this sensitive boundary zone, had formed a close relationship
824 Parsonson, 2001, p 181.
825 Parsonson, 1991, p197.
826 Draft letter byMcLean, 18 June 1847, McLean Papers, qMS·1205, ATL, Wellington.
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with Cooke through his marriage to Ngapei Ngatata.827 Despite some of the disadvantages of
being incorporated into the Te Atiawa community Cooke chose to remain in hismarriage to
Ngapei, and in turn his Ngatata kin called upon him to represent them in the settler sphere a
few years later in 1847.
When the final payments for the FitzRoy block were made Cooke was sent to the New Zealand
Company's agent, Francis Dillon Bell, by the Ngatata whanau to press their claim to Purakau
Native Reserve No. 16 at Te Henui.'" In response to the intervention by Cooke, Bell promised
to "make enquiries respecting it and see the place with Mr Cooke."829 McLean reported that
any resulting agreement "would be an exclusive arrangement of the Company.'?" It is
uncertain exactly what this meant in practical and legal terms but it does highlight that three
years after the reserves were initially laid out at least some had not been formalised.
A perception that the Crown had violated their respective property rights as landlord and
lessee of Native reserves could also draw Te Atiawa owners and settler tenants together. In
one remarkable case in New Plymouth in 1859 this led to a very public demonstration ofunity
between Maori and Pakeha individuals. Wiremu Te Ahoaho was one of the owners of two
adjacent reserves, Pukaka Native Reserve No. 18 and Raiomiti Native Reserve No. 23. By
September ,1858, Te Ahoaho was considered by the Crown to be the sale Maori owner
residing on the reserves."! Te Ahoaho and Daniel Bishop had entered a lease for parts of the
reserves in 1854 during the brief period when Commissioner Cooper had been sanctioning
leases.'" It is likely that the two men had become well acquainted through Bishop's work as a
827 Parsonson, 1998, p 19.
828 Draft letter ofMclean, 10 October 1847, Mclean Papers, qMS-1205, ATl, Wellington.
829 Ibid.
830 Ibid.
831 Mclean to Parris, 20 September 1858, Turton's Epitome, 0-57.
832 The Taranaki Herald, 15 October 1859.
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ferryman, ferrying people across the Waiwakaiho River.833 The ferry left from the bank of the
river that formed the northern boundary of Raiomiti Native Reserve No. 23. It is highly likely
that Bishop and Te Ahoaho had' negotiated use of the riverbank between them several years
before they entered an agreement for the lease of a portion of the reserves. In fact, the lease
of reserve land may have arisen because Bishop needed to live close to his boat to make his
living.
833 J CRichmond toCWRichmond, 19 August 1859, in The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GHScholefield (ed),
1960, Vol. 1,P483.
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Figure 11: An 1858 plan showing the road through Pukaka Native Reserves No. 18
and Raiomiti Native Reserve No. 23,1858 (source: HHTurton, Plans of Land
Purchases in the North Island of New Zealand, Vol. II, Taranaki, ATL, Wellington,
microfiche edition, n/d)
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Te Ahoaho and Bishop chose to take collective protest action to oppose the opening of a
newly completed road across the Native reserve which led to the Waiwakaiho bridge that was
to be publicly opened within a few weeks (see Figure 11 ).834 Their protest shows every sign of
having been planned in advance as astrategy for having their grievances heard. On 15 August
1859, the two men built a fence across the road to the bridge. The superintendent was
informed and Robert Parris and the Assistant Native Secretary for the province went to the site
"to see what they meant by such a proceeding.'?" It is clear that Te Ahoaho and Bishop's aim
was to be arrested as a means of having their grievances heard and addressed by the court.
Parris reported that "the only information we could get from them, was, that they were
dissatisfied, and wanted to be summonsed to appear in the Resident Magistrates Court where
they would state their grievance, that if we would do that, they would open the road.?" Bishop
threatened to "dig a trench across the road the following morning if he was not summonsed,'?"
This planning and strategizing is an indication of the depth of therelationship between the two
men. To protest together in this way required communication and trust beyond the limits of a
purely economic relationship between landlord and tenant.
A joint protest also suggests that although each man had a different grievance about the road
their interests had become inter-dependent to such a degree that they felt it appropriate to
protest together and to support each other's position. Te Ahaoho participated in the protest
with Bishop not because he thought that the Crown had taken the road across his reserve
illegally, but because he perceived some threat to his ownership of the remainder of the
reserve. At the court hearing, where both men were found guilty of obstructing a public road
and fined a total of one shilling, the newspaper reported that Te Ahoaho had "boldly averred
that he had never signed orseen the deed by which he alienated the road to the Oueen."?" A
few days later TeAhoaho wrote to the newspaper setting the record straight:
834 Parris to CWRichmond, 20 August 1859, in Ibid, pp 483 - 484.
835 Parris tothe Native Secretary, 8 September 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1,pp 229 - 232, ANZ, Wellington.
836 Ibid.
837 Ibid.
838 The Taranaki Herald, 27 August 1859.
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the truth of the matter is this. Mr Parris came to me at Mimi to solicit my consent to a
road through my farm for the bridge at the Waiwakaiho, I gave my consent for the road
and was pleased to do so, I gave up the road to the Queen and herheirs forever. I did
not consent to give up my land, that is my farm, I did not sign any map."
On the other hand, Bishop's main concern was to defend his rights to deal directly with Te
Ahoaho over the leasing of the Native reserve, but of course his rights depended upon the
owner of the reserve having the right to deal with him directly. Thus in defending his own rights
Bishop publicly supported Te Ahoaho's right to contract a lease with a settler for Native
reserve land. When confronted while in occupation of the road Bishop reportedly stated that "it
was a Native reserve and he would do anything he thought proper upon it, in defiance of the
Government, even purchase it off the Natives, under the Treaty ofWaitangL"840 A month after
the court hearing Bishop approached the provincial council "for compensation for land taken
from him for the new road leading to the Waiwakaiho Bridqe.?" In trying to determine whether
compensation was due to Bishop, the council concluded that Bishop's lease with Te Ahoaho
was legal in that "he had the countenance of Mr Commissioner Cooper."? Because this had
never been questioned the council concluded that it could "assume that it [the lease] had the
previous sanction of the Governor.'?" However, they also considered that in light of the
prosecution ofRichard Brown for depasturing stock on the Moturoa Native Reserve No.1:
Mr Bishop was not without warning of the insecurity of his holding, and that his
retention of the land depended, according to the construction put upon the ordinance
[Native Land Purchase Ordinance 1846], upon the forbearance of the General
Government which appears to have been exercised tnroughout.'"
In any case, the council noted that "Mr Bishop expressed his satisfaction with the proposals
made to him, and moreover, engaged in writing to receive in addition to the old line of road
839 The Taranaki Herald, 3 September 1859. McLean instructed Parris to execute abinding deed ofconveyance
to the Crown for the road with all the owners of the Native Reserves (Chief Commissioner toParris, 20 September
1858, Turton's Epitome, D-57). The deed was signed byWi Te Ahoaho, Wiremu Piti, Ihakara, Enoka Tamaiti and
Hone Ropiha on 6 November 1858 (Deeds - Deed No. 16, Waiwakaiho (Road through Reserve) Grey and Bell
District, 6 November 1858, Turton's Deeds, Taranaki Province).
840 Parris to the Native Secretary, 8 September 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1,pp 229 - 232, ANZ, Wellington.
841 The Taranaki Herald, 24 September 1859.
842 The Taranaki Herald, 15 October 1859.
843 Ibid.
844 Ibid.
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then used £10 in cash in liquidation of any claim he might have in equity to compensation."
Therefore they declined to pay him further cornpensatlon."
At a private level the joint protest by Te Ahoahao and Bishop demonstrated, and most likely
enhanced, the relationship between the two men. But the settler reaction to Te Ahoaho's part
in the protest revealed adifferent set of attitudes and tendencies operating in the public arena
between the settler and Te Atiawa communities. When Te Ahaoho failed to ascribe the same
meaning to the deed of conveyance as the majority of the settlers did he was publicly
condemned as dishonest and untrustworthy. The newspaper described Te Ahoaho's denial
that he signed the deed ofconveyance as "very gross conduct" and suggested that Te Ahoaho
had gone further, declaring that the deed produced in the court was "a forgery and a fraud.?"
The newspaper concluded that, "the scene in the court house shows that he is neither to be
depended upon or trusted" despite the fact that he had previously been "regarded as a man of
fair dealings and general good conduct?" The mutual economic and political interests of
landlord and tenant had encouraged Bishop and Te Ahoaho to extend the boundaries of their
social trust to develop a relationship out of which sprang their united protest. But, lacking a
common interest with Te Ahoaho, and seeing him as obstructing the progress of public
amenities, the settler public seems to have had greater difficulty in extending their collective
boundary oftrust to include Te Ahoaho.
The Town as Contested Space: Native Reserves and Inter-cultural Relationships in the
Public Sphere
In contrast to the social and economic bonds between Te Atiawa owners and settler tenants
the public relationship between the two cultures was often characterised by tension and
separation. In the wider public arena ofNew Plymouth in the 1850s the prevalence ofVictorian
notions of 'civilisation' encouraged settlers to define themselves as 'civilised' and Maori as the
'savage other.' This ideology was reinforced by astrong local perception ofNew Plymouth as a
845 Ibid.
846 The Taranaki Herald, 27 August 1859.
847 Ibid. Government officials and settlers were of the opinion that Te Ahoaho could not possibly have taken
protest action ormade the statements he did about his understanding ofthe deed which conveyed the road tothe
Crown and were convinced hehad been "tampered" with byanother settler orofficial (they do not name who they
suspect) (also see Parris toMcLean (Private), 12December 1859, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0009, ATL,
Wellington).
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small, struggling, undefended and under-resourced 'island' surrounded by wild lands.
Therefore, Te Atiawa and their Native reserves were considered to be a public nuisance, a
security threat, and a cost to ratepayers and citizens. Settler perceptions of the Te Atiawa
communities on reserves in and near the township (and the ideologies that informed them) had
a significant impact upon inter-cultural relationships. In particular, it became extremely difficult
for the settler community at New Plymouth to overcome these negative perceptions to allow Te
Atiawa communities to continue to live in the township on Native reserves.
It was unfortunate that the attitude of the settler community as a whole atNew Plymouth
tended to shut down the possibility ofMaori and Pakeha living side by side within the township.
Such settler attitudes were especially regrettable given the general tendency of the Ngamotu
hapu to move towards a joint community based on tangata whenua/manuhiri relationships.
From their first dealings with the New Zealand Company and its British settlers the Ngamotu
hapu operated in away that enlarged the boundaries of their social trust. Traditional practices
were adapted to allow for the incorporation ofPakeha into their economic and, tosome extent,
their social sphere. As Head has argued, this tendency was reinforced by a new idea of a civil
society with its foundation in peace upheld by the rule of law. Whakapapa, the traditional
organising principle of Maori knowledge, was adapted to include Maori and Pakeha
descending from ashared God and Queen.848
848 Head, 2001, pp 102, 111 and 115.
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Figure 12: A reproduction of a painting byJ Bunny in 1858 showing New Plymouth from the sea. Tothe left in the middle ground is themouth of the
Huatokl Stream above which can be seen the palllsadlng of Te Kawau Pa, and number of canoes are pulled uponthe beach below the pa (source: R
GWood, From Plymouth to New Plymouth, A H& AWReed, Wellington, 1959, plate between p 48 and p 49)
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Figure 13: An 1858 photograph of New Plymouth township. In thebackground is themain barracks on Pukaka/Marsland Hill, below and to
theright the building with thesteeply pitched roof is StMary's church. Intheforeground is Te Kawau pasurrounded with palllsading and
in close proximity to numerous settler houses and businesses
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The Role of Social Trust in the Alienation of Native Reserves atNew Plymouth, 1858-
1865
The Vacation ofTe Kawau Pa
The fundamentally different ways in which the communities at New Plymouth viewed one
another, and the effect this had on the level of trust and respect between the two communities
illuminates the decisions that led to the alienation of Native reserves in the township of New
Plymouth between 1858 and 1865. Settler public opinion about the Native reserves and their
Te Atiawa inhabitants was consistently negative and demonstrates the way in which civic,
military, economic and ideological pressures shaped the public response to Te Atiawa
communities in the township. As already discussed, the settler community had expressed a
distaste for Maori living in the township since the creation of Native reserves in the 1840s.
Vacant Native reserves had been considered a public nuisance and a cost to settler
ratepayers. As noted previously, the public pressure to remove Te Atiawa settlements
focussed particularly on Te Kawau Pa. The pa was located atthe mouth of the Huatoki Stream
and was the most well established and visible Maori settlement in the township. There had
been frequent complaints that Te Kawau Pa was blocking development, was afire hazard, and
a sanitation risk.849 In 1858 the newspaper hailed the newly appointed Commissioners of
Native reserves as the best people to persuade Maori to leave the pa. The editor announced
that "The Commissioners of Native reserves could not better employ themselves in their new
and important duties than in inducing the Maories [sic] to shift their quarters, which if for
sanitary reasons only, is highly expedient.?" No doubt the Native' reserves Commissioners
were also seen by the provincial council as the best hope they had in solving the problem of
the reserves 'nuisance' because they themselves lacked any power under The New Zealand
Constitution Act 1852 to deal with land in Native title. 851
849All these factors led Donald McLean tocomment that "the occupation bythe Natives of the town pa, New
Plymouth, has been for some time a SUbject ofcomplaint bythe Europeans residing in the vicinity of the pa, more
especially that portion ofit which interfered with the continuation ofCurrie Street." ('Memorandum on Te Kawau
Pa', 22 November 1861, Turton's Epitome, 0-71).
850 The Taranaki Herald, 2 October 1858.
851 The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, ss. 19,71 and 63.
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This reluctance to have Maori living within the immediate environs of the town was intensified
by growing perceptions in the mid-1850s that Te Atiawa posed a military threat to the settlers
at New Plymouth. In 1863, Parris explained that "before the troops went to Waitara, in March
1860, I was instructed by His Excellency the late Governor, to try to get the Natives to leave
the Town Pa (Kawau) in order that the town may be free of Natives by night."852 It is apparent
that the presence of Maori on reserves in and near the township was considered a threat
because they were believed to harbour armed Maori. In 1854 many Te Atiawa living in New
Plymouth supported and participated in inter-hapu conflicts over Crown purchases north of
New P'yrnouth.t" The Governor had issued a proclamation of 12 February 1858 making it
illegal for armed Maori to assemble within the settled district of Taranaki." However there
were still complaints that:
many of the Natives now engaged in hostilities against Ihaia and Nikorima reside on
lands reserved for their use within the purchased districts named in the Proclamation,
and they are in the practice of moving to and fro with arms, issuing from their homes
for attack and returning thither when the excitement which isusuallywound up with the
tomahawk isover. 855
Te Kawau pa was said to be a place to which "the town Natives habitually bring their arms.'?"
This made the pa particularly threatening because it was located just across the mouth of the
Huatoki Stre,am from Mt. Elliot, the administrative centre of the town. This was formerly
Pukeariki, an ancient pa, which had been appropriated and renamed. Itwas also "close to the
Resident Magistrate's Court, within sight of the Garrison" on Native Reserve No.1 0 (another
ancient pa appropriated and renamed Marsland Hill).857 This sense 'of threat was symptomatic
of a climate of fear amongst the settlers that led to the construction of a network of military
camps, palisades, gates and blockhouses around the town between 1855 and 1860.858 The
objective of these installations was to create a safe zone for settlers and a stronghold for
852 Parris to Henry Halse, 16 April 1862, AJHR, 1862, E-4, Section X, No. 18.
853 Henry Halseto McLean, 10 November 1856, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0314, ATL, Wellington.
854 Governor Gore Browne's proclamation, February 1858, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, No. 19.
855 The Taranaki Herald, Editorial, 27 February 1858.
856 The Taranaki Herald, 20March 1858.
857 Ibid.
858 Prickett, 1994, pp 34 - 36.
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Imperial and local lroops." Under these circumstances, Maori became the enemy. As War
approached, removal of all Maori from their settlements and Native reserves in the immediate
vicinity of the town was considered necessary for public safety. Te Kawau was in a strategic
position at the heart of the township; securing it thus simultaneously completed the inner circle
ofdefences around the township and prevented it from being used by groups of 'rebel' Maori.
There were other political reasons for excluding Te Atiawa from the town. The presence of
Imperial troops had created another problem: liaisons between Te Atiawa women and soldiers
- "the habit of intriguing with the wives and daughters of friendly Maoris in the pa in the
neighbourhood of the town."860 The military command and the Government were worried that
this would "not only create ill-feeling" but that it would lead to "the withdrawal of those Maoris
and their families from their allegiance."861 As war seemed inevitable it was recognised that Te
Atiawa allies would be important as intelligence-gatherers, scouts and troops and that the
Government could not afford to alienate them carelessly.
859 Report by Colonial Secretary [C L Nugent] ofhis visit toNew Plymouth, 27 January 1855, T 1/1855/437 held at
T1/1857/710, ANZ, Wellington.
860 Proclamation by R Carey, Lieut. Col. Deputy Adjutant-General, 23 November 1860, McDonnell inTW
Gudgeon, The Defenders ofNew Zealand being a Short Biography ofColonists who Distinguished themselves in
Upholding Her Majesty's Supremacy in these Islands, HBrett, Auckland, 1887, pp 513 - 514.
861 Proclamation by RCarey, lJeut Col. Deputy Adjutant-General, 23 November 1860, McDonnell inGudgeon,
The Defenders ofNew Zealand, 1887, pp 513 - 514.
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Figure 14: Plan showing the inner defences and outer circle of blockhouses around the
township of New Plymouth, 1860 -1861 (source: Nigel Prickett, Maori and Pakeha
Fortifications of the First Taranaki War, 1860 - 61, Records of theAuckland Institute and
Museum, Vol. 31, 1994, Fig 24)
Given all these pressures on Te Kawau Pa, it is unsurprising that Parris was able to persuade
the inhabitants of the pa to agree to leave so long as they were paid rent for it in the meantime,
and they could return to it after the hostilities.862 It appears that Parris asked the Te Kawau
people to leave the pa late in February 1860. By the time a notice was posted at the militia
862 Parris to the Superintendent, 15 April 1862, MA-MLP-NP 1, P261, ANZ, Wellington refers to the
superintendent's letter "on the subject ofpayment ofrent due on houses ofNatives inthe Kawau Pa." The people
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office in New Plymouth on 5 March 1860 they had left the pa: the notice read, "the Natives of
the Kawau pa having left it at the request ofHis Excellency the Governor, the pa is in charge of
the garrison of the town.?" They then built a pa at Puketotara about two miles from the
town.864 The prevailing views of the community at Te Kawau about their relationship with the
settler community offer a means of understanding why the community agreed to the Crown's
request. The decision of this community to vacate their settlement can be read as a sign of
their overriding concern with constructing and maintaining peaceful relationships with the
settlers, and with the settler government. Such relationships would then form the cornerstone
ofajoint Maori-Pakeha community.
In trying to explain the position of 'friendly' Maori communities like the Ngamotu hapu, Head
argued that these communities had come to understand through Christianity that peace was
the foundation of civil society. This made peace very important because it was "a prerequisite
for modernity", and the vision of modernity offered was that of "a European-style society." 865
Head argued that by 1860, when war broke out in Taranaki, this ideology was well established
in 'friendly' Maori communities. In short, "the peaceable community, with law as its guarantor
and prosperity its goal, had become the intellectual and cultural heritage ofMaorL"866
There is abundant evidence that Ngamotu hapu in the Paritutu to Bell Block area were
motivated by a desire for peace and for the kind of joint community that Head postulates.
Ngamotu hapu certainly had a long and thorough engagement with Christianity and its key
teaching regarding peace. Even before the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, John Whiteley,
then a Wesleyan Methodist missionary at Kawhia, had been visiting the small Te Atiawa
community at Moturoa accompanied by Maori Christian teachers. In 1840, Samuel Ironside,
John Hobbs, John Aldred and George Buttle visited Taranaki to preach, conduct baptisms and
marriages and examine candidates in the catechism. Te Atiawa gave land for amission station
moved inland beyond the boundaries of the town and built apa on Puketotara, Native Reserve NO.3 (Parris to
Henry Halse, 16April 1862, AJHR, 1862, E-4, section X, No. 18).
863 Wells, 1878, p 191. However on 21 March 1860 a number ofMaori swore their allegiance tothe Crown at Te
Kawau pa in the presence ofMcLean (The Taranaki Herald, 13October 1860).
864 Parris toHenry Halse, 16 April 1862, AJHR, 1863, E-4, Section X, p 18.
865 Head, 2001, P102.
866 Head, 2001, P116.
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at Moturoa, and the first missionary, Charles Creed, and his wife arrived there in January 1841
with John Leigh Tutu who had been converted by Hobbs and William Woon in the early
1830s.867
For the next two decades the Wesleyan faith grew strongly amongst Te Atiawa in the area
from Paritutu to Bell Block, while the Waitara people were almost exclusively Anglican. By
1842 the Maori Wesleyan Methodist congregation was large enough for a chapel to be built at
Ngamotu. Sally McLean, in her history ofthe Grey Institute, recorded that the chapel"had been
built by the local people under the leadership of Poharama, now a preacher and class
leader.868 In a similar move, Te Waka and the people atTe Kawau Pa built achapel at the pa
in 1858.869 After he moved to New Plymouth in 1856, Whiteley kept diaries and records of
communities he visited regularly to preach and to carry out baptisms and burials, and these
records illustrate how widespread this circuit ofMaori Wesleyan communities becsme.t"
This ideological underpinning helps to explain why these communities seemed generally to
support the protection ofthe town by Imperial troops. At least one Maori letter asking for troops
to be sent has survived. In June 1854, Hone Ropiha living on Purakau Waiwakaiho A wrote to
Governor Wynyard asking for troops to be sent, and pledging his own continuing adherence to
peace and British law. 871 Again the Crown's perception was that:
the majority are anxious that troops should be sent here, and many of them are
apprehensive that unless some such preventive step be taken the insolent and
overbearing conduct of some of the aborigines will - especially as large numbers are
expected to arrive here from Cook Straits in the course of this year - ere long attain
such aheight as to endanger the peace ofthe communlty?"
867 McLean, 1992, p 18.
868 "Chapels were also built inother villages and by 1843 there were four chapels and five other preaching places
in the Ngamotu mission circuit." By 1845, there were nine chapels, six other preaching places, 10 local
preachers, 12 class leaders and 19 Maori Sabbath school teachers who taught 350 scholars in 15 schools. There
were 164 society members and 13 more on trial in the Ngamotu mission circuit" (McLean, 1992, pp 19 and 42).
869 Chambers, 1992, p 240.
870 Scholefield (ed), A Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, Vol. II, 1940, P499. Methodist Deaths, card index
and Wesleyan Maori Baptisms: copied from Mr Fred Butler, New Plymouth Genealogical Society Library.
87\ Hone Ropiha to Governor Wynyard, 30 June 1857, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2 encl. in No. 16.
872 Cooper to the Colonial Secretary, 8JUly 1854, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, No. 16.
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When troops did finally arrive in August 1855 it was noted that they were well received by
British and Maori, McLean recorded that Maori at New Plymouth "sent them supplies of
potatoes, bread &C."873 However, while this gesture can certainly be read as a sign ofsupport
for peace it could equally be interpreted as the sort ofbehaviour Ngamotu hapu would consider
appropriate to the duties ofahost, and to the assertion ofmana and manawhenua.
There also seems to have been some significant Ngamotu hapu support for the ban on
firearms within the township from February 1858.874 The following month Poharama of
Moturoa laid information against Te Waka and others for carrying arms within the prohibited
area.875 However, again there may be another dimension to Poharama's actions. Only a few
years before Te Waka had forced Poharama into an embarrassing situation over the boundary
of the Waiwakaiho purchase, and Poharama's reputation with the Crown suffered. It ispossible
that he then saw Te Waka's carrying ofarms as the perfect opportunity to even the score; this
would certainly be consistent with Maori notions of utu and the restoration of mana. Yet local
settlers believed that Ngamotu hapu were also disobeying this proclamation. An article in the
Taranaki Herald stated that "the town Natives habitually bring their arms to the Kawau pa"
which was regarded as acase of"considerable aggravation and defiance."876 There was some
r
local hesitation over punishing those who contravened the arms ban. The resident magistrate,
Josiah Flight, reportedly suggested that the proclamation should be treated
as an indefinite threat, which may be violated in any way and to any extent provided
no actual harm isdone to settlers. If any action is to be taken against any ofthe Maoris
we must, according to him [Flight], wait until they have committed some crime for
which they would be condemned by Maori opinion as well as by our law.877
The leaders of the communities at Moturoa and Te Kawau had also taken a peacemaking role
in the conflicts between various factions of Puketapu hapu in the 1850s. In 1856 Te Waka,
backed it seems by "the weight of Poharama's influence" visited Kaipakopako, the pa
873 Prickett, 1994, p6and McLean to Sinclair, 22 September 1855, Sinclair Papers, MS-Papers-1947,
ATL, Wellington.
874 Governor Gore Browne's proclamation, 12 February 1858, Turton's Epitome, Taranaki, A-2, No. 19, P135.
875 The Taranaki Herald, 20 March 1858.
876 Ibid.
877 HRRichmond to CWRichmond, 7 February 1858, The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, GHScholefield (ed),
1960, Vol. 1,pp 345 - 346.
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belonging to Katatore, to assist in peace making. Henry Halse, the Police Commissioner,
believed that he did so with the support of"all the natives from Moturoa to the Hua, the majority
ofwhom would gladly make peace at any price so heartily tired are they ofthe whole affsir.'?"
As has been argued elsewhere in this thesis, the active support of peace and acceptance of
British law by Ngamotu hapu can be read in a number of ways. At an economic and political
level Ngamotu hapu were safeguarding their position offavour with the settler community. This
was necessary if the economic benefits they were reaping from their association with the
settlers and the township were to continue. The wealth that their engagement with the settler
economy generated also enhanced their mana amongst neighbouring hapu. Therefore, the
agreement of the community at Te Kawau to vacate the pa for the length of the conflict was
motivated by a desire both to continue and to express their relationship with the settler
community, Governor and Queen. Head's argumentalso suggests thatthe community at Te
Kawau may have agreed to vacate the pa because they believed that the Crown would use the
pa to sustain peace in the province. In doing so the inhabitants were motivated by a profound
belief in peace as the foundation of a shared Maori-Pakeha future in Taranaki, and a
relationship with settlers and their government based on trust and expectations of reciprocal
benefits.
878 Henry Halse to McLean, 10November 1856, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-314, ATL, Wellington.
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Figure 15: Plan of Native Reserves No. s 10 and 11, FitzRoy Block, c.1847 (shown here
as No.7and No.6) (source: 'Plans of Native Reserves in No.1 FitzRoy Block', TR 7,
L1NZ, New Plymouth)
The Acquisition and Exchange ofPukaka and Pukeikei Native Reserves
The acquisition of Te Kawau Pa by the Crown was not an isolated incident. Two other Native
reserves within the New Plymouth township owned by the Te Kawau community: Native
Reserve No. 10, a 10 acre reserve that included the ancient pa of the same name; and
Pukeikei Native Reserve No. 11, a reserve of 1 acre 3 roods 24 perches adjoining the inland
side ofNative Reserve No. 10, had been acquired by the Crown in 1855 (see Figure 14 above
where they are mislabeled as No.6 &7). The records relating to the acquisition of these two
reserves contain no evidence that the owners of the reserves were consulted or gave their
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consent for the reserves to be used for military purposes. Given the evident motives of the
community at Te Kawau it is possible that they werewilling to surrender these two reserves so
that troops could more effectively protect the settlers.
The Imperial War Department took Native Reserve No.1ofor the site ofa military barracks in
1855 after repeated calls by settlers and provincial government for troops to protect them. So
finally, on a visit to New Plymouth in April 1855, Acting-Governor Wynyard chose Pukaka as
the site for the main barracks.'" Twelve metres were sliced off the top ofthe pa in preparation
for the building.880After further persistent lobbying, Imperial troops were sent to the province
from Auckland in August 1855.881 In October 1855 the Commanding Officer of the Royal
Engineers, who were to occupy the barracks, approached the superintendent of the Province
requesting a Crown grant of Marsland Hill (as it was renamed). Although the superintendent
enthusiastically supported the request, the Governor was unwilling to make a formal grant to
the Ordnance Department, fearing that the land would never be returned to the colonial
. government,882 Despite a lack ofclear title the Ordnance Department continued its operations:
the prefabricated barracks arrived by sea and was completed and occupied by March 1856.883
Pukeikei Native Reserve No. 11 was asmall reserve behind Pukaka, and only separated from
it by the Huatoki Stream. It is likely that the proximity of another reserve to a key military post
was considered inconvenient or threatening. As discussed in the previous chapter, the owner
of the reserve, Timotu Kekeu of Te Kawau Pa, was offered and accepted a piece of land at
879 The Taranaki Herald, 4 April 1855.
880 The Taranaki Herald, 5 September 1855 and Prickett, 1994, p 6.
881 Nigel Prickett, The Archaeology ofaMilitary Frontier: Taranaki, NZ, 1860 - 1881, PhD Thesis, University of
Auckland, 1981, p 25.
882 Charles Brown tothe Colonial Secretary, 11 October 1855, IA1/1855/3399, ANZ, Wellington.
883 The Taranaki Herald, 22 March 1856. By 1870 Imperial troops had been withdrawn from the town and the
British Under-Secretary ofState for War was considering how the barracks, and othermilitary buildings and the
land should be disposed of. He concluded that Pukaka, and other New Plymouth lands used for military purposes,
were held by the Imperial War Department under grant from the Colonial Government. (Under-Secretary ofState
ofWar to the Under-Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 23 November 1868, BPP, Vol. 15, (307), pp 478 - 479) In
line with Imperial policy, itwas recommended that lands and buildings "originally granted by the Colonial
Government to this department" should be "re-conveyed to the colony." (Under-Secretary ofState ofWar to the
Under-Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 25February 1869, BPP, Vol. 15, 1868-9 (307), pp 483 - 484).
However, an accompanying Imperial schedule shows that no grants to the Ordnance Department forthese lands
were ever actually made. Despite this, the British Government passed the Colonial Fortifications Act in 1877
enabling the British Crown to transfer land it held in trust for military purposes to the Governor ofacolony by the
publication ofan Order in Council (A.D. 1877, Colonial Fortifications Act, 40&41 Viet. c. 23, Great Britain Laws,
Statutes. Etc, The Statutes: Revised Edition, Vol. XVIII, 39&40Viet to 41 & 42Viet A.D. 1876 -1878).
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Pukenui Native Reserve No. 14 in exchange for Pukeikej,884 By August 1860 Te Kawau,
Pukaka (and Pukeikei) were all military posts enclosed within the defences of New Plymouth
township (see Figure 13).
The New Zealand Wars, North Taranaki (1860 -1863)
The Impact of the New Zealand Wars on Individual Ngamotu/Settler Leasing
Arrangements
In general it is far easier to reconstruct the impact that war in Taranaki had on the relationship
between Ngamotu hapu communities and the settler community than it is to trace the effects of
war on the relationships between Ngamotu hapu and settler individuals involved in the leasing
of Native reserves atNew Plymouth. This is largely because sources used to discuss both sets
of relationships were generated by settlers and government officials. War was such adominant
reality for all the inhabitants of the province that letters and official correspondence, with a few
exceptions, contain little about the relationships between Te Atiawa landlords and settler
leasees.
However, the case of More's lease to Edgecombe of Otumaikuku Native Reserve provides
some indication of the sorts of impact the conflict had on relationships between Ngamotu hapu
landlords and settler tenants." It appears that Edgecombe terminated the lease agreement
some months after the outbreak of the conflict because the fences he had put up "were taken
away and his crops deslroyed.?" The reserve lay outside the palisades and gates that had
been erected around the township itself, and so was vulnerable to raids and destruction of
property by Maori fighting against the Crown. The agreement between More and Edgecombe
had been that Edgecombe would pay no rent in the first two years. In return "Edgecombe
fenced the land and took down and carted acottage from the town to the place for More which
he was to enlarge and leave in good repair at the end of fourteen years.'?" The sequence of
events isnot entirely clear from Whiteley's letter, but it appears that after the fences and crops
were destroyed "More sold the cottage and it was removed into town again." Edgecombe then
884 Parris tothe Superintendent, 5April 1862, MA-MLP-NP 1,P261, ANZ, Wellington.
885 The history of this lease isoutlined atthe beginning of this chapter.
886 Whiteley toGore Browne, 28 September 1861, Whiteley Papers, MS-Papers-0484·5, ATL, Wellington.
887 Ibid.
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approached the- Native reserves commissioners and "begged to be released from the
bargain."888
It is not clear whether More's removal of the cottage was a surprise to Edgecombe, or whether
the two men had discussed the surrender of the lease before Edgecombe approached the
commissioners. It would seem reasonable to suppose that More removed the cottage that he
owned because he feared that Maori fighting against the Crown might destroy it (as they had
already done with the fences and the crops). More's subsequent sale of the cottage was
probably motivated by financial pressures; it was noted around this time that he "had long been
wanting money" to enable him "to purchase a plough Bullock for the cultivation of his other
lands.'?" Shortly afterwards he requested that the reserve be sold, and it was purchased
privately by the Native reserves commissioner Robert Parris for the £100 which More had
asked for it. In defending Parris' purchase of the reserve his fellow commissioner, John
Whiteley, emphasised More was opposed to the reserve going to public auction and that he
was happy to sell it to Parris for £100.890
The Impact of the New Zealand Wars on Inter-cultural Relationships between
Communities atNew Plymouth
War and Ngamotu Hapu Hopes fora JointFuture
The first and second Taranaki Wars of 1860 - 1863 were responsible for a radical and
irreparable decrease in inter-cultural trust in the public sphere at New Plymouth. Both the
Ngamotu hapu communities and the settler community felt that their trust in the other had been
betrayed. The betrayal was felt at both amaterial and an ldeoloqlcallevel.
It isdifficult to make sense ofthe way in which Ngamotu hapu experienced the first and second
Taranaki Wars of 1860-61 and 1863 and the impact this had upon their vision of a shared
future with Pakeha. The Crown and settler labels of 'friendly' and 'rebel' obscure as much as
they illuminate and there is a shortage of work by historians seeking to understand the
experiences of 'friendly' hapu during this period. What is apparent however is that the great
majority of Ngamotu hapu communities remained either neutral or 'friendly' during these
888 Ibid.
889 Ibid.
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conflicts. Although the meaning of these activities is far from clear they appear to express the
hope of many Ngamotu people that the conflict could be resolved and a future based on a
sense ofkinship, equality and mutually beneficial relationships was possible.
After war was officially declared in March 1860, Ngamotu hapu leaders and communities at
Moturoa, Te Kawau, Waiwakaiho and Katere took oaths of allegiance to the Queen.891 Many
were then enlisted as guides and soldiers alongside government troops. Such activities also
effectively defined them as 'friendly' or 'loyal' (in opposition to those fighting against the Crown
who were regarded as 'rebels') in the eyes of the Crown and the settler community at New
Plymouth. 'Friendly' Ngamotu hapu communities also held a ring of outlying defensive
positions around the township. Here the settler community put its trust in its Ngamotu hapu
allies to protect their families and property from attack by 'rebel' factions. From these positions
'friendly' Te Atiawa were able to gather and pass on intelligence about the movements and
intentions of 'rebels', which could then be used by government troops to direct their operations
in the field~892 "Friendly' Te Atiawa from these defensive posts could also go into 'rebel'
territory as messengers and to bring in 'rebels' who surrendered."?
Supplied with arms and rations by the government in many cases, 'friendly' Te Atiawa
communities acted as a first line of defence against attack from inland, north and south. Te
Kawau people briefly held a position at the colonial hospital at Mangorei. 894 Ngati Rahiri
people who had recently returned from Queen Charlotte Sound occupied Fort Herbert, inland
of the township near what is now Pukekura Park. 895 'Friendly' Te Atiawa from Waiwakaiho,
Katere and Tapuirau had relocated onto Mr Horne's land, on the south bank of the Te Henui
890 Ibid.
891 For example the many ofthe inhabitants atTe Kawau Patook the oath ofallegiance to the Crown on 21
March 1860 (only four days after the first military action atWaitara) (diary entry, 31 March 1860 published in the
Taranaki Herald, 31 October 1860).
892 See for example report by Ropiha to the Government on 17 September giving details oftroops and 'rebels'
killed and location and strength ofWiremu Kingi's camp atMataitawa (diary entry 17 September 1960 published
in the Taranaki Herald 22 September 1860).
893 See for example Parris' request to Tahana Papawaka and Raniera to gotoout and bring in the wanted 'rebel'
Hoera Pirere (Big Joe) from 'enemy' territory in October 1860 (diary entry 8 October 1860 published inthe
Taranaki Herald, 13 October 1860).
894 Diary entry for 1 September 1860 published in the Taranaki Herald, 8September 1860.
895 Prickett, 1981, pp 38 - 39 and diary entry 2 March 1861 published inthe Taranaki Herald, 9 March 1861. Ngati
Rahiri are ahapu ofTe Atiawa whose rohe extends north along the coastal plan from Waitara.
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River, and a settlement remained there until at least 1864 when it was noted that the
population was 23 men and 17 women.896 Maori at the Waiwakaiho Pa near the Waiwakaiho
Bridge acted as guards. 897 It was noted that these people were "entrusted with the
maintenance of an important outpost on our main line of communication with the Bell Block
house and Mahoetahi."898 Parris was certainly advocating such arrangements and was initially
concerned that the Government was not valuing the 'friendly' Maori contribution to defending
the settlement. In July 1860, he suggested that:
the limiting of rations to 100 has produced a great deal of dissatisfaction. There are
upwards of 300 who are to take duty and protect the property of the settlers and I
believe would be found to be very efficient for that purpose, if dealt fairly with, and put
on full ration and a little warm clothing the same as the militia.899
In particular he noted that Mahau and his people held the post at Waiwakaiho with only half
rations and no payorother acknowledgement, Te Waka ofTe Kawau was at the hospital and
Poharama was defending the area between his settlement at Moturoa and Whalers' gate.900
The role that Ngamotu communities took in protecting the British settlement at New Plymouth
may also be read as an expression of a sense of obligation to protect settlers from 'rebel'
attack because they regarded the settlers as manuhiri within their rohe. If, as Head has
suggested, they also regarded themselves and settlers as part ofone community connected by
whakapapa, there may also have been a sense ofobligation to protect settlers as if they were
their own 'kin'. At a practical economic and political level hapu needed to retain their position
as allies of the settlers and the Crown to protect the economic advantage that they had
cultivated to great success throughout the 1840s and 1850s. The wealth that these
relationships generated for Ngamotu communities was a significant expression of mana that
they were loath to lose. By choosing to stay within the boundaries of the 'friendly' territory
896 MrHorne's sections were numbers 1961 to1965, Town ofNew Plymouth. Diary entry 17September 1860
published in the Taranaki Herald, 22 September 1860; 'Friendly Natives and places ofsettlement ofNew
Plymouth', AD 1,1864/2089, ANZ, Wellington respectively.
897 Diary entry 17 September 1860 published in the Taranaki Herald, 22 September 1860.
898 The Taranaki Herald, 16February 1861.
899 Parris toMcLean, 21 July 1860, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0493, ATL, Wellington.
900 Ibid. Whaler's gate was atthe junction ofSouth Road and Omata Road. From early 1860 a turnpike ortollgate
was set up there bythe province. Here 'friendly' Maori entering the town were required to produce apass signed
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(between Paritutu and the town side ofthe Waiwakaiho River) these communities were able to
exercise the obligations they felt towards the settler community at New Plymouth. But at the
same time they must have been mindful of the advantage this would give them in protecting
their property from destruction by government troops and settler militia. Above all they probably
saw their continued presence in their rohe during the conflict as a way of ensuring they
retained the rights that went with ahi kaa.
(
The Impact of War on Ngamotu Hapu Boundaries of Social Trust
The experience of war for Ngamotu hapu was not as simply as the activities documented
above would suggest. In particular some Ngamotu people shifted uneasily between 'friendly'
and 'rebel' during the conflict. Again there are many layers which need exploring to truly make
sense of the meaning that these shifts in allegiance held for those involved. However at one
level they can be read as an indication ofsense ofbetrayal. At an ideological level peace, the
. .
very ideal which British missionaries had presented to them as the foundation of civil society,
and ofa new, joint world, had been disregarded by the Crown and settlers who instigated war
against Te Atiawa at Waitara in 1860. At an immediate level there was bitterness and anger at
the injustice ofthis conflict as well as the suffering caused by fear, mistrust, deaths, migrations
and displacement.
Te Atiawa had what remained of their land confiscated by the Crown, and only a fragment of it
returned in individualised title more than two decades later.?" This affected 'friendly' Maori who
had sold their land to the Crown in the 1840s and 1850s because they had both kin and land
interests in the confiscated territory. The social fabric of Te Atiawa society was irreparably
damaged. Leaders were killed inbanle.and the population was diminished by disease. This is
very evident in the minutes of the Native Land Court in North Taranaki in 1887 when the Native
reserves first came before the court. Many of those named as successors were only remotely
related to the original owners because so many individuals on the family branches had died
without lssue.?" Even those who retained land faced considerable obstacles in making it
by the military officials (Dick Scott, Ask That Mountain: The Story ofParihaka, 1975 rep byReed/Southern Cross
Books, 1994, p 16).
901 Confiscation and the Compensation Court are dealt with in The Taranaki Report, 1996, pp 107 -162.
902 See for example the investigation oftitle for Puketotara Native Reserves NO.3 subdivisions 1 to 5 (Hearing at
New Plymouth 9June 1887, Taranaki Native Land Court minute book 3, p 310).
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productive again. Staple food crops were so completely destroyed that kumara varieties had
been completely lost. In 1870 Karauria, a chief near New Plymouth with "land at Puketotara
and at the 'Meeting of the Waters', Waiwakaiho and Mangorei" was asking the superintendent,
Charles Brown, to obtain kumara varieties from Auckland to replace those which were losl.'?'
A sense of betrayal expressed itself in a number of ways. Support for missionaries and their
churches that had taught the importance of peace declined sharply. It appears that 'friendly'
Maori trust in the Wesleyan Methodist mission and church was profoundly shaken by the
Wesleyan Methodist support for the Crown during the war. Stenhouse has concluded that the
Wesleyans who had supported Maori and humanitarian movements during the 1830s and
1840s were "firmly behind" the government by 1860.904 In particular he noted that "the
Reverend John Whiteley urged [Wiremu] Te Rangitake to surrender on the ground that
Scripture enjoined subjects to submit to the governing authorities."905 Like many missionaries,
Whiteley regularly communicated information to the qovernrnent.?" By May 1863, Whiteley
was only preaching at two communities in North Taranaki: Moturoa and Mataitawa. By 1867
only two Maori chapels remained with just 78 members compared to 320 members in 1852. 907
The shifting of alliance from 'friendly' to 'rebel' can also be understood in terms of the way that
Te Atiawa people felt pulled between traditional values and cultural practices related to war
and newer Christian notions and relationships with the settler community. Some left to join the
'rebel' forces and other positioned themselves in the ambiguous territory between relationships
with their Maori kin and with settlers, working as 'double agents' passing information to
government troops and officials and conveying information about the government's intentions
to 'rebel' kin.908 It is difficult to believe that warfare that had, until less than a generation ago,
been the fundamental mechanism used by Maori "to restore the mana of groups and their
903 Charles Brown to Mclean, 11 May 1870; Charles Brown toMclean, 10 August 1870 and Charles Brown to
Mclean, 24 June 1873 all in Mclean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0178, ATl, Wellington.
904 Stenhouse, 2000, p 31.
905 Ibid.
906 Mclean, 1992, p 56 &P58.
907 Ibid, pp 59 - 60.
908 Tahana Papawaka, aNative assessor from Katere was imprisoned for passing information to 'the enemy' (Hua
Fort Diary, Vol. 1, entry for 11 January 1861, Pukeariki Library Archive, New Plymouth).
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allies damaged by an injury of some kind" had entirely been dscarded.?" Some Ngamotu
people may have seen the conflict as an opportunity to exercise utu: "an essential return,
repayment or sanction imposed after episodes of loss resulting from crime or violence" in the
past, in order to restore the mana of their kln-qroup.?" Neither is it likely that there was such
rapid change to notions about the importance of leadership in battles in establishing and
retaining rangatiratanga. It is also unclear how strong newer notions of a conceptual kinship
with settlers were against well-established concepts ofwhakapapa and obligations to kin in the
life and death situations ofwarfare.
The Impact ofWar on the Settler Community's Boundaries ofSocial Trust
The 'rebellion' of Maori against the Queen's authority (and by extension 'civilisation', law and
good government) profoundly upset any sense settlers may have had of having safely
established a British community in the province. This was compounded by settler reliance on
Ngamotu hapu and other 'friendly' hapu to defend the besieged and fortified town of New
Plymouth and the sense ofbetrayal felt by many settlers when significant Ngamotu hapuchiefs
and their people defected to fight against the Crown. These often sudden shifts of allegiances
from 'friendly' to 'rebel', as they were perceived by many in the settler community, were one of
the key reasons for the hardening of attitudes towards Maori amongst many settlers at New
Plymouth. As a consequence, Te Atiawa were slated generally as deceitful or untrustworthy,
and relations between the two communities continued to deteriorate. As early as July 1860,
Robert Parris was deeply concerned that the settler attitude towards 'friendly' Maori was
scornful and actively vindictive. He commented that:
the settlers in particular think they have a right to treat them all as rebels, and are
attempting distinctively [sic], to influence the military against them, and taking
unjustifiable liberties with their property. I have taken two cases to court ... At the
commencement of the operations, while the Declaration of Allegiance, and the passes
were being put into force, Natives were handled sometimes rouqhly."!
As Parris pointed out, 'friendly' Maori felt threatened and uncertain about the government's
intention towards them, and the behaviour of settlers did nothing to persuade them otherwise:
909 Angela Ballara, Taua:' Musket Wars', 'Land Wars' orTikanga? Warfare inMaori Society in the early
Nineteenth Century, Penguin Books, Auckland, 2003, p26.
910 Ibid.
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"one mishap, orunwarrantable injury done to one of them would confirm them in the opinion so
prevalent among the disaffected viz. that the Government, intend to exterminate ihem.?"
The 'defection' of the prominent Te Kawau leader, Te Waka, and some of the members ofthat
community strengthened the negative perceptions of settler about 'friendly' communities. In
August 1860, Te Waka joined Wiremu Kingi's 'rebel' forces. Many of the inhabitants of Te
Kawau led by Te Waka resided at Puketotara.?" These people also owned the Puketotara
Native Reserve. A comparison of names on the assent notice for Puketotara and the deed of
sale for Te Kawau shows an almost perfect match, and an 1866 schedule notes that
Puketotara was owned by "Te Henui natives under the chief Te Waka."914 But in settler eyes
their loyalty became suspect when they built a pa at Puketotara for Ngatiruanui, who were
considered 'rebels?"According to the Taranaki Herald: 'from this stockade Wi Kingi has been
receiving detailed information of all that has been going on in the town during the war through
Waka's friendly espionage. Most of Te Waka's Pakeha neighbours and friends were by this
time fully impressed with his guilt."916 Te Waka and his people had been holding the hospital
as a military post, however, after only being in occupation for a brief period he and about 12
others left to join 'rebels' and by 17 September 1860 were at Wiremu Kingi's forest camp at
Mataitawa. 917 The newspaper noted that: "no incident of the war has occasioned more
comment, and perhaps more tended to shake confidence in Native professions than the
defection of the chief Waka."918
It is uncertain What motivated Te Waka and some of his people to join the conflict against the
Crown. But interestingly the newspaper's speculation about those reasons confirms that
settlers also felt that their government had entered a reciprocal relationship with chiefs like Te
Waka, and that the government's failure to meet its obligations may have led to Te Waka
911 Parris toMcLean, 21 July 1860, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0493, ATL, Wellington.
912 Parris toMcLean, 23 July 1860, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0493, ATL, Wellington.
913 Parris toHenry Halse, 16 April 1862, AJHR, 1863, E-4, section X, No. 18.
914 'An Account ofNative Reserves in the Province ofTaranaki together with the owners thereof, AD 1,1866/610,
ROB, Vol. 136, pp 52169 - 52177.
915 The Taranaki Herald, 25 August 1860.
916 Diary entry for 1 September 1860 published in The Taranaki Herald, 8 September 1860.
917 The Taranaki Herald, 25 August 1860.
918 Ibid.
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withdrawing his support. The media suggested that Waka's 'defection' had a lot to do with the
way in which he was treated by the Crown when the Native Assessors in Taranaki were re-
evaluated:
unhappily the measure was marred by the introduction of a graduated rate of
salary... [but] his service belonged to the past, and the Native Department reckoning
on their man [Te Waka] for the future, gave him office without emolument, while it
lavished its favour on men who had, with some exceptions, yet to prove themselves?"
They speculated that this wounded Te Waka's pride. Interestingly it was reported that to
compensate for this slight the government contributed "towards the construction of a timber
built house [for Waka] in the Kawau pa."920 These contemporary opinions also point to the
possibility ofcomplex undercurrents that affected allegiances.
At an ideological level the experience ofwar cut to the heart ofthe settlers' ideals ofa new life
in a new and better country. There was death from war and disease and the suffering caused
by the separation of families (many women and children were sent to Nelson for safety). The
perimeter of the town's defences was contracted and the barracks on Marsland Hill served as
refuge for the population during frequent invasion alarms. As a consequence the town was
seriously overcrowded and deaths from disease rose dramatically. To put this in perspective,
"according to one account, no fewer than 121 settlers died from disease during the war, as
against apeace-time death rate oftwelve orthirteen per annum."921
Many settlers felt bitterness over the loss ofproperty that they had struggled to establish in the
first twenty years ofthe settlement. James Cowan's assessment ofthe 1860-61 war was that it
had resulted in "the enormous destruction of settlers' property at comparatively small cost to
the Taranaki Maoris."922 He gives as evidence a figure of three-quarters of all settler
farmhouses at Omata, Bell Block, Tataraimaka, and settlements nearer to the town lost or
damaged by burning or sacking. In total he records that "the premises of 187 farming families
919 Ibid.
920 Ibid.
921 James Belich, The Victorian Interpretation ofRacial Conflict: The Maori, the British, and the New Zealand
Wars, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, London and Buffalo, 1986, p 105.
922 James Cowan, The New Zealand Wars: A History ofthe Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period, Vol. 1,
Government Print, Wellington, 1983 (reprint), p 219.
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were destroyed, many of them in daylight, and some within rifle-range of the stockades. The
total value ofhomes and stock lost was estimated at £200, 000." 923
The Immediate Post War Period (1863 - 1865)
The Private Sphere: Native Reserves as Continuing Sites for Maori-Settler Relationships
Despite the removal ofTe Atiawa communitiesfrom New Plymouth township, and the general
inter-cultural suspicion and mistrust at a public level, individual members of these communities
continued existing lease agreements for Native reserve land. The social dimension to the
agreements isevident in the way some settler tenants became personally involved in the lives
of their Te Atiawa landlords. In July 1869, the lessee of Waiwakaiho I, W Martin, paid for the
coffins for two Maori owners, Wi Ropiha and Kororaina, in lieu of a portion of the rent on the
reserve. Each coffin cost £4 and together they accounted for £8 of the £18 rent instslment?'
Another post-war incident at Moturoa demonstrates that for Te Atiawa owners of reserves the
character of the men who they sought to incorporate into their communities was at least as
important as the potential economic gain. This incident involved a settler, Peter Priske, who
had a section near the Moturoa Native Reserve. Priske had approached Commissioner Henry
Halse to ask him to help get Poharama's permission for an access road across the reserve to
his section. Priske, Halse and Poharama visited the site, with Halse acting as an interpreter to
explain why Priske wanted the right of access to be granted. "After a little consideration
Poharama agreed to allow Mr Priske a right ofpassage to his back section, because he was a
good Pakeha." Halse believed from this comment and the context "that the privilege was not to
extend beyond Mr Priske. I mean that, in the event ofMr. Priske's section falling into the hands
of strangers, the right of passage would cease.'?" Clearly the granting of rights were
dependent on, and inseparable from inter-personal considerations.
The Public Sphere: Becoming Visitors in a Settler Space
The mistrust of Te Atiawa allies and the fear, hardship and losses of warfare resulted in a
general unwillingness to contemplate the existence of, and to create a shared Maori-Pakeha
community. Instead there were moves to permanently exclude Te Atiawa communities from
923 Ibid, Vol. 1,P219.
924 'An Account ofAll Monies Received and Expended by the Commissioners for Native Reserves, New
Plymouth, during the Year ended 31 st December 1869', 2March 1870, Taranaki Provincial Gazette, Vol. XVIII,
No.7, 1870, pp 23-26.
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the township of New Plymouth. By 1862, military and civic pressures had resulted in all the
Native reserves within the immediate boundaries of the township being alienated from Te
Atiawa control and ownership: Te Kawau Pa, Pipiriki Native Reserve No.8, Otumaikuku Native
Reserve No.9, Native Reserve No. 10 and Pukeikei Native Reserve No. 11. The re-
establishment of aTe Atiawa community at Te Kawau Pa in central New Plymouth after the
war of 1860-1861 was unthinkable for many settlers, provincial and central government
officials. Waging war against the Crown was seen as a negation of trust in peace, order and
good government, and therefore in British civilization itself. The possibility ofMaori assimilation
seemed far less certain in the colonial mind after 1860. "'Rebellions' were often seen as a
"rejection of British policies and values. As a result, the capacity of non-Europeans to match
British standards was seriously questloned.'?" This reinforced the long-standing ambivalence
amongst the settler community about the presence of Te Atiawa communities in the township
ofNew Plymouth.
In the brief peace of mid-1861, between the first and second Taranaki Wars, it was reported
that: "a proposition has ... been on foot to establish a Native village on the sections near Henui
where the pa now stands.'?" Despite the assistance of 'friendly' Te Atiawa in defending the
settlement public opinion was firmly against the proposal. One reporter was particularly
scornful: "what abomination is covered by the name of a Native village, near a colonial town,
no one in New Zealand need be in ignorance."928 The proposal was rapidly dropped: "our
readers will be glad to hear that the proprietors of the Henui sections in question has been
informed that the plan is abandoned.'?" At that time Te Henui was the very northern fringe of
the settled district, so these objections would have been even stronger had Te Atiawa had
been permitted to settle again atTe Kawau Pa.
925 Henry Halse toHRRichmond, 4 June 1866, Turton's Epitome, 0-106.
926 Porter, 1996, p 220.
927 It isuncertain whether this refers to the pa which had been built on Mr Horne's land (sections 1961 to1965
Town ofNew Plymouth) byTe Atiawa people from Waiwakaiho, Tapuirau and Katere (diary entry 17September
1860 in the Taranaki Herald, 22 September 1860) ortopa on either Te Henui Native Reserve No. 15orPurakau
Native Reserve No. 16.
928 The Taranaki Herald, 27 April 1861.
929 Ibid.
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However there was no possibility ofTe Atiawa resettling at Te Kawau simply because they had
reluctantly sold it to the Crown in 1862. The sale was the end result of a breach of trust on the
part of the Crown, Te Atiawa had agreed to place the pa in the hands of the government only
after they were assured "that at the termination ofhostilities, the Kawau Pa should be restored
to them in its entirety." 930 As we have seen, the decision by Te Atiawa to leave this settlement
sprung out of a profound belief in peace and a joint future with the settlers. The agreement
demonstrated a high level of trust, and a belief in mutual give and take, all aimed at a stable
and productive future. However it also unwittingly opened the door for the Crown's possession
of the pa, and its subsequent construction of a road through it; and if this road had not made
the pa worthless to Te Atiawa it is doubtful they would have signed deed of sale in favour of
the Crown in 1862.
Despite the agreement the Crown had made with Te Atiawa "the Government appointed the
resident magistrate and two northern chiefs (Cain and Ahipere) to value the land at Kawau" in
April 1861.931 Parris considered the valuation was "for the purpose '" of endeavouring to
purchase it. "932 It appears that some Ngamotu hapu were consulted and gave their consent to
sell the pa. McLean reported that "in the early part ofApril last I had several conversations with
the Natives upon the subject, and they appeared to me quite willing that the land be sold to the
Governrnent.?" However the consent was neither publicly given nor inclusive ofall the owners
of the land. In April 1862 "four of the principal Natives of the Kawau Pa" went to Parris to
complain that a work had begun on a road across the pa to connect Currie Street to the
beach.934 Parris considered it "rather injudicious" that work had begun on the road before the
land had been acquired by the Government but only "inasmuch as it is calculated to embitter
the Native owners, and render them less practicable to negotiate for the same." He suggested
that if the Government were going to follow up their valuation then "the sooner it was done the
better.'?" On 9 May 1862 he was instructed by the Government to begin negotiations with Te
930 Parris toHenry Halse, 16April 1862, AJHR, 1863, E-4, section X, No. 18,
931 Ibid.
932 Ibid.
933 'Memorandum on Te Kawau Pa', Donald McLean, 22November 1861, Turton's Epitome, 0-71.
934 Parris toHenry Halse, 16April 1862, AJHR, 1863, E-4, section X, No. 18.
935 Ibid.
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Atiawa. 936 It took six months for negotiations to be completed, but it is unclear why this was the
case. The pa was finally purchased for £550 on 16 October 1862.937
The settler determination to eliminate Native reserves and the Te Atiawa communities that
lived on them from the township of New Plymouth and instead to provide temporary places for
them on settler cultural terms was at odds with the earlier intention of government that the
reserves be a means of assimilating Maori. At a practical level this tension between
marginalisation and assimilation prompted government officials in New Plymouth after the wars
to focus on ways to provide facilities for Te Atiawa in the township, but at the same time to
avoid making space available for permanent autonomous Maori settlements. This effectively
reduced Te Atiawa to being mere visitors in an increasingly settler place. Commissioner Parris
saw the need to provide a hostel for Maori visiting the town. Plans for a hostel were underway
before Te Kawau was vacated; in 1859 Parris noted that Maori from communities beyond the
town had no place to rest when they came into New Plymouth with oxen and carts to trade.
Parris had been renting abuilding for this purpose at his own cost but was now requesting the
government fund a purpose-built facility. 938 By May 1859, Parris had selected a central New
Plymouth site adjacent to a military reserve and was trying to get the superintendent to agree
to Maori using the military reserve for their horses and oxen while in town.939 By the end of
November the building was completed and the bill sent to the qovernment'" It appears that
the hostel orsimilar ventures were functioning until at least 1870.941
Atan ideological level hostels embodied conflicting British impulses to assimilate Maori, and to
marginalize them. The idea ofhostels as a tool for the assimilation first appeared in 1842 when
Bishop Selwyn, one ofthe Crown's first trustees of Native reserves, outlined aplan for building
hostels for Maori in towns to act as sites for training Maori in British habits. He announced that
936 Henry Halse to Parris, 9May 1862, AJHR, 1863, E-4, section X, No. 19.
937 For two versions ofthe purchase deed see R19/43, Land Transfer Office, New Plymouth and
MA-MLP 1/6, pp 152 -155, ANZ, Wellington.
938 Parris tothe Native Secretary, 16 March 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1, P209, ANZ, Wellington.
939 Parris tothe Native Secretary, 26 May 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1,pp 216 - 217, ANZ, Wellington.
940 Parris to the Native Secretary, 18 November 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1,pp234, ANZ, Wellington.
, 941 In 1870 the Civil Commissioner wrote to the Native Department requesting that "he be authorised to spend
£50 inerecting a small house for the accommodation ofNatives visiting town" (70/1451 in MA 3/4, ANZ,
Wellington).
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The plan of the trustees is this:- 1st. To build in every town a hostelry for the natives
who come there to trade, on a plan similar to an almshouse in England, with a small
chapel for their daily worship, and convenient boxes and cupboards for their goods; in
time we may have aclergyman to live in the midst of them.942
These would be coupled with schools where "all good and useful arts and habits may be
taught, from the earliest age."943 The hostel was implicitly and sometimes explicitly contrasted
with the pa. Hostels functioned as assimilating institutions by removing Maori from pa where
their power, communal social organisation and custom remained intact. When placed in a
British space Maori were expected to function as individuals and abide by British customs and
be supervised by the settler or government official charged with running the hostel. However
the hostel can be seen as an ambiguous venture: a place where in the very process of
assimilation Maori would be separated from settlers.
Parris explicitly contrasted the hostel he was building at New Plymouth with Te Kawau Pa,
hoping that it would provide an alternative to the pa for those coming into the town?" He also
envisaged the hostel as a controlled 'civilising' environment, commenting that it should "not
[be] allowed to degenerate from a quiet resting place for well conducted Natives, to a place of
evil resort for dissipated characters.?'' However he also considered that the hostel would
keep Maori out of the way ofsettlers. He argued that a hostel was necessary because visiting
Maori had no place to go but the street "which isfrequently acause ofunpleasantness with the
Europeans,'?"
Conclusion
Leases between Te Atiawa and settler individuals most often sprang out of relationships
between the parties, and the social obligations inherent in these leases both expressed and
furthered the existing relationship. Those settlers best positioned to form relationships with Te
942 Extract from the letters and visitation [51] of the Bishop ofNew Zealand - journal written atNelson, 21 August
to29 August 1842 inAppendix to the 15th report of the New Zealand Company, NO.1.
943 Ibid.
944 Parris to the Native Secretary, 26 May 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1, pp 216 - 217, ANZ, Wellington.
945 Ibid.
946 Parris tothe Native Secretary, 16 March 1859, MA-MLP-NP 1, P209, ANZ, Wellington. These tensions were
apparent inNew Plymouth even in the twentieth century when many hotels operated a 'colour bar' that excluded
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Atiawa individuals were those who had married Te Atiawa women or whose professional lives
had brought them into contact with Te Atiawa communities. These circumstances fostered a
willingness on the part of particular settlers to expand the boundaries of their social trust to
include Maori. For Te Atiawa these leases were a means of incorporating influential settlers
into their own communities. The settler tenant was then given the right to use the reserve land
but in exchange was expected to support or even intervene on behalf of their Te Atiawa
landlords. The cases that have come to light so far indicate that the settlers involved readily
adapted to these obligations.
These private arrangements were acounterpoint to the often public tensions between the two
cultures in the lead up to the outbreak of war at Waitara in March 1860. The vision Ngamotu
hapu had developed ofashared future with the settlers provided mechanisms which motivated
them to include the settlers in their economic and social world, and even to consider the two
peoples tied together by a conceptual whakapapa. It was a vision which motivated Ngamotu
hapu to agree to leave Te Kawau pa, and to trust promises made to them by Crown officials
that it would be returned to them after the conflict. However the cultural values of the settler
community as a whole provided no equivalent mechanism that would allow them to publicly
welcome Te Atiawa communities in the midst of the township. In fact a number of ideological
and practical considerations led to a level of public hostility towards Ngamotu hapu and their
settlement at Te Kawau Pa.
One of the major consequences of the first and second Taranaki Wars for these two
communities was that each suffered abetrayal offaith in the other, and each had their ideals of
a peaceful and prosperous future shattered. Many Ngamotu hapu found themselves pulled
between new ideas of peace as the foundation of civil society and older practices which had
been fundamental to asociety where war and utu served important functions. Once the conflict
ended the settler community were unwilling to allow Te Atiawa to live in or near the township.
In a further breach of inter-cultural trust the Crown allowed a road to bisect Te Kawau pa and
Ngamotu hapu reluctantly agreed to sell the pa. As a consequence there was no hope of re-
Maori. (John Hutton, Aspects ofthe Social History ofMaori in Taranaki, 1880 - 1960, Overview Report for the
Waitangi Tribunal and the Crown Forest Rental Trust, April 1998, pp 196-197).
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establishing their community in the heart of the township. Settlers rejected another location for
aTe Atiawa settlement at Te Henui. Although a hostel was built for Maori in the town, it was a
westernised space in which they were expected to behave as assimilated individuals but were
at the same time separated from settlers with whom they were supposed to aspire to integrate.
Within less than 25 years of the establishment of the settlement of New Plymouth Ngamotu
hapu found themselves visitors in a British place.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
The connection between assimilationist policies in the early colonial period and the provision of
Native reserves by the New Zealand Company and by the Crown has been made by a number
of historians. However, historians have yet to fully draw out the ways in which policies of
assimilation functioned as visions of the Maori future within an evolving Anglo-settler society,
and by extension to illuminate colonial attitudes towards inter-cultural relations. What is
remarkable is the consistency and sheer number of assimilationist statements by Crown
officials involved in the creation and management of Native reserves from 1840 to 1875.
Though this agenda remained prominent, official views about the way Native reserves would
function to assimilate Maori changed markedly between the 1840s and the mid-1850s.
Taranaki iwi and hapu ofTe Atiawa were one ofthe testing grounds for this experiment. Native
reserves created in the FitzRoy block (acquired in 1844), the Omata block and the Grey block
(both acquired in 1847) were scattered amongst the sections belonging to settlers in the British
township of New Plymouth in the hope that contact with settlers would lead to Maori emulating
their 'civilised' neighbours. However, a significant proportion of the Native reserves set aside
for Te Atiawa in the Waiwakaiho block (acquired in 1853-1854) were later re-purchased from
the Crown by individuals. Likewise in the Hua blocks (acquired in 1854) a substantial
proportion of the land retained by hapu in the wake of the purchase was re-purchased by
individuals from theCrown using a proportion of the purchase money paid to hapu for the
block. In this way individualised Crown-derived title would be created thus, it was hoped,
breaking down the communal nature of Maori society and bringing them to adhere to British
legal, social and economic norms. The evolution of Native reserve policy demonstrates that
Native reserves were at the vanguard of attempts to change Maori society. However the
possibility of Maori alienating land held in Crown grants had potentially serious, irreversible
long-term effects for hapu. This was particularly the case because Native reserves were the
only land hapu retained after the purchases, and they were dependant upon them to sustain
their communities and retain equal economic, political and social standing alongside settlers as
Anglo-settler communities were established and expanded.
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One of the most rewarding aspects of this research has been the attempt to understand the
vision particular Te Atiawa hapu at New Plymouth had about how they would share their rohe
with the Pakeha newcomers. Though their initial expectations ofbeing able to absorb into their
own communities all the settlers who would arrive rapidly proved unrealistic, Ngamotu hapu
consistently entered transactions with the New Zealand Company and the Crown in adesire to
establish and sustain mutually beneficial relationships with the newcomers. Their hope was
that these relationships would lead to the evolution ofajoint Maori-Pakeha community in which
hapu would remain both self-determining and politically, socially and economically equal with
settlers. These desires were underpinned by cultural values and practice regarding the
incorporation of strangers into their communities and the respective rights and obligations of
tangata whenua and manuhiri. These world-views have been explored by other historians and
feature prominently in Waitangi Tribunal historiography yet there has been little attempt to see
how these might have informed the way in which hapu utilised their Native reserves through
leasing to settlers.
This micro-level study of the ways in which Ngamotu hapu ofTe Atiawa engaged with settlers
at New Plymouth restores the perspective both of hapu and settlers to the history of Native
reserves in the province. In doing so it reveals both the astonishing degree to which these
hapu engaged with the capitalist economy which evolved in the province, and the remarkable
economic success of their ventures before the war of 1860-1861. Lease arrangements of
Native reserve land between individual Ngamotu people (and their hapu) and settlers, made an
important contribution to the economic development ofhapu. However what becomes clear for
the first time is the way in which the leasing of certain reserves or portions of reserves gave
expression to hapu strategies for utilising the reserves to sustain their communities and
generate wealth. Examining particular instances ofpartnerships between hapu and settlers has
illuminated the ways in which settler desire for suburban land coincided with both hapu desires
for relationships with settlers and for the benefits these would bring. It has also highlighted the
surprising extent of the social dimension to these relationships, strongly suggesting that lease
arrangements were both grounded in inter-cultural relationships and created the conditions for
the further development of those relationships. Thus Native reserves at New Plymouth can be
re-conceptualised as sites of Maori-Pakeha relationship: as a contact zone - a place of
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negotiation, exchange and agency, as much as an expression of Crown control over Maori
lives.
The extent and nature ofthese established relationships between Ngamotu people and settlers
in the leasing of Native reserves proved to have a defining influence on the work of the
Taranaki commissioners of Native reserves appointed under the New Zealand Native
Reserves Act 1856, and upon the extent of their success. Despite previous research little was
known about the way that the commissioners in this province approached the task of bringing
reserves under the Act and in subsequently administering them. What becomes evident is that
their initial pro-active approach was. rapidly replaced by a role as intermediaries between Te
Atiawa and settlers who came to them with leases already arranged. Investigating the many
connections between Ngamotu communities and the individual commissioners provided a
further insight into the intertwining of Maori and Pakeha lives in Taranaki before 1875. In
particular these connections cast new light on the way Crown officials operated within both the
Maori and settler spheres and between the two worlds.
A statistical analysis of the Native reserves offers a comparison between those that were
brought under the operation of the Native Reserves Act and those that remained in Te Atiawa
control. This .revealed the limits of the commissioners' success in seeking to administer the
reserves. Over half of the total reserve acreage remained in Te Atiawa control. However, there
were considerable disparities between the reserves Te Atiawa controlled and those that the
commissioners administered. Reserves not brought under the Act were overwhelmingly rural
reserves and orwere in the Waiwakaiho and Hua blocks; conversely, asignificant proportion of
those administered by the commissioners were suburban reserves surrounding the town of
New Plymouth. Settlers were particularly keen to lease suburban reserves of flat fern-covered
land within easy reach of the township of New Plymouth for small farms. In many cases the
parties brought their arrangement before the commissioners and the commissioners then had
the reserve brought under the Act in order to grant a formal lease. Hence the desire of Te
Atiawa to let reserves (and the willingness of settlers to lease them) was one of the most
significant factors in Te Atiawa choices about which reserves to bring under the Act. Ngamotu
hapu were able to mitigate the marginalising effect of losing control of so many of their
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reserves near the township by living on parts ofsome of the larger reserves there and allowing
parts to be leased to settlers. However, this pattern had profound long-term consequences for
hapu because, in the process of bringing those reserves under the Act, the Native title was
extinguished and they became Crown land administered in trust for those who signed the
assent. Having lost the ownership of the most commercially valuable of their reserves Te
Atiawa were poorly placed to develop businesses in New Plymouth as the settlement
prospered.
By shedding new light on the private sphere of inter-cultural relationships at New Plymouth in
this period this research has provided a counterpoint to the essentially ambivalent sentiments
which found public expression in settler community attitudes towards Te Atiawa and their
Native reserves within the vicinity of the township. The consistent theme of inter-cultural
relations in the public sphere was the desire of settlers to keep Te Atiawa communities at a
distance from the British township. These pressures had a significant influence on the spatial
patterns of reserves allocated in the Omata and Grey blocks in 1847, leading to the
aggregation of reserve land into larger blocks on the suburban and rural fringe of the settled
area. These patterns were a visible manifestation of tensions between Victorian cultural
notions about the duty of British colonists to 'civilise' Maori and Crown policies of assimilation
based on these ideals; and settler unease about the 'savage other' in their midst. Inthe climate
of fear generated by the Taranaki Wars of 1860 - 1863 these misgivings amongst settlers at
New Plymouth easily turned to active mistrust. In this regard the Taranaki Wars emerge as a
critical juncture in the relationship between the two communities, irrevocably shrinking the
boundaries of social trust and leaving a legacy of mistrust and bitterness. It is also clear that
this mistrust contributed significantly to the alienation of Native reserves and the removal of
Ngamotu communities from the township of New Plymouth in the immediate lead-up to the
war, and cut off the possibility of Ngamotu hapu resettling in the township when hostilities
ceased. The impact of this alienation of reserves was particularly marked in New Plymouth
because it deprived Ngamotu hapu of the few town sections allocated to them as Native
reserves.
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The alienation of all their Reserve lands, landmarks and sacred places in the centre of what is
now New Plymouth city has meant that Te Atiawa became, to some extent, manuhiri (visitors)
in their own landscape. They have struggled to have a physical presence in the city: a place
where they had once controlled all the resources of the land, rivers and sea. In particular the
alienation of central New Plymouth Native reserves has meant that there has been no land on
which to establish a marae in the city area. This has been one of the most significant losses for
Ngamotu hapu. As Sir Hugh Kawharu of Ngati Whatua has observed ofhis own iwi, who were
deprived ofa marae in Auckland, the lack of a turangawaewae, a place to stand, has deprived
hapu of the traditional arena for the conduct of tribal affairs and for rangatiratanga (authority),
whenua (land), taonga (cultural heritage) and tikanga (custom), the values which govern
them.947 Lack of land in the city has also hindered Te Atiawa participation in the economic
growth of the province, and has meant that in recent years they have had to lease land and
buildings tohave apresence in the city.
Te Atiawa have felt keenly the economic and spiritual loss of their land at New Plymouth, and
of the reserves that had promised to sustain their communities and allow them to participate in
the growth of the city which is now the economic hub of the province. Successive generations
ofTe Atiawa have challenged the Crown's actions and attempted to regain a place to stand in
the city. In' 1915, the people petitioned Parliament for the return of Pukeariki or for
compensation for its loss.?" In 1922, hapu petitioned for compensation for Pukeariki and its
desecrated urupa?" In 1932 when attempts were made by hapu to have a piece of land set
aside for a marae above the port, the Harbour Board which owned the land in question,
refused on the grounds that the land would be needed for port expansion, and the City Council
also refused a request to provide land.?" Again in 1937, the people petitioned parliament for
the return of ownership and control of reserves and waahitapu including Pukeariki and Te
Kawau.": Statements about the loss of these pa and Native reserves are prominent in the
947 Ian Hugh Kawharu, 'Mana and the Crown: A Marae atOrakei', in Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of
the Treaty of Waitangi, Ian Hugh Kawharu (ed), Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989, p 211.
948 Petition byNeha Kipa and 59 others, Petition No. 240 (1915), AJHR, 1928, 1-3, P12.
949 Petition byNeha Kipa and others, 22 December 1922, inLS 20/19/15 Pukeariki Pa file, L1NZ, New Plymouth.
950 The Taranaki Herald, 13 June 1935 and Taranaki Harbour Board Minutes, 11 JUly 1935, Westgate Technical
Services Archive, New Plymouth.
951 Petition by MorereWhatitiri and others, 29 September 1937, inLS 20/19/15 Pukeariki Pafile, L1NZ,
New Plymouth.
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statement of claim that Te Atiawa filed with the Waitangi Tribunal in 1986. In 1996, over one
hundred and thirty years after these losses were sustained, the Waitangi Tribunal delivered its
report on the Taranaki claim. At the same time aviable opportunity arose for the Iwi to regain a
foothold in the city. Barrett Street Hospital (part of Otumaikuku Native Reserve No.9) and the
New Plymouth railway station (Parahuka, the original marae of Pukeariki) were declared
surplus to the Crown's requirements.
Iwi were invited to make a case for their return, and if the Crown judged the places in question
to be significant enough the land would be retained and placed in a "land bank." These cases
were successful and'these lands are now likely to be part of the settlement of the Nga Iwi 0
Taranaki Treaty claim. Their return will be an important and symbolic step for Te Atiawa intheir
struggle to regain a place to stand in New Plymouth.
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Appendix 1: Statistical Analysis of the Composition of Native Reserves Allocated in the FitzRoy, Ornata, Grey, Hua and
Waiwakaiho Blocks
Status Total Native Total Number of Percentage (by FOG Native No. ofFOG FOG Native WH Native No. of WH WH Native
Reserve Native Reserves typeof land) Reserve Native Reserve acres Reserve Native Reserve acres as
Acreage Acreage Reserves aspercent of Acreage Reserves percent of total
total acreage acreage
Overall 4822.05 49 100% 1862.93 25 38.63% 2959.12 24 61.37%
Ofthis: Ofthis: •
T=28.76 T=6 T=0.60% T=28.76 T=6 T=1. 54% T=O T=O T=O%
5=2205.29 S=34 5=45.73% S=543.17 S=15 S=29.16% 5=1662.12 5=19 5=56.17%
RlS=560 RlS=1 Rl5=11.61% R1S=560 R1S=1 R1S=30.06% 5/R=0 Rl5=0 Rl5=O%
R=2028 R=8 R=42.10% R=731 R=3 R=39.24% R=1297 R=5 R=43.83%
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Appendix 2: Statistical Analysis Comparing Native Reserves in the FitzRoy, Ornata, Grey, Waiwakaiho and Hua Blocks
Brought under the Operation of the New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 against those not Brought under the Act
Acres No. of %of total No. ofacres No. of %ofacres No. of acres No. of %of acres
overall reserves reserve acres which were reserves which were whichwere reserves whichwere
overall allocated FOG reserves which were FOG reserve WH reserves whichwere WH reserve
FOG reserves acres WH acres
reserves
Native Reserves 2542.34 20 52.72% 1658.84 15 65.25% 883.50 5 34.75%
brought under
the operation of T=16.86 T=4 T=0.66% T=16.86 T=4 T=1.02% T=O T=O T=O%
theAct 5=803.57 5=10 5=25.35% S=350.98 S=7 S=21.16% 5=293.50 5=3 5=33.22%
Rl5=560 Rl5=1 Rl5=22.03% R1S=560 R1S=1 R1S=33.76% Rl5=0 Rl5=0 Rl5=0%
R=1321 R=5 R=51. 96% R=731 R=3 R=44.07% R=590 R=2 R=66.78%
Native Reserves 2279.72 29 47.28% 204.09 10 8.95% 2075.63 19 91. 05%
NOT brought
under the T=11.09 T=2 T=0.49% T=11.9 T=2 T=5.83% T=O T=O T=O%
operation of the 5=1561.63 5=24 5=68.50% S=192. 19 S=8 S=94.17% 5=1368.63 5=16 5=65.94%
Act Rl5=0 Rl5=0 R15=0% R1S=O R1S=O R1S=O% Rl5=0 Rl5=0 Rl5=0%
R=707 R=3 R=31.01% R=O R=O R=O% R=707 R=3 R=34.06%
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Appendix 3: list of Native Reserves in theFitzRoy, Ornata, Grey, Waiwakaiho and Hua Blocks Brought under the
Operation of the Native Reserves Act 1856
Block Native Reserve Type of land Acreage Acreage Date of gazette notice Date of publication
(a:r:p)952 (decimal)
Grey PtArarepe NR 2 R 150:0:00 150 14 March 1859 31 May 1858953
Fitz Otumaikuku NR 9 T 8:1:209; 4 8. 38 26May 1859 31 May 18599; ;
Grey Moturoa NR 1 S 200:0:00 200 28July 1859 8 August 18599)0
Waiw Waiwakaiho J - Whatapiupiu R 540:0:00 540 19January 1860 16August 1861 9;/
Fitz Pipiko NR 8 T 3:3:37 3. 98 19September 1859 6 November 1861
Fitz Pukekura NR 12 T 1:2:00 1.5 22 September 1859 6 November 18619;~
Fitz Pukenui NR 14 S 14:0:00 14 4 June 1862 6 December 1862
Fitz Pukewaranql NR 20 S 17:0:00 17 4 June 1862 6 December 18629; 9
Fitz Marangi NR 24 S 0:2:00 0.5 14April 1866 15August 1866
Om Ruataku NR 6 R 10:0:00 10 14April 1866 15August 1866
Grey PtArarepe NR 2 R 200:0:00 200 18April 1866 15August 1866
Hua Hoehoe S 50:0:00 50 1 August 1866 15August 1866
Hua Upokotauaki S 50:0:00 50 1August 1866 15August 1866960
Grey Puketotara NR 3 SIR 560:0:00 560 24November 1866 11 February 1867
Grey Ratahangae NR 4 S 50:0:00 50 26November 1866 11 February 1867
952 Acreages from Ford, 'Title Histories of the Native Reserves made in the FitzRoy, Grey and Ornata Purchases', 1991 and Harris, 'Title Histories of the Native Reserves made in
the Bell Block, Tarurutangi, Hua, Cooke's Farm and Waiwakaiho Purchases, 1991.
953 Notice ofassent nld, New Zealand Gazette, 1859, No. 16, p 109.
954 Ford's figure is incorrect stating more than 40 perches sothis figure is taken from 'Return of Native Reserves made in the Cession ofNative Territory to the Crown, also, of
Crown Grants to be issued toNatives and ofCrown Grants already issued', AJHR, 1862, E-10, P7.
955 Notice ofassent, 26May 1859, New Zealand Gazette, No. 16, 1859, P109.
956 Notice ofassent, 28July 1859, New Zealand Gazette, 1859, No. 27, P188.
957 Notice ofassent, 19January 1860, New Zealand Gazette, 1861, No. 38, pp221 - 222. This notice gives the area of the reserve as 500 acres.
958 Notice ofassent, 19 September 1859, New Zealand Gazette, 1861, No. 47, pp 288 - 289.
959 Notice ofassent, 4 June 1862, New Zealand Gazette, 1862, No. 41, p 357.
960 Notice ofassent, 14April 1866, New Zealand Gazette, 1866, No. 46, pp 317 - 319.
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Block Native Reserve Type of land Acreage Acreage Date of gazette notice Date of publlcation
(a:r:p\952 (decimal)
Fitz TeHenui NR 15 T 3:0:00 3 26 November 1866 11 February 186To
Waiw Waiwakaiho K R 50:0:00 50 5April 1867 8April 1867
Om Ratapihipihi NR 5 R 371:0:00 371 n/d 8April 1867962
Fitz Pukaka NR18 S 28:1:37 28.48 n/d 1 March 1872
Fitz Raiomiti NR 23 S 41:0:00 41 n/d 1March 1872963
Waiw Waiwakaiho C S 193:2:00 193.5 20 October 1874 22 October 18749 04
TOTAL 20 2542.34
961 Notice ofassent, 26 November 1866, New Zealand Gazette, 1867, No.9, p69 - 71,
962 Order in Council, 5April 1867, New Zealand Gazette, 1867, No. 21, P142.
963 Order inCouncil, New Zealand Gazette, No. 11, 1872, P145.
964 Order in Council, New Zealand Gazette, No. 55, 1874, P701.
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Appendix 4: A List of Native Reserves in the FitzRoy, Ornata,
Grey, Waiwakaiho and Hua Blocks Not Brought under the
Operation of the Native Reserves Act, 1856
Block Native Reserve Type of Acreage Acreage
land (amp)' (decimal)
Fitzroy Native Reserve 7 S 75:0:00 75
Fitzroy Native Reserve 10 T 10:0:00 10
Fitzroy Native Reserve 11 T 1:3:24 1.9
Fitzroy Native Reserve 13 S 0:2:00 O. 5
Fitzroy Purakau Native Reserve 16 S 15:2:30 15. 69
Fitzroy Pukeweka Native Reserve 17 S 86:0:00 86
Fitzroy Native Reserve 19 S 4:0:00 4
Fitzroy Native Reserve 21 S 9:0:00 9
Fitzroy Native Reserve 22 S 1:0:00 1
Fitzroy Native Reserve 25 S 1:0:00 1
Hua Paraiti S 48:3:11 48. 82
Hua Oropuriri S 47:2:07 47. 54
Hua Hoewaka S 49:1:32 49. 45
Hua Tapuirau S 50:0:00 50
By special Manganaha S 55:0:00 55
arrangement
By special WaiwakaiholKatere S 504:3:36 504.98
arrangement
Waiwakaiho Purakau- S 47:2:27 47. 67
Waiwakaiho A
Waiwakaiho Raupiu- S 101:0:10 101. 06
Waiwakaiho B
Waiw Waiwakaiho D S 30:0:00 30
Waiw Waiwakaiho E S 76:0:00 76
Waiwakaiho Waiwakaiho F S 50:1:16 50. 53
Waiwakaiho Waiwakaiho FA S 51:0:00 51
Waiwakaiho Waiwakaiho G S 73:3:20 73. 88
Waiw Waiwakaiho H- Whatapiupiu S 53:0:15 53.09
Waiwakaiho Waiwakaiho I S 53:3:05 53. 78
Waiwakaiho Rekereke- R 193:0:00 193
Waiwakaiho L
Waiwakaiho Araheke- R 464:0:00 464
Waiwakaiho M
Waiwakaiho Mangorei- R 50:0:00 50
Waiwakaiho N
Waiwakaiho Te Puia- S 76:0:00 76
1 From Ford, 'Title Histories ofthe Native Reserves made in the FitzRoy, Omata and Grey Purchases, 1991 and
Harris, 'Title Histories ofthe Native Reserves made inthe Bell Block, Tarurutangi, Hua, Cooke's Farm and
Waiwakaiho Purchases', 1991.
297
Block Native Reserve Type of ' Acreage Acreage
land (amp)' (decimal)
Waiwakaiho a
TOTAL 29 2279.72
TOTAL NATIVE 49 4822.06
RESERVES ALLOCATED
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Appendix 5: Table Showing the Names of Native Reserves 'Owners' Listed in Gazette Notices Bringing Reserves under the New
Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856 and 1866 Army Department Schedule
Document MoturoaNR 1 Ararepe NR2 Puketotara NR 3 Ratahangae NR 4 Ratapihinihi NR 5
Gazette Notice dated 28/7/1859 150 acres, 14/3/1859 dated 24/11/1866 Dated 26/11/1866 No names of owners
Poharima [sic] TeReo TeWaka Kipa Manihera No agents name
Wikawaho Waka Tipene HetaHeke NZ Gaz No. 21,
Kataraina Wituri Hone Wetere Emore 8/4/1867, p 142
Himaima Kerementia Paratene Parris
Miriama Neratini Paora NZGazNo.9,
Hoera Parepare ManiHera Heta 11/2/1867, pp 69 -70.
Wiremu Makoare Hare Karira -
Paharima Piripi Tamati Wiremu Ihaka Te Kauri
Piripi Taituha Emore
Mere Poharama Tahana
Flight Hoera Parepare Paratene Kuriwhare
NZ Gaz 1859 No. 27, Manihera Kipa Parris
8/8/1859, P 188. Hana Wetere NZGazNo.9,
Flight 11/2/1867, pp 70 - 71.
NZGazNo.16,
31/5/1859, p 109.
200 acres dated
18/4/1866
Poharama
Wi Kawau
Piripi Ngahuka
Hoera Parepare
Mori Kamuaka
Wi Makuari
Parris
NZ Gaz No. 46,
15/8/1866 pp 317 - 318.
ArmyDepartment "Moturoa Natives under "200 acres the above "Henui Natives under the "The late Assessor Hone "The late Chief [sic]
Schedule of Native the Chief Poharama". Natives [Moturoa Chief TeWaka many of Rophia [sic] ofWaiwakaiho Eruera & Poruta and
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Document MoturoaNR 1 Ararepe NR 2 Puketotara NR 3 Ratahangae NR 4 Ratapihipihi NR 5
Reserves, 1866, AD1 Natives under the Chief whom have been in and his relatives." their relatives. About 75
1866/61 in RDB Vol. 136 Poharama] 150 acres insurrection against the acres of this reserve was
pp 52169 - 52177 Ropata Ngarongomate Govtduring the last war." claimed by rebels."
and brothers. This 150
acres has been sold to
Europeans under the
Native Reserves Act and
Crown Grants from the
Govt issued for the
same."
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Documents RuatakuNR6 UnknownNR 7 Pipiko NR8 Otumaikuku NR 9 UnknownNR 10
Gazette Notice Dated 14/4/1866 NONE Dated 19/9/1859 Dated 26/5/1859 NONE
Hoera Pirere Manahi Poharama
Parris More Herihana
NZ Gaz No. 46, Kepa KoMeriRipo
15/8/1866, pp 317 - 318. Ko WiPatene Piripi
Poharama Te Whiti Hoera Parepare
Karipa More
Hoera Parepare Taniora
Piripi Mori
Hoera Pirere Flight
Flight NZGazNo.16,
NZ Caz No. 47, 31/5/1859, P 109.
6/11/1861, pp 288 - 289.
Army Department "Manaihi and his two "Ropata Ngarongomate "Sold to Provincial "Sold to Provincial "Kawau Natives
Schedule of Native brothers Hoera Piere and Leased to Europeans." Govt." Govt." Exchanged for town
Reserves, 1866, AD 1 Wi Patene. Manaihi and sections."
1866/61 in RDB Vol. Wi Patene were killed at
136 pp 52169 - 52177 Sentry Hill. Hoera Piere
was wounded."
Documents Pukeikie NR 11 Pukekura NR 12 Unknown NR 13 Pukenui NR 14 Te Henui NR 15
Gazette Notice NONE Dated 22/9/1859 NONE Dated 41611862 Dated 26111/1866
Ko Harieta Wright No owners names Kipa Manihera
Louisa Wright Flight MereKipa
Kipa Ngamoke NZ Gaz No. 41, Parris
Flight 6/12/1862, P 357. NZ Gaz No. 9,
NZ Gaz No. 47, 1112/1867, pp 70 - 71.
6111/1861, P 288.
Army Department "Kawau Natives "Harieta daughter ofTe "Timotu Kekeu. Kileed "Te Henui Natives under "Te Waro. Let an
Schedule of Native Exchanged for town Munu. Widow ofan old at Sentry Hill Payment Te Waka. Eight of the European."
Reserves, 1866, AD 1 sections." whaler, John Wright." for No. 11." original owners of this
1866/61 in RDB Vol. reserve are rebels."
136 pp 52169 - 52177
Documents Purakau NR 16 Pukeweka NR 17 Pukaka NR 18 Unknown NR 19 Pukewaranzi NR 20
Gazette Notice NONE NONE N/d NONE Dated 4/6/1862
No owners names No owners names
NZ Gaz No.11, 1/3/1872, P Flight
145. NZ Gaz No. 41,
6/12/1862, p 357.
Army Department "Wi Tana, brother of Wi "The old chief Rangi "Wi Te Ahoaho and Not listed "Kipa and Heta. Part let
Schedule of Native Tako. Wi Tana has been Matatoru and family. This brother and Hemi Poaka. to an European the
Reserves, 1866, AD 1 with the Taranaki rebels reserve isnothing but sand 46:0:37 leased to an remainder in the
1866/61 in RDB Vol. during the war." hills (iron sand)." European the remainder occupation of Heta."
136 pp 52169 - 52177 in occupation ofHemi
Poaka."
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Documents Unknown NR 21 Unknown NR 22 Raiomiti NR 23 Maranzi NR 24 Unknown NR 25
Gazette Notice NONE NONE n/d Dated 14/4/1866 NONE
No owners names TeWaka
NZ Gaz N0.11, 1/3/1872, Parris
p 145. NZ Gaz No.46,
15/8/1866, pp 317 - 319.
Army Department "Martin Tupoki and Wi "Karira (policeman). "Wi Te Ahoaho and "Te Waka. This reserve "Rangi Kapuoho
Schedule of Native Ropiu [sic Ropiha]. This reserve on the farm brother and Hemi Poaka. is on Mr Fishleigh's deceased. This and
Reserves, 1866, AD 1 Exchanged for town of the late Mr John Smith 46:0:37 leased to an allotment No. 30. Te several other small
1866/61 in RDB Vol. sections (reserve who always had European the remainder Waka consented to sell it claims ofRangi
136 pp 52169 - 52177 revested in Mr possession of it but no in occupation ofHemi and Mr Fishleigh offered Kapuoho's were merged
Richardson)." consideration was ever Poaka." £5 for it (its full value) in No.2 reserve, 150
paid to Karira for it." but the last Native acres of which was given
Minister as of the him as compensation."
opinion that it should be
sold by auction
supposing I presume that
it might fetch a higher
price but the probability
is it would not fetch
much for being an
insignificant piece in the
centre of a farm no one
would be likely to
oppose Mr Fishleigh, and
he may not bid more than
£5 for it and as £5.is the
full value of half an acre
ofcountry land it would
be unfair to wish Mr
Fishleigh to pay more
and equally unfair to Te
Waka to let it be sold for
a norminal sum."
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Documents TeKawauPa Te Puia Waiwakaiho a Waiwakaiho A (50:0:0) Raupiu Waiwakaiho B C (200:0:0)
(50:0:0) (100:0:0)
Gazette Notice NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE
R 19/43 - Deed ofsale, 16
October 1862
Te Waka
Poharama
Hoera Parepare
Mere Tahana
Heke Heta
Hone Weteri
Tipene Unuku
KararainaPi Kia
Timotui Okawa
Rawiri Motuere
Matiria Matara
Kipa Ngamoki
Ko Ami Hariata
Rilla Paani
Raretene Watene
Hone Tamti
Matina Tupoke
Wiremu Kawao
Pitarna te III ke ki Ihaka
Koiha ko te karni
Karena teha
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Documents D (25:0:0) d (5:0:0) E (75:0:0) F (50:0:0) Fl [FA] (50:0:0)
Gazette Notice NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE
Army Department Rawiri Motutere and Wi Ani "Hopotaia (rebel)" "Martini Tupoki" "Wi Tana (rebel)"
Schedule of Native Kawao
Reserves, 1866, AD 1
1866/61 in RDB Vol.
136 pp 52169 - 52177
Documents G(75:0:0) H (50:0:0) 1(50:0:0) J (500:0:0) K (50:0:0)
Gazette Notice NONE NONE NONE NZGazette No. 38, NewZealand Gazette No.
16/8/1861, pp221 - 222. 21, 8/4/1867, P142.
Dated 19January 1860 Dated 5/4/1867
Fli~ht Parris?
Army Department "Kirihipu, "Poharama" "Wi Rophia" "Wi Tako (Waikanae) "More"
Schedule of Native Herewini" Wi Tako wanted to sell
Reserves, 1866, AD 1 in 1861 but the
1866/61 in RDB Vol. government refused to
136 pp 52169 - 52177 allow him to do so."
Documents L (193:0:0) M N
Gazette Notice NONE NONE NONE
Army Department "Wi Te Ahoaho and Not listed Not listed
Schedule of Native relatives."
Reserves, 1866, AD 1
1866/61 in RDB Vol.
136 pp 52169 - 52177
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Appendix 6: Statistical Analysis of Native Reserves in the FitzRoy, Ornata, Grey, Waiwakaiho and Hua Blocks Sold before 1815
Fate No. of Acres % No. No. of % of acres No. of No. of %ofWH
reserves overall total which Acres which were reserves Acres Native
overall reserves were which FOG which which Reserves
allocated FOG were FOG reserves were were
reserves reserves H&W H&W
reserves Reserves
All or part of the 9 248.59 5.15% 7 167.59 67.42% 2 81. 00 32.58%
reserve sold
T=2 T=12.36 T=4.97% T=2 T=12.36 T=7.38% T=O T=O T=O%
S=6 S=186.23 8=74.92% 8=4 8=105.23 8=62.79% S=2 S=81. 00 S=100%
R1S=O R18=0 R1S=O% R18=0 R18=0 R1S=O% R18=0 R1S=O R1S=O%
R=1 R=50 R=20.1l% R=1 R=50 R=29.83% R=O R=O R=O%
All or part of the 16 275.99 5.72% 14 194.99 70.65% 2 81. 00 29.35%
reserve sold!
exchanged!subsumed T=4 T=24.26 T=8.79% T=4 T=24.26 T=12.44% T=O T=O T=O%
or taken for military 8=10 S=201. 73 8=73.09% S=9 8=120.73 S=61. 92% 8=2 8=81. 00 S=100%
purposes R1S=O R1S=O R1S=O% R18=0 R18=O R1S=O% R1S=O R1S=O R1S=O%
R=1 R=50 R=18.12% R=1 R=50 R=25.64% R=O R=O R=O%
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Appendix 7:Table Showing Letters Recorded in Maori Affairs Inward
Letter Registers and Books sent and received from Taranaki regarding
Maori Economic Circumstances
Reference Date written Sender Register note
63/860 in MA 2/5 7 July 1863 RParris "Upwards for 150 natives (exclusive
of women and children) will shortly
be without means of subsistence."
63/1998 in MA 2/5 26 December 1863 RParris "Has been obliged to issue a small
quantity of food to Mahaus people."
65/119 in MA 2/6 18 January 1865 R. Parris "With alc for food supplied to
Natives in Taranaki."
66/910 in MA 2/7 8 May 1866 CC, Tar [Civil "The resident Natives wish to know
Commissioner, whether the Govt will make
Taranaki] provision for the maintenance of
those Natives who will attend the
Courts &c."
67/315 inMA2/8 21 December 1866 CC, Tar "Ropata Ngarongomate wishes to
sell some land to pay his debts."
67/841 in MA 2/8 4 June 1867 cc. Tar "Respecting sale of 150a ofland at
Waitara that it be effected at once
Natives being in want of food."
68/884 in MA 2/8 22 May 1868 CC, Tar "With alc for provisions for
Southern Island Natives visiting
Taranaki."
68/1474 in MA 2/8 3 October 1868 CC, Tar "The flour and dried fish from
Arapawa Natives arrived per
Airedale."
68/1475 inMA 2/8 3 September 1868 CC, Tar "Did not receive the money for Te
Teira & starving Chatham Islanders
till the 28th Sept not having time
before the 1st Oct to pay it away he
was obliged to pay it back into the
Treasury. Has asked for it again."
70/527 in MA 3/4 17 May 1870 FromCCTar "Forwards alc for provisions for
Natives."
70/1666 in MA 3/4 30 November 1870 Hon. Native "Honiana Te Puni to have Dozen of
Minister Wine, bag ofRice and bag of
sugar."
74/3330 in MA 3/7 22 June 1874 from CC Tar "With vouchers for £12.18 supplies
to Natives."
79/3661 in MA 3/12 25 August 1879 CC Tar [Major "Acknowg Circular No.13 - States
Brown] that an alc has been running for
supplies to Native [sic] - average
£7.10 a yr[?]"
80/3857 in MA 3/13 15 November 1880 CC Tar [Major "Ref to the destitute Natives that
Brownl were sent to Hospital"
80/4158 in MA 3/13 21 February 1880 CC Tar [Major "With claim £20.16.7 expenses
Brown] connected with the 3 destitute
natives placed in Hospital"
81/4237 inMA 3/14 17 December 1881 R Parris "With letter from Capt Messenger
representing the case of certain
Natives in the matter ofa want of
food."
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82/291 in MA 3/15 9 January 1882 W Rennell, Nat ''Natives from Waitara to Pukearuhe
Office, NP are short of food but refuse work at
prices offered."
308
Appendix 8: Table Showing Letters Recorded in Maori Affairs Inward
Letter Registers and Books sent and received from Taranaki Regarding
Requests for Native Reserves to be sold
Reference Date written Sender Reaister note
59/400 in MA 2/4\ 6 August 1859 Assistant Native "Owners of Reserve No.2 wish to
Secretary sell 50 acres of it to the Govt"
[Taranaki]
59/574 inMA 2/4 18 October 1859 Comm Nat Res, ''Natives wish to sell Reserve No.
NP 8"
60/52 in MA 2/4 17 January 1860 Nat Res Comm "The owners of reserve called
Manawawai are desirous of selling
the same."
61/352 in MA 2/4 17 May 1861 Comm Nat Res, "More wishes to sell reserve No.9
NP Otumaikuku"
611503 in MA 2/4 20 September Comm Nat Res, "Relative to Wi Tako's reserve at
1861 NP Waiwakaiho which he wishes to
sell"
62/452 in MA 2/5 4 June1862 Comm Nat Res, "Owners ofcertain reserves wish tosell
Taranaki the same."
62/1091 inMA 2/5 1 December 1862 R. Parris "Owners ofPukenui Reserve only
wish to sell 5 acres thereof."
63/27 in MA 2/5 31 December 1862 RParris "Forwards at letter from
Ngarongomate relative to a Reserve
of 25a which he wishes to sell."
63/80 in MA 2/5 13 January 1863 Comm Nat Res, "Suggests that a certain Native
Taranaki Reserve of Y2 an acre be sold to Mr
Fishleigh."
63/301 in MA 2/5 26 February 1863 Assistant Native "With copy and translation of a
Secretary, letter received from Ropata
Taranaki Ngarongomate."
63/1130 MA 2/5 12 August 1863 R.Parris "Report on Ngarongomate's letter
respecting 25 acres ofland inland of
the Grey Institution."
64/1679 inMA 2/6 16 September R. Parris "The owners of the Pukenui
1864 Reserve wish to sell it."
56/1107 in MA 2/6 10 June 1865 Revd J Whiteley "Regarding a 50 acre section which
he wishes to purchase from Hemi
Matini."
56/1916 in MA 2/6 9 September 1865 C.C. Taranaki "Mata Rophia sold 10 acres ofland
to D. Bishop for £10."
56/1933 in MA 2/6 8 September 1865 C.c. Taranaki "Reporting on Peter Martin's
application to purchase a Reserve
for Wi Tana."
67/315 in MA 2/7 21 December 1866 CC, Tar "Ropata Ngarongomate wishes to
sell some land to pay his debts."
67/934 in MA 2/8 21 December 1867 His HonH.R. "None of the sections reserved for
Richmond, Natives have been sold."
Taranaki
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68/340 in MA 2/8 19 February 1868 CC, Tar "Encloses documents bringing No.7
Reserve under the Nat Res Act-
Natives wish to sell."
68/952 in MA 2/8 13 June 1868 CC, Tar "Poharama wishes to sell a portion
of No.2 Reserve."
68/1237 in MA 2/8 4 August 1868 CC, Tar "About Reserve No.7"
68/1279 in MA 2/8 12 August 1868 CC, Tar "Poharama doesn't want to
withdraw his application to sell the
portion ofNo.2 Reserve."
68/1377 in MA 2/8 3 September 1868 CC, Tar "That Ropata Ngarongomate be
allowed to sell No.7 Native
Reserve."
68/1813 in MA 2/8 27 November 1868 CC, Tar "That R. Ngarongomate be allowed
to sell No.7 Reserve."
73/2580 in MA 3/6 6 May 1873 CCTar "Application from E.R. Munu to be
allowed to sell Y;acre Reserve on
Carrington Road."
73/3030 in MA 3/6 29 May 1873 CCTar "That the Reserve which Eruera
Renata Munu is desirous of selling
has not been brought under the
Native Res Act."
73/3724 in MA 3/6 7 June 1873 CCTar "Reporting on W. Martin's offer to
purchase Native Reserve I
Waiwakaiho."
75/631 inMA 3/8 11 February 1875 Superintendent, "Provl Govt wish to buy a reserve
Taranaki on Carrington Road."
75/1748 in MA 3/8 15 April 1875 CCTar "Re selling a Nat Res belonging to
R. Ngarongomate."
75/2242 in MA 3/8 15 April 1875 Ngarongornate, "Wishes to sell land to pay his
Taranaki, debts."
1 The MA 2J series (Inward letter registers) and MA 3/series (Inward letter books) are all that remains ofthe
Maori Affairs correspondence for this period, the letters themselves were destroyed byfire.
.0". r: o: ·0.:- 0"
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Appendix 9: Statistical Analysis ofNative Reserves Issued in Crown Grants to Ie Atiawaby187S·
Fate No. of Acres. Percentage .. No. No. of.Acres . Percent of .. No, of No. of Acres Percent ofH&W
reserves overall overall which which were acres which reserves which were Native Reserves
overall were FOG were FOG which were. H&W
FOG reserves reserves H&W Reserves
reserves reserves
Whole of part issued 6 819.22 16.99% 5 279.22 34.08% 1 540.00 . 65.92%
in a Crown grant to
Maori T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
8=4 8=138.73 8=15.39% 8=4 8=138.73 8=49.68% 8=0 8=0 8=0%
Rl8=O Rl8=0 Rl8=O% Rl8=O RlS=O Rl8=O% RlS=O RlS=O R/8=0%
R=2 R=680.49 R=84.61% R=1 R=140.49 R=50.32% R=1 R=540 R=100%
Appendix 10: Statistical Analysis of the Management and Usage of Native Reserves of the FitzRoy, Ornata, Grey,
Waiwakaiho and Hua Blocks
10A. Overall Usage of Native Reserves, 1867
Usage Total Total % of total No. No. of %of No. No. of % of Name of Reserves
Acres No. of acreage which Acres acreage which acres acreage
Reserves were which which were were which which
FOG were FOG WH were were
reserves FOG reserves Reserves WH WH
reserves reserves reserves
Wholly 1875 9 44% 3 384.5 20.51% 6 1490.5 79.49% Pt NR 2 - Ararepe
Unoccupied NR 12 - Pukekura
T=1. 5 T=1 T=0.08% T=l r-i. 5 T=0.39% T=O T=O T=O% NR 17 - Pukeweka
S=279.5 S=2 S=14.91% 8=1 8=86 8=22.37% 8=1 8=193.5 8=12.98% Waiwakaiho C
R/S=O R1S=O R1S=O% Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% Waiwakaiho J
R=1594 R=6 R=85.01% R=l R=297 R=77.24% R=5 R=1297 R=87.02% Waiwakaiho K
Rekereke Waiwakaiho L
Araheke Walwakalho M
Mangorei Watwakaiho N
Wholly 294.03 6 6.90% 0 0 0% 6 294.03 100% Upokotauaki
occupied by Hoehoe
Maori T=O T=O T-=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Tapuirau
S=294.03 S=6 S=100% 8=0 s=o 8=0% 8=6 8=294.03 8=100% Oropuriri
R1S=O R1S=O R1S=O% Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% Paraiti
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% Purakau Waiwakaiho A
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Wholly 494.92 13 11.61% 9 263. 17 53.17% 4 231. 75 46.83% NR 4 - Ratahangae
Leased NR 6 - Ruataku
T=3 T=1 T=0.61% T=l T=3 T=1. 14% T=O T=O T=O% NR7
8=481. 92 8=11 8=97.37% 8=7 8=250.17 8=96.16% 8=4 8=231. 75 8=100% NR 14 - Pukenui
Rf8=0 Rf8=0 Rf8=0% Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% NR 15 - Te Henui
R=O R=1 R=2.02% R=l R=10 R=3,84% R=O R=O R=O% NR 16 - Purakau
NR 18 - Pukaka
NR 20 - Pukewarangi
NR21
NR 23 - Ralomiti
Waiwakaiho FA
Waiwakaiho G
Waiwakaiho H
Waiwakaiho I
Partly 371 1 8.70% 1 371 100% 0 0 0% NR 5 - Ratapihipihi
occupied by
Maori rest T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
unoccupied 8=0 8=0 S=O% 8=0 8=0 8=0%
RfS=O Rf8=0 Rf8=O% Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0%
R=371 R=1 R=100% R=l R=371 R=100%
Partly 704 2 16.52% 2 704 100% 0 0 0% Pt NR L-Moturoa
occupied by NR 3 - Puketotara
Maori rest T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
leased 8=144 8=1 5=20.45% 8=1 8=144 8=20.45%
RfS=560 RfS=l RlS=79.55% Rl8=1 Rl8=560 Rl8=79.55%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Partly leased 177.06 2 4.15% 0 0 0% 2 177.06 100% RaupiuWaiwakaiho B
rest Waiwakaiho E
unknown T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
status 8=177.06 8=2 8=100% 8=2 8=177.06 8=100%
Rf8=O R1S=O R1S=O% Rl8=O Rl8=0 Rl8=0%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Sold 202.21 7 4.74% 5 121. 86 60.26% 2 80.35 39.74% Pt NR 1 -Moturoa
Pt NR 2 - Ararepe
T=12.36 T=2 T=6.11% T=2 T=12.36 T=10.14% T=O T=O T=O% NR 8-Pipiko
8=136.85 8=4 8=67.68% S=2 S=56.5 S=46.36% S=2 S=80.35 S=100% NR 9 Otumaikuku
RlS=O RlS=O RiS=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% NR 24 - Marangi
R=53 R=1 R=26.21% R=1 R=53 R=43.49% R=O R=O R=O% Waiwakaiho D
Waiwakaiho F
Exchanged 2.95 2 0.07% 2 2.90 100% 0 0 0% NR 11 - Pukeikei
NR25
T=1.95 T=1 T=66.10% T=l T=l. 95 T=66.10%
S=1 S=1 S=33.90% S=1 S=1 S=33.90%
RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% RlS=O RlS=O R1S=O
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O
Taken for 10 1 0.23% 1 10 100% 0 0 0% NR 10
military
purposes T=10 T=1 T=100 % T=1 T=lO T=lOO%
S=O s=o S=O% s=o s=o S=O%
RlS=O Rl8=0 Rl8=0% S/R=O S/R=O S/R=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Subsumed 4.50 2 0.11% 2 4.50 100% 0 0 0% NR13
NR19
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
S=4.50 S=2 8=100% S=2 S=4.50 S=100%
RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% S/R=O S/R=O S/R=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
314
No comment 126.45 3 2.97% 1 1 0.79% 2 125.45 99.21% NR22
Hoewaka
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O T=O T=O T=O Waiwakaiho a - Te Puia
8=686.98 8=5 8=100% 8=1 8=1 8=100% 8=2 8=125.25 8=100%
R18=0 R18=0 R18=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O Rl8=0 R18=0
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O R=O R=O R=O
TOTAL 4262.12
ACRES
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10B. Overall Usage of all Native Reserves in 1874
Usage Acreage No. of % of total No. No. of % which No. No. of % which Name of Reserves
Reserves acreage which Acres were FOG which Acres were
were which reserves were which WH
FOG were FOG WH were reserves
reserves reserves Reserves WH
reserves
Wholly 848 7 20.52% 4 98 11. 56% 3 750 88.44% NR 6 - Ruataku
Unoccupied NR 12 - Pukekura
T=1. 5 T=1 T=0.18% T=1 T=1. 5 T=0.48% T=O T=O T=O% NR 17 - Pukeweka
8=86.5 8=2 8=10.20% 8=2 8=86. 5 8=27.46% 8=0 8=0 8=0% NR 24 - Marangi
R/8=0 R/8=O R/8=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% Waiwakaiho K
R=760 R=4 R=89.62% R=1 R=10 R=72.06% R=3 R=750 R=100% Rekereke Waiwakaiho L
Araheke Waiwakaiho M
Wholly 609.75 8 14.76% 1 201. 75 33.09% 7 408 66.91% NR 2 - Ararepe
occupied by Upokotauaki
Maori T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Hoehoe
8=358 8=6 5=58.71% S=O S=O S=O% S=6 S=358 S=87.75% Tapuirau
R/8=0 R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% Hua [Oropurirl and
R=251. 75 R=2 R=41. 29% R=1 R=201. 75 R=100% R=1 R=50 R=12.25% Hoewaka]
Paraiti
Purakau Walwakaiho A
Mangorei Waiwakaiho N
Wholly 285 3 6.90% 1 15 5.26% 2 270 94.74% NR 16 - Purakau
Leased Waiwakaiho a - Te Puia
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Waiwakaiho C
8=285 8=3 8=100% S=1 S=15 S=100% S=2 S=270 S=100%
R/8=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
316
Partly 794.73 4 19.23% 4 794. 73 100% 0 0 0% NR 1 - Moturoa
occupied by NR 3 - Puketotara
Maori rest 1=0 T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% NR 18 - Pukaka
leased 8=210.73 8=3 8=26.52% S=3 S=21O.73 S=26.52% NR 23 - Raiomiti
R/8=584 R/8=1 R/8=73.48% R/S=1 R/S=584 R/S=73.
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O 48%
R=O%
Partly 367 1 8.88% 1 367 100% 0 0 0% NR 5 - Ratapihiphi
unoccupied
rest leased 1=0 T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
8=0 S=O S=O% S=O S=O S=O%
R/S=O R/8=0 R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O%
R=367 R=l R=100% R=1 R=367 R=100%
Sold 93.36 4 2.26% 2 12.36 13.24% 2 81.00 86.76% NR8 - Pipiko
NR 9 - Otumaikuku
T=12.36 T=2 1=13.24% T=2 T=12.36 T=100% T=O T=O T=O% Waiwakaiho 0
S=81 8=2 S=86.76% S=O 8=0 S=O% S=2 S=81. 00 S=100% Waiwakaiho FA
R/S=O R/S=O RlS=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/8=0 R/S=O R/S=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Exchanged 2.90 2 0.07% 2 2.90 100% 0 0 0% NR 11 - Pukeikei
NR25
1=1.90 T=1 T=65.56% T=1 T=1. 90 T=65.56%
8=1 8=1 S=34.48% S=1 S=1 S=34.48%
R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O RlS=O R/S=O
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O
317
Taken for 10 1 0.24% 1 10 100% 0 0 0% NR10
military
purposes T=10 T=1 T=100% T=1 T=lO T=100%
8=0 8=0 8=0% S=O S=O S=O%
Rf8=0 Rf8=0 Rf8=0% SIR=O SIR=O SIR=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Subsumed 14.50 4 0.35% 4 14.50 100% 0 0 0% NR13
NR19
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% NR21
8=14.50 8=4 8=100% S=4 S=14.50 S=100% NR22
Rf8=0 Rf8=0 Rf8=0% SIR=O SIR=O SIR=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Unaccounted 1107.16 12 26.79% 5 159 14.36% 7 948.16 85.64% NR 4 - Ratahangae
for on NR7
schedule T=3 T=1 T=0.27% T=l T=3 T=1. 89% T=O T=O T=O% NR 14 - Pukenui
8=564.16 8=10 8=50.96% S=4 S=156 S=98.11% 8=6 8=408. S=43.05% NR 15 - Te Henut
Rf8=0 Rf8=0 Rf8=0% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R1S=O 16 R/S=O% NR 20 - Pukewarangi
R=540 R=1 R=48.77% R=O R=O R=O% R=1 R/S=O R=56.95% Raupiu Waiwakaiho B
R=540 Waiwakaiho E
Walwakaiho F
Waiwakaiho G
Waiwakaiho H
Waiwakaiho I
Waiwakaiho J
TOTAL 4132.40
ACRE8
3~8
10C. Native Reserves vested in the Crown in 1867
Usage Acreage No. of % of total No. No. of % which No. No. of % Name of Reserves
Reserves acreage which acres were FOG which acres which
were which reserves were which were
FOG were WH were WH
reserves FOG Reserves WH reserves
reserves reserves
Wholly 888.5 4 36.14% 2 298.5 33.60% 2 590 66.40% NR 2 - Ararepe
Unoccupied NR 12 - Pukekura
1=1.5 T=l T=0.17% T=1 T=1. 5 T=0.50% T=O T=O T=O% Waiwakaiho J
8=0 8=0 8=0% S=O S=O 8=0% S=O S=O S=O% Waiwakaiho K
R/8=0 R/8=0 R/8=0% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O%
R=887 R=3 R=99.83% R=1 R=297 R=99.50% R=2 R=590 R=100%
Wholly 100 2 4.07% 0 0 0% 2 100 100% Upokotauaki
occupied by Hoehoe
Maori T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
8=100 S=2 S=100% S=2 S=100 S=100%
R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Wholly 147.09 6 5.98% 5 94.0 63.91% 1 53.09 36.09% NR 4 - Ratahangae
Leased NR 6 - Ruataku
T=3 T=l T=2.04% T=1 T=3 T=3.19% T=O T=O T=O% NR 14 - Pukenui
S=134.09 S=4 8=91.16% S=3 S=81 S=86.17% S=1 S=53.09 S=100% NR 15 - Te Henui
R/S=O R/8=0 R/8=O% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% NR 20 - Pukewarangi
R=10 R=1 R=6.80% R=1 R=10 R=10.64% R=O R=O R~O% Waiwakaiho H
319
Partly 371 1 15.09% 1 371 100% 0 0 0% NR 5 - Ratapihfpihi
occupied by
Maori and T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
rest S=O S=O S=O% S=O S=O S=O%
unoccupied RlS=O Rl8=0 Rl8=0% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O%
R=371 R=1 R=100% R=1 R=371 R=100%
Partly 76 1 3.09% 0 0 0% 1 76 100% Waiwakaiho E
leased and
rest status T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
unknown 8=76 8=1 S=100% S=1 S=76 S=lOO%
Rl8=0 RlS=O RlS=O% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Partly 704 2 28.64% 2 704 100% 0 0 0% Pt NR 1 - Moturoa
occupied by NR 3• Puketotara
Maori/rest T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
leased S=144 8=1 S=20.45% S=1 S=144 S=20.45%
RlS=560 RlS=1 Rl8=79.55% S/R=1 S/R=560 S/R=79.55%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Sold 171.86 6 6.99% 5 121. 86 70.91% 1 50 29.10% Pt NR 1 - Moturoa
Pt NR 2 - Ararepe
T=12.36 T=2 T=7.19% T=2 T=12.36 T=10.14% T=O T=O T=O NR8-Pipiko
8=106.5 8=3 8=61. 97% S=2 S=56.5 S=46.37% 8=1 8=50 8=100% NR 9 - Otumaikuku
Rl8=O RlS=O Rl8=0% SIR=O SIR=O SIR=O% R/S=O R/8=0 RlS=O NR 24 - Marangi
R=53 R=1 R=30.84% R=1 R=53 R=43.49% R=O R=O R=O Waiwakaiho D
Exchanged 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% None
Taken for 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% None
military
purposes
Subsumed 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% None
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No 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% None
comment
TOTAL 2458.45
ACRES
10D. Native Reserves vested in Maori in 1867
Usage Acreage No. of % of total No. No. of % which No. No. of % which Name of Reserves
Reserves acreage which acres were FOG which acres were
were which reserves were which were WH
FOG were WH WH reserves
reserves FOG Reserves reserves
reserves
Wholly 1529 6 62.51% 1 86 5.62% 5 1443 94.38% NR 17 - Pukeweka
Unoccupied Waiwakaiho C
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Whataptupiu
S=286 S=2 S=18.71% S=1 S=86 S=100% S=1 S=200 S=13.86% Waiwakaiho J
RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% Rekereke Waiwakaiho L
R=1243 R=4 R=81.29% R=O R=O R=O% R=4 R=1243 R=86.14% Araheke Walwakaiho M
Mangorei Waiwakaiho
N
Wholly 300 5 12.27% 1 50 16.67% 4 250 83.33% NR 4 - Ratahangae
occupied by Tapuirau
Maori 1=0 T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Oropurirl
8=300 8=5 8=100% S=1 S=50 S=100% S=4 S=250 S=100% Paraiti
RJS=O RJ8=0 RJ8=0% RlS=O RJS=O RJS=O% RJS=O RlS=O RlS=O% Purakau Waiwakaiho A
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Wholly 246.64 7 10.08% 4 67.98 27.56% 3 178.66 72.44% NR 16 - Purakau
Leased NR 18 - Pukaka
T=O T=O T=O% 1=0 T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% NR21
S=246.64 S=7 S=100% S=4 S=67.98 S=100% S=3 S=178.66 S=100% NR 23 - Raiomiti
RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% RlS=O RJS=O RJS=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% Waiwakaiho FA
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% Waiwakaho G
Waiwakalho I
Partly leased, 101. 06 1 4.13% 0 0 0% 1 101. 06 100% Rauplu Waiwakaiho B
rest unknown
status 1=0 T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
8=101. 06 8=1 8=100% S=l S=101. 06 S=lO%
R18=0 R1S=O R1S=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Partly 75 1 3.07% 1 75 100% 0 0 0% NR7
occupied by
Maori the rest T=O T=O 1=0% T=O T=O T=O%
leased 8=75 S=l S=100% S=l S=75 S=100%
R1S=O R1S=O R1S=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Burial 0.0125 1 0.00051% 0 0 0% 1 0.0125 100% Huira
Ground
1=0 T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
S=0.0125 8=1 S=100% S=l S=0.0125 S=100%
R1S=O R1S=O R1S=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Subsumed 4.50 2 0.18% 2 4.50 100% 0 0 0% NR13
into settler NR19
sections T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
5=4.50 S=2 S=100% S=2 S=4.50 S=100%
R1S=O R1S=O R1S=O% RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O %
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
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Exchanged 2.9 2 0.12% 2 2.9 100% 0 0 0% NR 11 - Pukeikei
NR25
T=1. 9 T=1 T=65.52% T=1 T=1. 9 T=65.52%
5=1 8=1 8=34.48% S=1 S=1 S=34.48%
Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O %
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Taken for 10 1 0.41% 1 10 100% 0 0 0% NR10
military
purposes T=10 T=1 T=100% T=1 T=10 T=100%
8=0 8=0 8=0% S=O S=O S=O%
Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% SIR=O SIR=O SIR=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
No Comment 176.80 4 7.23% 1 1 0.57% 3 175.80 99.43% Hoewaka
Waiwakaiho a- TePuia
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Waiwakaiho F
8=176.80 S=4 8=100% S=1 S=1 S=100% S=3 S=175.80 S=100%
RlS=O RlS=O Rl8=0% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
TOTAL 2445,97
ACRES
324
10E. Reserves vested in the Crown 1874
Usage Acreage No. of %of total No. which No. of % which No. No. of % which Name of Reserves
Reserves acreage were acres were FOG which acres were
FOG which reserves were which WH
reserves were FOG WH were reserves
reserves Reserves WH
reserves
Wholly 60.5 3 2.60% 2 10.5 17.36% 1 50 82.64% NR 6 - Ruataku
Unoccupied NR 24 - Marangi
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Waiwakaiho K
8=0.5 S=1 8=0.83% 8=1 8=0.5 8=4.76% 8=0 8=0 8=0%
RlS=O RlS=O Rl8=0% R/8=0 R/8=0 R/8=0% R/8=0 R/8=0 R/8=0%
R=60 R=2 R=99.17% R=l R=10 R=95.24% R=l R=50 R=100%
Wholly 306.75 3 13.20% 1 201. 75 65.77% 2 105 34.23% NR 2 - Ararepe
occupied by Upokotauaki
Maori T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Hoehne
5=105 S=2 S=34.23% 8=0 s=o S=O% 8=2 S=105 S=100%
RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/8=0 R/8=0%
R=201. 75 R=l R=65.77% R=l R=201. 75 R=100% R=O R=O R=O%
Wholly 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% None
Leased
Partly 794.73 4 34.19% 4 794. 73 100% 0 0 0% NR 1 - Moturoa
occupied by NR 3 - Puketotara
Maori and T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% NR 18 - Pukaka
rest leased 5=210.73 S=3 S=26.52% 8=;'03 8=210. 73 8=26.55% NR 23 - Raiomiti
RlS=584 RlS=l RlS=73.48% R/8=1 R/S=584 R/8=73.48%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
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Partly 367 1 15.80% I 367 100% 0 0 0% NR 5 - Ratapihiphi
unoccupied
and rest T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
leased S=O 8=0 8=0% S=O S=O S=O%
RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O%
R=367 R=1 R=100% R=1 R=367 R=100%
Sold 42.36 3 0.03% 2 12.36 29.18% 1 30 70.82% NR8-Pipiko
NR 9 - Otumaikuku
T=12.36 T=2 T=29.18 % T=1 T=12.36 T=100% T=O T=O T=O% Waiwakaiho D
8=30 8=1 S=70.82% S=O S=O S=O% S=1 S=30 S=100%
RJS=O RJ8=0 RJS=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
No comment 753.09 7 32.40% 4 84 11. 15% 3 669.09 88.85% NR 4 - Ratahangae
on schedule NR 14 - Pukenui
T=3 T=1 T=0.40%1 T=1 T=3 T=3.57% T=O T=O T=O% NR 15 - Te Henui
8=210.09 S=5 S=27.90% S=3 S=81 S=96.43% S=2 S=129.09 S=19.29% NR20-
RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O% Pukewarangi
R=540 R=1 R=71.70% R=O R=O R=O% R=1 R=540 R=80.71% Waiwakaiho E
Whatapiupiu
Waiwakaiho H
Waiwakaiho J
TOTAL 2324.43
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10F. Reserves vested in Maori 1874
Usage Acreage No. of No. of total No. No. of % which No. which No. of % which Name ofReserves
Reserves acreage which acres are FOG areWH acres area WH
are which reserves reserves which reserves
FOG were were
reserves FOG WH
reserves reserves
Unoccupied 787.5 4 37.46% 2 87.5 11.11% 2 700 88.88% NR 12 - Pukekura
NR 17 - Pukeweka
T=1.5 T=1 T=0.19% T=1 T=1. 5 T=1. 71% T=O T=O T=O% Rekereke Waiwakaiho L
8=86 8=1 8=10.92% S=1 S=86 S=98.29% 8=0 S=O S=O% Araheke Waiwakaiho M
Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O%
R=700 R=2 R=88.89% R=O R=O R=O% R=2 R=700 R=100%
Wholly 303 5 14.41% 0 0 0% 5 303 100% Purakau Waiwakaiho A
occupied by Mangorei Waiwakaiho N
Maori T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Tapulrau
8=253 8=4 8=83.50% S=4 S=253 S=83.50% Hua
Rl8=O Rl8=0 Rl8=0% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% Paraiti
R=50 R=1 R=16.50% R=1 R=50 R=16.50%
Wholly 285 3 13.56% 1 15 5.26% 2 270 94.74% NR 16 - Purakua
Leased Waiwakaiho a - Te Puia
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Waiwakaiho C
8=285 8=3 8=100% S=1 S=15 S=100% S=2 S=270 S=100%
Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O% RJS=O RJS=O RJS=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
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Usage Acreage No. of No.oftotal No. No.of % which No. which No. of % which Name of Reserves
Reserves acreage which acres are FOG areWH acres area WH
are which reserves reserves which reserves
FOG were were
reserves. FOG WH
reserves reserves
Exchanged 2.90 2 0.14% 2 2.90 100% 0 0 0% NR 11 - Pukeikei
NR25
T=1.90 T=1 T=65.56% T=1 T=1.90 T=65.56%
8=1 8=1 8=34.48% 8=1 S=1 S=34.48%
Rl8=0 Rl8=0 Rl8=0% R/S=O R/S=O R/S=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Taken for 10 1 0.48% 1 10 100% 0 0 0% NR10
military
purposes T=10 T=1 T=100% T=1 T=10 T=100%
8=0 8=0 8=0% S=O S=O S=O%
Rl8=0 RlS=O RlS=O% SIR=O SIR=O SIR=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
Subsumed 14.50 4 0.69% 4 14.50 100% 0 0 0% NR13
NR19
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% NR21
8=14.50 8=4 8=100% S=4 S=14.50 S=100% NR22
Rl8=0 Rl8=O Rl8=O% S/R=O S/R=O S/R=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
80ld 30 1 1.43% 0 0 0% 1 30 100% Waiwakaiho D
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O%
8=30 8=1 8=100% S=30 S=30 S=100%
Rl8=0 Rl8=O Rl8=0% RlS=O R/S=O RlS=O%
R=O R=O R=O% R=O R=O R=O%
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Usage Acreage No. of No. of total No. No.of % which No. which No. of % which Name ofReserves
Reserves acreage which acres are FOG areWH acres area WH
are which reserves reserves which reserves
FOG were were
reserveS FOG WH
reserves reserves
No 669.09 3 31. 83% 0 0 0% 3 669.09 100% Waiwakaiho E
comment Walwakalho H
T=O T=O T=O% T=O T=O T=O% Waiwakaiho J
8=129.09 8=2 8=19.29% 8=2 8=129.09 8=19.29%
RlS=O RlS=O RlS=O% R/8=0 R/8=0 R/8=0%
R=540 R=1 R=80.71% R=1 R=540 R=80.71%
TOTAL 2101. 99
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